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ABSTRACT 
 
The increasing responsiveness to the possibility of nuclear energy in meeting global 
demand for electricity is enormous; more than 8% comes from nuclear power plant. 
Several countries have utilised nuclear power reactors for their energy supplies. This 
demand is due to the rapid socio-economic developments. Hence, standards of living of 
such countries have been enhanced considerably. These can mainly be attributed to stable 
power generation and supply. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) in the Middle East, which 
comprises of seven fast developing emirates, is currently embarking on power generation 
through a peaceful nuclear energy programme. The country requires tremendous power 
supplies to meet their demands. The energy needs of the UAE have increased such that 
the traditional methods of power production do not satisfy the needs of the country.1 There 
seems to be an absence of clarity about the responsibilities of the government in terms of 
liability during incidents of misuse of the nuclear plants. The research therefore considers 
the determination of the efficacy of the country’s nuclear energy laws in dealing with 
potential liabilities arising from the energy programme. While determining civil and State 
liabilities in the UAE’s nuclear energy programme through the analysis of existing local 
and international laws regarding the programme, the research analyses aspects of liability 
and requirements for possessing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes through the 
analysis of the natures and impacts of past Chernobyl, Fukushima, Three Mile Island and 
Windscale nuclear disasters to identify potential liability issues and their perpetrators. 
Thus, the lessons of the past will help to shape the future of UAE developments in this 
area. An analysis of the natures and scopes of existing nuclear energy laws in the UAE 
and those of the international community is conducted to determine possible flaw(s) and 
opportunities for the review of liability concerns for relevant parties. The research 
evaluates the extent to which the new UAE nuclear law addresses potential liabilities and 
further makes recommendations towards the effective and safe use of nuclear energy by 
the UAE through compliance with international best practices.  
 
                                         
1 Bin Zayed Al Nahyan, 2008 cited in Dr. Bryan R. Early, ‘Export Control Development in the United Arab 
Emirates: From Commitments to Compliance, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard 
Kennedy School, July 6, 2009. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
 
 
INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY 
 
1.1Introduction of the thesis 
 
It is noted that the energy needs of the UAE have increased to the extent that the 
traditional methods of energy production no longer satisfy the needs of the country.2 This 
thesis therefore presents a systematic study to identify the key parameters affecting the 
present nuclear liability processes, while pursuing the prospects of UAE’s (United Arab 
Emirates) nuclear programme. The thesis analyses how genuine claims would be 
managed under the contemporary state and civil law meant for accidental damage in the 
UAE (United Arab Emirates). In this way victims of nuclear accidents would be accorded 
due justice.  
 
Chapter One forms the introductory part of the thesis. It analyses the scope and rationale 
of the research. It outlines the aims and objectives of the study. Chapter One also provides 
further background information about the research and discusses the justifications for 
carrying out this research. It discusses in detail the significance of the research and 
introduces nuclear liability and compensation issues. Chapter One further discusses the 
original contributions that the research makes to the body of knowledge in this area of 
study.  
 
Chapters Two, Three and Four provide a logical study and assessment of the feasibility 
of the UAE’s nuclear liability issues. Moreover, this work describes a methodical 
investigation into managing and monitoring potential liabilities in the case of UAE 
possessing nuclear energy. Chapter Five analyses past major nuclear incidents, which 
include: Chernobyl, Fukushima, Three Mile Island and the Windscale disasters. Chapter 
Six shows an analysis of the research results, while Chapter Seven presents the 
Conclusions and Recommendations of this work.  
 
 
 
                                         
2 Embassy of the United Arab Emirates, Washington D.C. (2015). Electricity: Rapidly Expanding Needs. 
[Online]. Available at: http://www.uae-embassy.org/about-uae/energy-uae Accessed on 26/07/2016. 
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1.2 Rationale and scope of the research 
 
Nuclear energy and liability law is very new to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the 
Middle Eastern region. This presents some pertinent issues for consideration, especially 
due to the sensitive nature of nuclear power production. The country is currently 
developing its nuclear power programme, billed to be commissioned in the year 2017. 
The UAE has enacted two significant laws to regulate its nuclear power programme. They 
are: Law No. 6 of 2009 on Nuclear Energy and Law No. 4 of 2012 on Nuclear Liability. 
Law No. 6 deals with the development of nuclear energy in the country while Law No. 4 
considers issues regarding how potential liabilities would be managed should there be 
disaster(s).3 
 
Energy drives human life and is extremely important for continued human development.4 
As the years go by, the energy needs of the UAE increase. It has come to the point that 
the traditional methods of energy production do not satisfy the country’s needs5. The UAE 
                                         
3
Key features of Law No. 6 include the following: 
 The establishment of the Federal Authority of Nuclear Regulation (FANR), a fully independent 
nuclear safety regulatory authority, which aims to oversee the nuclear energy sector in the state 
and to promote the highest standards of nuclear safety, nuclear security and radiological protection. 
All regulated activities are prohibited except in accordance with a licence issued by FANR; 
 The development of a robust system for the licensing and control of nuclear material; and 
 The criminalisation and assignment of harsh civil and criminal penalties for violating the law, 
including the unauthorised use, theft, transport or trade in nuclear materials. 
 The licensees’ responsibilities are defined by the law in this manner: Each Licensee shall be 
responsible for taking all steps necessary to reduce the risk of an accident to a level that is as low 
as reasonably achievable. 
Law No. 4 was established to determine civil liability and compensation for nuclear damage in the UAE. It 
represents a transposition into UAE law of obligations contained in nuclear liability conventions and 
incorporates the fundamental principles contained in those conventions, namely:   
 the channelling of the entire legal responsibility for nuclear damage exclusively towards the 
operator   
 the possibility of establishing the operator’s liability without having to prove negligence   
 the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of countries where the nuclear accident occurs   
 the limitation of the amount of liability and the possibility of setting a time limit for such a liability   
 the compensation of damage without discrimination on the basis of nationality, domicile, or 
residence  
The objectives of Law No. 4 include: 
 to regulate the provisions and determine the scope of the civil liability and compensation for 
nuclear damage   
 to determine the financial security that the operator must maintain   
 to apply the 1997 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage wherever no 
provision is made in this Law by Decree 
4 Asif, M. and T. Muneer (2005). Energy Supply, its Demand and Security issues for Developed and 
Emerging Economies. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews. Elsevier Ltd. Page1389. 
5 Policy of the United Arab Emirates on the Evaluation and Potential Development of Peaceful Nuclear 
Energy, Released April 20, 2008. Available at: https://pcs.enec.gov.ae/Content/Home.aspx. Last accessed 
on 24th August, 2012. 
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thus considered producing energy through nuclear power.6 The assertiveness of the 
country’s development of its nuclear power programme is in line with envisaged nuclear 
renaissance.  
 
The ever-increasing global need for power has favoured the value of this topic as the 
subject for research. It can be used as a guide for other countries hoping to engage in 
nuclear energy development, as this study is a detailed account of the activities of the 
UAE in development of its nuclear power projects. They can benefit from this study. The 
research considers the liability aspects as well as the requirements for possessing nuclear 
energy for peaceful purposes.  
 
Although the UAE is currently strategising its policies for nuclear energy, there is an 
absence of clarity on the position or responsibilities of government, in terms of dealing 
with liability during accidents or misuse. Hence the research is conducted to address 
issues of civil and State liabilities in the nuclear power programme of the UAE, through 
the study of existing local and international laws. 
 
The participation of the UAE government in the building of nuclear power reactors will 
assure the global community of the proper utilisation of nuclear fuel and will not create 
panic as to the illegitimate use of that fuel. Changes can be made in the way the nuclear 
power plants work by providing opportunities to private entrepreneurs to undertake power 
production from nuclear power plants, with a supervisory role to be played by the 
government. This can benefit the international community with greater economic 
development in the country and even the region, from cheaper and safer power.  
 
The main objective of the UAE is to produce power through nuclear energy to meet the 
needs of the country.7This seems to be a more justifiable use of nuclear power than the 
strengthening of the military forces. This is seen to be very sustainable.  The UAE’s 
practice regarding their nuclear programme has become a model for other countries in the 
region to explore. This research therefore becomes a source of information for those in 
search of a comprehensive study about nuclear power projects in the country.  
                                         
6 Jack Caravelli, Beyond Sand and Oil: The Nuclear Middle East (Praeger Security International).  
7 See Policy of the United Arab Emirates on the Evaluation and Potential Development of Peaceful Nuclear 
Energy. 
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Therefore, this research was necessitated by the need for robust strategic regulatory 
policies and framework concerning development of peaceful nuclear energy in the UAE 
and most importantly, the issue of settlement of liabilities for damages.  In this way, 
victims of nuclear incidents would be accorded due justice. 
 
1.3 Aims and objectives of the research 
 
1.3.1 Aims of the research 
 
The central aim of the thesis is to determine the nature and scope of potential liabilities 
within the Nuclear Energy Programme in the UAE. 
 
The further aims of the research are as follows:  
i. In order to evaluate the central aim, it would be necessary to evaluate the 
development of the UAE nuclear energy programme. It is important to highlight 
here that the programme is still in its infancy. Hence, the consideration for 
potential liabilities would ideally need to be assessed prior to extensive 
implementation of the programme.  
ii. To fully evaluate potential liabilities, case studies and interviews that have been 
conducted to show the likely range and type of hazards and risks, would need to 
be evaluated. 
 
1.3.2 Objectives of the research 
 
In order to achieve the main aims of the research, the following objectives are addressed: 
i. To review literature on issues pertaining to the UAE nuclear energy development 
and evaluate State liability for nuclear accidents. 
ii. To evaluate the operator’s liability for nuclear emissions under the State and Civil 
law for accidental damage. 
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iii. To evaluate liability for orphan sites,8 characterise the state and civil law for 
accidental damage,9 and to make recommendations on how the law can be used 
to determine issues regarding state and civil liabilities in nuclear power production 
in the UAE. 
 
1.3.3 Summary statement 
 
This study presents the original contributions to UAE’s civil liability issues regarding the 
country’s nuclear power programme. This research highlights the lessons learnt and 
knowledge gained from the experiences of previous nuclear accidents, giving utmost 
importance to the protection of nuclear power plants, inhabitants and the environment. 
The country abides by the international conventions and guidelines relating to 
procurement and protection of nuclear reactors.  
 
UAE benefits from the commercial viability of nuclear power generation, which hints at 
an expectation for huge development in the business areas. The researcher thinks that the 
demand for electricity would rise at an alarming rate and that it would not be possible to 
satisfy the demand without investing in a nuclear energy programme. In the same vein, 
the World Nuclear Association (2016) has stipulated the following facts:  
 “The world will need greatly increased energy supply in the next 20 years, 
especially cleanly-generated electricity. 
 Electricity demand is increasing twice as fast as overall energy use and is likely 
to rise by more than two-thirds from 2011 to 2035. In 2012, 42% of primary 
energy used was converted into electricity. 
 Nuclear power provides about 11% of the world’s electricity and 21% of 
electricity in OECD countries. 
                                         
8“An orphan site is a radioactive source which is not under the regulatory control, either because it has 
never been under such regulatory control or because it has been abandoned, lost or whose possession or 
ownership has otherwise been transferred in the absence of an appropriate license. It is usually when an 
operating company goes bankrupt and liability cannot be apportioned to any other party hence the public 
purse will have to pick up the liability”. See UAE Nuclear Law Decree No. 6 of 2009. 
9 Where the system which includes no neutral tribunal is provided and claimants are generally required to 
file claims in the courts where the nuclear installation is located, even with respect to nuclear transports on 
the high seas, with attendant costs, concerns about neutrality of the courts and law, and limitations of 
recoverable damages. See [Duncan, E. and J. Currie (2006). The Problems and Gaps in the Nuclear Liability 
Conventions and an Analysis of How an Actual Claim Would be Brought Under the Current Existing Treaty 
Regime in the Event of a Nuclear Accident. Denv. J. International L. & Pol’y 35:1, 85]. 
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 Nuclear power is the most environmentally benign way of producing electricity 
on a large scale. 
 Renewable energy sources such as solar and wind are costly per unit of output and 
are intermittent but can be helpful at the margin in providing clean power”.10 
 
This study discloses that the two discourses (which are discussed on pages 9 and 10) 
characterise two different belief systems which rest in diverse realistic and imaginary 
levels. It also considers control relations at the global and domestic levels concerning 
the exploitation of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. This study offers some 
recommendations for managing potential liabilities in the UAE’s nuclear power 
programme, as well as some original contributions to knowledge in this field. 
 
1.3.4 Statement linking the aims, objectives and methodology 
 
This research addresses the difficulties and gaps in the existing nuclear liability regimes 
and analyses how legitimate claims would be managed under the contemporary state and 
civil law for accidental damage. Understanding of the research problem is based upon the 
analysis of the international nuclear power regulations. This is approached using a desk 
based legal research and through interviews conducted with selected individuals, as the 
main sources of information for the thesis. In context, this approach explores different 
concepts: an extensive literature review and a questionnaire. The research result will open 
a pathway to the UAE’s decision makers towards implementing various nuclear power 
regulations. 
 
1.4 Importance of the research 
 
Basically, the research provides knowledge for the benefit of parties seeking to develop 
nuclear energy within UAE from a commercial perspective. There is a lack of specialised 
knowledge in this area, specifically within the UAE and this research will help to create 
more awareness in this regard. This research is aimed at providing a source of literature 
on the legal responsibilities which deals with developing nations, as well as other nations 
embarking on nuclear energy programmes and especially the countries in the Middle East.  
                                         
10
World Nuclear Association (2016). World Energy Needs and Nuclear Power. (Updated June 2016)  
[Online]. Available at: http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/current-and-future-generation/ 
world-energy-needs-and-nuclear-power.aspx Accessed on 27/07/2016. 
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The thesis provides a foundation for future studies on nuclear programmes in the UAE. 
It also gives a detailed account of the moral and ethical issues in nuclear power production 
and analyses the different approaches that can be explored while deciding on the right 
type and model of nuclear reactor that should protect future generations.  
 
It analyses the duties of a nation which is generating nuclear power to the rest of the 
world, through review of the international conventions, treaties and obligations. The 
researcher therefore warns the international community regarding the possibility of 
nuclear accidents and the dangers and advises on adherence to international standards of 
safety and security to reduce the dangers of such accidents.  
 
1.5 Outline of the research 
 
Chapter One generally introduces the thesis. The consideration of the UAE as a sovereign 
state, as well as the country’s motivation and preparedness to possess nuclear energy is 
looked at. This is done with the aim of highlighting the motivations for the research in 
relation to current social and political developments within UAE. It broadly discusses the 
introduction to nuclear liability and compensation issues in nuclear power generation.  
 
Issues regarding the UAE’s nuclear liability are considered in Chapters Two, Three and 
Four. The study examines how potential liabilities would be managed and monitored if 
UAE possesses nuclear energy. While the fifth chapter analyses past nuclear incidents, 
Chapter Six analyses the research results.  The last, Chapter Seven forms the Conclusion 
and Recommendations part of the study.  
 
1.6 The PhD elements of the research 
 
The UAE is currently building its organisational and institutional structures for its nuclear 
power programme.11 This study seeks to expand the knowledge in the management of 
liabilities arising from possible disasters in the UAE’s nuclear energy programme. 
                                         
11‘Plans include: Energy Planning Study (2006), Nuclear Policy (2008) then First unit followed by 
sustainable programme Infrastructure Development   by 2017. Programme objective to safely deploy first 
plant by 2017. This implies a first concrete in 2012.  Would represent one of the fastest deployment 
schedules 
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Since most of the literature in this area is from the perspectives of developed countries, 
relatively, little has been written about developing countries including the UAE. The 
importance of this study is therefore emphasised as ground breaking and shows aspects 
of originality and PhD focus. The outcome of this study forms the basis for subsequent 
studies on the nuclear agenda in the country. 
 
The PhD element of the research therefore identifies any lacuna in the UAE legislation 
regarding both state and civil liabilities in the event of accidents. This study provides 
useful knowledge in the field of nuclear power within the UAE and creates awareness for 
firms seeking investment opportunities in this area. This research is conducted to address 
issues of UAE civil and state liability during accidents or misuse by analysing the existing 
local and international laws. It therefore identifies and fills any gap in the UAE legislation 
regarding both state and civil liabilities in the event of accidents. 
 
The cause and effect of development in the UAE nuclear programme will create a new 
economic condition that has the potential to create the fifth largest system of international 
economic trade.12 The author therefore maintains that for this to be happen, the country 
needs to consider the formulation and implementation of standard regimes to deal with 
the delicate energy project. 
 
1.7 Case study of the UAE and contribution to knowledge  
 
The researcher uses the UAE as the case study in this research and can be seen throughout 
the thesis. Although this is the researcher’s home country, it should not be perceived this 
way instead should be seen as a first timer or a new developing provider of nuclear power. 
In the light of this, it is therefore important to look at international nuclear and political 
                                         
Policy Principles include: complete operational transparency, highest standards of non-proliferation, 
highest standards of safety and security, lose cooperation with the IAEA, partnership with governments and 
firms of responsible nations and long-term sustainability.  
Laws include: UAE Law No. 6 of 2009 on Nuclear energy and UAE Law No. 4 of 2012 on nuclear 
liability.’  
See: Hamad Alkaabi (2013). UAE Nuclear Power Programme: Embarking on the Development of Nuclear 
Energy. St. Petersburg, 28th June 2013 as Permanent Representative of the UAE to the IAEA. [Online].  
Available at: http://www-pub.iaea.org/iaeameetings/cn206p/Panel3-Alkaabi.pdf Accesses on 27/07/2016. 
12 See Policy of the United Arab Emirates on the Evaluation and Potential Development of Peaceful Nuclear 
Energy. 
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regimes and the way the country can benefit from these evaluations towards ensuring a 
hitch-free nuclear energy development. 
 
It is also important to bear in mind that there may be the occurrence of accident(s) or the 
misuse of nuclear plants during this venture and therefore leaves one to think about whose 
responsibility it would be when these eventually happen. International instruments 
including the Paris and Vienna Conventions provide that it would be the responsibility of 
the operator. The researcher sees the operator of a nuclear plant from the perspective of 
true ownership in spite that the plant(s) could be contracted. Here, the true owner has 
agreed with the IAEA to operate based on globally acceptable standards and policies and 
should work towards these. This means therefore that there should be clarity on the 
responsibility of the UAE as the owner and operating country and the resolve and 
effectiveness of the country’s nuclear regimes to deal with issues of liabilities should 
accident or misuse occurs. 
 
In considering the probable dangers and liabilities related to this imperative and possibly 
risky activity, the researcher looked at these aspects by the establishment of international, 
regional and local liabilities presented within a review of the nature of relevant 
organisations. The analysis of the UAE was formed through the comparative investigation 
of these international obligations. Here, various literatures, reports, major nuclear 
incidents and available nuclear laws of the UAE have been consulted and the 
identification of emerging trends in the development of nuclear energy and liabilities was 
achieved. These trends were then linked to developments within the UAE. 
 
In order to undoubtedly show the original contribution to knowledge, the primary data 
obtained from structured interviews were reviewed and evaluated, findings presented and 
conclusion drawn. Also, recommendations were established towards the effective and 
safe use of nuclear energy by the UAE through compliance with international best 
practices as well as proposals for future development made. The research evaluates the 
extent to which the new UAE nuclear law addresses potential liabilities. 
 
This study contributes to the limited knowledge on nuclear energy in developing countries 
in general and the UAE in particular by determining that it is possible that, in line with 
international regimes, sovereign and contracting States can use local laws to decide or 
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address potential liabilities arising from the nuclear energy programme. The outcome of 
the analysis of interviews with main experts in the field within the UAE is also a 
contribution to knowledge. 
 
States’ ratifications to international instruments relating to nuclear accidents and damages 
make it easier to score their readiness to nuclear power production. Regulatory 
compliance and strict adherence to led down and required standards and as a matter 
importance should not be undermined. Complete removal of excessive burden of proof 
on the part of the sufferer of nuclear accidents needs to be effected as this can be tedious 
and influential to justice. This makes liable person responsible for damages or accidents.  
 
Using UAE as the case study, it is proposed that a sovereign state through its constituted 
authorities, stringent laws and setting up of compensation limits can deal with harms that 
may arise from nuclear power production. This can be attributed to state or civil liability. 
 
It could also be discovered that the formulation and institution of a regulatory body as 
well as single legal mechanism dealing with all aspects of nuclear power and especially 
nuclear liability issues within the GCC member countries can encourage ethical nuclear 
power production in the region. The researcher therefore proffers that Gulf regional states 
should develop a model for the urgent notification of nuclear incidents occurring in any 
country within the region. This will ensure immediate response to nuclear incidents to 
avoid further damage for such incidents. 
 
1.8 Methodology and theoretical considerations 
 
The researcher sees research as an orderly study of materials and sources to ascertain new 
facts and achieve conclusions. Such activity is carry out to comprehend human activities 
and relations through suitable theoretical and procedural approaches so that the 
researchers have useful and appropriate data to enable them to answer their initial research 
questions13 For this research, the method used to obtain results that compliments the aims 
and objectives of the study. 
 
                                         
13 Ghauri, P. & Grønhaug, K. (2005). Research Methods in Business Studies: A practical guide, Prentice 
Hall; Saunders et al, (2009). 
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This research analyses the challenging discussions on nuclear energy in UAE by looking 
at the diverse connotations of the ideas which were promoted to bring about energy 
security policy. Being a growing economy, UAE tries to meet its energy needs. In this 
context, nuclear energy is presented as ‘the solution’ to the ‘problem’ of shortage of 
energy. On the other hand, starting from mid-2006, these attempts have featured 
environmentalist and anti-nuclear challenges, supposing that nuclear power generation, 
is indeed a ‘problem,’ and the ‘solution’ to UAE’s energy shortage should be sought in 
other alternatives, mostly renewable energy resources. The discussions of policy makers 
demonstrate how they created the meaning of nuclear energy as ‘power’ or an ‘asset’ 
for state security.    
 
Correspondingly, the thesis reveals what nuclear power means in the discourses of 
the opposition and how they constructed ‘nuclear’ as ‘the threat to life’. It shows how 
international standards and belief systems on nuclear non-proliferation, peaceable use of 
nuclear power, energy security, environmentalism and anti-nuclearism have formed the 
arguments.14 
 
The study discloses that the two discourses indicate two separate belief systems 
which rest in different useful and hypothetical levels. They include: Realism and Green 
Political Theory influenced by Egocentrism, Marxism and Critical Theory.15 The thesis 
therefore hypothesises that it is possible that these two discourses can still be 
reconciled within reach of Constructivism. Though the general points evaluated from 
analysis of discourse provides ordinary grounds for ‘Critical Engagement’ among the 
government and civil society, else the ‘conflict’ can go ‘extreme’ if the government 
neglects the public’s concerns and the civil society could protest at the expense of the 
prospect to manipulate the policy under consideration. 
 
Simply and most generally, realism is the view that entities of a certain type have an 
objective reality that is entirely ontologically autonomous of our theoretical schemes, 
                                         
14Udum, Sebnem (2010). Understanding the Nuclear Energy Debate in Turkey: Internal and External 
Contexts. A Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of International Relations, Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey. 
Pp 195-196. 
15 See Udum, Sebnem (2010). P 83. 
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linguistic practices and beliefs.16 Realists consider that reality subsists sovereign of the 
human mind. The definitive certainty is the world of substantial objects.17 Therefore, this 
research considers realism which confirms the UAE’s confidence to possess nuclear 
power. The common belief of all green theorists is in the universal applicability of 
basic green values, to which we have no objection and it is doubted that any of these 
theorists would clearly deny that green political actions which involve deliberate and 
strategic choices but must react to the broader political and institutional circumstances.18 
This means that the UAE is right in the pursuit of its nuclear programme and so the 
research in this direction is important.  
 
This research also considers epistemology and ontology as the bases for seeking 
knowledge in the area of study. Epistemology means the study of knowledge.19 
It developed as one of the two branches of the science of metaphysics meaning after or 
beyond the physics. Metaphysics is comprised of epistemology and ontology, meaning 
study of the universe and those universal concepts which apply to everything, as well as 
those definite concepts having to do with the most significant aspect of Being.20 
 
This work reveals the central implications the actors allocated to concepts like nuclear 
energy, radiation and security. It discovers the reference points of the proponents are the 
state, economy, and the environment in terms of its input to the economic processes and 
the continued existence of the state. Conversely, the opposition has upheld environmental 
protection and human health. 
 
This thesis presents a systematic study to identify the key parameters affecting the present 
nuclear liability processes and analyses how genuine claims would be managed under the 
contemporary state and civil law meant for accidental damage in the UAE. This research 
                                         
16Mastin, Luke (2008). [Online]. Available at: The basics of Philosophy. http://www. 
philosophybasics.com/branch_realism.html Accessed on 15-08-2016. 
17 Cohen, LeoNora M. (1999). [Online]. Philosophical Perspectives in Education. OSU - School of 
Education. Available at:  http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/ed416/PP2.html Accessed on 18-09-2016. 
18
Hunold, C. & Dryzek, J.  (2005). Green political strategy and the state: combining political theory and 
comparative history. In: The State and the Global Ecological Crises: [Online].  Available at: 
https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=-Sri_ZJX2hoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA75&dq=Green+Poli 
tical+Theory&ots=-fCRCtkeap&sig=CVTnCBwSYDcPeHhJs3Mna7L6WA4#v=onepage&q=Green%20 
Political%20Theory&f=false Accessed on 15-08-2016. 
19 Fox, Larry (1999). Foundations: A Manual for the Beginning Student of Epistemology. University 
Press of America: Ney York. 
20 See Fox, Larry (1999). 
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considers nuclear energy and its role in development, judging from the stance of 
developed nations through the evaluation of the extent to which the new UAE nuclear 
law addresses potential liabilities.  
 
It is important to clarify the type of research to be conducted. There are numerous 
approaches and it was clear to the researcher that a proper appreciation of the nature of 
legal research was required, as well as a clear understanding of how other research 
approaches could be used to support this prime approach. 
 
Research can be sorted into differing types, depending upon the goal to be achieved. For 
example, it can be classified as21: 
i. Descriptive - where one seeks to discover more about an issue and to try to clarify 
that issue by reference to detailed information. In this thesis, there is an element 
of descriptive analysis where the prevailing nature and legal norms concerning 
nuclear energy provision are identified and reviewed. 
 
ii. Exploratory - where the researcher is seeking to identify new areas of information 
or knowledge and to consider symptoms or actions on an issue. Again, the 
researcher has sought to include this approach in seeking to provide explanations 
for the use of peaceful nuclear energy and to provide structured guidance for the 
adoption of such practices within the UAE. 
 
iii. Explanatory - this can be used when the previous types still lead to questions of 
‘why?’ and ‘how?’ - and the researcher has adopted this approach in seeking to 
rationalise the nature of nuclear energy law and its application to the UAE and 
then further sought to explain how these standard international provisions can be 
utilised within the UAE environment. Therefore, the researcher uses structured 
interviews to gather primary research data. 
 
Thus, it was necessary to identify the nature of source materials. The researcher adopted 
a desk-based approach to the identification of primary legal source materials and, by way 
of extension, the extensive materials found within the specific subject field itself. So, 
                                         
21 See, for example, Wisker, G. (2001). The Postgraduate Research Handbook (Palgrave) at Ch.11. 
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elements of, inter alia, social practice, politics and economics were identified, which 
would help to support the basic themes running through the thesis. 
 
In legal research, it is important to stress that the primary source materials are likely to be 
the legal documents themselves - treaties, statutes and case decisions. “Primary sources 
are those sources which are direct, authoritative and not influenced by anybody’s opinion. 
Under this category will fall documents of an original nature or legislation or statutes or 
treaties or any other document of similar status.”22 
 
The method adopted should ensure that there is a substantive approach to the 
identification and analysis of such materials. These materials provide a neutral and 
objective source of information and can be considered to be ‘alive’. By comparison, the 
commentaries on such source materials are secondary sources for the legal researcher, 
and it is important to appreciate the unbiased nature of such sources. Therefore, the 
research is objective in nature. 
 
The standard methodology in legal research is referred to as ‘doctrinal’ or ‘black letter’ 
in approach. There needs to be, to support the analysis of primary documents, a critical 
analysis of the secondary sources.23 This can help the researcher to identify ‘what is 
known and what is not known’ about the field of study under review.24 There is a lack of 
substantive material available in the UAE and this is what makes this study original. 
 
To support the desk based research approach and to enhance the originality of the thesis, 
it was decided to conduct several structured interviews with identified experts within the 
field of study. To an extent, this is an approach based within the so-called ‘Grounded 
Theory’. In a general sense, this approach was used to provide expert opinion and 
experience as a means of validating the analysis of the primary source materials. This 
supports the researcher’s contention that the aims of the research are developed alongside 
the processes used. This is derived from the need to constantly check one’s findings 
against the available data, as Denscombe has stated: 
 
                                         
22 Chatterjee, C. (2000). Methods of Research in Law (Old Bailey Press) at p.20. 
23 See the following chapter for the extensive literature review of such secondary sources 
24 M Walter (2010). Social Research Methods (Oxford University Press) at p.485. 
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“Good qualitative…research, per the principles of grounded theory, involves a 
constant checking of the analysis (theories, concepts) against the findings and a 
constant refinement of the concepts during the process of research.”25 
 
The researcher found this approach to be valuable, because the nature of the subject matter 
is evolving and there were new issues and areas of concern developing during the research 
process. It provided for the interpretation of the stated legal sources, and allowed for a 
more critical evaluation of their scope and impact within the on-going nuclear programme 
in the UAE. This approach was further supported by the following statement by Strauss 
and Corbin26, where they argue that a clear perspective can be enhanced and modified 
using new and current evidence and information: 
“A grounded theory is one which is inductively derived from the study of the 
phenomenon it represents. That is, it is discovered, developed and provisionally 
verified through statistic data collection and analysis of data pertaining to the 
phenomenon. Therefore, data collection analysis and theory stand in reciprocal 
relationships with each other; one does not begin with a theory, then prove it, 
rather one begins with an area of study and what is relevant to that can emerge.”27 
 
In the present thesis, then, the area of study is nuclear energy law and the structured 
interviews conducted are the measures of the currency and relevancy of the issues 
indicated within the overall approach.  
 
As mentioned earlier, this is a desk based legal research, with interviews conducted with 
selected individuals to inform the thesis. This approach explores different concepts 
relating to the area of study. The study takes into consideration different research methods 
and re-references any standard text within this field.  
 
The methodology involves an extensive literature review. It aims at understanding the 
research problem by analysing the local and international nuclear power regimes. The 
Methodology involves the study of already existing literature about nuclear power and its 
                                         
25Denscombe, M (1998). The Good Research Guide (Open University Press) at p. 215. 
26 Strauss, A & Corbin, J. (1990). Basics of Qualitative Research: Grounded Theory Procedures and 
Techniques (Sage). 
27 Ibid, at p.23. 
 16 
 
importance in international development. Here, nuclear power regulations within the 
UAE and other developing and developed nations are reviewed. The implementation of 
these regulations is also taken into consideration through the review of existing books, 
articles and journals on the subject. The researcher also concentrates on the results so far 
achieved in the implementation of the policy of the UAE on nuclear energy.  
 
The approach analyses the opinions of the people and experts using a prepared 
questionnaire (see Appendix 1) which was approved by the research supervisory team 
(see Appendix 2); based on their knowledge of the areas under investigation. Hence, it is 
useful for identifying issues pertaining to developing a standard nuclear liability 
framework for the UAE.  Only when the data has been collected and analysed, may the 
aim of the research be determined. This is because the aim of the research tends to develop 
alongside the research process. 
 
1.9 Data collection 
 
Primary data were collected through face to face interviews with experts in the field using 
prepared and approved questions (see Appendix 1). Reports of various agencies within 
the UAE and other countries were consulted as secondary data. Secondary sources are 
those sources which are not first hand and are historical in nature. This method is usually 
followed in research when the interview method becomes practically impossible. The 
details of policies on the nuclear power projects are available in government reports. It is 
also necessary to access secondary data regarding the usage of power in the country. Such 
data can be collected from the reports of the governmental agencies, journals, articles and 
reports. The interview method considered for this research is limited when compared to 
the secondary sources.  
 
The secondary data collection for this work has some limitations. While several secondary 
data regarding nuclear law are available, most of them are not specifically on UAE, or 
there is a lack of in-depth analysis of issues. However, this could be overcome by 
undertaking a comparative study on other developing nations as well as an in-depth 
analysis of the available primary data.  
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In this research, the need for using nuclear energy for non-violent purposes is discussed 
while focusing on the UAE. The research makes use of the existing literature on the 
subject. It deals with the growing demand for energy in the Middle Eastern countries, 
especially the UAE.  
 
While primary sources, such as structured interviews, are used to analyse certain parts of 
the research, emphasis is also placed upon secondary sources of literature. The opinions 
and conclusions in these secondary sources are analysed before adopting it to the research 
thesis. The authors’ viewpoints are not taken as they appear, but their ideas are analysed 
individually to highlight their applicability as per the requirements of the researcher. 
 
Questionnaire was used because it was orderly prepared and presented and includes all 
the necessary information required to garner informed decisions. Those interviewed 
included very important and experienced officers from the Federal Authority for Nuclear 
Regulation (FANR) and Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC) directly involved 
in the development of the UAE’s nuclear programme (see Appendix 2b for 
Recommendation Letter from the Chief Scientist at FANR). The data gathered was used 
to analyse and evaluate the area of study. 
 
Although there was an element of interviewing during the study, the research was partly 
desk-based in nature and mainly considered analysis of legal and strategic policies 
regarding nuclear energy. Case studies and interviews were used to test reactions to 
emerging conclusions. Critical analysis of main factors and issues pertaining to questions 
of liability (both civil and state) was carried out. 
 
In order to ensure the reliability and validity of their findings in this research, Saunders 
et al (2009) suggest that it is better to use a mixture of approaches, as this enables 
researchers to triangulate the data collected.28 Data triangulation, according to Cameron 
and Price (2009), enables the researcher to increase internal validity and reliability by 
seeking secondary or tertiary sources to support the findings of any part of the study.29 
This enables the evaluation of the research result with existing secondary data. 
                                         
28 Saunders, M., Lewis, P. and Thornhill, A. (2009). Research Methods for Business Students, Prentice Hall. 
29 Cameron, S. & Price, D. (2009). Business Research Methods: A practical approach, CIPD. 
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1.10 Addressing the research objectives 
 
To effectively conduct the research, the following methodology was adopted to consider 
the objectives of this study: 
 
i. To review literature on issues pertaining to the UAE nuclear energy development 
and evaluate state liability for nuclear accidents.  To attempt this objective, a 
critical review of existing literatures which are related to the UAE, to nuclear 
energy programmes and to the nature of national and international legal and 
regulatory processes regarding nuclear power production, is required. This 
establishes the nature of existing liability frameworks and provides clear guidance 
for the adoption by the UAE of its own system for liability protections. Thus, 
coverage relates to international frameworks (example the UN Conventions), 
national frameworks (for example, the UAE nuclear Energy Acts Nos. 4 and 6) 
and regional frameworks (for example, trans-boundary incidents mechanisms). 
 
ii. To evaluate the operator’s liability for nuclear emissions under the civil law for 
accidental damage. To perform this, the researcher evaluates the potential legal 
liabilities facing the UAE in its development of a peaceful nuclear energy 
programme. The work reviews relevant international and national legislations and 
case studies, to provide an analysis of identified concerns. The researcher 
evaluates State liability for nuclear accident and pollution trans-boundary 
incidents, potential liabilities for ‘orphan sites’ and operators’ liabilities for 
emissions under civil laws. The research considers the nature and impacts of 
recent nuclear-based disasters, for example, the case studies of Chernobyl, 
Fukushima, Three Mile Island and Windscale nuclear incidents, to clarify 
potential liability issues and identify likely defendants’ issues pertaining to 
liability.  
 
The research also considers analysis of the nature and scope of existing nuclear 
energy laws in the UAE and those of the international community, to determine 
possible flaws and opportunities for review of liabilities concerns for relevant 
parties. The researcher engaged in primary data collection through structured 
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interviews with scholars and experts in nuclear energy, to measure findings and 
gain an insight into the nuclear power development and production issues 
regarding the UAE. This involved selected national and international bodies, 
agencies and commissions like the UAE government, UK Environmental and 
Nuclear Agency, United Nations Atomic Energy Agency. The interviews identify 
areas of best practice and relate them to the legal liability structures within the 
UAE. 
 
iii. To evaluate liability for orphan sites, characterise the state and civil law for 
accidental damage and to make recommendations on how the law can be used to 
determine issues regarding state and civil liabilities in nuclear power production 
in the UAE. For this objective, the researcher critically evaluates the research 
findings or results of investigation with specific reference to the UAE government 
policies concerning the development of peaceful nuclear energy. The study 
therefore makes recommendations as to who will be liable for nuclear accidents 
or hazards associated with substandard performances. These recommendations 
also cover issues regarding policies of the UAE government and their implications 
to state and operator’s liability. 
 
It is important to mention here that this research was conducted in line with the 
Southampton Solent University (SSU) Ethical Policy. 
 
1.11 Research participants 
 
As mentioned previously, ethical policies were fully considered during the execution of 
this study. For this reason, participants in the research are treated anonymously.  
 
The participants in the research were mostly people who have been engaged in nuclear 
energy development in the UAE and thus provided a degree of expertise in the field. A 
total of ten (10) people were interviewed. They include lawyers, senior officials and 
directors of nuclear associations as well as those of the companies carrying out nuclear 
energy projects in the country. The interviewees were contacted because they have wider 
knowledge regarding nuclear power programmes and projects. Interviewees were 
identified through making contacts with relevant authorities (FANR and ENEC). For the 
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purpose of this research and in line with the ethics policy governing it, the issue of 
anonymity of the participant(s) is well maintained. However, to ascertain the validity and 
indebtedness of the information collated during the interview, it is worthwhile describing 
the extent of the technical know-how of key officials directly involved in the UAE nuclear 
energy development, next. 
 
Three of the officials responded to legal and liability questions, three responded to 
political questions, two for the economic and two for the safety, security and 
environmental questions. Officials A, B and C work with FANR and have experience in 
legal issues regarding nuclear power programmes. Officials D, E and F are coordinators 
between departments of government (FANR and ENEC) and have experience in 
international relations. While officials G and H work in the economic department and 
have links with FANR and ENEC, officials I and J work with FANR and ENEC 
respectively and both work in the safety and security departments. 
 
1.12 Research limitations 
 
Research limitations basically present the discussions about the variables that impact a 
research but are beyond the control of the researcher. This research presents some 
limitations. The researcher admits that at present, there is very limited research in the field 
of nuclear law focussing on the Middle Eastern states. This is because nuclear energy and 
liability laws are very new to the UAE as well as the Middle East.  
 
The UAE nuclear laws No. 6 of 2009 on Nuclear Energy law and No. 4 of 2012 on nuclear 
liability have not yet been tested or enforced because the nuclear power plants are 
currently being built and will be commissioned in 2017. For this reason, the efficacies of 
these laws are yet to be determined, since no incident has occurred. 
 
The insufficiency of research materials (including articles, books and studies) on nuclear 
energy law, which investigate the subject area in the UAE and the Middle East region, 
has made it impossible for in-depth study to be ensured. Therefore, to compensate this, 
the researcher has used the structured interviews with identified experts in the developing 
process. This enhances the importance of the interviews and the relevancy of including 
Chapter Six in the thesis. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction to Chapter Two 
 
Chapter Two of the thesis has a few objectives. Initially, it considers the literature review 
for the study. It provides a detailed study of the UAE’s nuclear energy programme and 
defines the area of study. It reviews the conceptual frameworks covered in the research. 
The chapter also discusses the ethical reasoning behind the use of nuclear resources, as 
well as issues regarding nuclear liability. The development of international and domestic 
nuclear regimes regarding nuclear liability is also evaluated. This chapter also considers 
emerging facts and criticisms concerning nuclear power generation and analyses nuclear 
renaissance as an important aspect of the study. It also analyses milestones for nuclear 
power infrastructure development. 
 
The civil nuclear industry has seen many ups and downs during its alternating phases of 
development and decline. With the end of the Second World War, the nuclear industry 
grew under the conception that mankind should draw benefits by converting a destructive 
military technology into a peaceful one. By the 1970s, it was a general perception that 
nuclear energy is a source of abundant power that can be generated in an environmentally 
friendly manner at very economical cost. With technology, largely in the hands of a few 
advanced and wealthy nations, there was minimal government interference and public 
scrutiny. These favourable conditions attracted many countries to start considering the 
establishment of nuclear plants for the peaceful utilisation of nuclear energy30. 
 
However, major problems arose during the 1970s, with increasing public scepticism 
about the safety of nuclear reactors, overall stagnation in the demand for electricity and 
the Three Mile Island accident (1979) in Pennsylvania. This led to the ending of any initial 
euphoria and brought the dangers surrounding nuclear energy into the limelight. The fall 
in prices of natural gas and the increasing technical costs of establishing nuclear plants 
                                         
30
Lehtonen, Markku and Martiskainen, Mari (2015). Nuclear power after Fukushima: prospects and 
implications. In: Ekins, Paul, Bradshaw, Mike and Watson, Jim (eds.) Global energy: issues, potentials, 
and policy implications. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 306-330.  
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further led to downscaling of investments in nuclear programs. Public sentiments soon 
turned against nuclear technology. People started criticising it for being incompatible with 
democratic ideology because of secrecy and centralisation of nuclear technology. Nuclear 
institutions which were once considered as world saviours were being portrayed as remote 
and powerful bureaucracies. All these factors had an adverse impact on the future of 
nuclear plants worldwide31. In addition, the world has seen the rise of environmental 
protectionism, which has placed nuclear energy production under scrutiny. 
 
Momentum for nuclear programmes got strengthened again in the mid-1980s. With 
memories of Three Mile Island fading and economic growth picking up, many countries 
started considering new nuclear plants once again. Unfortunately, the Chernobyl accident 
in 1986 put an end to aggressive nuclear planning. The accident once again undermined 
public opinion regarding nuclear technology. It prompted improvements in reactor 
technologies, safety controls and brought more transparency to the operation of nuclear 
plants. The Fukushima accident in Japan, caused by a massive tsunami and earthquake 
on March 11, 2011, has led to a renewed focus on nuclear safety. The Fukushima accident 
posed questions about the amount of cross border liability and the exclusion of suppliers 
and contractors from any liability. In the aftermath of this incident, the international 
community is now actively considering new models of nuclear liability32.   
 
2.2 International and regional organisations in Nuclear Law 
 
2.2.1 The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
 
The IAEA was established in 1957 as an autonomous intergovernmental organisation 
through a multilateral treaty. It enjoys a special status in the United Nations system. The 
UN General Assembly has recognised IAEA’s leading position in the field of peaceful 
utilisation of nuclear energy33. The objective of IAEA is to ensure the development and 
implementation of nuclear infrastructure that supports successful introduction of safe and 
                                         
31Ibid. 
32Report on “International Law and Nuclear Liability”, American Academy of Arts & Sciences, Retrieved 
from: https://www.amacad.org/content/publications/pubContent.aspx?d=1507, (Accessed April 11, 
2016). 
33Prevor, O. J. (2010), “The Normative Role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Legal 
Basis and Legal Sources”, in International Nuclear Law: History, Evolution and Outlook, Nuclear Energy 
Agency, OECD. 
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secure nuclear power. Another primary objective of the Agency is to accelerate and 
enlarge the contributions of atomic energy towards peace, health and prosperity in the 
entire world.  The activities of the Agency are now mainly concerned with nuclear safety 
and security, nuclear science and technology and nuclear techniques for development and 
safeguarding environment34. The Treaties and legal frameworks etc., developed by IAEA 
are discussed later in the thesis. 
 
2.2.2 The European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC) 
 
Nuclear energy is estimated to account for almost 30% of all the electricity production in 
Europe35. It was once considered as a vital factor in ensuring self-sufficiency in terms of 
European energy requirements. To support the development of a coherent, competitive, 
secure and sustainable energy policy, the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC) 
was established in 1957 based on a treaty (Euratom)36. Euratom is aimed at creating a 
common market across Europe for nuclear ores and fuel. It promotes research and 
dissemination of technical know-how of nuclear information. It is also actively involved 
in the establishment of uniform safety standards and facilitating investments in the 
development of nuclear energy37. 
                                         
34Ibid. 
35Heffron, R. (2009), “Identifying How Legislation and Regulation Impact Upon the Conditions for New 
Nuclear Build in the European Union”, Proceedings of the International Conference Nuclear Energy for 
New Europe 2009, Bled, Slovenia. 
36‘The Euratom Treaty was signed on 25 March, 1957 at the same time as the Treaty establishing the 
European Economic Community (EEC Treaty). The Treaty is less well-known due to the lower profile of 
the organisation it founded. While the EEC has evolved into what is now the European Union, Euratom 
has remained much the same as it was in 1957, albeit governed by the institutions of the European Union. 
It was established with its own independent institutions. The Euratom treaty has seen very little 
amendment due to the later sensitivity surrounding nuclear power amongst European public opinion. 
Because of this, some argue that it has become too out-dated, particularly in the areas of democratic 
oversight. It was not included as part of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, which sought 
to combine all previous treaties, over fears that including nuclear power in the treaty would turn more 
people against it. It is therefore still in force today but as a separate legal treaty. It forms part of the 
active treaties of the European Union. The objectives of the Euratom Treaty are to: 
 contribute to the formation and development of Europe’s nuclear industry, so that all Member States 
can benefit from nuclear energy 
 enhance security of energy supply 
 guarantee high standards of safety for the public and workers 
 ensure that nuclear materials are not diverted from civil to military use’. 
See: European Institutions (2007). 50 years of the Euratom Treaty: reflecting on the past, safeguarding 
the future. Issue No.16 Spring (2007). [Online]. Available at: https://www.euronuclear.org/e-news/e-
news-16/euratom-treaty.htm Accessed on 28/07/2016. 
 
37 Ibid. 
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This treaty has shown tremendous resilience in form and over the years it has remained 
mostly unaltered and unchanged. It survived the impact of the 1970s’ oil price crisis and 
the 1986 Chernobyl disaster. Time and again some attempts were made to change or 
amend the treaty but these have largely remained unsuccessful. In 1977 Euratom Loans 
were introduced to finance the establishment of nuclear power stations. However, they 
were subsequently scrapped in the 1980s due to the failure of the Loans system. The treaty 
has also survived the criticism of a lack of democracy in decision making processes. The 
European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) and the Scientific and Technical 
Committee created under the provisions of Euratom Treaty each have a member 
nominated by national governments. These committees perform a role like the process of 
consultation followed in European Parliament38. 
 
2.3 Development of the International Civil Nuclear Liability Regimes 
 
The purpose of international law is to deal with apprehension relating to the non-peaceful 
use of nuclear energy, nuclear security, nuclear safety and the potential trans-boundary 
consequences of nuclear accidents relating to civilian nuclear power reactors39. Nuclear 
accidents have low risk of occurrence, but do have the potential of causing major damage 
that will trigger large claims for compensation. Such claims may require complex 
evidentiary proof because many health effects of radiation exposure manifest themselves 
after a considerable time gap following an incident. It is due to these and other reasons, 
that the international community realised traditional laws were grossly inadequate to 
handle claims arising from a nuclear accident40. 
 
In the early 1950s, most of the Western nations recognised the fact that the consequences 
of a nuclear accident will not remain confined to the boundaries of one nation only. The 
Brookhaven Report41 published in 1957 by the Atomic Energy Commission of the United 
                                         
38 Ibid. 
39Cook, Helen (2014). International Nuclear Law: Nuclear Safety, Emergency Response and Nuclear 
Liability. Springer Berlin Heidelberg: London. Pp 279-296. 
40Stoiber, C., Cherf, A., Tonhauser, W. and Carmona, M. D. L. V. (2010), “Handbook on Nuclear Law: 
Implementing Legislation”, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna. 
41WASH-740, The Brookhaven Report also known as “Theoretical Possibilities and Consequences of 
Major Accidents in Large Nuclear Power Plants” estimated maximum possible damage from 
a meltdown with no containment building at a large nuclear reactor. The report was published by the U.S. 
Atomic Energy Commission (USAEC) in 1957. The conclusions of this study estimated the possible effects 
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States, provided detailed estimates of various damages that may be caused by a nuclear 
accident, such as loss of life, injuries, health hazards and so on. Based on the findings of 
this report and realising the trans-border effects of nuclear accidents, the international 
community decided to establish an international nuclear regime to compensate victims 
for losses and damages42. 
 
Following the Brookhaven Report, two separate nuclear liability regimes were created. 
The first regime, the Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, 
referred to as the 1960 Paris Convention, was signed by 15 Western European Nations. 
This Convention fixed the operator’s liability for the damage caused by their activity and 
specified the competent court and law which would be applied in case of a nuclear 
accident. The Paris Convention was adopted under the auspices of the then Organisation 
for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), which was later reconstituted as the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), but it had not yet 
entered into force at the time when the Vienna Convention was adopted43. The 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) adopted a nuclear regime called the Vienna 
Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage in 1963. This Convention was signed 
by 30 countries mainly from Eastern Europe, South America, Africa and the Pacific.  
 
Both the Paris Convention and the Vienna Convention were supposed to create, in the 
national law of their respective Member States, a unique legal regime for nuclear liability 
derogating from the otherwise applicable rules governing third party liability44. 
                                         
of a “maximum credible accident” for nuclear reactors then envisioned as being 3400 deaths, 43,000 
injuries and property damage of $7 billion ($57bn adjusted for inflation in 2012 since 1957). The estimate 
of probability was one in a hundred thousand to one in a billion per reactor-year. When WASH-740 was 
revised in 1964-65 to account for the larger reactors then being designed, the new figures indicated that 
there could be as many as 45,000 deaths, 100,000 injuries, and $17 billion in property damage ($125bn 
adjusted for inflation since 1964). However; the assumptions underlying the results were unrealistic 
(including the worst meteorological conditions, no containment building, and that half the reactor core is 
released into the atmosphere as micrometre-sized pellets without any examination of how this might occur). 
These were due to conservatism (estimating the maximum possible damage) and the need to use atomic 
bomb fallout data, which had been collected from tests (computers in 1955 being greatly insufficient to do 
the calculations). 
42 Khan, S. (2015), “International Civil Nuclear Liability Regime and India: A Comparative Assessment”, 
International Strategic and Security Study Programme, NIAS, India. Retrieved from: http://isssp.in/ 
internationalcivilnuclearliabilityregimeandindiaacomparativeassessment/print/ (Accessed April 01, 2016). 
43International Atomic Energy Agency (2013). The 1988 Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the 
Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention - Explanatory Text. The existence of two distinct international 
treaty regimes on civil liability for nuclear damage. IAEA International Law Series No. 5. Vienna: IAEA. 
Pp. 1-2. 
44See: International Atomic Energy Agency (2013). The 1988 Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of 
the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention - Explanatory Text.   
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The researcher notes that the Vienna Convention has been ratified by more Member 
States, including the UAE. The country makes its nuclear laws in consonant with the 
provisions of the Vienna Convention. The UAE has also made its laws, ratifying the 
Protocol to amend the Vienna Convention as well as the 1988 Joint Protocol Relating to 
the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention45. The Joint Protocol 
was reached as a means of settling the differences between the Paris and the Vienna 
Conventions and harmonising them. The Joint Protocol contains robust provisions 
regarding third party or civil liability for nuclear damage.  
 
The researcher observes that the differences in the signatories and ranges of coverage of 
the Paris and the Vienna Conventions do not overly suggest that there are different rules 
for Western Europe and other parts of the world. It should be understood that the 
underlying fundamentals of these Conventions are geared towards acceptable standards 
and good practice. Irrespective of whether nuclear laws are made to cover specific 
political and economic regions, or individual Member States, or promulgated to reflect 
global perspective, the essence of the law is to ensure fairness and orderliness. The UAE, 
having adopted the set standards, should therefore work towards the ingenuity of its 
nuclear power programme.  
 
These Paris and Vienna Conventions were based on four pillars of a limited liability 
scheme. The first pillar is the ‘no fault scheme’ which means that no proof of fault or 
negligence is required to hold the nuclear installation’s operator responsible for a nuclear 
accident. Second, the liability of the operator would be absolute for nuclear accidents 
occurring at the installation site or during transport of nuclear material to or from the site. 
Third, as per these Conventions, the liability and time for instituting damage claims will 
be limited. And lastly, the operator would be required to secure insurance and other 
financial guarantee up to the amount of its liabilities46. The researcher views that it is 
possible that these four pillars can create a substantive and fair system for dealing with 
matters pertaining to liability and potential compensations for harm. In theory, the limited 
                                         
45
Federal Decree No. 32 of 2012 Ratifying the Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability 
for Nuclear Damage of 1997; and Federal Decree No. 33 of 2012 Ratifying the Joint Protocol Relating to 
the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention of 1988. 
46“International Nuclear Liability Regime”, World Nuclear Transport Institute; Retrieved from: 
www.wnti.co.uk/media/13831/8.pdf, (Accessed on April 02, 2016). 
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liability scheme considering the four pillars can be justifiably implemented but again it 
depends if in practice, the provisions are enforced accordingly. 
 
The Chernobyl accident (1986) in the former Soviet Union released massive amounts of 
radioactive materials into the atmosphere. These harmful materials spread across various 
neighbouring countries including Belarus, Ukraine and the UK. The accident proved that 
a nuclear disaster knows no geographical boundaries. It can affect any nation or region 
irrespective of the fact of whether that nation is a part of any limited liability regime or 
not47. 
 
As a subsequent result of this accident, the need for having a unified approach for dealing 
with nuclear disasters was felt to be an urgent necessity. To synergise international efforts 
for tackling nuclear disasters, a Joint Protocol was signed in 1988. In this protocol a 
common ground was developed between the Vienna Convention and the Paris 
Convention. This protocol mutually extends the benefits of the special regime of civil 
liability for nuclear damage to the contracting parties. It eliminates the possible conflicts 
that may arise from the simultaneous application of both Paris and Vienna Conventions 
to a nuclear accident. The Joint Protocol currently has 26 parties, comprising of 16 State 
parties, to the Vienna Convention and 10 State parties to the Paris Convention48. Later, 
the Vienna Convention was amended in 1997 and the Paris Convention in 2004 to remove 
the discrepancies in their implementation in terms of liability amounts, scope of 
application and rules of jurisdiction conflicts49. 
 
The Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC), concluded 
under the auspices of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was adopted in 1997. 
It was aimed at providing a worldwide liability regime and to supplement the funds 
required for funding the liability50. It was open to all parties of either the Paris Convention 
(1960) or Vienna Convention (1963). It was also open to those parties which were not 
part of either the Paris or Vienna Conventions, but were having domestic legislation in 
place consistent with the principles embodied in those Conventions51.  
                                         
47 Khan, S. (2015), Op Cit. 
48Stoiber et al., (2010), Op cit. 
49 Khan, S. (2015), Op Cit. 
50 Ibid.  
51Stoiber et al., (2010), Op cit. 
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The most important principles of the present international regime for civil liability for 
nuclear damage are52:  
 
 A defined scope for liability regime based on well-designed concepts of nuclear 
installation, operation, nuclear incident and nuclear damage: here, a wider 
coverage of all issues pertaining to nuclear power generation is enhanced; 
 The operation of nuclear installations bearing strict (no fault) liability; 
 Exclusive liability of the operator that would imply that parties other than the 
operator would be exonerated from any liability; 
 Exoneration of operator from any liability in case of extraordinary circumstances 
such as a nuclear accident caused by warlike events, grave natural disasters, or 
gross negligence of the person who suffers nuclear damage: in any of these 
situations, the operator cannot be held responsible since the cause(s) are not his; 
 Possibility of limiting the liability amount: it is possible that Member States can 
place limits on the amount to be paid to the victims as liability; 
 Mandatory financial security of the operator to meet the liability: it is mandatory 
that operators obtain adequate insurance coverage that can be used to pay off 
compensations when an incident occurs; 
 Limitation of liability in time; 
 Non-discrimination and equal treatment to all the victims irrespective of their 
nationality, caste, creed, religion or ethnicity: here, every victim is accorded 
unbiased treatment; 
 Exclusive jurisdiction of a single competent court: here only a competent court of 
jurisdiction is entitled to entertain cases pertaining to nuclear incidents; and  
 Obligation to recognise and implement the judgment of a competent court in other 
contracting nations, without re-examining the merits of the judgment: in this 
situation, all Member States are mandated to uphold the final judgement of a 
competent court held in any Member State. 
 
 
 
                                         
52 Ibid. 
 29 
 
2.3.1 Emerging trend in Nuclear Liability Regime 
 
Historically, the liability for a nuclear accident rests with the operator of the nuclear 
facility. Traditionally, the operators of nuclear plants have been entrusted with the 
responsibility of ensuring the quality and safety of products and services being offered or 
rendered. Subsequently, no emphasis was given to the liabilities and duties of the 
suppliers in any major international or national law. The only two conditions in which 
recourse could be claimed against a supplier were: (a) if a nuclear incident occurred due 
to the intentional act of omission or commission committed by the nuclear supplier, or 
(b) a contractual right to recourse exists53.  
 
This condition of almost no liability of suppliers remained in force for a considerable 
period and was even codified in the Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of 
Nuclear Energy (1960), the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage 
(1997, as amended) and the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear 
Damages (1997)54.  With this kind of codification, it became the norm in nuclear energy 
generation that the nations opting for nuclear energy generation complied with this 
condition. As previously stated, the researcher still believes that it is a good thing to set 
out these codifications to ensure good practice in the nuclear industry, but what is 
important is how the codifications are practiced and enforced. The UAE has promulgated 
its nuclear laws based on these codifications. It is possible that the provisions would be 
adhered to by the country when the nuclear plants are eventually used.  
 
For the first time the supplier liability was introduced in the Civil Liability for Nuclear 
Damage Act, 2010 (CLNDA) passed by the Indian Parliament. This Act incorporated a 
clause for supplier liability in case of a nuclear accident which would be over and above 
the principal liability borne by the operator. Section 17(b) of the Act states that: 
                                         
53 Abraham, M. (2014), “Nuclear Liability: A Key Component of the Public Policy Decision to Deploy 
Nuclear Energy in Southeast Asia”, Cambridge: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Retrieved from: 
http://www.amacad.org/gnf  (accessed April 02, 2016) 
54 Ibid.  
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 “The operator of a nuclear installation shall have a right of recourse where the 
nuclear incident has resulted from the wilful act or gross negligence on the part of 
the supplier of the material, equipment or services, or of his employee”55.  
 
Initially there were apprehensions that this provision for supplier liability would be 
strongly opposed by prominent supplier countries such as the United States, Japan, France 
and Russia. Recent reports have suggested that Russia has already entered a preliminary 
agreement with India for supplying nuclear material. France is also becoming inclined 
towards dealing with India because of lucrative financial benefits that are associated with 
supplying a growing economy as in India56. 
 
2.4 Nuclear Renaissance 
 
There is an increasing concern for global climate change as well as the realisation that 
mankind needs to reduce emissions from the burning of fossil fuels, such as coal, oil and 
gas; hence these factors are essential to the renewed interest in nuclear power57. 
According to the World Nuclear Association, nuclear renaissance has been used since 
2001 to refer to possible resurgence in the nuclear industry motivated by the rise in prices 
of fossil fuels as well as concerns about meeting the limits of greenhouse emissions58.  It 
has been reported that the generation of electricity from nuclear sources in 2012 was the 
lowest since 1999; ascribed to the fact that more nuclear reactors have been closed than 
opened in recent times59. 
 
Various factors capable of inhibiting nuclear renaissance have been identified. While the 
occurrence of more nuclear accidents, security and nuclear weapons proliferation are 
major factors, trade restrictions and lack of workforce in the nuclear sector, adverse 
economics in contrast to other sources of energy, the controversial issue of how nuclear 
waste or spent nuclear fuel can be reused and delay in tackle climate change are also 
                                         
55Balachandra, G. (2010), “The Civil Nuclear Liability Bill”, IDSA Brief No. 26, Institute for Defense 
Studies and Analysis, New Delhi 
56 Abraham, M. (2014), Op Cit. 
57 Nuttall, William J. (2004). Nuclear Renaissance: Technologies and Policies for the Future of Nuclear 
Power. CRC Press – Taylor & Frncis Group: Oxon. Page 1.  
58 World Nuclear Association (WNA), (2013).  “Nuclear power down in 2012”. World Nuclear News. (20 
June 2013).  
59The Economist, (November 11, 2013). “Difference Engine: The nuke that might have been”. The 
Economist Group, London. 
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considered to hindering nuclear renaissance60.  The researcher maintains that this change 
in nuclear energy production clearly opposes the main purpose of nuclear renaissance 
which include the need for an economic source of electricity that is continuous and 
reliable on a large scale which reduces dependence on overseas imports of fossil fuels. 
Others are increasing energy demand, increased awareness about climate change, cost 
effectiveness and grid stability. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA): 
 “A nuclear renaissance is possible but cannot occur overnight. Nuclear projects 
face significant hurdles, including extended construction periods and related risks, 
long licensing processes and manpower shortages, plus long‐standing issues 
related to waste disposal, proliferation and local opposition. The financing of new 
nuclear power plants, especially in liberalised markets, has always been difficult 
and the financial crisis seems almost certain to have made it even more so. The 
huge capital requirements, combined with risks of cost overruns and regulatory 
uncertainties, make investors and lenders very cautious, even when demand 
growth is robust.”61 
 
The above points suggest therefore that a nuclear renaissance is not clearly present, or at 
least faces major hurdles. The researcher believes that it is possible the UAE can 
overcome the significant hurdles discussed above by the IEA, by instituting vigorous 
plans for its nuclear energy programme and ensuring that such plans are extensively 
implemented. The country is more positive about its strategies and does not seem to be 
weighed down by such uncertainties.  
 
The halt in nuclear renaissance is assumed to be mainly attributed to the March 2011 
nuclear disasters in Fukushima and the shutdowns of other nuclear facilities across the 
world62. According to Platts (2011), the crisis at Japan’s Fukushima nuclear plants has 
prompted leading energy-consuming countries to review the safety of their existing 
reactors and cast doubt on the speed and scale of planned expansions around the world63. 
                                         
60Trevor Findlay, (2010). The Future of Nuclear Energy to 2030 and its Implications for Safety, Security 
and Nonproliferation. An Overview. February 4, 2010. Centre for International Governance Innovation 
(CIGI), Canada, pp13-21. 
61 International Energy Agency, (2009). World Energy Outlook. International Energy Agency (IEA), p. 
160. 
62Bloomberg, (March 2011). Nuclear Renaissance Threatened as Japan’s Reactor Struggles. [Online]. 
Available at: https://fukushimanewsresearch.wordpress.com/2011/03/13/31/ Accessed on March 10, 2011. 
63Platts, (2011) “News Analysis: Japan crisis puts global nuclear expansion in doubt. Platts. 21 March 2011. 
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The ever-increasing electricity generation gap, the dwindling fossil fuels supplies and 
impending climate change are the factors that have led the world to search for clean and 
efficient alternative sources of energy. Nuclear power is one of the best alternative 
sources of energy available to the world. Many countries around the world are now 
developing or considering building new nuclear power plants. This new build-up activity 
is termed as “nuclear renaissance”64. The present nuclear capacity is around 373 GWe. It 
is expected to be between 1100 and 3500 GWe by 2060, subject to political support and 
the level of priority. Most of this increase is expected in those countries which already 
have nuclear plants and this goes a long way to debut the IEA quote referenced above65.  
 
Apart from Germany, most of the Western European nations, including France, the UK 
and Russia, have announced their plans of increasing nuclear power generation. One of 
the key drivers in some of these countries is the gradual phase out of the existing nuclear 
reactors. Old nuclear reactors are required to be decommissioned as they are no longer 
technically and economically viable. For example, the Oldbury and Wylfa plants in the 
UK were recently shutdown because they use Magnox fuel, production of which has 
ceased66. The closed units are expected to be replaced with new higher capacity units in 
coming years. The researcher observes that this raises questions of potential liabilities 
associated with the decommissioning process itself. Thus, the need for clear legal 
regulation exists even after the life-span of a nuclear plant and the UAE is aware of this. 
 
The two main drivers for nuclear power are climate change and energy security67. The 
expected increase in nuclear energy generation is a general commitment of national 
governments to reduce carbon emissions in response to massive climatic changes. This 
requires less and less dependence on carbon technologies, particularly in power 
generation. Limiting the use of fossil fuels in power generation enhances the case for 
more reliance on nuclear power. Nuclear power is a relatively clean fuel and helps in 
meeting the challenge of climate change.  
                                         
64Goodfellow, M. J., Willaims, H. R. and Azapagic, A. (2011), “Nuclear Renaissance, Public Perception 
and Design Criteria: An Exploratory Review”, Energy Policy, Vol. 39, pp. 6199-6210. 
65 World Nuclear Association (2010), “The WNA Nuclear Century Outlook: Averting the Danger of 
Catastrophic Climate Change: Is the Nuclear Renaissance Essential?”  
66Goodfellow et al., (2011), Op Cit. 
67Greenhalgh, C. and Azapagic, A. (2009), “Review of Drivers and Barriers for Nuclear Power in the UK”, 
Environmental Science and Policy, Vol. 12, pp. 1052-1067. 
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The ever-growing energy demand has resulted in the need to put in place an energy 
security regime. This is possible within the increasing development and use of nuclear 
power. Presently, international cooperation on nuclear science and technology sharing 
has increased rapidly. The nuclear capacity has increased in Eastern Europe and Asia68. 
The recent surge in nuclear capacity is because of global population growth. The 
industrial development taking place in developed and developing economies is expected 
to double the energy consumption from 2007 level by 203069. The researcher therefore 
suggests that the UAE allows for long term objectives or gains for operators. The 
increasing disruptions in supplies, geo-political instabilities and the ever-increasing oil 
prices have forced the world economies to take energy security as an extremely serious 
issue70. These factors are major contributors towards a shift in international perception 
regarding the need for having a nuclear renaissance.  
 
The process of nuclear renaissance will occur in two phases71. In the first phase, the 
process will include major replacements and extensions in the life of existing nuclear 
plants. The focus during this phase would be on improving the efficiency and reliability 
of nuclear electricity production which has already been proposed by the UAE.  
 
The second phase will start after 2030, which will be marked by large scale production 
of nuclear energy in the UAE as an alternative to fossil fuel based electricity production. 
Decarbonisation of electricity production requires two main challenges to be surmounted. 
Firstly, nuclear plants should be established in all parts of the world without increasing 
the growth of nuclear weapon technologies and this suggests that nuclear is a viable 
alternative to carbon-based fuels. Secondly, a worldwide system of safe disposal of 
nuclear waste should be developed. A detailed assessment of risks associated with 
transport, storage and disposal of nuclear waste is to be carried out72. These suggestions 
should be considered by the IAEA as a global body controlling nuclear energy 
                                         
68 Henderson, H. (2014), Nuclear Power - A Reference Handbook, Second Edition, ABC-CLIO: California. 
69 Ibid. 
70Greenhalgh, C. and Azapagic, A. (2009), Op Cit.  
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developments. Member States should take on these observations. The researcher expects 
the UAE to take a lead on these.  
 
2.4.1 Challenges for Nuclear Renaissance 
 
The existing and future nuclear plants face multiple challenges. Some of the prominent 
current challenges include large cost overruns, long construction horizons, a history of 
poor initial performance at the time of commercial launch and unresolved disposition of 
high level waste73. In addition, the uncertainties surrounding the climate change policies 
and effectiveness of evolving power technologies are also a contributing factor in the 
riskiness of nuclear power generation.  
 
The consistency of nuclear supply chain issues is also a cause for concern. Presently, very 
few companies worldwide have retained the key capabilities to supply nuclear raw 
materials. Along with this, the nuclear skill set has also not been replenished in recent 
years. There is an acute shortage of expert personnel to manage and operate nuclear 
plants. The problem is more acute in the field of nuclear safety inspectors. The last two 
decades have witnessed closure of many nuclear radiation and reactor test facilities. This 
is again a serious cause of concern for future research and development in nuclear power 
generation in the UAE. Last but not the least, social factors comprising of public opinions 
about nuclear plants are also shaping policy decision making in the country74. The 
researcher suggests that the UAE should consider training and retraining of its labour 
force in the field of nuclear energy production and embark on wider orientation of the 
public concerning its nuclear programme. 
 
The issues that will emerge during the later stages of nuclear renaissance, say after 2030, 
would primarily be different than those being faced today. The prime concern in that 
period would be fuel availability. The present uranium fuel cycle will become 
unsustainable by 2060 and should be augmented by nuclear fuel reprocessing, innovative 
fuel cycles, or by gaining uranium from unconventional sources. In future, design 
considerations will also be more prominent than today. The future nuclear reactors should 
                                         
73 Holt, L., Sotkiewicz, P. and Berg, S. (2010), “Nuclear Power Expansion: Thinking about Uncertainty”, 
The Electricity Journal, Vol. 23, Issue 05, pp.26-33 
74 Grimes, R. W. and Nuttall, W. J. (2010), Op Cit.  
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be built in such a manner that they should offer three-way choice between life extension, 
reactor replacement, or full decommissioning and rebuilt. The demand for national and 
international inspectors is going to increase soon. Most of the existing inspectors and 
safety officers are getting older, young engineers and inspectors will be required in future 
to continue their legacy75.  
 
2.5 Milestones for Nuclear Power Infrastructure Development 
 
One of the most important projects that require a cautious scheduling, preparation and 
venture in time and human resources is the nuclear power programme. The handling of 
nuclear material itself is a major issue that requires strict procedures. For a Member State 
to decide to invest in a nuclear programme, such decisions should be based on an 
assurance of using nuclear power for peaceable purposes, in a safe and secure approach. 
 
The Journey to nuclear power infrastructure development can be successfully attained 
through the consideration of 19 Milestones set out by the IAEA. These milestones 
include: Management, National Position, Regulatory Framework, Legislative 
Framework, Site and Supporting Facilities, Stakeholder Involvement, Nuclear Fuel 
Cycle, Environmental Protection, Procurement and Industrial Involvement.  Others are 
Safeguards, Nuclear Safety, Electrical Grid, Radiation Protection, Emergency Planning, 
Human Resources Development, Radioactive Waste, Security and Physical Protection, 
Role of Government, Funding and Financing, Leadership/Commitment, Institution 
Building and Legal Framework and Rule of Law.76 The researcher is of the view that the 
basis for successful nuclear energy production in the UAE should be determined by 
instigating sound legal frameworks as guides to the building and operation of the nuclear 
plants. Carrying the public along in every aspect of the programme as well as deliberating 
issues of environmental protection, safety and security and manpower development 
should be evaluated by the UAE. 
 
The 19 milestones are further classified into four basic categories. These are:  
i. Milestones that are common to all (even fuel); 
                                         
75Ibid. 
76Murphy, P. M. (2007). International Atomic Energy Agency: Milestones for Nuclear Power Infrastructure 
Development. Opening Remarks - Finance. Vienna, Austria November 8, 2007 
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ii. Those that are more precise to nuclear (even grid); 
iii. All impact investing as opposed to funding; and 
iv. Those that indicate the government’s responsibility is persistent in all the 
milestones, but that there is an exceptional impact on funding. 
 
The commitment to a nuclear power project therefore entails the establishment of a 
sustainable national infrastructure that offer governmental, regulatory, legal, 
technological, managerial, industrial and human support for the nuclear programme 
throughout its life sequence.77 Essentially, the setting up of a responsible nuclear power 
programme is based upon the expression of conformity with global permissible 
mechanisms, internationally accepted nuclear safety standards, security guidelines and 
safeguards requirements. The improvement and execution of a suitable infrastructure to 
sustain the thriving commencement of nuclear power and its peaceful, safe, secure, and 
proficient application is a vital concern, particularly for countries that are allowing for 
and planning their initial nuclear power plant as is the UAE. The UAE will address these 
concerns by carefully implementing its robust policies and action plans. 
 
The facilities required to maintain the operation of a nuclear power plant are extensive. 
These range from the substantial infrastructure and equipment related to the discharge of 
the electricity; the transportation of the material and supplies to the site; the site itself; 
and the facilities for managing the radioactive desecrate material, to the legal and 
regulatory structure in which all of the basic activities are carried out; and the human and 
economic resources needed to realise the required activities.78 Basically, these must 
comprise all activities needed to set up and manage a nuclear programme and the UAE 
has taken this on board. 
 
The researcher maintains that all stakeholders (decision makers, consultants and senior 
managers in governmental organisations, utilities, trade organisations and regulatory 
bodies) in countries opting to establish or expand their nuclear power programmes and 
even or exporting supplies for these plans should ensure that the national infrastructure 
needed is accessible. It is believed that the experience and good practices of countries 
                                         
77 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), (2007). Milestones in the development of a national 
infrastructure for nuclear power. IAEA NUCLEAR ENERGY SERIES No. NG-G-3.1, Vienna: IAEA. 
78 See (IAEA), (2007). 
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with developed nuclear energy programmes can help shape the endeavours of new 
member states. The researcher is also of the view that the UAE is capable of facilitating 
efficiency in the expansion of a thriving state nuclear energy programme, if it pays proper 
early attention to all the milestones, while lack of proper awareness to any of the concerns 
may result in future difficulties that may drastically affect the successful introduction of 
nuclear power. 
 
It is also expected that a Member State considering a nuclear power programme should 
have steady opinionated, cost-effective and social backgrounds to enable it thrive. 
Political steadiness is essential to draw the support of global organisations and 
commercial bodies, but such steadiness only does not promise that a power plant vendor 
can be established who agrees to construct a plant, or that funding will be set up for the 
nuclear power plant. It is indeed a major commitment to undertake a nuclear programme 
and this requires stringent interest to nuclear safety and the management of nuclear 
material. This is not only a responsibility to the citizens of the Member State, but also to 
the global community. The basis of nuclear safety is to protect people and the 
environment from the damaging effects of ionising radiation from nuclear materials. An 
all-inclusive security framework needs to be developed that infuses all improvement 
activities.79 
 
2.6 UAE’s Nuclear Energy Programme: emerging facts and criticisms 
 
This section deals with the details as well as positive and negative views of people 
concerning the UAE’s nuclear power programme. The researcher maintains that it is 
helpful to provide a synopsis of how the UAE is managing the factors and requirements 
highlighted above, in the preceding section. 
 
 
 
                                         
79 One option for the development of this framework is to use the information found in the IAEA publication 
‘Fundamental Safety Principles’, which contains ten safety principles that represent the international 
consensus on the high level of safety required for the sustainable use nuclear power. The first principle 
establishes that the ultimate responsibility for safety must rest with the operator. It is incumbent on the 
leadership and management of the Member State and the operator to develop awareness of safety issues 
and the encouragement and enforcement of a safety culture throughout the entire programme; (IAEA, 
2007). 
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2.6.1 Emerging facts 
 
This sub-section of the chapter looks at the analysis of those specifics regarding nuclear 
power production. The author believes that the awareness in these areas will help to 
highlight the potential risks and harms that may give rise to future legal liabilities for the 
various stakeholders. 
 
According to the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), Nuclear Energy is a form of energy that 
originates from the splitting of uranium atoms in a process called Fission80. Fission means 
‘the splitting of something into two or more parts’. Nuclear fission therefore takes place 
at the power plant. Here, the fission process is used to generate heat for producing steam 
which is used by a turbine to generate electricity. This could be illustrated, in the Diagram 
1 below. 
 
Diagram 1: Nuclear reactor 
 
Source: Afritopic Media (Afritopic.com)
81 
 
There has been an increased awareness regarding the potential of nuclear energy to meet 
the increasing global demand for electricity and several countries such as England, China 
and Finland have made use of nuclear power reactors for their energy supplies82. The 
Middle East and North African countries have been favouring the use of nuclear energy 
                                         
80Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI). 
81Afritopic Media. Nuclear Reactor. [Online]: Available at:  http://afritopic.com/media/?tag=nuclear-
reactor. Accessed on 17/09/2014. 
82 Dennis Kumetat, (2011). ‘The Arab Region as Part of a Nuclear Renaissance: Outlooks and Alternatives’, 
Layla Al-Zubaidi, Joachim Paul, Doreen Khoury (eds.), ‘Nuclear energy and the Arab World’, 
Perspectives,Heinrich Boll Stiftung 1April, 2011. 
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for the generation of electricity83. The increase in the demand for energy all over the world 
is tremendous, due to the development of industries and economies.  
 
The standards of living in all the countries have considerably increased and the intensified 
global commercial development has also contributed to the dramatic push in the need for 
power. To fully appreciate the importance of nuclear power in a striving economy like 
that of the UAE, it is important to look at structure and the socio-political and economic 
diversities of the country from the perspective of the need for such power production. 
  
Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Fujayrah, Umm Al Qawayn and Ras Al Khaymah, 
together form the UAE. Each emirate has its own ruler but the administration of the 
federation is made possible by the Federal Supreme Council formed by the group of rulers 
of all the seven emirates84. The President of the UAE is elected from the council. Even 
though it is a federation of seven emirates, the comparatively richer Abu Dhabi and Dubai 
controls the administration of the federation in effect. The Supreme Council is bestowed 
with the power to assign the status of the Prime Minister and the ministerial status to 
persons85. The Federal Supreme Council meeting is scheduled to meet four times annually 
to draft the guideline for governmental policies86. The researcher notes that the Federal 
Supreme Council forms the decision makers in the UAE, thus it is important that they 
need to be aware of the risks and benefits in dealing with the developments of the nuclear 
programme. Therefore, the likelihood of the UAE making appropriate laws to deal with 
the issues that arise from nuclear power production can be assessed based on the sort of 
officials constituting the Council - those who understand and appreciate nuclear as a 
feasible alternative to fossil fuels. 
 
With the growing demand for power, the UAE government explored various sources for 
generating enough electricity that would be sufficient to sustain its economic 
development. Among the options explored, burning of liquids (like crude oil and/or 
diesel) was found to be logistically viable but environmentally a disastrous proposition in 
                                         
83 Ibid. Dennis Kumetat (2011). 
84Christopher Blanchard M. and Paul Kerr K., (2010). The United Arab Emirates Nuclear Program and 
Proposed U.S. Nuclear Cooperation, CRS 7-5700, December 20, 2010, Available at www.crs.gov Last 
accessed on 5-08-2012. 
85 Ibid. Dennis Kumetat. 
86 Kenneth Katzman, the United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy, July 17, 2012, Available at 
www.crs.gov last accessed on 5-08-2012. 
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the long run. Heavy reliance on liquids for power generation would also entail extremely 
high economic costs. The option of investing in coal based power generation plants was 
also discarded because widespread use of coal throughout the UAE would have even more 
detrimental effects for the UAE’s environment.  
 
The renewable energy sources, like solar and wind, were environmentally friendly but 
even their aggressive deployment had the potential of meeting only 6-7% of peak 
electricity demand87. Some of the main reasons why some of these sources of electricity 
are not going to be developed within UAE include inability to meet the huge energy need 
and cost effectiveness. As it stands currently, the UAE considers nuclear energy an 
acceptable way of meeting the country’s projected energy demand (see Diagram 2, 
below). This is simply because nuclear energy can be produced on a large scale; it is 
cleaner and more economical. 
 
Diagram 2: Projected Capacity and Energy Demand - UAE 
 
 
Source: Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation 
                                         
87 Policy of the United Arab Emirates on the Evaluation and Potential Development of Peaceful Nuclear 
Energy, Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation, Retrieved From: https://www.enec.gov.ae/ 
uploads/media/uae-peaceful-nuclear-energy-policy.pdf, (Accessed on April 15, 2016). 
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In response to these drawbacks of liquid, coal and renewable sources of power generation, 
the government of the UAE evaluated meeting some of its energy requirements through 
nuclear energy. Intensely conscious of the particular situations and considerations around 
the establishment of nuclear reactors, the government endorsed the following policy 
statement for starting a peaceful civil nuclear energy programme88: 
i. The UAE is dedicated to absolute operational clearness. Here, wider consultation 
is carried out with the local people and other stakeholders to brief them about the 
projects as well as gathering inputs to improve on the programme. 
ii. The country is committed to following the maximum values of non-proliferation. 
As previously stated, the researcher posits that the country ratifies the Non-
Proliferation Treaty. This means that it will not use the projects for destructive, 
instead, for peaceful purposes. 
iii. The UAE is committed to the utmost principles of safety and security. The country 
will try and maintain good practice by ensuring that relevant legislative 
mechanisms are followed.  
iv. The UAE intends to operate staunchly with the IAEA and consider its standards 
in assessing and possibly establishing a peaceful nuclear energy agenda. The 
IAEA controls all nuclear power projects globally. Therefore, the guidance of this 
agency will go a long way to ensuring the success of the UAE’s nuclear energy 
pursuit. 
v. The country expects to expand any peaceable domestic nuclear power potential in 
corporation with the governments and firms of liable nations, as well as the 
support of suitable skilled organisations. Here, UAE gains from the challenges 
and experiences of other successful nations in this regard. 
vi. The UAE will pursue any peaceful domestic nuclear power programme in a way 
that best ensures sustainability. In all, the continuity of the country’s nuclear 
power programme is important. As so much is put in to achieving the goals of 
nuclear power, the researcher expects that proper maintenance culture is put in 
place to ensure that the programme is sustained. 
 
 
                                         
88 Policy of the United Arab Emirates on the Evaluation and Potential Development of Peaceful Nuclear 
Energy, Op Cit. 
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The UAE selected the South Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) to build the 
first nuclear reactor supervised by the Abu Dhabi Water and Electricity Authority 89[see 
Appendix 3 (Certificate of Competent Authority for Radioactive Package Design) and 
Appendix 4 (License for the Construction of a Nuclear Facility)]. The selection of 
KEPCO was based on the company’s affordability and training of indigenous personnel 
compared to the American and European companies. South Korea possesses 
commendable track records in this regard. The finalisation on the area of building the 
reactor, the planning of safety regulations and review of environmental effects were 
carried out two years ago, in the UAE90. There are nuclear power generation stations to 
be set up at Baraka and at three other places, which will be functional from 2020. The 
UAE has been successful in getting financial help from Korea for building the power 
plant in Abu Dhabi91. In fact, it is Abu Dhabi that has taken the lead in the UAE’s efforts 
to achieve more power through nuclear programmes92.  
 
The plan of action was decided by the diplomats of Abu Dhabi and the basic structure of 
the nuclear energy plan was set out in 2008 by the UAE93. It also enlists the principles 
that will be followed while the UAE harnesses nuclear power. The objective of the nuclear 
power programme as enunciated from the documents is to build several nuclear power 
plants to produce electricity for the seven emirates that will be administered by the local 
bodies within the UAE94.  
 
The need for nuclear power generation arose when power generation through other 
sources were not enough. It was anticipated by the government of the UAE that there will 
be an increase in demand for power from 16 gigawatts to 40 gigawatts by the year 202095. 
According to them the need for power increases at 9% per year96. The government of the 
UAE does not envisage that the economic crunch would affect the projected increase in 
                                         
89 Report on The Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review (INIR) Mission to Review the Status of the 
National Nuclear Infrastructure in The United Arab Emirates, op.cit. 
90 Christopher Blanchard. M. et al, op.cit. 
91 Emily Meredith and Song Yen Ling, “Cash-Rich Abu Dhabi Seeks Nuclear Financing,” Uranium 
Intelligence Weekly, October 18, 2010. 
92 Ibid. Emily Meredith et al (2010). 
93 Policy of the United Arab Emirates on the Evaluation and Potential Development of Peaceful Nuclear 
Energy, op.cit. 
94 Christopher Blanchard. M. et al, op.cit. 
95 Ibid. Christopher Blanchard. M. et al, op.cit. 
96 See Christopher Blanchard. M. et al, op.cit. 
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demand for power in the future. There are new commercial projects which require heavy 
volumes of power in Abu Dhabi97. 
 
Accordingly, “known volumes of natural gas that could be made available to the nation’s 
electricity sector would be insufficient to meet future demand.”98 The UAE has 
committed to long period contracts to make available around 600 million cubic feet of 
natural gas a day to Japan while it buys around 2 billion cubic feet of natural gas from 
Qatar99. The Dolphin pipeline system is used by the UAE to transport natural gas. 
According to the government of the UAE, the abundantly available petroleum resources 
may not be economically viable for the production of power. They also doubt its effects 
on the environment100. The country also considered using coal as a means for energy 
production but decided it unsuitable due to its harmful effects on the environment as well 
as the scarcity of coal even though it is much cheaper than the petroleum products101. 
Although coal is plentiful in Australia, North America and Europe, its emissions are 
harmful. Production of electricity through wind and solar energy were also considered by 
the UAE. Christopher B. M. et al (2010) states that these means may not be sufficient to 
meet the need for power at the rate of 9 percent yearly102. The UAE concluded that nuclear 
energy would be the best source to produce energy that would meet demand by 2020103.  
 
The nuclear energy programmes of the UAE aim at producing electricity through setting 
up several nuclear power generation plants at the same time, with the use of modern 
technology to ensure safety and security in the plants104. This plan was intended to be 
developed through external support. The country is planning open a nuclear power plant 
                                         
97 Chris Stanton, “Taweelah to host chemical city,” The National (Abu Dhabi), May 4, 2008; and, Chris 
Stanton and Ivan Gale, “EMAL smelter remains on schedule,” The National (Abu Dhabi), January 13, 
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99Middle East Economic Digest, “UAE purchases gas from Dolphin pipeline at reduced rate,” May 16, 
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104 Ibid. INIR 
 44 
 
by the year 2017 and a further three nuclear power plants thereafter.105 This is illustrated 
in Table 1, Diagram 3 and Diagram 4 below (see next page). 
 
                               Table 1: Planned UAE nuclear power reactors 
 
  Type MWe gross  Construction starts Start up 
Barakah 1 APR-1400 1400  July 2012 5/2017 
Barakah 2 APR-1400 1400  May 2013 2018 
Barakah 3 APR-1400 1400   2019 
Barakah 4 APR-1400 1400   2020 
       Total:   5600 MWe     
 
Source: World Nuclear, 2013
106
 
  
 
Diagram 3: Map of UAE’s nuclear power - Barakah site where ENEC is building the 
UAE’s nuclear power (1) 
 
Source: GulfNews.com, 2013107 
                                         
105 See INIR 
106Source: http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-T-Z/United-Arab-Emirates/#.Ui 
Cok9K1EoA Last accessed on 30-08-2013. 
107 GulfNews.com, 2013. Nuclear plants: ENEC picks site. (By Ahmed A. Namatalla, Staff Reporter, 
Published: April 22, 2010). [Online]: Available at: http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/uae/government/ 
nuclear-plants-enec-picks-site-1.616290 Accessed on 16/09/2014. 
 45 
 
 
Diagram 4: UAE’s nuclear power - Barakah site where UAE is building the UAE’s 
nuclear power (2) 
 
Source: GulfNews.com, 2013108 
 
The UAE started its nuclear programme in 2008 and within two years, the country was 
given membership to the IAEA109. The UAE had no problem in satisfying the 
requirements that the IAEA had set for them.110 The intention of the UAE in starting the 
nuclear power plant was transparent and the international community could not suspect 
anything illegal related to the country’s developing nuclear power projects. The UAE was 
given quick approval since the nuclear programme was widely publicised and the 
                                         
108 GulfNews.com, 2013. UAE’s nuclear plants built on strong premises. By Francis Matthew (Editor at 
Large). Published: April 6, 2013. [Online]: Available at: http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/uae/ general/uae-
s-nuclear-plans-built-on-strong-premises-1.1163144 Accessed on 16/09/2014. 
109 Vincent Mulvey (2011). ‘United Arab Emirates: Change and Challenge - Nuclear power making its way 
to the UAE, I.E.L.R 29. 
110The IAEA requirements are: 
i. Government policies and national commitment;  
ii. Action plan for introduction of the first new power plants (NPP) and its integration into the 
national planning framework;  
iii. Organisational structures and competence for energy and electricity system planning;  
iv. Institutional and organisational structures for independent regulation of radiation protection 
and nuclear safety and for plant ownership, both with highly qualified and appropriately 
trained staff;  
v. Adequate supporting infrastructures in industry, research and development (R&D), manpower 
development, technology transfer and quality management/quality assurance (QM/QA);  
vi. In order to obtain nuclear technology, and supply of nuclear equipment, materials and 
services, international agreements (implies nuclear safeguards) need to be concluded and  
vii. Financing  
 See: International Atomic Energy Agency (2001). Nuclear power programme planning: An integrated 
approach. Vienna: Austria. [Online]. Avalaible at: http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/TE 
_1259_prn.pdf Accessed on 10/08/2016. 
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intention of the authorities to develop nuclear power plants was only to generate 
electricity for the increased demand111.  
 
The country is now in the process of institutionalising and organising the nuclear power 
growth process. Sadiki (et al) (2011) maintains that several countries in the Middle East 
have been trying to develop nuclear energy but, as most of these countries are 
geographically small and are situated near each other; these close geographical constraints 
pose a threat of chain nuclear accidents112. In case of a nuclear leak, it would make the 
boundaries of these countries inconsequential, as nuclear radiation would travel beyond 
such demarcations113. The peculiar geographical feature of Middle East thus becomes a 
non-favourable condition for the expansion of nuclear power generators (See Diagram 5) 
below.  
 
Looking at the observation of Sardiki L.(2011), the researcher does not believe that the 
geography provides an overwhelming case for the non-development of nuclear energy - 
at least on a large scale. This is where safety and security come into play. As long as 
IAEA requirements are met, approval given for the project, building and operational 
standards are maintained, it is possible that nuclear power development can be feasible. 
The researcher equally observes that the UK, Sweden and Japan are relatively small 
geographical areas, yet they have numerous nuclear installations. So, why should 
geographical argument be used against UAE? Indeed, Japan’s environmental instability 
(earthquake zone) makes the UAE more secure than Japan itself. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                         
111 Ibid. Vincent Mulvey (2011). 
112Sadiki Larbi, (2011). ‘Going Nuclear: An Arab Oppenheimer?’ in Layla Al-Zubaidi, Joachim Paul, 
Doreen Khoury (eds.), ‘Nuclear energy and the Arab World’, Perspectives, Heinrich Boll Stiftung 1April, 
2011. 
113Ibid. Larbi Sadiki (2011). 
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Diagram 5: Broad map of UAE region – including proximity to other states 
 
 
Source: Map Data, 2014 
 
The UAE signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty of the IAEA in 1995. It also completed a 
Small Qualities Protocol in 2003 since the country is a non-nuclear state without a 
significant nuclear programme or nuclear materials in its possession114. The country has 
also entered into small cooperation agreements with IAEA mostly in relation to nuclear 
power generation. The agency had advised the country in 1977 on establishing a nuclear 
energy administration. In 1984, the small project was launched in the country to consider 
the aspects of uranium exploration. The government approved a technical cooperation 
project in 2005 that was designed to access the technical and economic feasibility of 
nuclear power and desalination plants115. The UAE has also acceded to the Protocol to 
Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage of 1997 and the 
Joint Protocol on the Application of the Paris and Vienna Conventions116. The status of 
the UAE’s Non-proliferation and nuclear material safety commitments is given in Table 
2 (next page)117.  
                                         
114 Blanchard, C. M. and Kerr, P. K. (2010), Op Cit. 
115 Ibid. 
116Brendel, N. R. and Garn, J. (2012), “Nuclear Liability”, K&L Gates, Retrieved From: 
http://www.klgates.com/files/Publication/30ec13b7-8c42-4506-aa82-9e1c16327eea/Presentation/ 
PublicationAttachment/a12b9be4-bb93-4041-8ea4-aa447c47ba6b/Nuclear_liability_alert.pdf, (Accessed 
April 04, 2016).  
117 Policy of the United Arab Emirates on the Evaluation and Potential Development of Peaceful Nuclear 
Energy, Op Cit. 
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The researcher maintains that the UAE has shown its readiness to comply with 
international obligations and to develop its programme of awareness of risks and to 
provide adequate measures for dealing with potential liability scenarios. This is evidenced 
by the steady progress so far made. 
 
Table 2: UAE’s Non-proliferation and Nuclear Material Safety Commitments 
 
S. 
No. 
Instruments Year of 
Commitment 
1 IAEA Treaty on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 1995 
2 IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement 2003 
3 IAEA Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear 
Material 
2003 
4 UN Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 2000 
5 UN Security Council Resolution 1540 2004 
6 UN International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of 
Nuclear Terrorism 
2005 
7 IAEA Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear 
Accident 
1987 
8 IAEA Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear 
Accident or Radiological Emergency 
1987 
 
Source: Policy of the United Arab Emirates on the Evaluation and Potential Development of Peaceful 
Nuclear Energy 
 
2.6.1.1 The UAE Federal Law No. 06 (2009) 
 
On the recommendations of the IAEA, the government established a Nuclear Programme 
Implementation Organisation that founded the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation 
(ENEC) based in Abu Dhabi with an initial funding of $100 million118. The Federal 
Supreme Council adopted in October 2009, a national law authorising a nuclear 
                                         
118 Abraham, M. (2014), Op Cit. 
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programme. The Federal Law No. 6 of 2009, Concerning the Peaceful Use of Nuclear 
Energy, provides that the operator would be wholly responsible for nuclear safety119.  
The Law also prohibits uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing, proposes 
creation of a Federal Authority for Nuclear Registration (FANR) and advocates 
development of a nuclear material licensing and control system120. UAE nuclear laws are 
binding and there seems to be nothing to suggest that future governments in UAE will not 
adhere to them. The country’s commitment in the successful implementation of its nuclear 
energy programme is vigorous.  
 
2.6.1.2 The UAE Federal Law No. 04 (2012) 
 
New legislation was enacted in the UAE on November 14, 2012 - Federal Law No. 4, 
Concerning Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage. This law attempts to align the UAE 
legislation with the Protocol of 1997 and to implement the obligations of the UAE under 
international Conventions. This law brings about several principal changes in the UAE 
civil nuclear liability regime. It introduces the exclusive legal responsibility for nuclear 
damages on the operator121. It establishes operator’s liability without requiring any proof 
of the operator’s negligence. It allows for exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of the 
country where the nuclear accident has occurred. It limits the liability and sets the time 
limit for claiming compensation122. The provisions of this law can be broadly classified 
into three categories as discussed below. These are also contained in the regimes for civil 
                                         
119Brendel, N. R. and Garn, J. (2012), Op Cit.  
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emerged from or resulted from ionizing radiation emitted from any radiation source within a Nuclear 
Installation, or emitted from Nuclear Fuel, Radioactive Products or Waste in a Nuclear Installation, or of 
Nuclear Material coming from, originating in or sent to a Nuclear Installation,, whether arising from the 
radioactive properties of such material or from a combination of radioactive properties with toxic, explosive 
or other hazardous properties of such material. See: Federal Law by Decree No. 4 of 2012 Concerning Civil 
Liability for Nuclear Damage. 
122Brendel, N. R. and Garn, J. (2012), Op Cit. 
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liability analysed earlier in this chapter. However, the UAE is complying with 
international obligations. 
 
a) Channelling of Liability 
The Federal Law 4 provides that the entire civil liability arising from a nuclear accident 
should be channelled exclusively to the operator of the nuclear facility. In some cases, the 
transporting party or the party handling the nuclear material may also be held liable. The 
law held the operator strictly, solely and exclusively liable for ‘nuclear damages’ subject 
to the condition that it is proved that the damage is caused by a nuclear incident. In cases 
where it is established that nuclear damage has occurred then the law provides that strict 
liability be imposed with no requirement to establish operator’s negligence or any type of 
fault. The term nuclear damage is defined in a similar manner as per the definition given 
in the 1997 protocol that it includes death or personal injury, loss of or damage to 
property, economic loss, cost of restoring the damaged environment, or loss of income 
from an economic interest arising from using the environment123.  
 
b) Limits on Operator’s Liability 
The Law sets limits for the liability of the operator along with defining the period within 
which compensation can be claimed. For each nuclear accident, operator’s liability is 
fixed and it requires the operator to take insurance or other financial security to adequately 
cover the liability limit. The law also states that claims for compensation can be made 
within 3 years of the date the person suffering damage had knowledge or ought to have 
had the knowledge of the damage. For loss of life or injury, the victim is required to make 
a claim within 30 years and for other damages the claims can be made up to 10 years. In 
addition, the law also exonerates the operator, partially or fully, from any type of claim if 
a court rules that the damage has been caused by the gross negligence of the person 
suffering the damage124. The author observes that there seems to be no provision to cover 
claims for ‘latent damage,’ that is damage that occurs but remains hidden for a time and 
is not obvious to anyone, including possible victims (example: development of cancer 
within individuals following radiation leak). This is equally important as it may take a 
very long period for victim to start realising the impact of such damage. 
                                         
123 Ibid. 
124 Ibid. 
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c) Operator’s Right of Recourse 
The law also provides the operator the right of recourse if such an option is expressly 
written in the contract, or if the person who has suffered nuclear damage, has caused a 
nuclear incident by an act or omission with the intent to cause damage. It implies that the 
operator has the right to claim contractual indemnity claims against a supplier or 
contractor or any other person who has caused the damage125. The researcher suggests 
that reliance on contract terms should not be the only possible scenario that operators can 
claim indemnity for losses, rather international or domestic laws should also provide for 
this. 
 
2.6.2 Emerging criticisms 
 
While interest in nuclear power generation has become more widespread, there is also a 
sharp increase in campaigning for a more environmentally friendly alternative to fossil 
fuels which include coal and natural gas. Global-warming has become a threat to the 
ecosystem and for this reason; the need to go ‘green’ cannot be overemphasised.  
 
Supporters of nuclear power maintain it is an indispensable alternative energy production 
to fossil fuels; yet opponents uphold that past nuclear incidents are warning enough as to 
the negativities of such power production and are evidence that the costs have become 
excessive, too high to substantiate the safety hazards and risks involved.126 
 
The researcher argues that if the threats of global warming are to be addressed alongside 
the satisfaction of the rising desire for electricity, then determined development of nuclear 
power is necessary. It is noted that the production of electricity accounts for nearly a third 
of U.S. greenhouse emissions, mainly from burning fossil fuels to generate power and 
consequently, greenhouse gases like carbon dioxide, are accumulated in the atmosphere 
                                         
125 Ibid 
126Totty, M. (2008). The Case for and Against Nuclear Power. The Wall Street Journal. (Updated June 30, 
2008). [Online]. Available at: http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB121432182593500119 Accessed on 10-10-
2015. 
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contributing to a steady increase in global standard temperatures.127 The researcher 
reasons that this likely is why UAE is avoiding fossil fuel systems. 
 
Totty, M. (2008) says that plants generating nuclear power do not release carbon dioxide, 
sulphur or mercury and its full life cycle emission is comparable to that of wind and 
hydropower and less than solar power.128 Even when taking into consideration ‘full life-
cycle emissions’ which consist of mining of uranium, shipping fuel, building plants and 
managing waste, carbon-dioxide releases from nuclear plants are inconspicuous. The 
author views that power generation from a nuclear source is not the only answer to green 
ecosystems. There is still the need to explore other green sources, such as wind and solar. 
 
An important criticism against the nuclear energy generation of the UAE according to 
Supersberger (2011) is that the ill effects of nuclear power generation is shifted on to 
other countries via the export of used nuclear fuel rods to other countries. However, this 
does not decrease the level of risks posed by nuclear waste129. This is because nuclear 
wastes still have the potential to cause damage despite having already been exploited  
 
There are also problems posed by using conventional methods that affect the change in 
climatic conditions, such as the dangers of producing environmentally hazardous waste 
materials. Thus, the use of nuclear energy to produce power gains more strength. The 
production of electricity through conventional methods utilises non-renewable resources. 
These resources are perishable and will be unavailable to the coming generations if used 
without any restrictions. The researcher poses that in nuclear power production, the waste 
products bring about a threat to the coming generations through radioactive materials if 
they are not properly disposed of.  
 
An international concurrence has been reached subscribing to deep geological disposal 
on land as being the most suitable means for disposing high level radioactive waste 
                                         
127 See Totty, M. (2008). 
128 Ibid Totty, M. (2008). 
129Nikolaus Supersberger (2011). ‘The Arab Region as part of a Nuclear Renaissance: Outlooks and 
Alternatives’ in Energy’ Layla Al-Zubaidi, Joachim Paul, Doreen Khoury (eds.), ‘Nuclear energy and the 
Arab World’, Perspectives, Heinrich Boll Stiftung 1April, 2011. 
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(HLW)130 permanently from man’s environment131. Nevertheless, other options include 
disposal in geological formations under the deep ocean floor; on the ocean floor; in 
glaciated areas; extra-terrestrial disposal; and destruction by nuclear transmutation132. 
Additionally, extended storage, whether at sites of production or in a centralised store, 
may, as a standard, be an adequate waste management approach, provided it is not 
supposed to be continued for longer than is reasonable and safe and is to be replaced by 
a more stable solution afterwards133. The UAE intend to store radioactive waste in the 
country for 20 years, after which it will be removed using new techniques while most 
radioactive wastes will be sent back to South Korea for treatment and reprocessing, then 
would be re-imported again, into the country. With these, the author opines that the UAE 
system in nuclear power generation will emerge viable. 
 
Critics tend to dispute that the cost of construction of a nuclear power plant is very high, 
thus making nuclear power uneconomical when compared to other power sources.  This 
argument may be justified, as the processes toward acquiring a new plant can be 
extremely cumbersome and time consuming, possibly affected by political and regulatory 
delays. Naturally, these circumstances incur huge costs, but the justification is that, in the 
end, the gains will far outweigh the expenses. The delays in developing a new plant can 
also leave lenders with uncertainties over quick recovery of their investment funds. The 
researcher’s view is that the long-term benefits of a nuclear plant offset any criticism over 
construction costs, as the money is reclaimed through usage.  
 
There have also been repeated arguments concerning the safety of nuclear plants, 
especially during accidents. Likely these criticisms emanate from the stance of past 
nuclear incidents which include those of the Three Mile Island plant in Pennsylvania in 
1979 and the 1986 explosion at the Chernobyl plant in the Ukraine. About thirty-three 
serious incidents and accidents at nuclear power stations have been identified since the 
first, recorded at Chalk River in Ontario, Canada (1952).  Of those most publicly 
                                         
130 High-level radioactive waste (HLW) means highly radioactive wastes requiring permanent isolation 
from man’s environment that arise as a by-product of nuclear power generation. [See: Nuclear Energy 
Agency (NEA), (1989)]. 
131 Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA), (1989). Issue Brief: An analysis of principal nuclear issues. The disposal 
of high-level radioactive waste. No. 3, January 1989. [Online]. Available at: https://www.oecd-
nea.org/brief/brief-03.html Accessed on12/08/2016. 
132 See: Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA), (1989). 
133 See: Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA), (1989). 
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recognised, six occurred in the US, five in Japan, three in the UK and three in Russia (See 
Table 3 below)134. 
 
Table 3: Nuclear power station accidents and incidents from 1952-2011 
 
Nuclear power station accidents and incidents from 1952 - 2011 
Year Incident 
INES 
level 
Country IAEA description 
2011 Fukushima 5 Japan Reactor shutdown after the 2011 Sendai earthquake and 
tsunami; failure of emergency cooling caused an explosion 
2011 Onagawa   Japan Reactor shutdown after the 2011 Sendai earthquake and 
tsunami caused a fire 
2006 Fleurus 4 Belgium Severe health effects for a worker at a commercial irradiation 
facility because of high doses of radiation 
2006 Forsmark 2 Sweden Degraded safety functions for common cause failure in the 
emergency power supply system at nuclear power plant 
2006 Erwin   US Thirty-five litres of a highly-enriched uranium solution 
leaked during transfer 
2005 Sellafield 3 UK Release of large quantity of radioactive material, contained 
within the installation 
2005 Atucha 2 Argentina Overexposure of a worker at a power reactor exceeding the 
annual limit 
2005 Braidwood   US Nuclear material leak 
2003 Paks 3 Hungary Partially spent fuel rods undergoing cleaning in a tank of 
heavy water ruptured and spilled fuel pellets 
1999 Tokaimura 4 Japan Fatal overexposures of workers following a criticality event 
at a nuclear facility 
1999 Yanangio 3 Peru Incident with radiography source resulting in severe radiation 
burns 
1999 Ikitelli 3 Turkey Loss of a highly radioactive Co-60 source 
1999 Ishikawa 2 Japan Control rod malfunction 
                                         
134Guardian News and Media Limited, Datablog (2016). Nuclear power plant accidents: listed and ranked 
since 1952. [Online]. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2011/mar/14/nuclear-
power-plant-accidents-list-rank Accessed on 13/08/2016. According to Guardian News, the information is 
partially from the IAEA which, astonishingly, fails to keep a complete historical database and partially from 
reports. 
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Nuclear power station accidents and incidents from 1952 - 2011 
Year Incident 
INES 
level 
Country IAEA description 
1993 Tomsk 4 Russia Pressure build-up led to an explosive mechanical failure 
1993 Cadarache 2 France Spread of contamination to an area not expected by design 
1989 Vandellos 3 Spain Near accident caused by fire resulting in loss of safety 
systems at the nuclear power station 
1989 Greifswald   Germany Excessive heating which damaged ten fuel rods 
1986 Chernobyl 7 Ukraine 
(USSR) 
Widespread health and environmental effects. External 
release of a significant fraction of reactor core inventory 
1986 Hamm-
Uentrop 
  Germany Spherical fuel pebble became lodged in the pipe used to 
deliver fuel elements to the reactor 
1981 Tsuraga 2 Japan More than 100 workers were exposed to doses of up to 155 
millirem per day radiation 
1980 Saint 
Laurent des 
Eaux 
4 France Melting of one channel of fuel in the reactor with no release 
outside the site 
1979 Three Mile 
Island 
5 US Severe damage to the reactor core 
1977 Jaslovské 
Bohunice 
4 Czechoslova
kia 
Damaged fuel integrity, extensive corrosion damage of fuel 
cladding and release of radioactivity 
1969 Lucens   Switzerland Total loss of coolant led to a power excursion and explosion 
of experimental reactor 
1967 Chapelcross   UK Graphite debris partially blocked a fuel channel causing a fuel 
element to melt and catch fire 
1966 Monroe   US Sodium cooling system malfunction 
1964 Charlestown   US Error by a worker at a United Nuclear Corporation fuel 
facility led to an accidental criticality 
1959 Santa 
Susana Field 
Laboratory 
  US Partial core meltdown 
1958 Chalk River   Canada Due to inadequate cooling a damaged uranium fuel rod 
caught fire and was torn in two 
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Nuclear power station accidents and incidents from 1952 - 2011 
Year Incident 
INES 
level 
Country IAEA description 
1958 Vinča   Yugoslavia During a subcritical counting experiment a power build-up 
went undetected - six scientists received high doses 
1957 Kyshtym 6 Russia Significant release of radioactive material to the environment 
from explosion of a high activity waste tank. 
1957 Windscale 
Pile 
5 UK Release of radioactive material to the environment following 
a fire in a reactor core 
1952 Chalk River 5 Canada A reactor shutoff rod failure, combined with several operator 
errors, led to a major power excursion of more than double 
the reactor's rated output at AECL’s NRX reactor 
 
Source: Guardian News and Media Limited, Datablog, (2016) 
 
The effects of these accidents generated much concern. Fortunately, today, nuclear plants 
are much safer than they were in the past primarily because they possess safety features135. 
Unlike previously, in the case of accidents today, nuclear plants would contain rather than 
emit radioactive materials. It is noted that there are more safety features at nuclear plants, 
plant personnel are better trained, and reactors have been redesigned so that accidents are 
unlikely to occur. 
 
Critics also argue that nuclear power expansion will increase the risk or possibility that 
potentially antagonistic countries will decide to use nuclear material from a power 
programme to develop weapons of mass destruction. The researcher points out that this 
is where non-proliferation is considered; for the fact that adequate mechanisms and 
treaties have been put in place to check proliferation, it is possible that potential nations 
can be subdued. UAE is seeking peaceful use of its nuclear programme and is not looking 
at exploiting it for weapons of massive destruction. The UAE is principally interested in 
boosting its electricity generation and is doing everything possible to achieve the set goal. 
 
 
                                         
135 See Totty, M. (2008). 
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2.7 Evaluation of the UAE’s Nuclear Programme 
 
This section shows how the UAE have considered and dealt with the criticisms discussed 
above. The UAE’s entire nuclear programme depends almost on foreign entities for 
material, technology and expertise136. The nuclear laws in the UAE are completely in line 
with international nuclear principles and norms. The UAE has set the liability limit at 
roughly 450 million special drawing rights for its nuclear agreement with KEPCO, which 
is higher than the limit prescribed under the Vienna Convention. The main point to be 
noted here is that in case of the UAE, the operator is a foreign entity. This situation raises 
some challenges for the future growth and development of nuclear energy programs in 
the country137.  
 
The nuclear regulator in the UAE is the Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation 
(FANR). The governing board of this body comprises of only UAE nationals, whereas, 
senior management, scientists and other top level executives are all foreign nationals. 
Moreover, the UAE retains foreigners as operator and suppliers of nuclear material. 
Hence, in the case of a potential nuclear accident, absence of a dedicated in-house team 
of experts to determine compensation claims and extent of liability would be a big 
limitation for the country.  
 
In addition, the jurisdiction of the UAE’s court over foreign entities is another important 
factor which must be considered when entering new agreements138. The researcher 
therefore considers that as a major characteristic of modern nuclear law, exclusive control 
over court of law empowers the UAE Court of Competent Jurisdiction to try cases of 
nuclear damage and that the outcome of such case(s) remains respected regardless of the 
parties involved. The UAE has aligned its court jurisdiction with international 
obligations. 
 
The Federal Law 4 of 2012 has clarified many provisions regarding the potential liability 
for nuclear damage and has brought about a synergy between the 1997 Protocol and 
UAE’s legislation. It should be noted that since this law is published in Arabic, any 
                                         
136 Abraham, M. (2014), Op Cit. 
137 Ibid. 
138 Ibid.  
 58 
 
potential conflict with its English version will be resolved in favour of the original Arabic. 
The contracting parties should consider both the provisions of this law in the context of 
Islamic Shariah and the applications of this law under UAE’s Federal and local Emirate 
laws139. It is possible that this could raise broader concerns, relating to the adequacy of 
the UAE legal system to administer cases of possible liability. It should be understood 
that the essence of this is to avoid the negation of the country’s original traditional values. 
Shariah is not likely to make parochial provisions against the domestic and international 
obligations. Shariah is compatible with the UAE’s undertakings and will help deepen the 
people’s understanding of the country’s nuclear energy programme. 
 
2.7.1 UAE’s Nuclear Power Programme and manpower development 
 
The nuclear reactors are intended to provide more employment opportunities to the 
inhabitants thereby increasing the dependency of the business sector of the country to the 
local labourers140. The majority of the population in the UAE are from other countries141. 
Citizens of the Emirates add up to only less than a quarter of the total population. Most 
of the people living in the country are from Asia and are skilled workers142. Since the 
country is known to be a wealthy sovereign state through petroleum reserves, paying and 
providing for most foreign population is not a matter of concern for the country. Such 
practise has helped the UAE, as well as the labour force from outside the country143. The 
researcher observes that in the situation whereby petroleum reserves are running out, it is 
possible that this will impact upon the population and work-force; hence other potential 
economic sources would be liable for exploitation. 
 
The long-standing practice of appointing foreign workers in some industries has, in effect, 
made a monopoly of the foreign labourers144. This has in turn affected the indigenous 
population’s skills development with regards to acquiring necessary expertise in the field. 
Thus, this affects the Emirates’ participation in the development of nuclear power 
plants145. Since the industrial sector has not flourished historically alongside other 
                                         
139Brendel, N. R. and Garn, J. (2012), Op Cit. 
140 See Vincent Mulvey (2011). 
141 Ibid. Vincent Mulvey (2011). 
142 See Vincent Mulvey (2011). 
143 Ibid. Vincent Mulvey (2011). 
144 Ibid. Vincent Mulvey (2011). 
145 See Vincent Mulvey (2011). 
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industrialised countries, the inhabitants of the UAE have no long-term transfer of the 
required skills. Thus, employment of citizens of the Federation becomes tough, with very 
few individuals skilled enough to be accommodated in the nuclear power industry146.    
 
According to Supersberger (2011), the country lacks the required expertise and 
technology for power production through nuclear power reactors147. This would mean 
that the country should depend on other countries, not only for nuclear fuel, but also for 
technological advancement148. The researcher therefore suggests that methods detailing 
how to deal with a lack of expertise and technical abilities in the native population require 
inclusion within the UAE’s plans for its successful implementation of a nuclear system. 
 
The government was aware of the lack of availability of indigenous skilled persons from 
the Federation to work for the new nuclear programme. The government was cognisant 
of this difficulty even while awarding the contract to Korea Electric Power Company to 
build the nuclear power plants [see Appendix 3 Certificate of Competent Authority for 
Radioactive Package Design and Appendix 4 License for the Construction of a Nuclear 
Facility]. The scarcity of skilled indigenous labour affects the development of the nuclear 
power plants by the local labour force149. Even though some argue that the nuclear power 
generation would increase the prospects of employment in the country, there is only a 
limited scope for the generation of employment, when compared to other sources of 
power generation150.  
 
According to Supersberger (2011), the creation of electricity through renewable sources 
provides opportunities to both low skilled and high skilled employees151. Acknowledging 
this debate, one might ask why the UAE is not investing in renewable sources. The author 
poses that whilst renewable sources may provide better work opportunities for the 
workforce, the viability of renewable sources does not actually meet the State’s demands 
for energy. Thus, the workforce should be trained and educated into the nuclear system. 
                                         
146 Ibid. Vincent Mulvey (2011). 
147NikolausSupersberger (2011). ‘The Arab Region as part of a Nuclear Renaissance: Outlooks and 
Alternatives’ in Energy’ Layla Al-Zubaidi, Joachim Paul, Doreen Khoury (eds.), ‘Nuclear energy and the 
Arab World’, Perspectives, Heinrich Boll Stiftung 1April, 2011. 
148 Ibid. NikolausSupersberger (2011). 
149 Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation press release, December 27, 2009 and see Vincent Mulvey, op.cit 
150NikolausSupersberger, op.cit. 
151Ibid. NikolausSupersberger (2011). 
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It should be envisaged that this will involve costs, time and availability of experts from 
abroad to act as teachers. Perhaps, the reason for UAE’s non-involvement in renewable 
energy is that it is sometimes criticised for being variable or intermittent152. 
 
ENEC aims at developing the local skills and talents of UAE citizens to be utilised in 
developing the power generation programme of the UAE153. According to the publication 
of the ENEC the contract for the development of nuclear power plants “call[s] for 
extensive training, human resource development, and education programmes as the UAE 
builds the capacity to eventually staff the clear majority of the nuclear energy programme 
with national talent.”154 Consequently, there is a training programme in place to achieve 
this, described below. 
 
According to the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of ENEC in Mulvey (2011), “The 
KEPCO team dedicated a highly-experienced team to our project and has shown a serious 
commitment to transferring the knowledge gained from Korea’s 30 years of successful 
nuclear industry operation into the UAE programme.”155 Mulvey (2011) states that an 
institution for the development of human resources and skills for UAE nationals was 
considered an urgent need by the government. Thus, Gulf Nuclear Energy Infrastructure 
Institute (GNEII), with the co-operation of Sandia National Laboratories and the Nuclear 
Security Science and Policy Institute of the United States of America (USA) and the 
University of Khalifa are to help in this regard156. The Institute was to be formed with the 
support of the ENEC and the Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation (FANR) of the 
UAE157. Mulvey (2011) also states that the objective of the formation of the GNEII is: 
“To prepare the institute’s staff and GNEII program graduates to help GNEII become, 
within five years after its inauguration, a self-sustaining source of nuclear safety, security, 
and non-proliferation education consistent with international standards.”158 
 
                                         
152 Renewable Energy Debate. [Online] Available at: http://www/Renewable_energy Last accessed on 06-
03-2014. 
153 Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation Press Release, December 27, 2009, op.cit. 
154 Ibid. Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation Press Release, December 27, 2009, op.cit 
155 Vincent Mulvey, op.cit. 
156 Ibid. Vincent Mulvey (2011). 
157 See Vincent Mulvey (2011). 
158 Ibid. Vincent Mulvey (2011). 
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The attempt of the UAE government to offer guidance on the building of nuclear power 
plants is a welcome move for the development of nuclear power generation. To construct 
and operate nuclear power plants, it is important that the labour force is well equipped 
with the much-required knowledge, on all segments of nuclear power plants, from the 
very lowest to the highest level. It is not until knowledge is inculcated at all levels, that 
the nuclear programme may be successful159.   
 
It cannot be forgotten that the learning of a skill based talent needs theoretical, as well as 
practical knowledge. Mulvey (2011) added that imparting knowledge on all levels of 
nuclear power generation requires the practical experience at the site of power generation 
and cannot be concluded by classroom teaching160. Even if it is an engineer with a 
decade’s experience in the nuclear industry, or a tradesman who works with the coolant 
pump, they all require practical experience to know the difference in the sounds made by 
the machinery, to come to a conclusion should the plant require a repair161. The asset of 
practical experience cannot be replaced by mere theoretical knowledge. Such hands-on 
experience would help in diverting an accident or a fault in the industry well before it 
causes irreparable damage162. Such a transfer of practical knowledge is the most important 
aspect when deliberating the training of persons working in nuclear power plants, since a 
slight change in the work routine could lead to unimaginable catastrophe(s). While there 
is skills shortage within UAE, this practical experience is to be achieved through its 
government sending workers to South Korea to learn the practical skills necessary for the 
running of the energy programme. 
 
The country is deficient in skilled manpower. This was thought to be remedied, by 
entering a contract with the Korean group of companies to transfer the skill sets from 
Korea to the UAE. It was expected to be time consuming since there are considerable 
differences between the societal systems and individuals’ mind-sets. Even if the country’s 
authorities are successful in up-skilling the citizens with the necessary skills and 
knowledge for running nuclear power plants, there could be numerous other challenges 
that need to be faced by the authorities promoting the development of the nuclear power 
                                         
159 Christian Blanchard,op.cit and also see Vincent Mulvey, op.cit 
160 Vincent Mulvey, op.cit. 
161 Ibid. Vincent Mulvey, op.cit. 
162 See Vincent Mulvey, op.cit. 
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projects163’164. Mulvey (2011) maintains that it is doubtful whether the time-consuming 
training process would help UAE nationals gain higher positions in the nuclear power 
programme165. Instead the more menial job positions may initially be filled by nationals 
whilst the higher positions are given to foreign nationals. This would not satisfy the need 
for an Emirate to run the nuclear programme, as is preferred by the government. 
Nevertheless, to date, the contractual relationships have progressed well enough to enable 
the fulfilment of the contract166.  
 
2.7.2 UAE’S Nuclear Energy Programme and the international community 
 
The increased awareness of nuclear power production has made the international 
community doubt the intention of many states in harnessing nuclear energy which might 
possibly lead to nuclear explosion167. There are concerns expressed by other states as to 
the suitability of a nuclear resource located within the Middle East. The researcher 
therefore queries: So, if nuclear facilities exist in Israel, why not in other Mid-Eastern 
states?  This illustrates that the security issues would be similar, surely. 
 
The study’s significance increases with the escalation of fear amongst the international 
community regarding the use of nuclear weapons at the outbreak of a war. The 
consequences of using nuclear weapons have been seen in various parts of the world, for 
example Japan and South Sea Islands. The international community’s concern increases 
with the notion that the Gulf countries encourage terrorist activities and that this could 
lead to the use of nuclear weapons by terrorist groups. The UAE’s decision to use nuclear 
energy for peaceful purposes therefore attracts attention from the global community. 
Although these concerns are justified, for global peace and security, the UAE’s decision 
is a welcome one. Any research on this topic understandably attains significance in the 
                                         
163 Ibid. Vincent Mulvey, op.cit. 
164Claire Boudreau, Daniel Cogné. Actes Du 22e Congrès International Des Sciences Généalogique 
Et Héraldique À Ottawa, 18-23 Août 1996. 
165 See Vincent Mulvey, op.cit. 
166 Christian Blanchard, op.cit and see Vincent Mulvey, op.cit 
167 Report on The Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review (INIR) Mission to Review the Status of the 
National Nuclear Infrastructure in The United Arab Emirates, January 2011, Available at 
http://www.iaea.org/NuclearPower/Downloads/Infrastructure/files/UAE-INIR-Mission-January-2011-
Report.pdf, Last Accessed on 4-08-2012.  
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present international circumstances. In terms of protecting nuclear plants from terrorist 
activity, the government plans to use its security forces to guard the facilities. 
 
These issues were deliberated upon in depth by the UAE, which consequently formulated 
policies to combat these threats to the international community. In order to reassure the 
international community that the UAE does not intend to amass nuclear power, the UAE 
resorted to fuel supply outside its boundaries168. This has assured other countries of the 
real objectives of the nuclear power programme in the UAE.   
 
2.8 Philosophical and ethical arguments for the use of resources for peaceful 
purposes 
  
There have been some moral arguments raised both for and against the use of nuclear 
energy for peaceful purposes. These arguments tend to be geared towards guiding against 
the effects of nuclear power production on the present and future generations. Since this 
involves decisions regarding the duties to be performed by the present generation, the 
next aspect of the moral obligation would be on whose shoulders the duty will fall, so as 
to provide for the welfare of the future generation. It is opined by many that the financially 
less fortunate are the ones who will bear the burden, thus the issue of providing for the 
future generations has ultimately led to a situation that relates within one generation as to 
who should bear the burden of the moral duties towards the future generations169. The 
UAE has taken this into consideration as could be seen in its policy statements. 
 
The continuing use of the current nuclear fuels in the future is not certain. There could be 
a technological boom that encourages different methods of electricity production other 
than the ones employed now. Therefore, it cannot be certain that future generations would 
use the same technology to produce the power and moreover whether the same fuel will 
be used to generate power. The researcher suggests that the present generation preserve 
the facilities that are available now for the future generations also. The moral obligations 
are such that it encourages the present generation to perform according to the needs of 
the future generations.  
 
                                         
168 Christopher Blanchard M. et al, op.cit. 
169Shrader-Frechette, K. S. (1997). Risk and rationality. University of California Press Berkeley.  
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The alteration in the resource cycle itself can bring about astonishing changes in the future 
availability of the resource. The whole cycle of a uranium nuclear power plant happens 
in different stages. The first step of extracting uranium and its enrichment is followed by 
its filling in the reactor, for chemical reactions to occur, which results in the formation of 
nuclear wastes. These wastes are then treated before disposal. The one-through fuel cycle 
employs uranium once and the fuel that is not irradiated becomes waste. Such wastes are 
disposed of for 200,000 years. Despite the risk involved, the storage of nuclear wastes is 
a viable process. On the other hand, in a closed fuel cycle the waste after the first 
irradiation is treated and reused as fuel for the next process of irradiation. It is known as 
reprocessing of nuclear wastes and the UAE is also contemplating this. 
 
Re-usage enables the prolongation of nuclear fuel use. This process is utilised in many 
parts of Europe. Moral duties may be realised in optimal utilisation of nuclear fuel. 
Another option for reusing the nuclear fuel is to partition and transmute, which enables 
the separation of components which are capable of being irradiated and then reusing them 
in the reactor. The efficiency of the Uranium nuclear fuel can be increased by using 
breeder fuel cycle and employing certain plutonium isotopes.  
 
The negative and positive moral aspects of nuclear energy production determined by the 
present generation affects those in the future. However, the moral aspect of the nuclear 
energy production can be ascertained using modern techniques, like Partitioning and 
Transmutation and this is a good thing to do. Thus, the moral issues of nuclear power 
production can be dealt with by the combined usage of modern techniques and risk 
analysis. The researcher believes that this method would ensure the safety, security and 
prolongation of the nuclear fuel. The alternative to using this technology is that the 
plutonium extracted during this method can be used for the development of weapons of 
mass destruction. This is the reason why reprocessing of nuclear waste is not encouraged, 
for fear of proliferation by countries. The UAE, through strict monitoring of its nuclear 
programme, will successfully deal with this. 
 
Another major crisis that will be brought about by the present generation utilising nuclear 
power plants is the threat of nuclear waste. Merely the inability to anticipate the methods 
or techniques that will be employed in the future makes the disposal of nuclear wastes of 
great concern. According to Ekeli (2004), the inability to foresee the needs of the coming 
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generations diminishes the responsibility of the present generation towards them170. The 
researcher argues that if Ekeli (2004) is saying that because we do not know what future 
generations will want we are not responsible for considering them, then this is not morally 
acceptable. Sustainable development suggests that we are morally responsible, as well as 
accountable, towards future generations. The task then is to assess the risks now and 
diminish any potential harm in the future. We can assess the risk, so we ought to do 
something about it, which is contrary to what Ekeli is suggesting here.  
 
Golding (1981) maintains that the responsibility towards the future generation(s) is 
inversely proportional to the remoteness of the future generation from the present 
generation.171 This means responsibility reduces with the increase in the distance between 
the future and present generations172. This also is not morally acceptable, as one should 
be able to do what is moral, irrespective of time. So, he is saying that as we do not know 
what future generations want, we do not need to consider them. Yet, the whole point of 
developing nuclear energy within the UAE is to deal with the future implications of 
exhaustive supplies of petroleum and the need to produce energy for future generations. 
Therefore, the points raised by Ekeli and Golding can be rebutted. The Bruntland 
Commission suggested that sustainable development is any development that “meets the 
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their 
own needs”173. This sets a moral objective based on social needs (not wants or desires) 
and shows how the needs of today need to be assessed considering the needs of tomorrow. 
 
The waste disposals that are carried out now are aimed at protecting the generations for 
the next 10,000 years, meaning that the population existing after this period will be 
exposed to more radiation.174 The present generation cannot be expected to live in 
anticipation of the protection of generations that might exist in 10,000 years. This 
diminishes the obligations of the present generation towards those of the future. These 
impediments of the present generation to provide safety for future generations might 
                                         
170Ekeli, Skagen K. (2004) ‘Environmental Risks, Uncertainty and Intergenerational Ethics’, in: 
Environmental Values 13 (4): pp421- 448. 
171Golding, M. P., (1981). ‘Obligation to Future Generations’, in: Partridge, E. (ed.) Responsibilities to 
Future Generations: Environmental Ethics, (Prometheus Books, Buffalo, New York) 61-72. 
172 Ibid Golding (1981). 
173 World Commission on Environment and Development (1987). Our Common Future, Oxford University 
Press. 
174 Ibid Golding (1981). 
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confuse those in the present as to whether they really owe a duty towards the generations 
to follow. Nonetheless, it could be deduced that the current generation has a responsibility 
towards the next generation or at least the generations that will exist within a short period 
from now. Such an obligation cannot be disregarded by the present population. This is 
presented in the Rio and Kyoto treaties on environmental harm and sustainable 
development. 
 
The question of bearing the burden by the present generation for the welfare of the future 
generation requires an answer: according to OECD (1995), the persons responsible for 
the production of nuclear waste are the present generation and thus, must take the 
responsibility of treating it, without impacting greatly upon their successors175. Since the 
present generation uses nuclear reactive materials to benefit themselves, it is necessary 
for the beneficiaries to ensure that there are no ill effects for the next generations. There 
is no doubt that the beneficiaries should bear the burden of protecting the future 
generations also. But on whom should these responsibilities be attached in the present 
generation?  
 
According to Bullard et al (2000), the responsibility of having greater safety measures 
and security is usually borne by those categorised as belonging to the lower middle class 
in terms of income, within the same generation176. Greater risk of nuclear reactions will 
be faced by economically backward people within this generation. For the improved 
safety of the future generation(s), the present will have to suffer. This may not be a 
welcome move, therefore threatens the safety and security of the coming generations. The 
priority concern is the way in which moral issues are resolved. For this reason, in order 
to avoid disparity between sections within one generation, a solution should arise within 
that generation, rather than forgetting the moral obligations of any generation towards the 
next.  
 
                                         
175 IAEA-NEA, ‘Uranium 2001: Resources, Production and Demand’, in A joint report by the OECD 
Nuclear Energy Agency and the International Atomic and Energy Agency, (Paris: IAEA and NEA-OECD, 
1995) 
176 Bullard, R. D. (1994). Unequal protection: Environmental justice and communities of color, Sierra Club 
Book, San Francisco, CA, and Bullard, R.D., and Johnson, G.S. ‘Environmental justice: grassroots activism 
and its impact on public policy decision making’, 2000 Journal of Social Issues 56 (3), pp. 555-578. 
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There are also various legal issues distinctive to nuclear peace programmes for electricity 
production. The insurance contract does not include provision for indemnity and 
subrogation. Since the operator of the power programme is exclusively liable for the 
damage that might occur in the case of a nuclear accident or fallout, the doctrine of 
indemnity in the insurance contract of a nuclear power plant would vitiate the legal 
principle. The construction of the plant itself is different from other kinds of conventional 
methods of power production. The constructor cannot be given control of the nuclear 
power plant until it is proved that the plant works according to the contractual 
requirements. Hence, the rejection of a constructed nuclear power plant is not within the 
rights of the operator of such plant.  
 
Even if there are any defects in the construction or design of the power plant, the operator 
cannot reject the plant since the working of the nuclear power plant can exclusively be 
done by the constructor. The contractors for the construction of the plant cannot be held 
liable even if the accident occurs due to a fault in the design or construction. It should be 
acknowledged that the construction of a nuclear power plant cannot be done by one 
contractor since it has two distinct parts that can be performed only by experts in the field.  
 
Therefore, the best moral framework that suits the production of electricity through 
nuclear fuel would be to adopt a nuclear reactor that can reuse nuclear fuel through 
partitioning. This method would reduce the amount of nuclear reactive wastes as well as 
possible risks. While this might not be sufficient, it can greatly mitigate the burden on 
future generations. It is expected by the present generation to suffer a little in return for 
the massive benefit they receive using nuclear power plants and to reduce the impact of 
such usage on the coming generations. Thus, a viable solution to perform moral duties is 
to go for a reusable method of power production to reduce the impact of such power 
production.  
 
The nuclear power reactors can pose a huge danger to the environment and living things 
if not dealt with properly. Leakage or other nuclear accidents might occur which can be 
extremely harmful. In order to avoid these, nuclear power plant operators are expected to 
take all the necessary safety and security measures. Reusability of nuclear reactive 
materials necessitates a safer practice. It is not sufficient to meet the waste management 
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requirements; the obligations to the future generation must also be satisfied. There are 
other issues such as the impact of nuclear accident and mitigation of such occurrence.   
 
Moral values might expect that the present generation perform sustainably, but moral 
values or obligations are not mandatory and therefore are not enforceable. The 
international community should draft laws or regulations through IAEA Conventions 
aimed at protecting the interests of future generations, whilst also ensuring that the right 
to have efficient use of energy is availed of by the present generation. This should also be 
applicable to domestic laws. The researcher therefore maintains that the present 
generation should make use of nuclear energy to produce power, whilst maintaining the 
long-term vision of providing for the safety of the coming generations.  
 
2.9 A Duty to Act 
 
This section basically gives an insight into a more theoretical analysis of the concept of 
‘duty’. This helps to provide a theoretical and philosophical support to the exploitation of 
nuclear energy. Ross (2000) gives more importance to the duty which requires the 
population refrains from performing an act177.This means the duty not to do an act, so as 
to prevent an injury should be given more importance than the duty to do well. These 
could be moral or legal duties, which may place obligations on others. But can current 
generations place duties on those to follow? Of course, if a current generation does what 
is worthy, it is expected that future generations will follow suit. 
 
Rawls (1999) is of the same view that the duties which are framed in the negative format 
must be given priority over the positive duties178. Negative duties such as prohibitions are 
easier to write and define (criminal law is a good example). More positive duties are 
problematical as the nature and scope of the duty can be flexible and thus often dependent 
upon current circumstances. However, Golding (1981) differs from all the other 
academics, philosophers, theorists, or scholars in believing that a positive duty should be 
                                         
177 Ross, W. D., (2002). The Right and the Good. Edited by Stratton-Lake, P., (Clarendon Press, Oxford). 
178 Rawls, J. (1971). A theory of justice, revised edition. The Belknap, Press of Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
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given more importance to the negative duty considering the closest generations that come 
in future179. 
  
According to Callahan (1972), in order to provide for the distant generations, it is better 
to give priority to the negative duty rather than the positive one180. On the other hand, De-
Shalit (1995) proposes the inclusion of both duties by emphasising the need for the 
positive duty necessary for the future generations, while propounding the need to 
discourage the negative ones181. A positive duty for the future can be ‘weak’ - i.e. a duty 
to protect future generations is limited by the meaning of the words ‘protect’ and ‘future’. 
Therefore, how would one phrase in law today which places a duty on those in the future, 
‘protect’ when we cannot see what circumstances may exist in the future? 
 
There are various ethical solutions to the problems faced by the adoption of nuclear 
energy to produce electricity. These solutions require that the present generation perform 
additional ethical, as well as legal duties so as to protect the coming generations.  
 
There are two reasons why the moral solution casts an extra burden on the present 
generation. The first one being that the use of nuclear energy is beneficial to the present 
population, but the ill effects of such usage is passed on to the coming generations. The 
second follows that the present generation benefiting from the use of nuclear power makes 
the future generation pay for it. According to Gardiner (2006), the existing generation is 
lucky enough to enjoy the nuclear fuel that is abundant now, but the generation of power 
for the benefit of the present population would produce damaging nuclear wastes for the 
generations to follow182. 
 
The problems that should be anticipated in the event of electricity production by nuclear 
power plants are that the nuclear fuel will not last long enough to cater for the needs of 
the future generation and that the use of nuclear power for electricity will produce wastes 
                                         
179 Golding, M. P., (1999). ‘Obligation to Future Generations’, in: Partridge, E. (ed.) Responsibilities to 
Future Generations: Environmental Ethics, Prometheus Books, (Buffalo, New York, 1981) p. 61-72. 
180 Callahan, D. (1972). ‘What Obligations Do We Have to Future Generations?’ American Ecclesiastical 
Review 164, pp. 265-80. 
181 De-Shalit, A. (1995). Why Posterity Matters: Environmental Policies and Future Generations Routledge, 
London and New York. 
182Gardiner S. M, (2006). ‘A Perfect Moral Storm: Climate Change, Intergenerational Ethics and the 
Problem of Moral Corruption’, Environmental Values 15 (3), pp. 397-413. 
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proven to be harmful to the new generations. To overcome these issues, there are two 
obligations which the present generation needs to fulfil. The present generation should 
consider it their duty not to injure the coming generations and to protect their welfare by 
making the fuel available to them183. 
 
It is the usage of nuclear fuel, especially Uranium, which depletes with constant usage 
that generates nuclear wastes and poses a threat to the future generations. It is not possible 
to disagree with the argument that we have a duty towards the upcoming generation, since 
such a contradiction would be morally corrupt and against public policy. The researcher 
believes that ‘doing the right thing’ is more justifiable and beneficial to all concerned. 
Doing what is not morally acceptable means denying future generations of their rights. 
 
The first duty of the present generation is to avoid injuring those of the future. This 
principle is applicable to all fields/topics and is not merely restricted to the exploitation 
of nuclear energy. Accordingly, the use of the principle in the medical field and in 
environmental protection is well noted. According to the principle ‘prevention is better 
than cure’, there should be earnest, real efforts from mankind to avoid the possible ill 
effects of unwarranted procedure, by taking all possible steps to reduce them184. The 
expected danger from a nuclear power plant is associated with radioactive waste products. 
There is need for proper treatment of these wastes to avoid burdening the next 
generation(s)185.  Special methods of treating the nuclear wastes are necessary to prevent 
injury to the new generations.  
 
The second obligation on the present generation is to protect the welfare of future 
generations. According to Barry (1998), (from a temporal perspective) “No one 
generation has a better or worse claim than any other to enjoy the earth’s resources, 
depletion should be compensated for in the sense that later generations should be no worse 
off […] than they would have been without depletion”186. The other issue would be to 
                                         
183Taebi, B. (2010). ‘The Morally Desirable Option for Nuclear Power Production’, in Nuclear Power and 
Justice between Generations - A moral Analysis of Fuel Cycles’ (Philip Brey, Peter Kroes and Anthonie 
Meijerseds), Available at: http://www.ethicsandtechnology.eu/images/uploads/ Nuclear_Power_and_ 
Justice _between_Generations.pdf , last accessed on August 28,2012. 
184 Wingspread-Statement. (1998). The Precautionary Principle. 
185 IAEA (1995) ‘The principles of radioactive waste management’, in Radioactive waste safety standards 
programme, Vienna: IAEA. 
186 Barry B, (1989). ‘The Ethics of Resource Depletion’, in: Democracy, Power and Justice, Essays in 
Political Theory. Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp. 515, 519. 
 71 
 
find out a reason why the same amount of resources should be kept for the coming 
generations. The opinion of Beckerman (1997), that the older generations required lesser 
fuel than the present generation is noteworthy187. Additionally, Barry (1998) further 
opines that the next generation should not be made to face an even worse situation unless 
it is due to their own fault188. The argument in favour of this responsibility is that the 
current generation has the obligation to provide for the coming generation with as much 
fuel as was necessary for the welfare of the present generation.  
 
The two duties discussed above are the primary responsibilities, which can be replaced 
with other obligations if required. The confusion that might arise later would be regarding 
the primacy of one duty over another. There may be circumstances under which the two 
duties cannot be performed together. If these happen, choosing which of these two duties 
should be performed over the other would become an issue. Therefore, execution of these 
obligations further requires the utilisation of new techniques. The duties as described 
above need to be prioritised, in order to avoid misunderstanding as to which one to fulfil 
in a situation that demands the performance of one first or only. These duties should 
therefore be reflected in legal requirements as in the UK Energy Law. 
 
The responsibility to compensate the coming generation for the resources used by the 
present one is a good moral duty to profess, but in practice it has many problems 
associated with it. Unlike the conventional resources of power generation, nuclear power 
generation has various techniques which enable the substitution of the fuel or recycling 
of the fuel. This would help in alleviating the problems of the future generation to some 
extent. The present generation has the option to haul out nuclear fuel from sea water or 
other phosphate deposits, for the reserves to last longer for the coming generations. The 
changes in technology can benefit future generations by providing different kinds of 
resources for nuclear power production and, certain techniques during the nuclear power 
generator processes provide for nuclear wastes which could be used as fuel for further 
power generation.  
 
 
                                         
187 Beckerman, W. (1997). ‘Debate: Intergenerational Equity and the Environment’, Journal of Political 
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188Barry B, op.cit. 
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2.10 Nuclear law and the legislative procedure 
 
Having looked at duties to be acted upon by the present generation in order that future 
generations will not be adversely affected, it is important to consider what should be done 
to hold the present generation responsible for any immoral act it may commit. Hence, the 
need for legislative procedure to guide the present generation is essential. The legislative 
body has the task of drafting those duties and making defaulters punishable. 
 
2.10.1 Theory of nuclear law 
 
The aim of this section is to analyse issues that could support States in preparing laws 
which offer sufficient foundations for exploring and exploiting the economic and social 
gains of nuclear energy and ionising radiation. It is therefore imperative to present a basic 
theory of nuclear law. To sufficiently attempt this, the following questions need to be 
addressed: What does nuclear law mean? How is nuclear law different from other features 
of national and international law? What connection should nuclear law have to other 
fundamentals of a State’s legal structure?189 
 
However, Heffron, R. (2009) view is that nuclear energy can legally be distinguished 
from other energy sources. The legislation pertaining to the nuclear sector is different 
(due to the severity of the sector in terms of potential damage it could cause) and the 
mechanism of enacting this legislation can undermine the inclusion of synchronisation of 
legislation across states. This means that such formulation can involve a country’s own 
constitutional and legal mechanisms, cultural traditions, scientific, technical and 
industrial capacities, as well as financial and human resources190.  
 
A comprehensive and multifaceted chronological and investigative assessment of efforts 
in over six decades to develop legal standards following an intricate understanding is 
therefore examined. Conversely, this attempt is limited to outlining the essential issues 
that relevant players need to deal with.  
                                         
189Stoiber, C., Baer, A., Pelzer, N. and Tonhauser, W, P, (2010). Handbook on Nuclear Law: Implementing 
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2.10.2 Definition of nuclear law 
 
Taking the above fundamental aspects into consideration, nuclear law could therefore be 
regarded as: “The body of special legal norms created to regulate the conduct of legal or 
natural persons engaged in activities related to fissionable materials, ionizing radiation 
and exposure to natural sources of radiation”191. 
 
In the above definition, four crucial components could clearly be seen making up a typical 
nuclear law.  Foremost, nuclear law is a set of special legal norms, due to the effects 
nuclear can cause.  It is known to be a fraction of universal or countrywide legislation. It 
is also comprised of diverse regulations necessary, due to the exceptional nature of 
technology. Also, the constituent of nuclear regulation integrates the risk-benefit 
approach, vital to controlling harmful activities which are simultaneously socially and 
economically advantageous. Thirdly, the specific legal norms relate to the performance 
of legal individuals, together with business-related, intellectual, systematic and 
governmental bodies. The last element centres on the production of energy or power using 
fissionable material or ionising radiation, thus ensuring the law is seen as a special legal 
system192. 
 
2.10.3 Objective of nuclear law 
 
It is imperative to emphasise briefly the core reason why a State would decide to 
promulgate legislation, before trying to classify which aspects of nuclear law 
differentiates it from other types of law. Basically, the primary purpose of nuclear law is: 
“To provide a legal framework for conducting activities related to nuclear energy and 
ionising radiation in a manner which adequately protects individuals, property and the 
environment”.193 
 
Therefore, the primary responsibility of affected authorities or governments is to 
cautiously consider their nuclear and related activities, as well as their future plans for the 
                                         
191 See Stoiber, C. et al (2003).  
192See Stoiber, C.et al (2003).   
193 See Stoiber, C. (2003). 
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development of nuclear energy, so that they can sufficiently cover them in the law; this 
is paramount.  
 
2.11 Legal, regulatory and liability developments regarding nuclear power 
production 
 
‘The law’ is essentially the society’s desire(s) that has been accepted into legislation. The 
law also stipulates punishments in case of non-compliance. Therefore, the best method of 
executing the moral duties of the community is to formulate laws which provide for the 
performance of such obligations. The moral values previously discussed can be satisfied 
by formulating laws and regulations. The disposal of nuclear reactive wastes that form as 
a by-product of electricity production through nuclear power plants requires mandatory 
and specific rules. International conventions are entered into by the countries involved, 
in order to formulate such regulations, which bind the signatories to the convention.  
 
The legislation also gives substance to the welfare of the future generation since the effect 
of a nuclear accident or a leakage in a nuclear plant lasts for generations. The 1986 
Chernobyl accident gave the international community an insight into the effects of nuclear 
accidents. The researcher believes this caused the international community to be careful 
about the construction, operation and usage of nuclear power plants and nuclear reactors.  
 
More recently, the 2011 Fukushima nuclear crisis alarmed the international community 
over the extent of damage that can be caused by a nuclear accident. This made the 
international players explore solutions to the increasing amount of nuclear waste. Since 
its emergence, mankind has been afraid of the massive destruction potentially caused by 
a nuclear incident. However, these fears could hamper the development of nuclear power 
generation all over the globe194. The age of utilising nuclear energy merely for destructive 
purposes appears over now. The world is on the threshold of developing economically, 
medically, culturally and socially, using nuclear energy in various fields. Nuclear energy 
is now used for the production of electricity and for treatment of various diseases.  
 
                                         
194Hariharan S. (2012). Nuclear Safety, liability and Non- proliferation: a legal insight, IELR 108. 
 75 
 
Increased awareness regarding the effect of the emissions from conventional methods of 
electricity production and the signing of the Kyoto Protocol made the world turn to 
nuclear energy for such purposes. The very aim of the international convention- to pass 
on the development from one generation to another - could only be made possible if 
nuclear energy is harnessed in the correct way. Thus, written law was required, to aid 
fulfilment of the moral duty to protect the coming generation(s). The researcher therefore 
admits that the duty of the law itself is a deterrent towards maintaining morals and 
ensuring that things are done properly, while the enforceability of the law makes it more 
coherent and considerate.  
 
Article II of the IAEA Statute provides for the use of nuclear power to be performed in a 
way that peace, health and development of the world is safeguarded195. It also envisages 
that nuclear energy should not be used for the use of weapons or for mass destruction. 
The subject of legal structure around the globe include the use of nuclear energy in a 
secure way; safeguards from radiation; disposal of nuclear wastes; the safe mobilisation 
of nuclear materials; training on how to deal with emergency situations; responsibility for 
the injury caused by radioactive materials; the secure handling of radioactive materials; 
protection of areas with nuclear active materials; commercial transaction of nuclear 
materials and the decommissioning of nuclear power plants196. The safeguarding of 
human beings from being exposed to nuclear active materials is one of the prime concerns 
of the international community. The radiation from nuclear active materials causes 
damage to human tissues, even if the radiation level is exceedingly low. Health injuries 
that can be caused by nuclear materials may potentially be passed on to future generations. 
Hence, the moral obligation to protect the interests of the future generation is addressed 
by the legal framework. 
 
The United Nations Organisation (UNO) has formed the IAEA to formulate regulations 
for the preservation of Safety Standards for the protection from radiation. The objective 
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Accessed on 13/08/2016. 
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of Basic Safety Standards (BSS) is to safeguard mankind from the results of radiation, 
while the steps to be taken for safeguarding the environment do not exist in the 
regulations197. It provides for the utmost amount of radiation that is permissible for human 
beings and the maximum amount of such materials that can be stored198. There are 
provisions to keep monitoring facilities to measure the level of radiation emitted from a 
radioactive source. The holder of the radioactive material is expected to have power over 
the emission(s). This suggests a gap in the law, as a single international instrument should 
provide for the safety measures that are to be followed by every operator who uses nuclear 
materials, in order to ensure the whole world is equally protected.  
 
There are regulatory measures adopted by the IAEA on the nuclear power plants. It 
mainly deals with the effects of the nuclear materials on the environment199. According 
to sub-programme 1.1 Basic Nuclear Safety and Criteria the aim was “to examine current 
safety issues and to propose solutions for them with a view to establishing commonly 
shared safety principles and objectives… and to advise on safety policy and criteria in 
order to ensure a consistent approach to nuclear safety compatible with evolving radiation 
protection philosophy and criteria.”200 The IAEA safety regulations addressed the issues 
of constructing the nuclear power plant; the external hazards of nuclear plants; the defects 
in the design of the power plants; the effects of the power plant due to the passage of time; 
keeping a record of events that have safety concerns and also certain rules regarding the 
security of the nuclear power plants201.  
 
The Hazardous Material Transportation Act was the outcome of the efforts of the United 
States Congress of 1975 to stipulate standards for the mobilisation of materials that are 
radioactive. It authorises the Department of Transport (DOT) to protect mankind “against 
the risks to life and property which are inherent in the transportation of hazardous 
materials in commerce.”202 On the international level, the IAEA has made the Regulations 
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for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material to govern the mobilisation of radioactive 
materials203. To deal with this, the UAE has made The United Arab Emirates Regulations 
for Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials [UAE RSTRM (56/2004)]. The UK also has 
the 2002 No. 1093 Atomic Energy and Radioactive Substances (The Radioactive Material 
(Road Transport) Regulations 2002). Regulations governing the transport of radioactive 
material in these countries are based on standards developed by the IAEA. The researcher 
observes that IAEA regulations are prescriptive and apply internationally to enable the 
safe transport of packages across international borders. 
 
The business of radioactive materials is governed by the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT). In addition to the standards set forth by GATT while trading 
internationally, radioactive materials which are used for trade need to pass the 
requirements of national security and environmental protection204. 
 
Apart from the safety standards that need to be followed internationally, there are certain 
basic principles of law that are followed while determining the liability in case of a 
nuclear accident. The international law recognises the right of the victim to claim 
damages from the person liable for the nuclear accident. It further makes the operator of 
the nuclear power plant strictly liable for any damage that is caused by the running of the 
nuclear power plant. International treaties, such as the Paris Convention, envisage that 
the operator alone is exclusively liable for the damage caused by the nuclear power plant 
and it cannot be blamed on defects in construction or design. This principle is applicable 
to the non-signatories of the Paris Convention by the 2004 Protocol which amended the 
Paris Convention. The Vienna Convention similarly makes the operator liable for the 
damage caused by nuclear accidents.  
 
Traditionally, there has been a two-tier system regarding liability, since most countries 
maintain a system at both national and at international levels. The scope of liability of the 
operator is also not definite, since the international instruments have bestowed only 
restricted liability, while national level laws have provided unlimited liability regarding 
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 78 
 
the operator of a nuclear power plant. From victims’ viewpoints, the national laws which 
permit unlimited liability are a welcome move, because the original victims are not the 
only ones that suffer as injury might also be passed on through to their future family 
generations. Such injury cannot be compensated for in solely monetary terms but by also 
ensuring that adequate measures are put in place to check reoccurrence and avoiding 
adverse effects on future generations. 
 
Since the operator will be exclusively liable for any nuclear reactor mishap occurring, 
there should be a strong insurance contract for the operator. The insurance contract in a 
nuclear power plant is usually provided by a group of companies and is not limited to a 
sole company. The liability to indemnify the victim will be in proportion to the risk 
insured. The radiation in the international level is exempted from the purview of the 
insurance contract while it also excludes the right of subrogation. This right is removed 
from an insurance contract with a nuclear power plant with the intent to satisfy the strict 
and exclusive right of the operator, in case of a nuclear accident. In order to cover the 
risks involved while transporting the nuclear reactive materials, the person liable during 
such transit must obtain a document from the insurer with all the details of the materials 
transported and the amount of money on hand to pay for the claims.  
 
There are international instruments to control the production of nuclear weapons around 
the globe but there is no international practice which regulates the manufacture, carrying 
or expansion of arms205. Recently however, there have been developments in international 
laws which control the use of arms and their production. The Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties governs the interpretation and execution of treaty provisions, while the 
Convention on Disarmament aims at restricting the addition of arms to those already 
existing and limiting the desire for arms development in neighbouring countries206. 
 
The UNO has different structures which are aimed at protecting international peace by 
controlling the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The General Assembly of the UNO 
“may consider the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international 
                                         
205 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar v US), 1986 I.C.J. 135 P 269. 
206 Harald Müller, David Fischer and Wolfgang Kötter (1994). Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Global Order 
2-4; Jörn S. Harry, IAEA Safeguards and Non-Proliferation, in the Future of the International Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Regime (1995)167, 168. 
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peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of 
armaments, and may make recommendations regarding such principles to the Members 
or to the Security Council or to both”207. On the other hand, the Security Council “shall 
be responsible for formulating … plans to be submitted to the Members of the United 
Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments”208.  
 
With the increased awareness of the international community regarding the effects of 
nuclear radiation, there was a Disarmament Commission set up between Canada, France, 
UK, USA and USSR aiming to reach a consensus toward ending nuclear tests. The result 
of these discussions was the signing of the Test Ban Treaty (TBT) in the year 1963. The 
Test Ban Treaty bans “any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion” 
in the atmosphere, in outer space, under water and “in any other environment if such 
explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State 
under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted.”209Regrettably, the TBT 
could not be passed with the provision for disarmament due to failure in reaching a 
compromise. Thus, the treaty was ratified without provisions of disarmament, in 1996210. 
 
The intentions of the member states to this treaty were different. When the states which 
already have nuclear weapons wanted to restrict the development of nuclear weapons by 
other countries, some of the other Member States wanted to ensure that they would not 
be attacked by other countries with nuclear weapons. The anxieties of some of the nations 
led to the signing of the Non-Proliferation of the Nuclear Weapons Treaty, popularly 
known as NPT. The NPT exempts the five permanent members of the Security Council 
who already have nuclear weapons and can keep them, yet restricts other countries from 
manufacturing or augmenting nuclear arms211. The researcher observes that there is no 
justification for such exemptions. If the aim of NPT is to prevent Member States from 
harnessing weapons of mass destruction from their nuclear programmes, then there 
                                         
207 UN Charter Article 11. 
208 Ibid, Article 26. 
209 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Test in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, UK, USSR, 
US, August 8, 1963, 480 U.N.T.S. 43 (hereinafter TBT). See Allan Gotlieb, Disarmament and International 
Law (Canadian Institute of Page15 International Affairs, 1965), pp.28-32, 44-50. 
210 S.C. Res. 50/245, UN Doc. A/RES/50/245 
211 Gabriella Venturini, (2001). “Control and Verification of Multilateral Treaties on Disarmament and 
Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction”. 17 U.C. Davis J. Int’l L. & Policy 345. 
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should not be exemptions given to some Member States. Rather, all Member States must 
abide by the objectives of the Treaty and develop peaceful nuclear energy programmes. 
 
The legal framework that covers the nuclear energy industry is wide and encompasses 
almost all the possibilities of nuclear energy. It also has loosened its hold on the purposes 
of nuclear energy, in order to develop investment in the development of nuclear power 
generation and the use of nuclear reactive materials in the medical and other fields.  
 
The next step would be considering the whole world as a single unit, to provide for an 
international legal framework alone and to forgo national legislations. Although the 
existing international law is adequate to provide for the disposal of nuclear wastes and 
define the liability of operator for damage caused by nuclear reactors. The unification of 
the IAEA and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in the matter of nuclear energy can 
help in realising a single market to enable better ability to transact the nuclear waste. 
Since security and safety is the primary concern of the international community, it is 
highly desirable to develop trade and commerce in nuclear materials that are fully covered 
by strict provisions to prevent negative impacts. The author suggests that it should also 
be ensured that nuclear materials are with persons who are accountable or could be held 
responsible in case the materials are misused. Therefore, the safety of nuclear power 
reactors can be enhanced through the deployment of professionally trained persons.  
 
2.12 National legal hierarchy 
 
Essentially, it is normal that permissible standards for the regulation of nuclear energy 
form part of a sovereign State’s common legal structure212. Hence, nuclear law should be 
positioned in the common legal hierarchy appropriate in most States. This hierarchy 
consists of a number of levels. The first, which is the constitutional level, introduces the 
basic institutional and legal arrangements governing all relationships in the State. The 
statutory level is second level. In this level, specific laws are made by the legislature to 
institute other obligatory bodies and to implement processes having to do with a range of 
                                         
212 Ibid Stoiber, Carlton et al (2010). 
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activities having to do with State interests, for example the UK and UAE legal 
hierarchy213. 
 
Detailed regulations which are highly technical rules are contained in the third level, 
basically to control those actions indicated by legal instruments. Due to the nature of these 
rules, they are usually developed by expert bodies (including bodies nominated as strict 
establishments)214. These bodies can direct precise parts of national interest. They are 
formed in agreement with the national legal structure. The next level which is the fourth 
consists of non-compulsory guidance instruments. These instruments are 
recommendations intended to assist persons and organisations to meet legal needs215. The 
UK is an example of countries where there are various pieces of legislation within its 
energy law. The author suggests that UAE could adopt similar measures within its own 
legal hierarchy. 
 
It is possible that the use of nuclear knowledge can engage the application of a wide 
variety of laws which mainly recount to other subjects216. It depends on the kind of 
nuclear activities a nation wants to permit; generally, the difference in the common 
framework of national legislation should be customary only where the character of an 
activity warrants extraordinary action. It is therefore pertinent to note that, it should not 
be obligatory to enact new legislation to the level that a nuclear related activity is 
adequately covered in other laws. Yet, from the inception of the development nuclear 
energy law, nuclear energy has been considered to involving exceptional legal 
arrangements to guarantee that its proper management. 
 
2.13 Risks and benefits 
 
Factually, nuclear energy poses unusual risks to the health and safety of persons and to 
the environment, which must be cautiously controlled. However, nuclear material and 
technology also guarantee significant benefits in different ways including medicine, 
agriculture, electricity production and industrial development. It would therefore be 
                                         
213 Ibid Stoiber, Carlton et al (2010). 
214 Ibid Stoiber, Carlton et al (2010). 
215 Ibid Stoiber, Carlton et al (2010). 
216 These include protection of the environment, industrial safety, land use planning, administrative 
procedure, mining, transport, government ethics and the regulation of electricity rates. 
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prudent to articulate that any human activity involving no more dangers than benefits 
entitles a legal system of proscription rather than guideline. Thus, a fundamental feature 
of nuclear energy law is its dual focus on risks and benefits217. The benefits of nuclear 
energy in the UAE are fully discussed in the next Chapter Three of this thesis. 
 
2.13.1 Risk 
 
Using the USA as an example, one of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC) 
principal tasks is to make sure that Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) is maintained. 
PRA steadily looks at how pieces of a modern PRA use several definite techniques to 
achieve this analysis. The NRC uses Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) to estimate 
risk by computing real numbers to determine what can go wrong, how likely is it, and 
what are its consequences. Thus, PRA provides insights into the strengths and weaknesses 
of the plan and operations of a nuclear power plant.218 
 
The determination of risk is dependent on two factors. These include: How frequent a 
certain hazard may arise; and the amount of harm such hazard could cause?219 The author 
maintains that risk can be reduced by making a detrimental occurrence less probable or 
by making its result less severe. PRA is used as one approach to assess general risk 
particularly in the nuclear industry. This reminds us of the legal concepts of duty - the 
need to do what is required by the law so that actions will not bring about negative impact 
on the system. These actions should be positively beneficial to both the present and future 
generations. 
 
2.13.2 Risk assessment methods 
 
There are various methods of carrying out risk assessment. Different steps are employed 
to achieve a PRA. The foremost thing to do is to identify the hazard to be prevented. Core 
damage is normally used for hazards from nuclear power plants. The core contains the 
fuel and forms the initial physical barrier between the radioactive process and the host 
                                         
217 See Stoiber, C., et al, (2010). 
218United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC), (2013). Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). 
[Online]. Available at: http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/risk-informed/pra.htmlAccessed 03-02-
2015. 
219See United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC), (2013). 
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community. The second step is to identify the initiating events that could probably cause 
harm. Thirdly, the regularity of each initiating occurrence is then determined. The next 
step is the estimation of the tenability of the occurrence, followed by the identification of 
the blend of chances of failures leading to consequences, if the initiating incident has 
occurred220. The researcher posits that this is a reasonable foresight within legal concepts 
of duty. 
 
After considering the above steps, the calculation of the probability of each permutation 
is then carried out, while the likelihood of all the sequences that leads to similar effects is 
totalled. To discover how frequently this outcome might take place, these likelihoods are 
multiplied by the regularity of the initiating event(s). 
 
To accomplish the above analysis, present PRA applies numerous precise procedures. 
These include the (Event Trees221, Fault Trees222, Human reliability analysis223 and Monte 
Carlo methods224.)225. These relate to the acceptable approach to PRA.  
 
A sample of Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) can be shown in Diagram 6 below. 
The researcher therefore suggests that UAE should consider adopting this model in 
assessing possible risks involved in its nuclear power developments with the view that it 
will help in the reduction of risks in its nuclear projects.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                         
220Ibid United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC), (2013). 
221Event trees model the plant response to each initiating event. 
222Fault trees model plant systems in detail. Analysts use fault trees to identify the combinations of failures 
that cause the overall system to fail. Then, the fault tree logic is used to calculate the overall failure 
probability. Analysts pay attention to problems that can fail more than one component at the same time. 
223Human reliability analysis (HRA) is used to evaluate human errors that are important to the outcome of 
an event. Analysts assess the probability of a mistake considering factors like training, procedures, and 
expected conditions during an event. 
224Monte Carlo methods are used to compute the risks. This technique allows analysts to consider variations 
in each factor of the analysis, imperfect knowledge, as well as the many possible ways the factors can 
interact. 
225 See United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC), (2013). 
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Diagram 6: Sample of Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) 
 
Source:  United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC), (2013) 
 
 
2.13.3 Types of risk assessments 
 
Preparing an essential PRA model may take lot of effort. The use of modern information 
gadgets, for example the computer, makes it easier to apply or alter every PRA model and 
test several different scenarios. The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(USNRC) posits that the PRAs of most ordinary nuclear power plants deal with ‘internal 
events’ which occur within the plant, while for ‘external events’, the PRAs operate by 
means of initiating events, examples include earthquakes and hurricanes. It is also 
important to note that special PRAs are used to tackle exclusive problems, such as spent 
nuclear fuel storage cask design or the geology of a prospective depot for high-level 
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radioactive waste. USNRC maintains that in the nuclear power industry, analysts label 
PRAs by level226.227. These levels of PRA are illustrated in Diagram 7 (see next page). 
 
Diagram 7: Levels of Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) 
 
 
Source:  United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC), (2013) 
 
                                         
226 See: United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC), (2013). The levels are as follows: 
a. A Level 1 PRA estimates the frequency of core damage. It starts with conditions that are well known, 
usually with a reactor operating at full power. All the systems that work to protect the reactor are modelled. 
Since the workings of these systems are well understood, the uncertainty of the result is relatively small.  
b. A Level 2 PRA estimates the magnitude and timing of releases. (That is, “If the core is damaged, how 
much radioactivity might escape into the environment?”) Uncertainty associated with how much coolant 
escapes the reactor systems (and how violently), as well as variation in containment system response, makes 
a Level 2 PRA less precise than a Level 1 PRA. 
c. A Level 3 PRA assesses the injuries and economic losses that might result if radioactivity escaped from 
containment (What can go wrong, how likely is it, and what are the consequences?). Highly variable factors 
like wind speed and direction will affect the results. 
227 See United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC), (2013). 
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Looking at a different jurisdiction, there have been a series of ambiguities on the 
feasibility of the Civil Nuclear Liability for Damage Act 2010. For example, India: the 
Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project (KNPP) in Southern India, which through Parliament 
raised a debate concerning the Act. Similarly, the 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident in 
Japan motivated public apprehension about nuclear security in India228. Although 
campaigning against the project was limited, it subsequently gained resolute support by 
civil society groups referring to safety cooperation on a variety of technical factors. 
 
Even though the government set up professional committees to moderate any concerns, 
the case was disputed before the Madras High Court, then to Appeal before the Supreme 
Court of India229. While the Madras High Court assured the security and legitimacy of 
the project, the Supreme Court of India endorsed the observation, with additional 
instructions, determining the superiority of expert committees who unanimously 
concluded the project was safe.  
 
Since KNPP was a project of national importance, both the Madras High Court and the 
Supreme Court of India came together to defend its integrity. The Central Information 
Commission even ordered that the KNPP project site and safety evaluation reports be 
made accessible to the public. Opposing this however, the Nuclear Power Corporation 
pleaded with the Delhi High Court, claiming that such information was proprietary, 
successfully acquiring a stay order230. 
 
The essence of this section is to further remind Member States and operators of nuclear 
power projects regarding the need to perform their responsibilities, taking into 
consideration relevant standards in the sector. This will go a long way toward minimising 
possible risks potentially emanating from nuclear power plants. From the above analysis, 
it could be deduced that although laws have been made to guide the harnessing of nuclear 
power to ensure good practice and conformity, there may still be situations where lapses 
occur despite the laws. Should this occur, Member States could seek expert opinion to 
                                         
228 Ram Mohan, M. P. and Shandilya, Akshay (2014). Nuclear Energy and RiskAssessment by Indian 
Courts: Analysis of Judicial Intervention in the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project (May 16, 2014). 
Journal of Risk Research, 2014; DOI: 10.1080/13669877.2014.913665. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract =2437833 Accessed on 18-12-2014. 
229 See Ram Mohan, M. P. and Shandilya, Akshay, 2014. 
230 See Ram Mohan, M. P. and Shandilya, Akshay, 2014. 
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cope with issues? The researcher expresses knowledge is not stagnant but evolutionary; 
new knowledge when tested becomes acceptable and can be exploited for good purposes. 
In this way, the UAE can gain from the above analysis, utilising it toward further ensuring 
a successful nuclear energy programme. 
 
2.14 Summary of Chapter Two 
 
Chapter Two provided an understanding of the international civil nuclear liability regimes 
with special focus on the way in which the UAE is approaching its nuclear programme. 
It traced the development of the nuclear regimes the world over, starting with the Paris 
(1960) and the Vienna (1963) Conventions. In the early 1950s, the civil use of the nuclear 
fission process was hailed by many Western Nations as an economically viable and 
environmentally friendly source of electricity generation. This utopia soon diminished, 
with the occurrences of nuclear accidents in the United States (Three Mile Island, 1979) 
and Europe (Chernobyl, 1986). The changing public opinion vis-à-vis nuclear reactors 
led to a decline in the establishment of nuclear plants.  
 
Nuclear renaissance has to do with the increase of the production of energy through 
nuclear sources. This has been proposed to enable countries to invest in a more economic 
and safer means of energy production to tackle climate change. Nuclear renaissance is 
affected by a number of factors, which have posed huge risks in the sector, thus increasing 
the amount of possible liabilities. The use of nuclear energy by countries is often 
suspected by the international community for fear that it may also entail the production 
of deadly weapons, which will affect both present and future generations. In view of this, 
the use of nuclear energy requires strict planning and implementation.  
 
The international community is apprehensive about more states possessing nuclear 
energy, especially after the nuclear accidents in power plants like Chernobyl and 
Fukushima. The augmentation of nuclear power is viewed suspiciously globally. The 
effects of nuclear incidents endure for more than a generation and are appalling. Thus, 
the international community is wary before allowing a member State to start a nuclear 
programme. Those countries which already own nuclear weapons are not interested in 
allowing others to augment their own nuclear weaponry for fear of being attacked 
themselves. Restrictions on the possession of nuclear weapons are beneficial for the 
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international community therefore, since the uncontrolled use of nuclear power would 
mean increased competition amongst the member States. One of the most important uses 
of nuclear energy is for the cheapest production of electricity. This meets the Middle 
East’s demand, which is rising by 9 percent annually. More conventional methods are 
incapable of providing for such an increment in demand for electricity.  
 
However, the present generation find the moral issues more daunting than the legal. The 
power generation through nuclear energy is to satisfy the increasing needs of the present 
generation, but this type of power generation produces nuclear wastes that remain for 
more than 10,000 years and will affect the coming generations. So, it is argued that the 
current generation has a duty towards that of the future to protect them from the ill effects 
of the luxury the present generation enjoy. The researcher emphasises that the current 
generation has a responsibility to protect the future population’s welfare whilst 
simultaneously undertaking that no harm is caused to those generations to follow. Many 
authors of the relevant literature argue that the duty not to harm the coming generation is 
awarded more importance than the responsibility to protect the welfare of the future 
population. 
 
It appears a difficult task perhaps, to protect the future generation whilst providing for the 
current. Such a dilemma requires a solution that may be achieved by using different 
methods of nuclear power production. It can be attained to some extent by using a reactor 
which can reuse the nuclear fuel, thus reducing the nuclear wastes. Partitioning and 
transmutation is one method which reduces nuclear waste production. Such a reactor can 
cater for the current generations’ increased power and meanwhile, reduce the quantity of 
nuclear waste produced, which in turn reduces the potential harm to the future populace. 
 
The legal and regulatory frameworks provide for the moral needs of the society. The 
standards of safety and security as provided for by the IAEA strive to achieve the safest 
method of operation for nuclear power plants. The legal and regulatory frameworks 
provide for strict liability to the operator, which suggests that operator(s) will be vigilant 
in taking measures to prevent any accident or leakage in the nuclear power plant that 
would affect the Earth’s future inhabitants.  
 
 89 
 
The use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is not restricted by any international 
convention or treaty. Plus, the dangers surrounding implementation of nuclear energy and 
its possible misuse are overwhelming, potentially devastating. This has made the 
international community extremely sceptical regarding the use of nuclear energy even for 
peaceful purposes, since high levels of safety and security measures are required to avoid 
possible hazards. It is also necessary to be mindful of the future generation while yet 
encouraging the use of nuclear energy for producing power or for other peaceful purposes. 
 
While the UAE wants to acquire nuclear energy, it is not without strategic constraints for 
possessing the same. This chapter considered some of the reasons the UAE has stated for 
enjoying nuclear energy and the limitations therein. The next chapter explores in detail, 
the motivation for possessing nuclear energy and the challenges that UAE is likely to face 
in obtaining nuclear energy.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
UAE’s MOTIVATION TO POSSESS NUCLEAR ENERGY 
AND FUTURE STRATEGIC CONSTRAINTS 
 
3.1 Introduction to Chapter Three 
 
This Chapter considers the UAE as a sovereign state, its motivation and preparedness for 
controlling nuclear energy in relation to current social and political developments. It also 
analyses the UAE’s motivation for the possession of nuclear energy and the constraints 
the country would face in implementing its nuclear power programme. The socio-
economic and political benefits of a nuclear energy programme to the UAE are evaluated 
too. The Chapter then critically analyses issues of construction and operation of nuclear 
power plants, in terms of financing, legalities and liabilities considerations and so forth.  
While the local and international legal concerns regarding developing even a peaceful 
nuclear programme are likewise discussed in this chapter, the possible expectations of the 
international community and of the UAE for embarking on nuclear power projects are 
similarly evaluated. Therefore, the thesis is aimed at determining the nature and scope of 
potential liabilities in the UAE’s nuclear energy programme, as well as how they could 
be addressed. 
 
The Chapter subsequently discusses the incentives behind the UAE’s private ownership 
of nuclear power production. It also looks at the limitations the country is likely to 
encounter in carrying out such projects. This is a follow up of the justifications for the 
UAE’s development of nuclear energy programmes outlined in the preceding Chapter 
Two. Although the country has been very positive about the programmes, there are some 
important issues that need to be considered to make it sustainably successful.  
 
3.2 UAE: its motivation to possess nuclear energy and future strategic constraints 
 
According to Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan, the UAE’s Foreign Minister, the main aim 
of government, in seeking to develop nuclear energy, is: “To develop a model for the 
deployment of nuclear energy that is based on the highest standards of operational 
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transparency, safety, security, and non-proliferation, as well as the principles of long-term 
sustainability and cooperation with the IAEA and responsible nuclear supplier states.”231 
These objectives will be assessed to determine the validity of the UAE programme. 
 
The need for harnessing nuclear energy was felt in the UAE when the demand for 
electricity increased232. The country plans to establish four nuclear power plants by the 
year 2020, once the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) initiates studies on nuclear power 
plants233. Members of the GCC - Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE, Qatar and 
Oman, have commenced their research on the exploitation of nuclear energy for useful 
purposes, including the production of energy234. This is facilitated by France, while Iran 
also agreed to provide technological support235. The GCC produces a total of 273 billion 
kilowatts of electricity in a year, but this is from non-renewable resources and there is an 
upsurge in the requirement of electricity in the range of 5 to 7 percent per year236.  
According to the reports in 2009, the demand for power was increasing at the rate of 10 
percent every year, while the need for desalination was rising at the rate of 8 percent, 
which requires the installation of a plant that can generate enough energy to meet the 
countries requirements237.  
 
Most authors’ and the government’s published papers238, have projected an increase in 
the need for electricity in the future, hence the reason for generating nuclear power for 
electricity239. Some authors have opined that the decision to exploit nuclear energy is 
purely political and an effort to challenge countries; examples of these countries are Iran 
and Israel, which have already utilised nuclear energy240.  The use of nuclear energy is 
                                         
231 Bin Zayed Al Nahyan, 2008 cited in Dr. Bryan R. Early, ‘Export Control Development in the United 
Arab Emirates: From Commitments to Compliance, BelferCenter for Science and International Affairs, 
Harvard Kennedy School, July 6, 2009. 
232 Christian Blanchard, op.cit. 
233 World Nuclear Association, ‘Nuclear Power in the United Arab Emirates’, Available at 
http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/UAE_nuclear_power_inf123.html , Last accessed on 5-8-2012. 
234 Ibid. World Nuclear Association. 
235 Christian Blanchard, op.cit 
236 Ibid. Christian Blanchard, op.cit 
237Ibid. Christian Blanchard, op.cit 
238 Forum on Energy, (2013). Future of Nuclear Power in Emerging Markets: United Arab Emirates. 
September 9, 2013. [Online]. Available at: http://forumonenergy.com/2013/09/09/future-of-nuclear-
power-in-emerging-markets-united-arab-emirates/ Accessed on17/08/2016. 
239Ali Darwish, ‘We Need a Long-Term Advocacy Strategy Towards a Nuclear Free Region’, Layla Al-
Zubaidi, Joachim Paul, Doreen Khoury(eds.) in Heinrich Boll Stiftung, ‘Nuclear energy and the Arab 
World’, Perspective 1 April, 2011. 
240Ibid. Ali Darwish. 
 92 
 
also an indication of development and modernisation according to the countries in the 
Middle East,241 as previously discussed above in presenting the philosophical and ethical 
justifications for the UAE’s nuclear programme.  
 
Nuclear power generation it was realised, is probably the best option for generating the 
required energy and when compared to other sources, is reasonably environmentally 
friendly and cheaper242. Not only was nuclear energy capable of producing the ever-
increasing amount of electricity to meet the people’s requirements243, it was also 
considered to be the most commercially viable method of electricity production, because 
of the large quantities of power generation capabilities, combined with the fact that no 
non-renewable natural resource is being used, thereby making it a very attractive option 
for power generation244. The UAE intends to run 14 nuclear power plants in the country, 
with four of them expected to be fully functional by 2020245. These four nuclear power 
plants are currently forecast to be located in Abu Dhabi, Al Fujayrah and As Sila246. The 
nuclear power plant in As Sila is to provide electricity for Qatar and Bahrain.  
 
There have been various grounds put forth by those advocating the use of nuclear energy 
in the UAE247. It is believed that the programme will bring about an increase in 
employment opportunities which can foster development in the financial sector. The 
programme will enable the steady production of electricity to meet the country’s ever 
expanding requirement for power. The implementation of nuclear power production will 
relieve UAE’s reliance on other nations for its electricity supply. The programme will 
enable the production of electricity with reduced environmental impact whilst preserving 
non-renewable energy resources. The country aspires to develop technologically, 
acknowledging the programme will attract technological know-how from other 
nations248. 
 
                                         
241 See Ali Darwish 
242 Vincent Mulvey, op.cit. 
243 World Nuclear Association, op.cit. 
244 Ibid. World Nuclear Association, op.cit. 
245 Ibid. World Nuclear Association, op.cit. 
246Christian Blanchard, op.cit and World Nuclear Association, op.cit. 
247 Dennis Kumetat, op.cit. 
248 See: Dennis Kumetat, op.cit. 
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Concurring with a suggestion made by the IAEA, the UAE founded a Nuclear Energy 
Programme Implementation Organisation249. This organisation institutionalised the 
Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC) to a cost of $100 million250. The 
Corporation was to assess and execute the nuclear energy programmes in the UAE.251 
The plan was to provide for Abu Dhabi which is the biggest city in the country while 
others will follow. 
 
The country’s intention is to establish the nuclear energy plants in collaboration with 
foreign capital252. The plants for production of electricity and water already functioning 
in the country have most shares owned by the government with the rest held by Joint 
Venture partners253. The UAE will also use foreign technology and contractual services 
to run the plant while discouraging the use of its nationals and knowledge. Perhaps this 
will further reduce potential liabilities that may arise from sub-standard operations.  
 
The UAE’s plan is to ensure safe provision of fuel for electricity production, coupled with 
secured methods of nuclear fuel transportation and waste disposal methods that will not 
affect the environment254. Again, this effort will minimise risk of liabilities in the 
programme, which form the aims and objectives of the study.  
 
The UAE’s policy regarding the evaluation and potential development of peaceful nuclear 
energy was established by its government in 2008. The main objectives of the policy were 
to emphasise the need for transparency in nuclear-related activities and to discourage the 
re-use of spent fuel, in order to adhere to the non-proliferation standards [the Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which provides the basic legal right of states to develop 
nuclear energy programmes]255as previously discussed as part of the philosophical and 
ethical issues vis-à-vis the nuclear power programme (see Chapter Two above).  
 
                                         
249 UAE Government, ‘1st National Report on Measures Taken by the United Arab Emirates to Implement 
the Convention on Nuclear Safety’, August 2010. 
250 Ibid. UAE Government Report 2010. 
251 See UAE Government Report 2010. 
252 Ibid. UAE Government Report 2010. 
253 See UAE Government Report 2010. 
254 Ibid. UAE Government report 2010. 
255 Nuclear Policy statement. Available at: http://fanr.gov.ae/ar/media/get/20090430_uae-policy-white-
paper.pdfLast accessed on 24th August, 2012. 
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The building of the nuclear power plants was to be decided via a bidding process; from 
nine companies a shortlist of three were selected. Areva, GE-Hitachi and the Korean 
consortium were the major contenders256. The Korean consortium led by the KEPCO won 
the bid for the construction of the four power plants [see Appendix 3 (Certificate of 
Competent Authority for Radioactive Package Design) and Appendix 4 (License for the 
Construction of a Nuclear Facility)]. The operation of the reactors of the first phase is 
expected to yield a profit of 20 billion dollars for the Korean consortium, over a span of 
more than 50 years257. The Korean consortium won the bid on the basis it promised less 
time required for constructing the power plants, offered the greatest capacity, combined 
with the lowest production costs258. The expenditure on electricity production is expected 
to be one quarter of the cost of production from other sources. The UAE also plans to sell 
power outside its borders259. Minimising costs can allow for a greater use of resources 
elsewhere. Thus, the UAE will economically gain from those nations bordering it. 
 
Later, an assessment of the impact of the nuclear power plant that was to be set up in Abu 
Dhabi was done and approved by the Environmental agency in July 2012260. This is to 
consider possible damages that nuclear energy production may cause to the environment 
and living things. The Federal Authority of Nuclear Regulation (FANR) assessed the 
location for the four nuclear power plants in the UAE261.  
 
The evaluation of the locations was based on rules laid out by FANR. It included six 
different locations for comparison and evaluation of their suitability for the four 
reactors262. This assessment was based upon the guidelines of the United States Electric 
Power Research Institute (USEPRI), as well as those of the United States Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (USNRC) and the IAEA263. FANR granted licences (see 
Appendices 3 and 4) to ENEC, approving the site at Barakah and a licence which limits 
the construction affecting the permission to produce important components for the four 
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nuclear power plants264. A licence that certifies the construction without any impact on 
the environment was also granted to the ENEC. This followed the commencement of the 
construction works of the plant in 2011265.  
 
Furthermore, construction permits were applied for the first and second site by the ENEC 
and was allowed in July 2012266. This application process had to be processed by 60 
employees of FANR and more than two consulting firms and IAEA267. Those exploiting 
radioactive material and sources of ionising radiation in the UAE must have a FANR 
licence; hence, to obtain a FANR licence, users must first apply to FANR - this is to 
ensure that the highest standards of radiation protection are applied throughout the 
UAE.268Possible legal and liability issues are covered in the Federal Law by Decree No. 
4 of 2012 Concerning Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (see Appendix 5). The 
objectives of the Law include:  
i. To regulate the provisions and determine the scope of the civil liability and 
compensation for Nuclear Damage.  
ii. To determine the financial security that the Operator must maintain.  
iii. To apply the 1997 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage 
wherever no provision is made in this Law by Decree.269 
 
While the building of the first nuclear power plant began immediately, the plant will start 
functioning only in 2017270. Others are expected to start running in subsequent years. The 
IAEA integrated nuclear infrastructure review mission identified the good practices of the 
UAE nuclear power programmes as: “co-operation, without compromising their 
independence, between the regulatory bodies and utility, human resource development, a 
well-structured management system, and a strong safety culture.”271 
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The nuclear programme initiated by the UAE aims at disposing the nuclear waste in two 
ways272. The first method is by a national system of storing and getting rid of the waste 
allowing for the cooperation of local nations273. The Middle Eastern countries follow the 
EU countries’ examples for disposing of nuclear wastes274. The UAE collaborates with 
the USA and South Korea, signing an agreement. Japan has also joined via the signing of 
a memorandum of understanding with the UAE275. Along with Japan, the UAE also in 
addition signed an agreement of cooperation with France, who commit support in 
technology and knowledge transfer necessary for the operation of the nuclear power 
plant.276 
 
The researcher believes that UAE has carefully considered all risks and opportunities 
involved with nuclear power production prior to developing the plans to invest in it. The 
country has studied past nuclear incidents and drawn valuable lessons from their causes 
and other issues they pose; it can properly strategise for its nuclear power programme. 
From the above analysis, we can see how the UAE has considered and dealt with risk 
assessments and is developing coherent risk-management strategies for implementation 
of its energy proposals. 
 
3.3 Benefits of nuclear energy production 
 
Production of energy on a commercial basis has a greater impact on the economic sphere 
of a country than on its socio-political aspects. The industrial sector largely depends on 
power to function and in turn, the economic development of the country is affected by its 
ability to function efficiently277. Therefore, the decision to use nuclear energy for power 
production affects the economic development of the UAE. The conventional methods of 
energy production cannot manage the increasingly demanding needs of the industrial 
sector278. Thus, alternative methods, like nuclear power generation, are required. The 
most important reasons for harnessing nuclear power are to curb the dangers posed by 
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conventional power production on the environment and to satisfy the growing demand 
for more energy.  
 
Although the solution to fulfilling the need for the huge amount of power is nuclear 
energy generation, dealing with nuclear waste is a problem affecting the development of 
the domestic market279 and needs to be addressed. According to Schwartz et al (2008), 
power production is the sole factor driving the development of a country280. Increased 
expenditure required for conventional methods of power generation has encouraged 
sourcing power generated by nuclear energy. The proper use of nuclear energy would 
help reduce use of non-renewable means of energy production. The expenditure on non-
renewable sources like petroleum products diminishes the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) rate of a country281.  
 
The UAE is anticipating an increase in the demand for power at the rate of 9 percent per 
year, which cannot be attained by utilising natural gas for electricity production282. 
Nuclear energy is used globally and produces 14% of the total electricity production. The 
production of power through nuclear reactions was first employed in 1954 and this has 
grown to 450 nuclear power generators producing 2608 billion kWh of power283.  Even 
though there are more than 100 reactors worldwide to-date, the Middle Eastern and Asian 
countries have not been successful in making optimum use of nuclear energy. These 
countries include Iran, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Yemen, Israel, Syria 
and Jordan.284 Over 45 countries are actively considering embarking on nuclear power 
programmes. These range from sophisticated economies to developing nations. The front 
runners after Iran are the UAE, Turkey, Vietnam, Belarus, Poland and Jordan.285 The 
author suggests that states engaging in nuclear energy production can determine the 
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nature and scope of legal liabilities through state laws, but obviously, these should be in 
concurrence with, or based upon acceptable international standards. 
 
The UAE has focussed on electricity production utilising nuclear power plants. The safety 
and misuse of nuclear power is the country’s primary concern, as it is the worlds, whilst 
it embarks upon nuclear power generation. The researcher notes that there have been 
doubts about abatement of terrorism and destabilising the country’s political situation. 
However, fostering economic and social developments are the UAE’s key concerns 
currently. This has intensified the country’s effort to overcome the hurdles of nuclear 
power production to attain greater economic status. When the world was hit by the 
devastating economic crisis, the UAE remained optimistic about Abu Dhabi’s increasing 
energy requirements286. This long-term view regarding the increasing demand for energy 
kept the nuclear power project(s) going, even during the global financial downturn. The 
country has taken advice from various developed countries such as the UK and the USA. 
UAE is looking for ‘best practice’ hence it additionally forms relationships with other 
international partners. Plus, the ratification of the Non - Proliferation Treaty highlights 
the good intentions behind UAE’s nuclear power generation programme.  
 
It is expected that the number of nuclear power plants intended to be operational in the 
UAE would bring about the country’s much needed economic development. Due to 
doubts the international community held over Iran possessing weapons of mass 
destruction, the UAE aims to remain transparent in its own nuclear power activities. The 
agreement entered into by the UAE and the USA brings clarity to the objectives of nuclear 
power projects in the UAE and its relations with other nations. The agreement with the 
USA is expected to elevate the status of the UAE among the GCC for the Arab States.287 
 
The NPT, ratified by the UAE, would help to encourage foreign investment in the country, 
thereby developing its financial and political status.288 The researcher maintains that it is 
possible the USA encouraged the nuclear power projects in the UAE to compel Iran to 
abandon their nuclear projects, thus the impetus for UAE’s nuclear programme came from 
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America’s opposition to Iran. According to the US-UAE Business Council of 2009, the 
increase in the number of nuclear reactors would boost the returns of the UAE 
government’s investments and would in addition facilitate signing of more service and 
infrastructure contracts to the tune of billions289.  
 
Numerous nuclear power reactors have been built in countries like England, China and 
Finland encouraging the Middle East and North African countries to also consider 
utilising nuclear energy.290 Although there has been huge support for the UAE to 
undertake nuclear power production as the sole source of its electricity supply, there are 
also various benefits to using solar energy over nuclear power generation.291 One of these 
includes lower capital investment required to set up solar energy, compared to nuclear 
power generation. There is also no nuclear hazard scenario involved with using solar 
energy.  Regrettably, the use of solar energy alone will not supply the enormous volume 
of power the Middle Eastern region so desires.  
 
The UAE’s traditional methods of energy production simply do not satisfy the growing 
needs of the country anymore292. Thus, the UAE in considering nuclear power production 
tries to convince the international community of its intention to use the programme solely 
for electricity generation and not to produce weapons used for nuclear proliferation and 
terrorism. This is because the interest the Middle Eastern states have expressed in 
harnessing nuclear energy is looked upon with suspicion, weighing up Iran’s nuclear 
plans and Israel’s alleged possession of deadly weapons which require nuclear energy293. 
There is apparently an increasing globally-held notion that terrorism has the backing of 
Islamic governments. These issues were elaborately considered by the UAE whilst 
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formulating policies to combat these threats. To reassure the UAE does not intend to 
accumulate nuclear power, the country resorted to sourcing fuel supplies from outside its 
boundaries294. This gave other countries more confidence vis-à-vis the real objectives of 
the UAE’s nuclear power programme.  
 
Having discussed the economic and political aspects of nuclear power production in the 
UAE, it is appropriate to now reflect upon the legal issues surrounding the programme. 
These include the state laws, regulations and statutes that are relevant to this study. These 
legalities are analysed below.  
 
3.4 Legal issues involved in developing a peaceful nuclear programme 
 
Nuclear power production has the potential to harm the environment. But the carbon 
footprint set by a nuclear reactor is less than those of the conventional methods of energy 
production. Apart from producing enormous energy, other issues arise when nuclear 
power production becomes operational. European nuclear power plants have given 
optimism to other countries, with the vastly improved performance of the European 
Pressurised Reactor (EPR) over existing power plants295. The development of laws 
relating to nuclear power reactors is another reason to opt for nuclear power generation. 
In addition to these, production from nuclear reactors is more financially viable than other 
forms of electricity, since nuclear power plants are more durable296.  
 
Before discussing the international requirements for developing nuclear power 
generation, it is necessary to analyse the requirements of the same in the UAE. Decree 
No. 6 of 2009 (see Appendix 6) of the UAE deals with the establishment of FANR. The 
Decree No. 6 came into effect in September, 2009. The FANR is the only regulatory body 
that deals with the safety, security and protection from nuclear radiation. It has the power 
to evaluate the conditions for a construction licence297. The licence contains security 
matters; a report on the environmental impact; pattern of construction; system of 
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management and the strategy describing the functioning of the plant. When the licence 
for construction is granted, a licence for operation is applied for298. Only after the issuance 
of the permit for operation of the plant, can nuclear fuel then be loaded into the plant. The 
issue of a licence is based on the production and adherence to the safety requirements. 
The UAE nuclear law offers distinct powers to the FANR to grant licences for the 
construction and running of nuclear power plants299.  
 
FANR is autonomous and it is mandatory to obtain the permission from the body to carry 
out nuclear activities in the country300. ENEC is not linked to the FANR. Board members 
of the FANR have no relation with the country’s nuclear activities301. Nuclear activities 
in the UAE are regulated and permitted only by FANR as it is an independent authority 
of government empowered to do so. Other sources such as radioactive substances and 
radiation used in medicine, research, oil exploration and other industries are also 
regulated and permitted by FANR. In addition, it is responsible for controlling and 
supervising the nuclear sector302 specifically on issues relating to safety and security, 
radiation protection and safeguards.303 Every commitment in the relevant international 
treaties, conventions or agreements ratified by the UAE is conducted by FANR. It also 
attempts to put together an Emirates labour force to manage the nuclear sector in the 
country.  
 
Guaranteeing the continuous safety, security and sustainability relating to peaceful 
application of nuclear energy and ionising radiation in the UAE constitutes the main aim 
of FANR, through the promulgation of adequate regulations and overseeing their 
implementation.304 In particular, FANR carries out licensing and assessment activities  in 
line with international best practices, provides strategies for capacity-building for 
continuity, performs appropriate functions enshrined in the international legal instruments 
regarding the nuclear sector entered into by the UAE;  finally, it ensures administrative 
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principles which maintain quality in regulation305. FANR is accountable to the 
government of UAE. This is because it is set up by government; therefore, it is important 
that it presents their activities for scrutiny and approval.  
 
The advantages of nuclear power production have encouraged many countries to harness 
it. The US President Barrack Obama reiterated in his campaign speech that he wanted to 
encourage the exploitation of nuclear energy for increased power production306. The UK 
is striving to achieve greater output of power through nuclear energy too307. The decision 
to encourage nuclear power production is indeed easier than its implementation. During 
the operation of nuclear power reactors, practical difficulties may arise which can be 
attributed to the complexity maintaining standards. The construction of a nuclear plant is 
a huge task and comes with similar challenges and difficulties in commissioning it. The 
impediments are the capital funds involved and the investments that are required308.  
 
Unlike other projects and plans in a country, a nuclear power project requires attaining 
specific international as well as national benchmarks prior to commencement. There are 
various requirements for obtaining licences, defined in international treaties, which apply 
to the builders, designers and operators. The mere fact nuclear energy which has a high 
potential risk to the environment and lives is involved, makes passing security measures 
mandatory309. The writer understands that there are substantial high risks, which therefore 
suggest the need for a strong risk assessment and management strategy. 
 
There are international laws or conventions which oversee the use of nuclear energy. The 
liabilities and duties from an international treaty are confined to the operator. According 
to Article 9 of the Convention on Nuclear Safety310: “[Each] Contracting Party shall 
                                         
305Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation (FANR) (2012). Our Vision, Mission & Core Values.  
 [Online]. Available at:http://fanr.gov.ae/En/AboutFANR/Pages/Our-Vision-Mission-Core-Values.aspx 
Accessed on 05-09-2013. 
306 Available at: www.iht.com/articles/2008/10/10/america/10nuclear.php Last Accessed August 24, 
(2012). 
307Hansard; Available at: www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmhansrd/cm081016/debtext/ 
81016-0009.htm, Last Accessed August 24, 2012. 
308 The Economics of Nuclear Power. Available at: http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf02.html Last 
accessed on August 24, 2012. 
309Reece, R., Garancher, T. and Cousin, A. (2009). ‘Nuclear Projects in the 21st Century’, IBLJ 437. 
310
The Convention on Nuclear Safety was adopted in Vienna on 17 June 1994. The Convention was drawn 
up during a series of expert level meetings from 1992 to 1994 and was the result of considerable work by 
Governments, national nuclear safety authorities and the Agency’s Secretariat. Its aim is to legally commit 
 103 
 
ensure that prime responsibility for the safety of a nuclear installation rests with the holder 
of the relevant licence and shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that each such 
operator meets its responsibility.”311 
 
The UAE has ratified this convention. This provision is also captured in the UAE Law 
No 4 of 2012. The country also made its 1st National Report on measures taken by the 
UAE to implement the Convention on Nuclear Safety in AUGUST 2010. This report was 
prepared in fulfilment of Article 5 of the Convention for review at the 5th review meeting 
held in April 2011. 
 
A licence is defined as: “Any authorisation granted by the regulatory body to the applicant 
to have the responsibility for the siting, design, construction, commissioning, operation 
or decommissioning of a nuclear installation”.312 
 
The UAE invokes the above definition under the powers provided in Articles (6) and (28) 
of Federal Law by Decree No. 6 of 2009 Concerning the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy 
(the Law), the Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation (FANR) (the Authority) hereby 
issues a licence to: The Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC) being a 
corporation established by Abu Dhabi Law No 21 of 2009. This license authorises ENEC 
to conduct some regulated activity as set forth in Article (25) 1 of the Law. 
 
The Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management also stipulates that the 
operator is responsible for the functioning of the reactor313. This identifies the nature of 
the legal liabilities. According to the UAE strategic plan the license holder or the operator 
of nuclear facility(ies), is liable to any form of disaster taking place during the operation 
of such facility(ies). This constitutes the purpose of this study - the determination of issues 
of liability and possible measures to be taken should it occur. 
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During a nuclear disaster, the liability of the operator and the investor can be 
differentiated by the provisions of the international conventions on civil liability. The 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries ratified the 
1960 Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, which is also 
known as the Paris Convention (see Appendix 9).314. Later, the Convention on Civil 
Liability for Nuclear Damage was concluded in Vienna in 1963 (see Appendix 8 - Vienna 
Convention) taking guidance from the IAEA. This is to say that perhaps, all areas of 
concern in nuclear power generation have been addressed by the law at the international 
level. It is therefore imperative that UAE national laws on nuclear energy are aligned with 
international laws whilst also addressing local issues. 
 
The main objective of the international conventions relating to nuclear energy was to 
protect the victims of nuclear accident(s) and to promote the implementation of nuclear 
energy for peaceful purposes. The conventions are aimed both at providing for damages 
to the victims of nuclear accidents by enforcing liability specifically to one party and 
development of nuclear projects is not slowed, by unnecessary obstacles, instead that the 
appropriate laws enable expansion of nuclear industry.315 The preamble of the Convention 
on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy states that: “...desirous ensuring 
adequate and equitable compensation for persons who suffer damage caused by nuclear 
incidents whilst taking the necessary steps to ensure that the development of the 
production and uses of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is not thereby hindered.”316 
 
The UAE is committed to ensuring that victims of potential accident(s) arising from its 
nuclear power programme are adequately compensated. The country complies with 
relevant legalities regarding claims and compensations. Equally, the country enacts UAE 
Law by Decree No 4 of 2012, in consideration of the above statement of commitment. 
 
Even though the chances of occurrence of nuclear accidents are very slight the effect of 
such accidents would be wide-reaching, even disastrous. International Conventions on 
Nuclear Energy seek to restrict the amount of damages payable by the operator. Such 
restrictions on the amount of damages would help encourage more investment in the field 
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and increase the number of nuclear reactors for power generation. This is evidenced in 
countries like UK and USA. The researcher believes that this is a good lesson for the 
UAE. 
 
Another important aspect of the international conventions relating to nuclear energy 
plants is that the operator of a nuclear power reactor is the only person responsible for 
any mishap that takes place from the reactor for which he holds the licence317. The 
international treaties have exemption provisions that restrict the exclusive liability of 
operators of nuclear power reactors. These exceptions are those damages caused by armed 
conflicts, aggression, war or rebellion. These exemptions do not include terrorist 
activities. The exclusive liability clause in the international conventions which binds only 
the operator of a nuclear reactor, saves the persons providing the operator with nuclear 
resources, services and the necessary techniques from the responsibilities of providing for 
any victims318. The author observes that the UAE should consult relevant international 
and national laws to be able to manage this should it happen. 
 
The international conventions do not mention the liability of the suppliers of services and 
resources if a nuclear accident is caused because of negligence on their part. International 
instruments remain silent regarding whether the operator can turn to these suppliers in 
case the accident takes place due to an act or event instigated by suppliers of resources 
and services. So, that legal obligations on these issues can be determined and evidenced 
in domestic law, it is possible that countries like the UAE seeking to develop nuclear 
power, can make laws on such issues. The operator has no responsibility to provide for 
claims for the damage caused to the tools and amenities of the suppliers of resources and 
manpower319. The UAE can consider dealing with this from the perspective of its national 
laws. For this reason, this is one of the research objectives. 
 
The operator of a nuclear reactor has the duty to insure the reactor to the extent to which 
he will be economically liable to the victims should a nuclear accident take place320. This 
in turn assures the stakeholders that their claims are protected through insurance. 
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According to international legal instruments (the 1997 Joint Protocol), the proper forum 
for adjudication of nuclear accident claims is the courts of the State in which the disaster 
has occurred. Article (12) (1) states that The Federal Courts in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi 
shall have exclusive jurisdiction over actions arising pursuant to this Law by Decree.321 
It makes the process of claiming damages much easier and uncomplicated. This also 
allows the maintenance of only one forum for the adjudication of claims. This will 
guarantee equivalent management of nuclear accident victims322.  
 
The Chernobyl nuclear disaster in Ukraine warned the member States of Vienna and Paris 
Conventions (see Appendices 8 and 9) to enact laws which befitted international 
obligations. These instruments were the Joint Protocol (see Appendix 10), which targeted 
establishing a relationship between the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention. The 
member States also had the objective to overhaul the Convention concluded in Vienna, 
enact a protocol that made changes to the Vienna Convention and provide for additional 
damages. There were other protocols which amended the provisions of the Conventions 
in Paris and Brussels.  
 
The signing of additional protocols to effect amendments in the Paris, Brussels and 
Vienna Conventions were aimed at widening the scope of liability, to include the right of 
damages to victims of the nuclear accidents from those nations which are not parties to 
the Convention on nuclear energy323. The UAE has ratified the additional protocols. 
 
The additional protocols have not been enforced and the Conventions on Nuclear Energy 
only have a few states that have ratified them. Moreover, some of the strongest nations 
using nuclear energy have not adopted either the Paris or Vienna Conventions. These 
include Canada, China, South Korea and USA. Interestingly, UAE relies on most of these 
nations for building its nuclear power plants.  
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Considering the nature of nuclear energy production, it is necessary that member states 
observe all international conventions regarding nuclear power production. It is not 
acceptable that while some member states comply with all conventions and other 
legalities, others do not and this is certainly not in the interest of global peace and 
uniformity. 
 
3.5 Issues in construction and operation of nuclear power plants: financing, legalities 
and liabilities considerations 
 
There are several issues involved in the running of a nuclear reactor. It begins with the 
construction of a nuclear plant which unlike the conventional power plants, lack the factor 
of certainty and assurance regarding the project’s safety. The certainty is affected by 
massive construction costs, while the concern for uncertainties are in the legal framework 
and the absence of experience in the operation of nuclear power plants.  
 
Additionally, the strict liability of the operator in case of an accident affects the building 
of nuclear power reactors, making it more time consuming and problematic in comparison 
to conventional power generators. Other concerns are the supply of resources to produce 
electricity and the disposal of nuclear wastes. There are also issues caused by the limited 
ability to transfer the licence to operate nuclear reactor(s). These factors are obstacles to 
the construction of nuclear power plants.  
 
The concerns deliberated above can be overcome by effecting some alternatives to the 
construction of nuclear power plant(s). The States are left with the option to invest and 
operate the nuclear power plants by awarding construction contracts. There are other 
innovative methods of construction which demonstrate the participation of both 
government and private sectors. Such innovative methods are apparent in Europe324.  
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Competition and Regulation in Network industries, Vol.9, No.3, September, pp.147 - 181. 
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The consumer co-operative models have the companies running the nuclear power plants 
to supply electricity to industries which predominantly use electricity or those that are 
private power utilities. The consumer co-operative model works with a company that 
contributes equity and the acceptors of the equity will lend the money to the company 
which floats the equity. The group responsible for constructing and running the nuclear 
power plant and the company which floats equity enter an agreement to purchase power, 
while the company floating equity agrees to sell said power to its shareholders325. The 
researcher therefore suggests joint-liability in this instance. The operator of the nuclear 
power plant contracts with an independent party to construct the plant. Thus, the 
construction, operation and funding of a nuclear power plant is done through various 
parties at different stages326. The researcher suggests that the operator still bears the 
liability, except when such terms of contracts are documented in form of the law. 
 
The company which finances a nuclear power reactor does not intend to purchase the 
electricity produced by such a plant. It makes available the funds required by the operator, 
in return, acquiring the right to buy electricity from any plant run by said operator.327 The 
entities providing financial assistance for the building and functioning of the plant are not 
in direct contact with the construction or operation of that plant. From the perspective of 
the financing entities, the success of the nuclear power plant is not directly linked to the 
return of the money invested. Moreover, the investors are not tied up with the liabilities 
of the operator of the nuclear power plant328. Again, this is where the law comes to play 
on the issue of liability in case(s) of harm; but only if it is provided for in the law. 
 
In the traditional model of power plants, the construction contracts are given to another 
party by the operator for a fixed amount of money. This enables the operator of the power 
plant to revert to the contractor in the event of any construction or design defects. But this 
arrangement is not practical in the case of a nuclear power plant329. A nuclear power plant 
has two different parts, which are usually constructed by two different companies. So, the 
two companies are engaged in completely different tasks and may not be interested in 
                                         
325 Reece R. et al, op.cit, p.444. 
326 Ibid. Reece R. et al, op.cit. 
327 See Reece R. et al, op.cit, p.445. 
328 Ibid. Reece R. et al, op.cit. 
329See Reece R. et al, op.cit, p.446. 
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shouldering the burden jointly330. This would mean that the operator himself must bear 
the risks for both companies since he is the beneficiary. The terms of the construction 
contract are also different from the traditional power plant construction model. The 
researcher stresses that that contract can clearly indicate the potential liabilities upon 
parties, if such is provided for in the law. 
 
Another significant difference between conventional power reactors and nuclear power 
reactors is that the risks of nuclear accidents are the operator’s responsibility, which is 
not the case for operators of conventional power reactors. Allocation of such risks on the 
owner is covered by the Paris and Vienna Conventions. In a situation, whereby an 
accident occurs due to a fault in construction, the contractor of a conventional model 
power plant is liable, but in a nuclear power plant, since the working of the power plant 
is different, with two distinct parts constructed by different companies, allocation of joint 
risks to those companies is not possible. 
 
According to the Vienna Convention, “Nuclear damage” is defined as: “loss of life, 
personal injury, damage to property, and consequential cost and loss to the extent that the 
loss or damage arises out of or results from ionising radiation emitted by any source of 
radiation inside a nuclear installation, or emitted from nuclear fuel or radioactive products 
or waste in, or of nuclear substances coming from, originating in, or sent to, a nuclear 
installation, whether so arising from the radioactive properties of such matter, or from a 
combination of radioactive properties with toxic, explosive or other hazardous properties 
of such matter”331. 
 
Clearly, the above definition encompasses a great deal, even huge, area for risk. The 
question might be asked: why would any contracting party undertake such risks? The 
author’s view is that this illustrates the nature of nuclear business, thus the expectation is 
that any party wanting to venture into it must abide by the laws guiding it. Hence, even if 
leakage from a nuclear reactor is due to possible defect in its construction, the victim of 
a nuclear accident cannot make the contractor liable for the damage. The construction of 
nuclear power plants must follow the rules and laws of insurance and indemnification by 
                                         
330 Ibid, Reece R. et al, op.cit, p.447. 
331 International Conventions on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage. Series No. 4, at 6, (1976). 
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the state. This therefore demonstrates that there is no nexus between the damaged third 
party and the contractor as could be reflected in the common law of tort. 
 
The legal provision which makes the operator of a nuclear power plant liable for nuclear 
damages is with a view to safeguarding construction contractors (who may cause latent 
harm due to design defect) against huge liabilities in the event of a nuclear accident. The 
operator’s right to recover the amount of damages paid to victims depends upon national 
legislations332. The whole concept of strict legal enforcement of operator responsibility is 
to exempt the contractor from liability should there be a nuclear disaster. There are 
differing views regarding this approach, but before the 1980s, this was the practice and it 
continues333. To avoid this, it is therefore necessary to consider a strict liability system as 
opposed to a fault-based system. This encompasses issues ranging from adherence to 
operational licences, jurisdiction, enforcements and prosecution. 
 
Traditionally, the control of conventional power plants remains with the contractor until 
the operator is satisfied with the construction. Comparatively, in a nuclear power plant, 
control rests with the operator immediately after installation of the nuclear reactor(s)334. 
The procedures from this point onwards for testing the plant is in good working order can 
only be carried out by the operator, not the contractor, unlike in traditional power plants. 
As soon as the nuclear resource is fed into the reactor, the control of the plant rests only 
with the owner of the plant. In a conventional power plant, if the functioning of the plant 
does not satisfy the operator, it can be rejected. This is not the case in a nuclear power 
plant. The rejection or return of the nuclear plant to the contractor is not possible 
according to the existing international laws, since holding a plant which is inoperable, but 
which has nuclear reactive fuel in it would not be appropriate335.   
 
In the construction of power plants employing conventional methods, disruption of work 
due to unexpected circumstances entitles the contractor to extend completion deadline. 
However, regarding nuclear power plants, there are certain differences: the laws on 
nuclear energy and production of electricity in many countries are in their early stage and 
                                         
332Reece R. et al, op.cit. p. 449. 
333 Julia A.Schwartz, op.cit, p.59. 
334 Reece R. et al, op.cit. p.449. 
335 See Reece R. et al, op.cit, p.450. 
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the precedents in this field are fewer, compared to the electricity production by 
conventional methods. Due to the lack of experience in the field, the procedures for 
getting the licences and other approvals are protracted. Other than lack of experience, the 
requirements for fool-proof construction and operation of the nuclear power plant, vis-à-
vis the high level of safety and security involved, contribute to delays in getting the 
necessary approvals and licences.  
 
3.6 Possible expectations from the international community 
 
Most of the specialised representatives of the United Nations (UN) concern themselves 
with social and financial matters affairs. The IAEA’s objective however, is more specific: 
investigate and tackle recent technology that can bring about massive destruction to 
mankind336. The security and safety of nuclear power projects has always been a matter 
of concern for the countries embarking on such projects337. It is not only those countries 
dealing with nuclear energy that are worried about its hazards, but also those that share 
boundaries with them338.  
 
In 2009, the UAE ratified the IAEA treaty that deals with Nuclear Safety. It also ratified 
the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and the Safety of 
Radioactive Waste Management339. The country also accepted the Federal Law that deals 
with the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy (see Appendix 6) providing for a scheme for 
licensing and controlling the use of nuclear materials340. It provides for the supervision 
of the FANR to regulate nuclear energy activities in the country too341. Additionally, 
FANR assigns a Regulator’s board under the leadership of a regulator with long standing, 
from the USA.342 The development, construction or operation of uranium resources or 
facilities for the processing of spent fuel within UAE is made an unlawful act343.  
 
                                         
336 Fischer David, op.cit. 
337 Ibid. Fischer David, op.cit. 
338 H.E. Ambassador Hamad Alkaabi, op.cit. 
339 Ibid. H.E. Ambassador Hamad Alkaabi, op.cit. 
340 See Fischer David, op.cit. 
341 Ibid. Fischer David, op.cit. 
342 See Fischer David, op.cit. 
343 World Nuclear Association, op.cit. 
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The financing strategies in the nuclear industry are formed by ENEC, coupled with an 
extra duty to supervise the growth of the nuclear programme in the UAE344. It deals with 
financing the nuclear sector within the boundaries of the UAE as well as outside the 
country345. Generally, ENEC is empowered to ensure that the country’s nuclear 
programme is successful. 
 
The Nuclear Safety Review Board analyses the security and impact of building the 
nuclear power plant as well as initiating the ENEC programme. The Board also helps in 
re-evaluating the licenses granted for building power plants346. The Board has members 
from the USA, Japan and Korea. Members are experts in the field of nuclear power 
production. An International Advisory Board was established by the ENEC too347. 
 
The World Association of Nuclear Operators is a union of countries that deal with nuclear 
power generation. Its objectives: to provide a friendly atmosphere for countries to 
cooperate and offer suggestions aimed at avoiding nuclear disasters348. The UAE would 
greatly benefit from the World Association of Nuclear Operators349 and can make 
necessary reforms to guarantee a high level of security and safety. 
 
For the last twenty years, there have been various concerns arising from the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons350. In 1996, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (see 
Appendix 13) was ratified by the UAE promising not to misuse nuclear energy351. The 
country demonstrates its concerns apropos the dangers of nuclear energy being put to 
unnecessary and deadly use352 and is strongly against the practice, whilst remaining 
transparent in its pursuit for nuclear power. The UAE governments’ policy is to 
practically display its support of the removal of weapons for mass destruction from the 
Middle East353.  
 
                                         
344 Ibid. World Nuclear Association, op.cit. 
345 UAE Government Report op.cit.  
346 Ibid. Government Report op.cit. 
347 Ibid. Government Report op.cit. 
348 US-UAE Business Council, op.cit. 
349 Ibid. US-UAE Business Council, op.cit. 
350The Embassy of the United Arab Emirates in Washington DC, Available at: http://www.uae-
embassy.org/uae/foreign-policy/non-proliferation , last accessed on 7-8-2012. 
351The Embassy of the United Arab Emirates in Washington DC, op.cit. 
352 Ibid. The Embassy of the United Arab Emirates in Washington DC, op.cit. 
353 See: The Embassy of the United Arab Emirates in Washington DC, op.cit. 
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The UAE’s real intention in having its nuclear plan is evident in its membership of the 
IAEA and the NPT.  This should reassure the world the country does not intend to misuse 
its nuclear energy. The country is also a member of the Global Initiative to Combat 
Nuclear Terrorism. Therefore, the UAE obviously advocates global protection from 
nuclear threats. UAE, being a signatory to the NPT has showed its dissatisfaction over 
the accumulation of nuclear power by Iran, suspected to be developing mass destruction 
weaponry354. The country also supports the resolution passed by the UN, banning the 
transportation of materials with nuclear potential and technology to Iran355.  
 
The Mega Ports Initiative is supported by the UAE, instigated to avert the transportation 
of nuclear materials by terrorists through water356. The country has also ratified the 
Proliferation Security Initiative aimed at preventing the carriage of weapons of mass 
obliteration, including materials that can be used for such a purpose. The United States 
Container Security Initiative is likewise supported by the USA. The initiative enhances 
the security of the port in Dubai, by keeping close watch on cargo being transported to 
the USA357. The researcher suggests that the Mega Port Initiative, if fully implemented 
by the UAE, is capable of reducing the country’s nuclear programme’s potential 
liabilities. 
 
The Dubai Ports World is a member of the Secure Freight Initiative, which controls cargos 
transported to the USA and UK, protecting them from the dangers of radiation. The 
Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism considers Dubai Ports World as its 
associate in ensuring the safety of the commercial cargos belonging to government. The 
carriage of radioactive materials between boundaries is being closely monitored with the 
help of the United States Department of State (USDS)358.  
 
Additionally, the UAE has adopted strategic and operational policies for the successful 
formation of its nuclear power programme. The country strives to attain transparency in 
                                         
354 CRS Report RL33865, Arms Control and Non-proliferation: A Catalogue of Treaties and Agreements, 
by Amy F. Woolf, Mary Beth Nikitin, and Paul K. Kerr. The UAE has had an IAEA safeguards agreement 
in force since 2003. The text is available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/ 
Documents/Infcircs/2003/infcirc622.pdf 
355 Ibid. CRS Report RL33865. 
356 Vincent Mulvey, op.cit, and see The Embassy of the United Arab Emirates in Washington DC, op.cit. 
357CRS Report RL33865, op.cit. 
358 Ibid. CRS Report RL33865, op.cit. 
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the functioning of its nuclear agenda and is following the primary methods of non-
proliferation of nuclear materials359. Plus, it strives to maintain standards towards 
maintaining the safety and security of the nuclear power programme360. Furthermore, it 
has shown commitment to cooperating with the IAEA in formulating a nuclear 
programme which will satisfy desires for peace held by its own people and those of the 
international community361. The country promises to work with others towards devising 
more nuclear programmes for peaceful usage. Finally, it also strives to encourage the 
sustainability of peaceful nuclear programmes362  while restricting the use of nuclear 
power for exportation of nuclear products to curb the dangers of nuclear proliferation.   
 
Formed to uphold nuclear non-proliferation, the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) is 
supported by the UAE. For this reason, the country pledged ten million dollars to show 
solidarity towards the fuel bank initiative of the IAEA. This amount is to be used for 
reinforcing the non-proliferation plans363. 
 
In general, the UAE has signed many instruments for preventing the misuse of nuclear 
energy. These include: the IAEA Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 
1996; IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement in 2003; IAEA Convention on the 
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material in 2003; UN Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 
2000; UN Security Council Resolution of 1540 in 2004; and the UN International 
Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism in 2005 (see Appendix 
7)364. The country plans to approve the IAEA Additional Protocol to Safeguards 
Agreement; the IAEA Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection; and the 
Nuclear Suppliers Groups Export Guidelines365. The UAE has gained more experience 
from these instruments and is developing its national mechanisms to facilitate their needs 
and implementation366. The main aim of these ratifications is to ensure that the country 
operates its nuclear programme according to acceptable standards. 
 
                                         
359 CRS Report RL33865, op.cit. 
360 Ibid. CRS Report RL33865, op.cit. 
361The Embassy of the United Arab Emirates in Washington DC, op.cit. 
362 Ibid. The Embassy of the United Arab Emirates in Washington DC, op.cit. 
363 See: The Embassy of the United Arab Emirates in Washington DC, op.cit. 
364 Ibid. The Embassy of the United Arab Emirates in Washington DC, op.cit. 
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The country has also ratified various safety instruments. These are the IAEA Convention 
on Early Notification of Nuclear Accident (see Appendix 14) and the IAEA Convention 
on Assistance in the case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency367. The UAE 
plans to sign the IAEA Treaty on Nuclear Safety and the Safety of Spent Fuel 
Management in the future368.   
 
On completion of the nuclear power plants, UAE will be accountable under the IAEA 
1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (see Appendix 8); IAEA 
Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability (see Appendix 10); IAEA 
Joint Protocol on the Application of the Vienna and Paris Conventions (see Appendix 
12); and the IAEA Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage 
(see Appendix 11)369.  
 
The reprocessing and enrichment of nuclear raw materials can be useful in certain nuclear 
reactors, but at the same time can be employed for the manufacture of mass destructive 
weaponry. This dual usage can be perceived as suspicious, due to the fear of envisaged 
possible harm. To assuage suspicion, the ratification of the NPT by UAE assures its 
nuclear activities would be bound by IAEA regulations370. The Additional Protocol would 
increase the accessibility of the UAE’s nuclear activities. UAE plans to depend on light-
water reactors instead of heavy-water ones, which can effectively reduce the misuse of 
nuclear reactive materials. Noteworthy also is that in fact, nuclear weapons are not 
normally manufactured by nuclear reactors which are producing energy on a commercial 
basis371. The ratification of the NPT (see Appendix 13) subjected the UAE to the 
regulations of the IAEA; thus, all nuclear activities in the country must comply with 
international regulations. 
 
3.7 Summary of Chapter Three 
 
The use of nuclear energy by countries is often suspected by the international community 
acknowledging it can also signify production of deadly weapons which would affect the 
                                         
367 Christian Blanchard, op.cit and see The Embassy of the United Arab Emirates in Washington DC, op.cit. 
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369Ibid. The Embassy of the United Arab Emirates in Washington DC, op.cit. 
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371 International Institute for Strategic Studies, Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East: In the Shadow of 
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present and future generations. In view of this, the use of nuclear energy requires strict 
planning and implementation.  
 
From the discussion, it could be seen that the UAE’s power usage rises at the rate of 
almost 10 percent annually. The conventional methods of electricity production have been 
using water, natural gas or oil. Though the UAE is rich in petroleum resources, constant 
use would mean continuous depletion of the resources, which cannot be replenished. Not 
only does the depletion of these resources matter, the truth is that they cannot provide for 
the ever-increasing power requirements of this economically developing nation.  
 
Therefore, UAE considers a method of generating power without cost to the non- 
renewable petroleum resources. Coal was the next option for the country, but although it 
was found production of electricity from coal was economically viable, the danger of its 
combustion in the environment is well-known. Therefore, the only option left which is 
cheaper, as well as capable of producing commercial quantities of power was nuclear 
energy. Hence, the UAE decided to opt for nuclear energy to produce power in the 
country.  
 
The nuclear power projects in the country are intended to be used for peaceful purposes 
only. The country is therefore very cautious in handling these projects and would not want 
to jeopardise the integrity of the country. This reassured the neighbouring countries that 
the projects were exclusively intended to produce power. The country’s plan is to build 
about fourteen nuclear power plants across its cities, with four billed to be operational by 
the year 2020. The country started the construction of the power plant in Abu Dhabi in 
collaboration with a Korean Consortium, selected after a bid from nine other companies.  
 
The plants will create many jobs; thus, many UAE nationals are being trained to take up 
these jobs as incorporated into the contractual obligations of the Korean Consortium. 
Most employees in the UAE are foreigners. Working in the nuclear power plant is risky, 
hence it requires a large amount of practical experience to avoid possible disasters. Of 
note is that the difference in cultural practices also affects the imparting of knowledge 
from Korean counterparts. Although time consuming, the GNEII was set up to train the 
UAE nationals to exclusively construct and run the nuclear power plants.  
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The expectation is that the power projects will benefit the country economically; this 
development will increase the GDP of the country.  To maintain transparency in the 
running of the nuclear programme, ENEC was formed as a public entity. The corporation 
is to evaluate and control the running of the nuclear power programme.  
 
To maintain transparency in the nuclear programme, the country is against the enrichment 
of nuclear fuel, since it will create ambiguity regarding the nuclear power production 
programme.  This is because fuel enrichment also occurs when producing nuclear 
weapons. The UAE adheres strictly to the rules and regulations of the national and 
international agencies policing the safe handling of nuclear energy. The leadership of the 
country is updated on issues regarding the nuclear programme by the International 
Advisory Board (IAB). The Board is a pool of highly skilled professionals from around 
the world for assuring the safety of the programme as well as adhering to its primary 
purpose.  
 
In addition to the domestic agencies that ensure the safeguards, there are also international 
agencies to control the affairs of the nuclear power programmes. The World Association 
for Nuclear Operators (WANO) are a union of countries that use nuclear energy for power 
production. These countries help each other and give recommendations for safer handling 
of the nuclear energy. The UAE is a member of various organisations which include 
primarily the IAEA. The ratification of the IAEA’s NPT by the UAE is a welcome 
development.  
 
The UAE, despite the financial crunch have taken the risk to continue with the programme 
since expectation is that the demand for electricity will not fall. Records from the 
authorities show that the demand for electricity would rise at a very high rate, hence the 
need for nuclear power. Perhaps, the country acknowledges that it is going to gain 
economically from the project 
 
Having looked at the motivational framework for the UAE to possess nuclear energy as 
well as the concerns that the country might face in running the programme, it is important 
to consider the management and monitoring of potential liabilities should it successfully 
acquire Nuclear power. These are analysed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
MANAGING AND MONITORING OF POTENTIAL 
LIABILITIES SHOULD UAE HAVE NUCLEAR ENERGY 
 
4.1 Introduction to Chapter Four 
 
Chapter Four discusses the evaluation of the management and monitoring of potential 
liabilities for the UAE nuclear programme. Other issues analysed are likely legal 
liabilities, nuclear liability principles and international frameworks for nuclear liabilities. 
The chapter further analyses how other countries, especially the developed nations (for 
examples: USA, UK and Japan), have managed liabilities from their nuclear power 
programmes. The chapter then examines possible lessons the UAE could learn from 
previous nuclear incidents, as examples: the 1957 Windscale disaster; the 1979 Three 
Mile Island; the 1986 Chernobyl accident; and the 2011 Fukushima accident. Reviews of 
the nature of criminal and civil liabilities of nuclear energy are also conducted. The 
overall aim of this chapter is to address the issues regarding liability coverage in the event 
of nuclear accident, should the UAE possess nuclear energy. The points raised in this 
chapter are inter-linked, in that they specifically present substantial lessons the UAE 
could benefit from, to deal with liabilities originating from its nuclear power 
project/plans. 
 
4.2 Managing and monitoring of potential liabilities should UAE have Nuclear 
Energy 
 
During the last century, more than a hundred countries have relied on nuclear power 
plants to produce energy to meet their increasing need for electricity. Even though many 
of them have shown interest in nuclear power generation, the way they have implemented 
their nuclear energy programmes have been different372. These dissimilarities are due to 
the uncertainties arising from concerns about nuclear accidents, such as those at 
                                         
372Fuhrmann, Matthew, (2009). ‘Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation 
Agreements’. International Security 34(1):7-41; and Miller, Steven and Scott Sagan. Nuclear Power 
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Chernobyl and Fukushima Daiichi in Japan. These accidents have created doubts about 
the approach of industrialisation used. The then German Chancellor, Angela Merkel 
pronounced that the Fukushima Daiichi incident could result in a change in the global 
system of commercialisation373. In addition to nuclear accidents which can affect many 
countries, there are other risks associated with the use of nuclear active products capable 
of producing the raw materials for nuclear weapons. Such practices could possibly cause 
insecurity at the international level.374 
 
There are various reasons why more countries opt for nuclear power generation. The cost-
effectiveness of nuclear power plants is one of the reasons for such widespread 
attraction.375 Although this method is economical, the capital investment required is much 
higher than that of other more conventional production methods.  
 
Another reason is the issue of security provided to a country in relation to energy. When 
a country relies on another for its energy requirements, it will do everything possible to 
protect its interests and exert influence376.  This may result in insecurity. In order to avoid 
this, many countries opt for nuclear power generation377 within their own territory. 
 
There are opposing reasons for countries deciding on nuclear power plants. These include 
the drastic effects of radioactive materials, intense investment and difficulty in applying 
the complex technological skills. Since it is possible the consequences of a nuclear reactor 
in one country may be felt by another, it is necessary to frame definite rules and 
regulations regarding the liabilities to be incurred, by parties signing up to such 
programmes. There are various legal liabilities (including both civil and criminal), to be 
accepted by the participating parties. This chapter therefore tackles the liabilities of 
nuclear power projects in four parts. 
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The first part of the chapter addresses the possibilities of liabilities that may arise from 
nuclear power projects including environmental concerns. The second part analyses the 
methods which States that already have nuclear power plants, have used to deal with 
possible liabilities. Meanwhile part three analyses the legal concerns arising from the 
Chernobyl and Fukushima incidents and how the UAE can make changes in operations 
and legislations. Part four reviews the nature of civil and criminal liabilities that may arise 
in a nuclear power project. Collectively, the consideration of these points helps to 
augment the lessons the UAE could learn from each of them to successfully manage 
potential liabilities from the nuclear power programme. 
 
4. 3 Possible legal liabilities 
 
4.3.1 Operator Liability 
 
This section of the thesis analyses the legal liabilities that should be prepared before 
venturing into nuclear power projects. There are many limitations to international legal 
systems. These limitations include: they are suggestions; there is need for consensus; they 
lack a single international “ruler”; they lack enforcement mechanisms (“world police”); 
funding is restricted; they possess vast differences in cultures and have no real 
“norms”.378The source of international law has been defined differently by different 
actors. The absence of an authority gives a negative impact to international law and its 
execution379. The researcher proclaims that this means a central controlling agency, but 
who can fulfil this role? Is it the IAEA or the UN? The international law requires 
consensus between states, how is this to be achieved in the sensitive area of nuclear 
development? It is suggested that there are large political, as well as legal limitations here.  
 
Since the systems of legislature, the judiciary and executive are absent in international 
law, it is difficult to compare how it complements national laws. International law is 
entirely different from a national law in terms of drafting, implementation and 
enforcement. The absence of these three features prevents its efficacy, unlike domestic 
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laws380. The researcher views that it is better to utilise domestic laws, which are drafted 
in consonant with relevant international laws. 
 
Due to technological advancements, there is a reduction in the effects of nuclear reactions 
on the environment. Nuclear power now poses a very suitable competition for the other 
methods of power generation. Moreover, the laws relating to these projects have been 
well defined today, with a clear demarcation of the liabilities of each party involved in 
the projects.381 The development of international law and the increasing cost of raw 
materials required for the conventional methods have attracted the interest of new 
countries to nuclear power generation382.  
 
Since international conventions have relevant rules for setting up a nuclear power project, 
it is necessary the UAE ascertains the legal challenges associated with nuclear power 
projects. According to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the safety of each nuclear fitting 
is the responsibility of the person who holds the licence for the same. Therefore, every 
contracting party should be cautious as to the methods adopted by the operator383. 
 
The liability of the contracting parties can be ascertained by analysing international 
legality concerning civil liability. There are two conventions relating to civil liability in 
the case of a nuclear accident. One is a regional convention meant for European countries, 
while the other is the International Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage 
adopted on May 21, 1963. This was drafted under the supervision of IAEA384.  This was 
drawn up to encourage more investment in this area by securing the interests of the 
victims if an accident takes place385.  
 
According to the international Convention, victims of nuclear accidents can seek 
compensation even without proving that the operator of the plant was responsible for such 
injury/accidents. There is no burden of proof on the victims. The operator of the plant is 
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strictly liable for the accident and its consequences386. According to the Paris and the 
Vienna Conventions, there is no exclusion for the liability so mentioned, other than when 
such an accident occurs due to an act of State, war or insurrection. Barring when an injury 
or damage is caused by the victim due to lack of attentiveness, the operator of the reactor, 
will not be held liable.  
 
Another interesting, notable point here is that suppliers of raw materials, labour or the 
mode of operation cannot be held liable for the consequences of a nuclear accident. Again, 
only the operator who holds the licence to operate the reactor will be held liable under the 
international conventions387. Even though the suppliers or the owners of the nuclear 
reactor are free of compensating the victims of a nuclear accident, the operator cannot be 
held liable for the property(ies) belonging to the suppliers or owners, which were used 
for the running of the nuclear plant and have been damaged by this accident388. However, 
when cause has to do with the running and/or operation, the operator is deemed at fault. 
 
Although the legal liability of the operator of a nuclear reactor is wide, there are 
limitations on the amount that can be claimed by victims. Such claims also have a 
limitation period which becomes applicable after a certain period and the lapse of such 
time invalidates the claim389. This does not seem to be a ‘good thing’. The researcher 
argues that based on the nature of radioactive radiation, it is possible it could take a long 
while for the effects of such radiation to be noticed in order that claims can be made.  
 
The operator is solely responsible for the damages to be paid to the victims of a nuclear 
accident. This makes it mandatory for an operator to secure finances for such claims 
through insurance and securities through channelling. The international conventions also 
stipulate that individuals who suffer a nuclear accident can prefer to place their claims in 
the country in which the accident took place. Additionally, this reduces time and 
complexity if such claims were to be decided by an international body. It also guarantees 
equal rights for all claimants.  
                                         
386 Nathalie L. J. T. Horbach and P. Blanchard, ‘Responsabilitécivilenucléaire des transports internationaux: 
Questions nouvelleset propositions’, (“Civil nuclear liability in the transport of international materials: New 
questions and propositions.”)  2006 RDAI, 633 to 662. 
387 Julia A. Schwartz, International law and Civil Nuclear Liability after Chernobyl (OECD, 2006), 
Available at: www.nea.fr/html/law/chernobyl Last Accessed on June 9, 2013). 
388Ibid. 
389Paris Convention, op.cit and the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, 1997. 
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Another important and encouraging aspect of nuclear power projects is that the capital 
required for construction and equipment can be loaned from creditors. These creditors, in 
the case of other, conventionally fuelled power plants, are given guaranteed security of 
the plant, which could then be run by them if the loan is not repaid. In the case of a nuclear 
power plant, however, since the operator alone can operate the project and be responsible 
for any accident, the creditors’ interest will not be properly addressed. The creditors will 
not be able to take over the plant and so the present legality does not provide for their 
needs. While lending money for a nuclear power plant, the creditor cannot take the 
nuclear power plant as security390. Therefore, the question arises: what about investors’ 
protection? It is possible that state legislation can be drafted to provide for investors’ 
protection mostly on occasions whereby the fault is not theirs, but, this should be proven 
beyond reasonable doubt. The author maintains that it is still possible the investor must 
take on insurance cover for their investments. 
 
Also, victims of a nuclear accident cannot turn to the contractor or the owner of the project 
- only the operator - even if the accident is because of the design or construction. The 
right of the operator to be indemnified for the damage that occurs due to contractor fault 
has not been defined in the international legal instruments that deal with nuclear power 
projects. Such liabilities will be decided according to the domestic law in practice391. The 
international instrument providing for a situation where the operator could claim 
indemnity from the contractor is to encourage nuclear power projects contractors to work 
without huge insurance policies and other securities392. This could be likened to systems 
within environmental law, for example, the liabilities attaching to parties responsible for 
oil spillages at sea. 
 
4.3.2 State Liability 
 
International law makes it obligatory on the part of ratifying states not to operate nuclear 
power plants in such a way that they cause environmental pollution or destruction that go 
                                         
390 Rupert Reece et al, op.cit. 
391 Art.6 of the Paris Convention, and Art.IV of the Vienna Convention, and the different approaches taken 
by various non-convention States. 
392 Cosimo Rucellai, “Contrats de fourniture nucleaire, responsabilité des dommages et arbitrage”, 
1978Rev. De l’Arbitrage 450 
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beyond geographical boundaries. According to the customary international law as defined 
in the Trail Smelter Case, no sovereign state should allow the use of its territory for 
creating injury in another393. Based on tacit international customs law, the Declaration 
approved by the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment by Principle 21, 
holds that all sovereign states have the responsibility for ensuring that the activities 
occurring within its territory should not result in damage to the environment of other 
states394. Various international legal instruments, like the Declaration on Environment and 
Development, the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, reiterate the same principle of liability of nations to prevent 
environmental pollution and damage395. The author suggests that UAE should consider 
the provisions of the above Convention and Declaration towards protecting biodiversity 
and the environment, while developing its nuclear power. 
 
The IAEA has issued regulations and legal status of codes of conduct relating to 
radioactive waste management. These codes of conducts are guidance/regulatory, and do 
not of themselves create legal liabilities. Though not ratified by all countries, these 
recommendations have persuasive value396. The IAEA made the provisions of the 
Convention on Nuclear Safety mandatory for the states to follow397.  These Conventions 
make it the liability of the State to ensure the safe use of nuclear materials within its 
jurisdiction398. Furthermore, the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment also 
makes it the liability of the state to take “all appropriate and effective measures to prevent 
reduce and control significant adverse trans-boundary environmental impact from 
proposed activities”399 individually or collectively.  
 
                                         
393 Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R. Int’l Arb. Awards 1905 (1938 & 1941)   
394 Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, Swed., ‘Report of the United Nations Conference 
on the Human Environment’, Principle 21, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/REV.1 (Jan. 1, 1973)   
395 Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June 3-14, 1992, Report of the 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Vol. I, Principle 2, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.151/26/REV.1(VOL.I) (Jan. 1, 1993), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 
194(2), Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3 and The Convention on Biological Diversity art. 3, June 5, 1992, 
1760 U.N.T.S. 79.   
396 David B. Dixon, ‘Transnational Shipments of Nuclear Materials by Sea: Do Current Safeguards Provide 
Coastal States a Right to Deny Innocent Passage?’, 16 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 73, 84-87 (2006).  
Convention on Nuclear Safety, June 17, 1994, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 104-6 (1995), 1963 U.N.T.S. 293 
397 Ibid. Convention on Nuclear Safety.  
398Ibid. Convention on Nuclear Safety. 
399 Article 2(1), Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context app. I(2)-
(3), Feb. 25, 1991, 1989 U.N.T.S. 309.   
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The management of nuclear active wastes is of concern to the international community. 
While there are prohibitions in place for disposing of such wastes beyond a country’s 
geographical boundary, there are many instances where such wastes are being exported 
to other countries. The safe and proper management of nuclear wastes has been a matter 
of discussion among nations. The Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel 
Management and Safety of Radioactive Waste Management is obligatory for more than 
thirty countries and makes these sovereign states liable for the management of nuclear 
wastes400. International conventions thus oblige each country to take domestic measures 
during law making to provide for the safe treatment of nuclear active materials and wastes 
arising from power plants.   
 
4.4 Nuclear liability principles 
 
According to the President of IAEA Board of Governors General Conference: 
International Conference on the Safety of Transport of Radioactive Material: “There 
remains considerable uncertainty and debate related to the implementation of a 
comprehensive regime to deal with the legal liability resulting from an accident during 
the transport of radioactive material”.401There are many liability-related conventions, to 
which many states are parties while others are not. The President added that: “the 
provisions of the liability conventions, and the relationships between them, are not simple 
to understand”402 concluding that: “the preparation of an explanatory text for these 
instruments would assist in developing a common understanding of what are complex 
legal issues, and thereby promote adherence to these instruments. The Agency Secretariat 
should prepare such an explanatory text, with the assistance of an independent group of 
legal experts appointed by the Director General.”403 
 
                                         
400 Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste 
Management pmbl. vi, Sept. 5, 1997, 2153 U.N.T.S. 357.     
401International Conference on the Safety of Transport of Radioactive Material held in Vienna, Austria, 
from 7 to 11 July 2003.   
402 See International Conference on the Safety of Transport of Radioactive Material held in Vienna, Austria, 
from 7 to 11 July 2003. 
403Boyle, Alan (2005). Globalizing Environmental Liability: The Interplay of National and International 
Law. Journal of Environmental Law, Vol. 17 No. 1, 4. See further, Fitzmaurice, Malgosia: International 
Responsibility and Liability, in: Bodansky, Daniel - Brunnee, Jutta - Hey, Ellen (eds.): The Oxford 
Handbook of International Environmental Law. Oxford University Press, Oxford - New York, 2007. 1024. 
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The researcher notes that the adoption of both the Protocol to Amend the Vienna 
Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage in 1997 (1997 Protocol) (see Appendix 
10) and the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC) (see 
Appendix 11) demonstrated the most important landmark in the growth of international 
nuclear liability instruments. The above instruments contain essential progression in the 
quantity of reparation obtainable, the extent of injury covered and the allotment of control. 
In addition, the CSC offers the support for creating a comprehensive system with 
extensive observance by nuclear and non-nuclear countries. The UAE is party to these 
regimes and have also incorporated their provisions into the domestic nuclear laws. 
 
The following principles are present within the Conventions and the laws regarding the 
nuclear third party liability. These principles help to shape nuclear regimes. They are the 
nuclear operator’s strict liability; operator of nuclear installation’s exclusive liability; 
provision of compensation without nationality, residence or domicile discrimination; the 
liability operator’s financial coverage to be mandatory; the jurisdiction to be exclusive 
(especially for the nuclear accident jurisdiction areas and the courts of State) and the time 
and amount liability limitation.404 
 
Situations may arise whereby Strict Liability is maintained. This means that the victim 
of nuclear incident does not have to prove fault. The claimant must only establish that 
harm has occurred, then the operator is deemed to be responsible, regardless of whether 
it is the operator’s fault. However, whereby an accident occurs, the operator (of power 
plant, enrichment or fuel and/or reprocessing facility) is responsible, irrespective of proof 
of any mistake or carelessness. This makes the legal action process less cumbersome by 
eliminating any impediments that could exist, especially with the burden of proof, 
considering the complexity of nuclear discipline. Simply, strict liability entails that a 
claimant does not need to prove the accident occurred405. The author contends that it is 
possible the claimant should prove the accident occurred and led to harm, but is not 
required to prove cause, or who was at fault. 
                                         
404 Parties to Vienna Convention are mainly outside of Western Europe, including: Argentina, Bulgaria, 
Czech Rep, Egypt, Hungary, Kazakhstan (2011), Lithuania, Mexico, Poland, Romania, Russia, Saudi 
Arabia (2011), Slovakia, Ukraine, United Arab Emerates (2011). See also http://www.iaea. 
org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/liability_status.pdf+ Accessed on 23/04/2013. 
405 See Callow v Tillstone sited from http://e-lawresources.co.uk/Strict-liability.php Accessed on 
13/04/2013. 
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There may occur a situation whereby all claims are brought against the nuclear operator 
when an accident occurs and this is when, in terms of the operator, Exclusive Liability 
comes into place. This is regardless of the accident’s cause. By implication, this means 
that suppliers or builders of the nuclear plant are protected from public legal actions when 
there is an accident. Here, the claimants need not prove who is responsible for the accident 
but again, according to the law, the nuclear operator bears it.406 
 
It is mandatory that an operator of nuclear power plant is insured. The operator should 
ensure that there is availability of funds, either his or the insurers’ to compensate for 
damages.407 The above describes Mandatory Financial Coverage, which guarantees 
availability of funds for payment of claims. States are able to make laws to set the 
minimum amount of protection, but in doing so must comply with international treaty 
obligations. It is obvious that the amount for mandatory protection has improved over 
time. This is due to inflation and equally permits increased responsibility on nuclear 
operators. 
 
The Exclusive Jurisdiction principle makes it possible that only the courts of the country 
in which an accident has occurred have jurisdiction over claims for damages.408 The 
principle possesses two major effects: the first includes prevention of forum shopping - a 
situation whereby claimants search for courts and national legislation to support their 
claims. This suggests to the nuclear operator some measure of assurance and protection. 
Secondly, this principle also makes it possible for the competent court to be located close 
to the source of damage. Here, victims of nuclear damage do not need to travel far to 
register their claims. The combination of exclusive jurisdiction and exclusive liability 
make it possible for applicable courts to be easily reached, irrespective of the nature of 
the accident - whether it is transport-related and/or the affected company is also distantly 
situated.  
 
                                         
406 See also http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/liability_status.pdf+ Accessed on 
18/05/2013. 
407 See also http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/liability_status.pdf+ Accessed on 
18/05/2013. 
408 See also http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/liability_status.pdf+ Accessed on 
18/05/2013. 
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The essence of Limitation of Liability is to offer protection to nuclear operators; hence 
it is quite controversial.409 The question here is: is it fair to claimants? The level of 
limitation depends on the nature of damage. The researcher argues that it appears the 
essence of limitation of liability is to consider leverage on the part of the nuclear operator. 
The risks of an accident are efficiently mitigated by restricting the amount that operators 
must pay. Outside a certain level of damage, responsibility is passed from the individual 
operator to the state, or a collection of nuclear operators, or both. It therefore implies that 
this limitation recognises the benefits of power reaped from the nuclear source and the 
contained risks a state takes by authorising the construction and operation of power plants.  
 
The aim of the principles discussed above is to guarantee that significant levels of 
compensation are accessible to victims, with a negligible level of court cases and 
complications in the case of an accident. Strict liability is accepted in exchange for a cap 
on liability, which creates certainty for insurers of operators, but if state or plaintiff can 
prove negligence, then there is no cap and liability is unlimited. The evaluation of these 
principles therefore suggests that their scopes have a huge impact on the determination of 
liabilities and payment of claims in the nuclear business. They allow for a well-planned 
implementation of claims based on the magnitude of damage(s) and this can be very 
beneficial to the UAE’s nuclear programme. 
 
4.5 Analysis of how countries using nuclear energy manage potential liabilities 
 
Given that governments are aware of the risk of nuclear accidents causing trans-boundary 
harm, the development of international instruments to ensure that access to justice was 
readily available for victims outside of the country in which an accident occurred, became 
a reality. For countries to enjoy this provision, they must ratify relevant conventions. The 
researcher notes that the proliferation of different international instruments and their aims, 
regularly give rise to misunderstandings. Some of the most important instruments have 
been amended several times and are discussed below. It is also observed that not all 
member countries had consented to the earlier version, but have ratified the recent ones. 
                                         
409 See also http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/liability_status.pdf+ Accessed on 
18/05/2013. 
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For this reason, there is huge ambiguity and efforts towards the harmonisation of these 
regimes are in progress.410 The UAE has ratified these instruments. 
 
The development and use of nuclear power plants have been encouraged by many 
countries. Although the initial cost of these plants was high, there was still elevated 
demand for such methods of power production in all the developed nations. The 
management of nuclear active waste materials posed a challenge that required much 
debate. Most of the developed nations have now built extensive nuclear power projects 
to provide low-cost and steady power supply and have successfully managed these 
projects to standards. The countries that have entered nuclear power generation try to 
maintain a balance of the liabilities and profits of these projects. For this to happen, 
international codes of rules and regulations should be prepared so that those countries can 
adhere to them.  
 
The major aspect to be considered by countries while setting up a nuclear power plant is 
to ensure that the plant is safe from radioactive emissions. The security from such hazards 
needs to be effectively tackled to minimise the possibility of higher liability for the state. 
Human tissues are susceptible to radioactive materials. According to experts, a minimum 
exposure to such radiation can lead to damage of human tissue. If a benchmark is decided 
by the countries in allowing exposure to such radioactive substances, it leads to 
occupational hazards and is against the morals of a sovereign state411.  
 
The IAEA is endowed with the power to set a consistent standard regarding safe exposure 
to radiation, but there is no mechanism available to the said agency412. Therefore, there 
was a need to produce a set of rules that can define the permissible limits of radiation 
from a nuclear power plant or any nuclear active project, which can be controlled. This 
instrument does not provide for the procedures to be followed to make the nuclear project 
protected. It provides that the maximum limit of radiation a standard person can be 
                                         
410 Andrew Roman, Michelle Fernando, Cross-border Nuclear Liability, Partner, Miller Thomson LLP 
barristers & solicitor patent and trade mark agent, Available from http://www.millerthomson.com/ 
assets/files/article_attachments/Cross-border_Nuclear_Liability.pdf Accessed on 29-06-2013. 
411 Neal Smith and Michael Baram, (1987). “The Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Regulation of 
Radiation Hazards in the Workplace: Present Problems and New Approaches to Reproductive Health” 13 
Ecology L.Q. 879. 
412 Abel J. González, (2002). “The Debate on the Health Effects Attributable to Low Radiation Exposure” 
1 Pierce L. Rev. 39. 
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exposed to over a period of three decades is five rems, although this dosage changes from 
person to person413. 
 
According to the British Safety Standards (BSS), states using nuclear power generation 
require strict adherence to the maximum limit of radiation emitted by the project.414 To 
comply with such emission rates, the states are required to have constant supervision over 
the project. Yet the procedures to follow to keep the radiation below the BSS are not 
mentioned. Such procedures are adopted from the allied documents of the IAEA415 
although there are local agreements between nations within regions, to safeguard nuclear 
power plants from excessive radiation.  
 
To safeguard nuclear power projects, the IAEA set up an ‘Environmental Aspects of 
Nuclear Power Stations’ as a part of the initiative to provide international safety 
standards416. The difficulty in attaining maximum safety of nuclear power plants is due 
to the inability of all countries to accept a common set of regulations. The IAEA finds it 
difficult to coordinate this, despite its role to provide regulations to cater for safety issues 
in nuclear power stations.417 The IAEA ensures the security of nuclear power plants 
during construction and functioning stages. It brought about the development of the 
‘Incident Reporting System’418. The International Conference on the Safety of Nuclear 
Power in 1991 formed a comprehensive nuclear security and safety code for countries 
worldwide419. The UAE considers this in its nuclear power programme. 
 
The safety of nuclear power plants and the safeguarding of lives from radiation emitted 
by radio-active products need to be dealt with differently and the use of distinct codes of 
conduct is preferred. While the standards are totally different, the international 
                                         
413 International Atomic Energy Agency, Basic Safety Standards for Radiation Protection (1982) Safety 
Series No. 9. 
414 See International Atomic Energy Agency, Basic Safety Standards for Radiation Protection (1982) Safety 
Series No. 9. 
415 Elena Molodstova, “Nuclear Energy and Environmental Protection: Responses of International Law” 
(1994) 12 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 185. 
416 International Atomic Energy Agency, Environmental Aspects of Nuclear Power Stations (1971) 
Proceedings Series STI/PUB/261. 
417 International Atomic Energy Agency, The Agency’s Programme and Budget for 1991 and 1992 XVII-
XXI (1990). 
418 Int’l Atomic Energy Agency, International Atomic Energy Agency Illicit Trafficking Database, see: 
http://www-ns.iaea.org/security/itdb.htm Last Accessed June 7, 2013]. 
419Ibid. Int’l Atomic Energy Agency, International Atomic Energy Agency Illicit Trafficking Database. 
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legislations for these are the same. These legislations determine how domestic laws 
regarding nuclear safety and standards are often enacted as analysed in section 4.5.1 
below. Due to the differences in national legislations that are already in practice, it is 
difficult and time consuming to produce a combined instrument that is acceptable to all 
countries420. The Convention on Nuclear Safety was adopted by nations with a view to 
combining the efforts of Euratom and the IAEA to enact two codes of standard which 
deal with safety of nuclear plants and safeguarding against radiation from nuclear active 
materials421.  
 
Also, many countries have adopted the Convention on Early Notification of Nuclear 
Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the case of a Nuclear Accident/ 
Radiological Emergency. Here, the IAEA is responsible for preparing necessary 
mechanisms to supervise the standards and to help each nation be prepared to face nuclear 
accidents and radiological emergencies.  
 
During the nuclear energy generation, the most hazardous stages are the final three, which 
include the extraction of uranium from the soil, the alteration of uranium to uranium oxide 
which can be used to produce the power and the management of nuclear waste, which 
poses damage to the environment as well as public health. It requires proper mechanisms 
to ensure protection of the flora, fauna and the environment from being harmed 
throughout these processes422.  
 
Yet another important part of nuclear power generation is the movement of nuclear active 
materials from one place to another. Since these materials are radioactive in nature, 
careful steps should be taken to avoid hazards associated with them. The Hazardous 
Material Transportation Act in the USA was the first of its kind to provide for a body to 
supervise the transportation of radioactive materials and to follow specific steps to reduce 
the hazards caused by such transportation423. Furthermore, there are recommendations 
                                         
420Ibid. Int’l Atomic Energy Agency, International Atomic Energy Agency Illicit Trafficking Database 
421International Atomic Energy Agency, International Atomic Energy Agency Illicit Trafficking Database, 
http://www-ns.iaea.org/conventions/nuclear-safety.asp, Last Accessed June 7, 2013. 
422 Elizabeth V. Scott, (1985). “Unfinished Business: The Regulation of Uranium Mining and Milling” 18 
U. Rich. L. Rev. 615. 
423 Michele Mattsson, “Transportation of Radioactive Materials in Our Backyards - A State's Perspective” 
(1988) 9 J. 
Energy L. & Pol’y 47. 
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and rules framed by the IAEA to safeguard all transactions of radioactive materials and 
the UAE recognises them in its own nuclear power development. The right of innocent 
passage alone is a grey area which needs to be tackled under the guidelines of the 
IAEA424.  
 
There are different methods of commercial transactions on radioactive wastes. For 
example, the USA and Japan are the foremost countries that reuse spent fuel. There are 
policies that deal with such businesses. These policies, along with safety standards are 
better dealt with domestically than on an international basis. While the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) can be made applicable to radioactive materials, 
there are certain characteristics peculiar to radioactive materials that make trading of 
nuclear substances ineffective when GATT guidelines are strictly followed.425 There is 
therefore requirement for another instrument that is more effective on nuclear materials 
trading than GATT426. 
 
To some extent, the USA takes a different approach in managing and monitoring potential 
liabilities from nuclear energy production, and having been the first to embrace the 
concept, the country is party only to CSC (which is yet to be enforced) and no other 
international nuclear liability convention. The first comprehensive nuclear liability law 
which has been central to addressing issues of liability for nuclear accident since 1957 is 
the Price-Anderson Act.427 The Act provides $12.5 billion coverage without involving 
the public or government and no fault is to be proven. It covers power reactors, research 
reactors, enrichment plants and waste repositories.  This can be a good lesson for the 
UAE. 
 
In 2005, the Act was renewed for a period of 20 years with good bi-partisan support, and 
entails that individual operators should be liable for two levels of insurance cover.428 
                                         
424 Lawrence Marín, “Oceanic Transportation of Radioactive Materials: The Conflict between the Law of 
the Seas’ Right of Innocent Passage and Duty to the Marine Environment” (2001) 13 Fla. J. Int’l L. P. 361. 
425 Lutz Strack, The Safety Regime Concerning Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste and its 
Compatibility with the Trade Regime of the WTO. [Online]: Available:  http://www.oecd-nea.org/law/ 
nlb/nlb-73/025_049.pdf, Accessed June 7, 2013 
426Ibid Lutz Strack, The Safety Regime Concerning Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste and 
its Compatibility with the Trade Regime of the WTO. 
427 Centre for Nuclear Science and Technology Information. The Price-Anderson Act: Background 
Information. [Online]. Available at: http://www.nuclearconnect.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/54_ 
PriceAnderson_Background.pdf Accessed on 25-02-2015. 
428 See Centre for Nuclear Science and Technology Information. The Price-Anderson Act. 
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Firstly, each nuclear site is required to obtain US$375 million liability cover (as of 2011) 
provided by a pool of private insurance [American Nuclear Insurers (ANI)].429 The above 
involves financial liability and not lawful liability as in European liability standard. 
 
According to the World Nuclear Association (WNA), all US reactor operators have 
mutually provided for the second layer or Secondary Financial Protection (SFP) plan and 
this is funded through traditional payments, if required, of up to $112 million per reactor, 
per accident, composed in annual repayments of $17.5 million (and in tune with 
inflation).430The Department of Energy meanwhile, also makes available $10 billion for 
its nuclear activities and the entire terms come to more than $12.2 billion, paid for by the 
utilities.431 Congress, otherwise regarded as ‘insurer of last resort’ would have to choose 
the way damages is provided when a major accident occurs, but only if the amount is 
beyond the above-mentioned cover, irrespective of mistake432. 
 
The Nuclear Installations Act of 1965 in the UK provides for recompense for 
harm/damage sustained, in cases where the law has been breached during routine, normal 
functioning/operation of nuclear power plants. The Act also makes provision for strict 
liability of nuclear power projects operators, but only on the condition that the damage 
caused from such plants is radiation related. To clarify, if such radiation causes any 
damage, the operator is exclusively responsible and there are no circumstances under 
which the operator’s fault would even have to be proved. Here, the law of negligence is 
relevant to an extent, especially when the injury caused is not only expected but 
accessible433.  
 
A new limit of liability was stated for specific installation after the UK Energy Act of 
1983 brought legislation in to line with the revisions of the Paris/Brussels Conventions.434 
Each major installation was provided with a limit of £140 million in 1994 to make sure 
                                         
429 See Centre for Nuclear Science and Technology Information. The Price-Anderson Act. 
430World Nuclear Association (August 2013). Liability for Nuclear Damage available from http://www. 
world-nuclear.org/info/Safety-and-Security/Safety-of-Plants/Liability-for-NuclearDamage/ Assessed on 
on 21-12-2014. 
431 Ibid World Nuclear Association (August 2013). 
432 See also World Nuclear Association (August 2013). 
433 Blue Circle Industries v Ministry of Defence [1999] 2 Ch. 289. 
434Nuclear Engineering International (27 March 2011). Liability for nuclear accidents - how is it handled? 
[Online] Available at: http://www.neimagazine.com/opinion/opinionliability-for-nuclear-accidents-how-
is-it-handled/Last accessed on 24-09-2013. 
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the operators were liable for claims up to this amount.435 16 Lloyd’s syndicates and 8 
insurance companies form a pool in UK recognised for providing much of this insurance 
(Nuclear Risk Insurers). The present Paris/Brussels system is applied beyond this UK 
£140 million, where the government contribution would be SDR 300 million (c €360 
million). 436 
 
During late 2012, legislation was proposed by the UK government which required EUR 
1.2 billion insurance by the operators.437 The 2004 Paris/Brussels Protocol requires that 
EUR 700 million be set as the initial level and then an annual increase of EUR 100 million 
takes place.438 When financial security measures and commercial insurance are not 
present in the private market, the nuclear operators are provided with indemnity, waivers 
and government provided insurance. In the year 2011, a public consultation over this 
proposal took place.439 
 
Operators of nuclear plants are supplemented by two mutual insurance arrangements 
along with the commercial insurance pool in Europe. In 1978, the European Mutual 
Association for the Nuclear Industry (EMANI) was founded, followed by the European 
Liability Insurance for the Nuclear Industry (ELINI) in 2002. As a third-party cover, the 
ELINI plans to provide EUR 100 million and as a special capital fund, the 28 members 
would need to contribute half the amount by late 2007.440 Most of the EU nuclear plant 
operators are members of the ELINI and the EMANI incorporates nearly 100 sites, with 
70 members. There are nearly EUR500 million as funds present, covering most of 
Europe.441 
 
Individual nations in Europe have their legislations in congruence with the international 
conventions and the caps set also change overtime. There exists an unlimited operator 
liability for Germany; the operator is required to provide €2.5 billion as security for each 
                                         
435 See Nuclear Engineering International (27 March 2011). 
436 Ibid. Nuclear Engineering International (27 March 2011). 
437 See World Nuclear Association (August 2013). 
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440Antony Froggatt and Simon Carroll (2010). Third Party Insurance: The Nuclear Sector’s “Silent” 
Subsidy in Europe. pp 555-625. [Online]. Available at: mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ ISN/126193/ 
.../en/ch+13.pdfc Last accessed on 25-09-2013. 
441 See Antony Froggatt and Simon Carroll (2010). 
 135 
 
plant.442 Insurance covers part of this security, which is €256 million for each plant. 
France requires a security of EUR 91 million, while €600 million is to be insured by 
operators from Switzerland which has signed, but not ratified the international 
conventions yet.443 This nation proposes an increase of €1.1 billion along with ratifying 
the Paris and Brussels Conventions.444 
 
The laws of Japan conform to the international liability conventions, but the country is 
not party to any, which includes: The Law on Compensation for Nuclear Damage and the 
Law on Contract for Liability Insurance for Nuclear Damage.445 These laws are revised 
every ten years. An exclusive liability is provided to the plant operator whereby he must 
provide a financial security amount of JPY 120 billion (US$ 1.4 billion) that was half the 
amount in 2010.446 If the damage caused was by a major natural disaster of an exceptional 
nature, then the liability of the operator may be relieved by the government. The liability 
remains unlimited in any other case.  
 
In the year 2011, the government set up a state backed institution to help those affected 
by the Fukushima accident by expediting payments. This institution would receive 
financial contributions from those electric power corporations with nuclear power plants 
in Japan and special bonds would be provided by the government to be cashed when 
required. JPY 5 trillion ($62 billion) totals the government bonds.447 Other nuclear power 
generators would also be represented by this institution, which behaves as an insurer for 
the industry too. In addition, this institution plans and makes provision for any future 
nuclear accidents. The nuclear operator provisions for contributions are very much like 
those of the USA. The government’s expectations are that in 10 to 13 years’ time, TEPCO 
will have been able to complete its repayments. From there on, it will no longer have 
government involvement and will have become a completely private organisation. The 
government would then be paid an annual fee for support, plant safety would be ensured 
and adequate level of supply would be maintained.  
                                         
442The Energy Library (2009). Civil liability for nuclear damage. [Online] Available at: http://theenergy 
library.com/node/338Last accessed on 24-09-2013. 
443 See: The Energy Library (2009). Civil liability for nuclear damage. 
444 See: The Energy Library (2009). Civil liability for nuclear damage. 
445 World Nuclear Association, (2015). Liability for Nuclear Damage: Nuclear Insurance. [Online]. 
Available at: http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Safety-and-Security/Safety-of-Plants/Liability-for-
Nuclear-Damage/ Accessed on 18-02-2014. 
446 See World Nuclear Association, (2015). Liability for Nuclear Damage: Nuclear Insurance. 
447 Ibid World Nuclear Association, (2015). Liability for Nuclear Damage: Nuclear Insurance. 
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The Tokyo Legal Affairs Bureau received deposits totalling JPY 120 billion (about $1.56 
billion) from TEPCO in January 2012, as insurance coverage for the organisation’s 
nuclear energy facilities.448 Initially, the Japan Atomic Energy Insurance Pool covered 
the utility, which was an industry organisation consisting of 23 non-life insurers. In mid-
January 2012, the contract with TEPCO was to expire and in August 2011, the Pool stated 
that it would not be renewing their contract. About accident liability coverage, Japanese 
nuclear utilities are obligated to secure JPY 120 billion.449 Private-sector insurers are 
being sought by TEPCO for coverage. JPY 1 billion as insurance and the balance of JPY 
13.5 billion by the parent company (Sumitomo) were paid after the 1999 Tokai-mura fuel 
plant serious accident.450 
 
The 2004 Joint Protocol relating to Paris and Vienna Conventions has been ratified by 
Finland. Based on this convention coming into force, a 2005 Act was implemented 
whereby it was required that operators maintain a €700 million insurance cover, 
minimum.451 At present, the level is maintained at EUR 300 million, while beyond € 1.5 
billion, the operator liability becomes unlimited, based on the Brussels Convention.452 
The revised Paris Convention states the Nuclear Damage concept and it moreover 
includes terrorism hypotheses.  
 
The 2004 Joint Protocol relating to the Paris and Vienna Conventions have also been 
ratified by Sweden. Insurance of SEK 3300 million (EUR 345 million) is the least amount 
possible required by the country according to the Nuclear Liability Act and the State 
would then be obliged to contribute SEK 6 billion per incident beyond this as cover.453 It 
has also been observed that Sweden is analysing the EUR 700 million operator’s liability 
under the Joint Protocol amending the Paris Convention and is also announcing unlimited 
operator liability. 
 
                                         
448 Ibid World Nuclear Association, (2015). Liability for Nuclear Damage: Nuclear Insurance. 
449 Ibid World Nuclear Association, (2015). Liability for Nuclear Damage: Nuclear Insurance. 
450 Ibid World Nuclear Association, (2015). Liability for Nuclear Damage: Nuclear Insurance. 
451 International Atomic Energy Agency. Finland 2011. [Online]: Available at: http://wwwpub.iaea.org/ 
MTCD/Publications/PDF/CNPP2011_CD/countryprofiles/Finland/Finland2011.htm Accessed on 
17/12/2014. 
452 See International Atomic Energy Agency. Finland 2011. 
453See World Nuclear Association, (2015). Liability for Nuclear Damage: Nuclear Insurance. 
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The amendment to the Vienna Convention is being ratified by the Czech Republic and 
the mandatory insurance coverage for each reactor became CZK 8 billion (EUR 296 
million) in 2009.454 
 
The international Conventions and Nuclear Liability and Compensation Act are 
consistent with each other in Canada. There exists an absolute and exclusive liability for 
third party damage to the licensee. An absolute discharge of liability is provided to the 
goods and services suppliers. The insurance cover was set at a limit of C$75 million per 
power plant in 1976 for individual licensees, but was increased to C$650 million as part 
of the 2008 Act.455 However, this Act has not been passed yet. Claimant is not required 
to prove where fault lies; only injury may be highlighted, with cover provided by a pool 
of insurers. The government would provide the funds, which may be required beyond the 
cap level. 
 
Since 2005, Russia has been party to the Vienna Convention. The Russian Association 
of Nuclear Insurers (RANI)456 has been managing the domestic nuclear insurance pool, 
which consists of 23 insurance organisations covering a $350 million liability. A 
reinsurance arrangement with China and the Ukraine was initially carried out, but since 
2009 there have been 28 nations forming a part of the Russian Pool, because it became a 
member of the International Pooling System. The new build in India has been asked by 
Atomstroyexport to be covered, as civil liability of US$ 5 to 10 billion level by RANI.457 
 
A domestic liability law was adopted by the Ukraine in 1995, but it was soon revised to 
bring it into harmony with the Vienna Convention. This Convention joined in the year 
1996 and is party to the Joint Protocol signed by the CSC. 150 million SDRs (c €180 
million) is the cap for operator liability.458 Coverage needs to be extended outside the 
Vienna Convention countries, which is why the special provisions apply to the Chernobyl 
shelter. 
 
                                         
454 Ibid World Nuclear Association, (2015). Liability for Nuclear Damage: Nuclear Insurance. 
455 Ibid World Nuclear Association, (2015). Liability for Nuclear Damage: Nuclear Insurance. 
456 See Russian Association of Nuclear Insurers (RANI). Available at: http://ranipool.ru/eng/ Accessed on 
27-08-2013. 
457 See Russian Association of Nuclear Insurers (RANI). 
458 Ibid World Nuclear Association, (2015). Liability for Nuclear Damage: Nuclear Insurance. 
 138 
 
China is an active member of the international insurance pooling system, but it is not 
party to any international liability. Once the fuel is loaded in the reactor, it covers first 
party risks as well as the third-party liability. The State Council issued an interim 
domestic law in China in 1986, which encompasses the international Conventions as well 
as the liability limits, which increased to international levels in September 2007. A 
symbol more than substance has been observed after a reinsurance arrangement was set 
up with Russia.459 
 
For plant insurance, more than half of China’s nuclear power insurance market has been 
provided by Hong Kong-listed Ping’an Insurance Company.460 The clients include the 
first and second phase projects of Qinshan Nuclear Power Station in Zhejiang and the 
nuclear power plants in Guangdong. To the Tianwan Nuclear Power Station in Jiangsu, 
four Chinese insurance organisations provided nearly US$ 1.85 billion worth of insurance 
and most of this would be reinsured internationally. Ping’an, All Trust, CPIC, PICC and 
others have provided RMB 40 billion ($5.85 billion) insurance for the EPR first two units 
at Taishan nuclear plant.461 An RMB 100 billion insurance cooperation agreement with 
China Guangdong Nuclear Power Co was signed by seven insurance organisations and 
China Power Investment Corporation (CPI) in late 2009, to insure that 10 CPR-1000 units 
would be built by CGNPC in the next 3 years.462 In December 2007, a US$2 billion 
insurance arrangement was announced by Ningde Nuclear Power, in agreement with Ping 
An Insurance Corp in Fujian province, for the 4-unit CPR-1000 nuclear power project. 
This agreement was limited to first part cover only.463 
 
The nuclear liability of the Indian government is in line with international levels aided 
by the Nuclear Act that has been passed. The operators are held liable for nuclear 
accident(s) and no third-party supplier protection is to be provided. Insurance to be taken 
by the operators up to the liability cap of $110 million and several other provisions which 
are part of the IAEA’s Vienna Convention (1997 amendment).464 
 
                                         
459 Ibid World Nuclear Association, (2015). Liability for Nuclear Damage: Nuclear Insurance. 
460 Ibid World Nuclear Association, (2015). Liability for Nuclear Damage: Nuclear Insurance. 
461 See Ibid World Nuclear Association, (2015). Liability for Nuclear Damage: Nuclear Insurance. 
462 See Ibid World Nuclear Association, (2015). Liability for Nuclear Damage: Nuclear Insurance. 
463 See Ibid World Nuclear Association, (2015). Liability for Nuclear Damage: Nuclear Insurance. 
464 See International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA. 
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4.5.1 Analysis and evaluation of above countries in relation to UAE 
 
Generally, most of the countries which have nuclear power plants have taken up their 
legal liability to damage caused by nuclear power plants, as stipulated by the Paris 
Convention. The Vienna Convention on Civil Liability also considered the countries 
while drafting legislations to deal with damage caused by radioactive substances.465 
According to the UK’s legislation, the damage caused by nuclear power stations can be 
claimed only within thirty years of its occurrence. The Paris Convention has restricted the 
upper limit of compensation payable to victims damaged by nuclear accident, capping it 
at 1500 Euros.466 The researcher argues that in the present-day economy, 1500 Euros is a 
very small amount for a victim to get for the harm he suffers from a nuclear disaster. This 
is more like not being compensated at all. 
 
The transportation of nuclear active products may also lead to damage, during transfer. 
The responsibility for such damage rests with the person who holds the licence for such 
movement467. When nuclear active materials are relocated from one place to another, the 
transporters are liable for any damage caused during the transfer, unless such a person 
was unaware of the nuclear nature of the materials468. The UAE has formulated a law 
regarding the transportation of radioactive materials. While the responsibility of harm 
caused by the movement of radioactive materials rests with the carrier, the injured party 
cannot bring claims against the carrier for the damage caused. The operator who holds 
the licence is made liable for the damages caused during the transit of such materials. 
Even if the damage is caused by the actions of the transporters, the injured can claim the 
amount of compensation only from the operator. Later, the operator or the insurer may 
claim back the amount from said carrier whose fault it was that the damage occurred469.   
 
The method of calculating the liability of nuclear operators differs between countries. 
Some nations imbibe the international system of liability, while some have their own 
methods of calculating the liability for nuclear accidents. These are examples the UAE 
                                         
465 Vienna Convention on the Civil Liability. 
466 The Paris Convention. 
467 Monika Hinteregger (2006). “The New Austrian Act and Third Party Liability for Nuclear Damage” 35 
Denv. J. Int’l L. &Pol’y 193. 
468Ibid. 
469 SCM Presentation 16, A. Blanco-Bazan, Overview of Existing and Applicable International Instruments, 
Note by the IMO Secretariat. 
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could consider. There are other nations that do not have systems in place to deal with 
liability for nuclear accidents. The ambiguities in the legislation between nations make 
the liability of nuclear operators dubious. This increases the risks of nuclear reactors and 
thereby decreases the number of investors in this arena.470 The absence of a unified system 
determining the investors’ liability will affect the system, detrimentally. Moreover, the 
increase in liability for operators would result in an increase in the cost of power. Some 
of the domestic legislations allow for unrestricted amounts of compensation for those 
injured in or by nuclear accident(s), while the international legislation stipulates a 
restricted amount for compensation. The disparity in the limits on compensation available 
obviously affects the amount of compensation received by victims.471 
 
Insuring the nuclear power plant is an important factor in nuclear power projects, since 
there is always a high risk nuclear accident(s) might occur. In case of a nuclear accident, 
the amount for which the nuclear operator is liable is high in some countries, in contrast 
to the upper limit cap for compensation set internationally. Usually, insurance policies 
available for nuclear operators are limited to a certain time, since an insurance policy has 
always been risky to the insurer. Insurance companies do not usually cover those claims 
that have caused damage outside the territory of the country in which the plant is situated 
or for damage caused whilst moving the radioactive material from one place to another. 
The Protocol of 2004 increased the higher limit of compensation available, which 
augments the premium amount. In order to satisfy credibility, the researcher believes that 
the UAE will have to consider the above deviations regarding insurance coverage. 
 
There is no international regulation on arms control or disarmament. This is left to the 
sovereign’s discretion. Pertaining to this, there are various agreements entered into by 
different countries within the region, through bilateral and multilateral treaties which deal 
with the prohibition of arms and disarmament472. There is further clarification regarding 
the harm potentially caused by nuclear weapons and how the collection of such 
armaments would result in conflicts among nations, which could in turn, lead to the 
                                         
470 See SCM Presentation 16, A. Blanco-Bazan. 
471 Ibid SCM Presentation 16, A. Blanco-Bazan. 
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destruction of both the environment and of national security. This resulted in the Test Ban 
Treaty, in 1963473.  
 
4.6 International Nuclear Event Scale (INES) and Analysis of specific legal liability 
concerns arising from recent nuclear incidents, including lessons that UAE can learn 
from these  
 
The first nuclear power plant was established in the UK in 1956, to cater for the ever-
increasing power needs of that country474. The development of nuclear power plants 
around the world have been mainly affected by two factors: international community fears 
that the effects of nuclear emissions could damage the environment, as well as humans475; 
and the uncertainty of the legal developments regarding nuclear power generation, which 
can result in huge losses to the investors if there were accidents476. The author views that 
risks to commercial activities should not be regarded as a valid set of objections, given 
the scale of potential harm they represent.  
 
In order to understand the level of severity of nuclear incidents around the world, it is 
important to understand the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES) (see Diagram 8, 
next page).  
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474 World Nuclear Association, ‘Outline History of Nuclear Energy’, (2010), Available at 
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475 Patricia Birnie, Alan Boyle and Catherine Redgwell, International Law and the Environment, (3rd Ed., 
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476 Michael Trebilcock and Ralph A. Winter, ‘The Economics of Nuclear Accident Law’, (1997), 17 
International Review of Law and Economics, 215. Available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/ 
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Diagram 8: International Nuclear Event Scale (INES) 
 
 
Source: www.iaea.org 
 
Introduced in 1990 by the IAEA, the International Nuclear and Radiological Event 
Scale (INES) facilitates timely communication of major information regarding safety 
during nuclear accidents477. The Scale is an established guide for the determination of the 
impact of any nuclear incident or accident due to operational failure of nuclear plants. 
This is comparable to the moment that magnitude scale is used to explain the relative 
degree of earthquakes.  
 
On the INES scale, every escalating level characterises a disaster about ten times more 
severe than the preceding level. In a situation, whereby the intensity of the event can be 
quantitatively assessed (in contrast to earthquakes), the severity level of an artificial 
disaster, such as a nuclear accident, is more subject to explanation.  
 
After an incident occurs, the INES level of such incident is assigned. This is due to the 
difficulty in interpretation. Hence, it has a very limited capability for providing support 
in disaster-aid deployment. INES ratings are not allocated by a central body; high-profile 
                                         
477 World-nuclear-news.org. 6 October 2008. “Event scale revised for further clarity”. Retrieved on: 13 
September 2010. 
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nuclear incidents are occasionally assigned INES ratings by the operator of the nuclear 
plant; by the formal body of the country; also by scientific institutes; international 
authorities or even other experts, which may bring about uncertainty as to the definitive 
scale of severity. The researcher argues that it is neither reasonable nor objective for INES 
ratings not to be allocated by a central body. It should not be permissible that the operator 
gauge the extent and nature of harm (or damage), rather, this should be proved by neutral 
parties. This will ensure that correct information is presented. 
 
It is therefore important to briefly analyse the Chernobyl, Fukushima, Three Mile Island 
and Windscale incidents, before looking at the legal liabilities that arise at the time of 
such accidents. Assessing the nature of an incident/accident can help to determine the 
scale of the harm caused and the potential legal liabilities of parties concerned. To fully 
appreciate the scope of legal liabilities it is helpful to consider the nature of previous 
incidents so as to determine and clarify the parameters of such liabilities. Thus, there have 
been four major incidents worldwide that can aid us in assessing the issues here, and from 
which the UAE can learn valuable lessons for its own nuclear power development. 
 
4.6.1 The 1957 Windscale accident in the UK 
 
While the Three Mile Islands accident is treated as the most serious in the history of US 
commercial nuclear reactors, the release of radioactive substances in October 1957, 
following the accident at Windscale in Northern England, was considered to be of greater 
concern than Three Mile Island. This accident was rated at Level 5 on the INES. This 
means that the accident had wider consequences or impact on people and the 
environment. 
 
The nuclear accident marked a turning point in the annals of the nuclear industry. The 
end of the Second World War marked the beginning of the super-powers opting for 
nuclear capabilities. This led the British government’s quest for nuclear attainment and 
the urge to build its own atomic bomb. In furtherance of this goal, the nuclear installation 
was sited at the village of Seascale, Cumbria, while the reactors built were referred as 
‘Windscale Pile 1 and 2’.  
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In the Windscale accident, a fire in the graphite core of the Windscale reactor burned 
continuously for several days. The radiation fallout resulted in some of the milk from 
cows in the surrounding area showing radioactivity levels at milking time as high as 800, 
000 picocuries per litre - 40 000 times the levels observed at Three Mile Island.478 Dr. 
John Rundo of Argonne National Laboratory observed that the environmental 
consequences of Three Mile Island are considered to be a lot less significant than the 
Windscale accident. 
 
On 11th October, at about 9 am, the core of the reactor was flooded with water and this 
continued for several hours; by that evening the fire was extinguished. In the aftermath 
of the accident, it was thought that an estimated 700 terabecquerels (20,000 curies) of 
radioactive materials had been dispersed into the countryside.479 Very little effort has been 
done for relocation or for evacuating the people away from the surrounding areas. The 
best efforts of the agencies in charge was the concern that milk within the surrounding 
area could have been hazardously contaminated; so, milk within a radius of 500 km2 of 
the site was destroyed for about a month.480 
 
Recent studies have shown that about 18.6PBq of radioactivity was released, made up 
components such as 1.8PBq of I (Iodine) and 42TBq of Po (Polonium).481 An immediate 
concern then was the radioactive isotope iodine-131 which, though it had a life of eight 
days was nevertheless dangerous, as it is absorbed by human beings and stored in the 
thyroid, often leading to cancer of the thyroid. It was also thought that this accident caused 
about 200 cancer cases, but recent studies have shown the figure may have been higher.482 
The accident was widely reported in the media and within a few days, the government 
had set up a board of inquiry, whose summary findings were made public within a month.  
 
Information on the actual magnitude and the dispersion of radio nuclides in the 
environment has been made public and re-published to mark the anniversary of the event. 
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The Board of Enquiry met under the chairmanship of Sir William Penny and at the end 
of its sitting issued what was termed the ‘Penny Report’. On the 26th October 1957, it 
arrived at four conclusions483:  
 
i. The primary causative factor for the accident was the second nuclear heating 
applied too soon and too rapidly on 8th of October. The researcher observes that 
this suggests negligence by the operator was the cause of the incident. 
 
ii. The steps taken by the operators in dealing with the disaster were without delay, 
efficient and showed substantial commitment to responsibility. This shows that it 
was not negligence. 
 
iii. The measures adopted to deal with the accident were sufficient, as there was no 
instantaneous harm to the wellbeing of the public or plant workers; but it queried 
technical and organisational deficiencies. The researcher observes that this must 
do with operational management, which was not negligence but strict liability. 
 
iv. Recommendation that a more detailed technical assessment was needed, 
anticipating organisational changes, better defined radiation dose limits and 
redefined responsibilities for health and safety. 484 
 
The magnitude of contamination deduced by recent studies, revealed that the radioactive 
dispersion which took place between the afternoon of 10th of October and the evening of 
the 11th, had peak emission rates. The first peak had winds transporting the emissions 
eastward, while the second peak had the emissions being transported south/south-
eastward. In effect, this meant that the plumes from Windscale were detectable in Europe 
and Scandinavia and to this extent, radioactivity was detected at Mol in Belgium; 
Frankfurt in Germany and Holland; and the Scandinavian States within the first three/four 
days of the accident.485 
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The Windscale site was eventually decontaminated and is still in use, with some parts of 
it being transferred to BNFL, called Sellafield. The whole site is now owned by the 
Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA). In fact, in the Windscale accident, 
radioactivity has extended to Leeds, which is around 100 miles away and the radioactivity 
in milk was nearly 40 000 picocuries per litre on October 16, a week after the accident. 
Also, there was a 10% increase in background radiation at Leeds, which was a result of 
radioactivity being deposited on the ground.486 The British farmers received 
compensation for their losses. 
 
In contrast, at Three Mile Island, up to May 4, 1979, the NRC had reported no noticeable 
radiation in soil or water samples taken near the station. There appeared to be traces of 
radioactive iodine in milk, however it was twenty picocunes per litre, which is far below 
the Food and Drug Administration’s recommended action level of 12,000 picocunes per 
litre.487 There was no compensation awarded in this instance, the reason being that the 
notification of the incident was not immediately reported. 
 
4.6.2 The 1979 Three Mile Island accident in the USA 
 
One of the major nuclear disasters of a US commercial nuclear reactor is the accident 
which occurred in the Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-2) reactor, near Middletown, Pa., 
that partially melted down on March 28, 1979.488 The Three Mile Island accident was 
rated at Level 5 on the INES, meaning that there were wider consequences or impacts 
upon people and the environment. It was the same level as Windscale on the INES. 
Although the small radioactive releases did not have any detectable health effects on plant 
workers or the public,489 this accident has been significant in bringing about major 
changes which involve emergency response planning, human factors engineering, reactor 
operator training, radiation protection, as well as focus on several other areas of nuclear 
power plant operations. It also caused the Nuclear Regulatory Committee (NRC) to 
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Available at: http://www.threemileisland.org/downloads/354.pdf Last visited 28 February 2014.  
487 See Mitchell Rogovin. 
488The Three Mile Accident Report. [Online]: Available at: http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-
collections/fact-sheets/3mile-isle.pdf Last accessed 27 February 2014. 
489Ibid: The Three Mile Accident Report. 
 147 
 
tighten and heighten its regulatory oversight. These changes have contributed in a major 
way toward increasing U.S. reactor safety.490 
 
During the accident, the main concern was regarding the hydrogen bubble forming within 
the containment building. 491 If large amounts of radiation leakage took place in the 
environment, it was expected an explosion would occur in the containment building. 
However, this risk was resolved, since the oxygen levels present within the building 
reduced the likelihood of explosion. 492 
 
The government’s angry reaction to the incident was criticised by the industry. 493  The 
public lacked information in the first two days, when the risk was largest. The public’s 
anxiety worsened after the hydrogen bubble incident was brought under control and 
public risk reduced. This was mainly due to misinformation regarding the hydrogen 
bubble worries, confusion and the inadequate actions of the government towards the local 
community, which escalated fears. 
 
It is quite understandable how the industry reacted over the exaggerated response, but 
they did not fully comprehend how, in the first two days the government, as well as the 
industry, acted inadequately concerning the public’s rights regarding risk(s). If a 
catastrophic accident takes place, there is a public right to know and TMI did not honour 
this.494 The author poses that this is legal liability which has negated the freedom of 
information. This also encouraged the public to lose faith in the nuclear industry. 
 
The NRC and the industry were taught by the TMI that if equipment fails, human operator 
presence would not necessarily be able to improve the situation.495 Considering the 
potential seriousness of an accident, the Kemeny Commission Report addressed the 
assumptions of this mind-set. The Three Mile Island was a serious nuclear accident and 
preventing these in future, would require fundamental changes in the practices, 
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procedures and organisational aspects. Also, the attitudes of the nuclear industry and the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission needed to be changed.496 The industry and the NRC 
were convinced, having previously assumed the absence of serious accidents 
proves/illustrates that the technology is safe. This attitude must be changed, according to 
the Commission and it is essential to understand that nuclear power has a potentially 
dangerous nature and that safeguards must be present always to prevent any accidents. 
Human beings and equipment must be treated with equal respect and for this a 
comprehensive system is needed.497 After this report, the training of the operator became 
the focus for improvement(s). 
 
Under the Energy Reorganisation Act of 1974, the newly established NRC was obliged 
to be banned from promoting nuclear power.498 It was observed by the Commission 
however, that the NRC did not abandon the prior mission completely, indeed was still 
trying to nurture the growing industry. There was also failure on the part of the NRC to 
communicate the safety issues present to those facilities with similar reactors, because it 
was discovered that prior to TMI, an accident had taken place in another plant, which 
involved an error in turning off the cooling system, hence, the lesson learned from one 
plant was not communicated to the rest of the industry499. 
 
A senior engineer believed that they were lucky the error committed did not lead to a 
serious accident, as under similar circumstances a very serious accident could indeed 
arise. The researcher proposes that this suggests negligence and culpability. It was 
required that clear instructions be sent out to the operators for safeguarding. The 
Memorandum had been written thirteen months before the Three Mile Island accident 
took place, regrettably no new instructions resulted.500 
 
The utility was functioning under nuclear reactors that consisted of unpredictable and un-
assessed conditions. This would indeed be disturbing. An NRC Special Inquiry Group 
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presented a report to the Commissioners in which it was stated that nearly 2 meltdowns 
took place at the core on the first day.501 
 
According to the estimates in the report, the reactor was within 30 to 40 minutes of 
meltdown, but incomplete information meant the core’s condition was misunderstood and 
in reality, the reactor meltdown was in 4 hours (not 30-40 minutes). Finally, after the 
initial confusion cleared, both agency and industry observed the TMI Unit 2 core had 
been subjected to a partial meltdown 1 year and 1 day after it was subjected to the first 
criticality.502 This indicates there was negligence - breach of duty on the part of the 
operator. President Jimmy Carter after the Three Mile Island case stated that the nation’s 
nuclear power is the last resort for sourcing energy and it is necessary that conservations 
goals be met.  The lesson learnt here which could be useful to the UAE, is that information 
regarding nuclear reactors should be precisely relayed to all those concerned. 
 
On 10 April 1979, the Chairman of the NRC, Joseph M. Hendrie, when testifying before 
the Senate Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulation in the US had reportedly told Senator 
Pete Domemci that the possibility of a flammable mixture turned out to have been a 
misplaced concern.503 According to the April 1979 information bulletin of the Atomic 
Industrial Forum (AIF), Hendrie further explained that it took the NRC a few days before 
its analyses showed that “there hadn’t been any oxygen involved or very little, if any.”504 
 
Here, a fund was set up on the grounds of strict liability. Anyone who applied could 
recoup from the fund and the evidential requirements were very low. This was due to 
previously stated overreaction from the government and public. The UAE can benefit 
from this lesson as ‘good practice’ for the future. 
 
4.6.3 The 1986 Chernobyl Accident 
 
The Chernobyl plant was regarded as a catastrophe with Level 7 event on the International 
Nuclear Event Scale (INES).505 Ecocide is the term used by some to 
                                         
501 Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n Special Inquiry Group, Three Mile Island: A Report To The 
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504Ibid. A brief review of the accident at Three Mile Island. 
505See, Analysis: A Month on, Japan Nuclear Crisis Still Scarring, Int’l Bus. Times (Apr. 9, 
2011), http://in.ibtimes.com/articles/132391/20110409/japan-nuclear- crisis-radiation.htm; Richard 
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describe Chernobyl, the most tragic and enduring environmental problem of the 
Ukraine.506 On the Ukraine-Belarus border, four nuclear reactors were running with a 
capacity of one gigawatt. One of the reactors in the Chernobyl plant malfunctioned due 
to operative error (the plant was operated by inadequately trained personnel), which 
resulted in the emission of radioactive materials. The Chernobyl nuclear accident 
occurred at 01:21 a.m. on April 26, 1986. Not until forty-eight hours after the incidental 
malfunction did authorities in Moscow admit the accident had occurred.  Former Soviet 
President Mikhail Gorbachev’s first public address about Chernobyl did not occur until 
eighteen days later. The radioactive fallout, ‘30 to 40 times the radioactivity of the atomic 
bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki,’507 landed primarily on agricultural land. 
However, the V. I. Lenin Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station is only seventy-two miles 
north of Kiev, the capital of Ukraine. 
 
While Soviet officials claimed that only thirty-two people died because of the disaster, 
the Ukrainian government in 1992 officially estimated that between 6000 and 8000 
people died as a direct result of the meltdown of the Chernobyl nuclear reactor with Scale 
7 on INES.508 Unofficial estimates of potential deaths run as high as 10,000, which would 
make it the worst industrial disaster in the world. While 5800 children and 7000 adults 
suffered from irradiation of the thyroid gland in 1986, more than 2.5 million people have 
been affected by the blast, with increased deaths from cancer and a five to tenfold rise in 
many diseases.509 Today, some of the children who marched through the streets of Kiev 
in the May Day Parade only five days after the disaster are dying of leukaemia, and others 
are suffering from thyroid and cancer-related illnesses. 
 
In the thirty-kilometre zone around the reactor, 116,000 people were evacuated. Several 
million people live in areas where radiation may exceed official limits. More than four 
million live in areas which are generally clean but contain ‘hot spots’, where radiation 
                                         
Shears, Fires Still Raging at Stricken Fukushima Nuclear Reactor One Month After It Was Destroyed by 
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509Stephen Nisbet, (1992). Ukraine Appeals to West Not to Forget Chernobyl, Reuter Libr. Rep., Feb. 20, 
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can be up to twenty times the normal background radiation. Chernobyl shook the 
confidence of the people in science’s ability to conquer the limits of nature.510 Former 
Minister of Environmental Protection Yuri Shcherbak, explains ‘that under the debris of 
the fourth unit was buried the ruinous doctrine of developing atomic energy in our country 
based on the monopoly of one group of scholars, one department, on the forced and secret 
imposition of the construction of atomic electric power stations without taking into 
account the population’s mood and the decisions of local soviets, without thorough 
environmental analysis and assessment of possible consequences ...a crisis of faith in 
atomic technocrats is at hand”.511 
 
Delay in announcing the Chernobyl accident caused the international community to 
realise that countries are obliged to immediately notify and warn neighbouring countries 
and even other countries that a nuclear accident or incident had occurred. As a result of 
the USSR’s failure to provide immediate notification about the Chernobyl accident, the 
two principles of early notification and assistance were codified in the 1986 Convention 
on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the 1986 Convention on Assistance in 
the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, which were adopted under 
the auspices of the IAEA.512 These two Conventions were adopted because practical 
application of the international customary norms regarding the issues of notification was 
not clear.513 The international community realised the need to strengthen and improve the 
legal regime of international law regarding nuclear energy to control trans-boundary 
environmental damage and to prevent and reduce consequences of nuclear accidents.514 
These obligations of notification and assistance in case of a nuclear accident have become 
clearer in their application, through the detailed content of these codified Conventions.515 
 
                                         
510Contra Charles E. Ziegler, (1987). The Bear's View: Soviet Environmentalism, TECH. REV., Apr. 1987, 
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511 Ibid Contra Charles E. Ziegler, (1987). 
512The two Conventions were adopted at the IAEA Headquarters in Vienna on September 26, 
1986. See Convention on Early Notification 1986, supra note 302; Int’l Atomic Energy Agency, 
Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, IAEA Doc. 
INFCIRC/336 (Nov. 18, 1986). [Online]. Available at: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/ 
Infcircs/Others/infcirc336.shtml Last assessed on 13/04/2013. 
513Catherin Redgwell, International Regulation of Energy Activities, in Energy Law in Europe, National, 
EU and International Law and Institutions 13, 76 (Marha M. Roggenkamp et al., eds. 2001) 
514Adede, A. O. (1987). The IAEA Notification and Assistance Conventions in Case Of A Nuclear 
Accident.  
515Alan Boyle, (1989). Nuclear Energy and International Law: An Environmental Perspective, 60 
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 152 
 
The radioactive materials emissions were first noticed in Sweden after the accident516. 
Within seven days of the accident, innumerable labourers had died and the radioactive 
emissions led to the injury of several hundreds of people. Many were detected with 
thyroid cancer. The Chernobyl accident resulted in social, economic and psychological 
instability. The emission affected almost the whole of the northern hemisphere and 
presently, there are still places where agriculture is prohibited since the radiation effect is 
still active in such areas.517 This suggests the extent to which radioactive materials spread 
and the impact they can create.  
 
The issue arose that almost the whole of Europe was affected by the incident but none of 
the victims from other countries were compensated for their injury518. Another issue was 
that at the time of the incident, Russia had not ratified any of the Conventions relating to 
nuclear power projects and emissions519. So, no country could make any claim(s) against 
Russia. Most of these affected countries incurred huge losses in attempts to save their 
citizens from the effects of the emissions. This is highly significant with regard to liability 
and compensation. This suggests that it is important for countries likely to be impacted 
negatively by the nuclear projects in another country, to ratify relevant legislations in 
order to help them institute claim actions if the need arises. 
 
The results of the Chernobyl accident led the international community instigating urgent 
measures, necessary to minimise the consequences of nuclear accidents in the future520. 
Therefore, the duty falls upon IAEA, which controls global nuclear undertakings, to 
provide these measures at the international level. At the UAE (national level), it is the 
responsibility of FANR to provide such measures. The limitations of the existing system 
in dealing with the consequences of nuclear accident were felt. A global method of 
ensuring safety of nuclear power projects was found to be of priority. The safety of 
nuclear power plants was known to be achieved through co-operation between 
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neighbouring countries and a more robust method of developing a structure of liabilities 
on nuclear accident was also required.521 
 
4.6.4 The 2011Fukushima Accident 
 
On 11th March 2011, an extremely powerful earthquake struck Japan, along with a 
devastating tsunami which descended upon Iwate and Miyagi Prefectures.522Because of 
this tsunami and earthquake, the area’s nuclear facilities were severely damaged.523 The 
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Complex was the most famous and most serious 
casualty of the crisis. This plant was located in the Okuma and Futaba in Fukushima 
Prefecture towns.524 Thousands of residents had to be evacuated and widespread power 
shortages occurred after the disaster.525 The Fukushima incident was caused by natural 
disaster and was not due to operator fault and/or liability. The UAE is not situated in a 
natural disaster volatile environment but is close to Iran (one of the GCC countries), 
which is prone to earthquakes. Therefore, the country’s nuclear programme may not be 
affected by natural disaster(s). But this is not to say that measures should not be taken in 
case of any occurrence.  
 
Since the Chernobyl plant in 1986, the Fukushima incident has been regarded as the 
largest and most severe incident, reaching Level7 on the INES scale. The reactor’s 
connection to the power grid was broken after the tsunami hit the plant and even after the 
remaining reactors shut down automatically after the earthquake, the emergency 
generators needed to be used for electronic control and cooling of systems that had no 
power. Hence, there was overheating of the reactors and large amounts of radiation 
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escaped out into the atmosphere, causing hydrogen explosions within the plant on 
subsequent days526 (see Diagram 9 below).  
 
Diagram 9: Fukushima nuclear incident 
 
Source: Freepatroit.org, 2013527 
 
To save the reactors from getting damaged by over-heating, the government allowed the 
use of seawater by the emergency response team.528 However, this step was more 
ineffective than helpful, as the water level in the fuel rod pools kept on falling (due to 
tides).529 The adjoining areas of up to 12 miles’ distance were cleared out immediately 
and electrical power was supplied to a few reactors, to facilitate automatic cooling.530 
 
The Japanese Government consistently rejected the global help calls during the crisis and 
initially marked the incident as a Level 4 (incident with local consequences) on the INES 
instead of the original Level 7 (major accident with major impact on the people and the 
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environment). The researcher’s view is that the reason for the constant rejection by the 
Japanese government was to avoid enormous blame arising from the incident and this is 
not morally acceptable.  
 
The Japanese government has been condemned by numerous groups and communities 
around the world. Many of the greatest criticisms related to the administration’s poor 
correspondence, administrative disappointments and reluctance to concede the full scale 
and extremity of the fiasco. Many evacuees still cannot return home, examinations of the 
Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) have started and bans on sustenance developed 
in the zone have been measured. On 16 December 2011, the government proclaimed that 
the plant is steady, yet the appraisal is that it will take decades to purify the encompassing 
area and decommission the plant altogether.531 
 
In the twentieth century, a growth in favour of atomic power has been witnessed, with 
nations like France, the US and Japan fabricating more plants, making new outlines for 
the reactor, and helping developing economies like China in the advancement of their 
own atomic power systems. In this modern atomic era, catastrophes like Chernobyl 
appear to have been forgotten, but the author recognises that the international community 
has learned lessons from past incidents. It is obvious that UAE will also benefit from 
these experiences and consider a stronger plan for its nuclear programme. Many in Japan 
and from around the globe have added further thought to the global atomic administrative 
authority after the latest catastrophe at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi plant. 
 
The IAEA administered the production of five Conventions, which drew up the global 
principles for atomic protection and risks collaboration in case should there be a disaster 
and an early warning framework between countries.532 The IAEA has additionally laid 
down atomic security standards and guidelines however, they are not mandatory for 
member states. Accordingly, a few states have neglected to execute these regulations and 
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have overlooked maintaining their own guidelines.533 The author posits that although they 
are not mandatory, they contain provisions that could ensure viable nuclear projects, if 
adequately followed. Member States are liable for making their own legislations to guide 
their nuclear projects, which again, must be in line with those of IAEA and the UN. The 
UAE has in this way produced many laws to augment its nuclear programme. 
 
Japan has constantly been subjected to worldwide criticism for neglecting the protection 
of its atomic administration. Not only does the administration stay oblivious to the 
disorder in the plants, but the enterprises also hide the information regarding the 
conditions in them. These disorders of the national framework have brought about harm 
to the protection and prosperity of the public, national inspections and anti-atomic 
exhibits. The catastrophe at Fukushima shed light on the failures of the attempts made by 
national administration and the current global atomic safety regime, to secure the 
prosperity of the general population during an atomic occurrence. The author suggests 
that countries should not solely depend upon their own administration whilst ignoring 
those of the international community, but that a combination of both could be most of 
most help and benefit. 
 
The Fukushima nuclear accident happened amidst discouraging public support for the 
growth of nuclear power plants. However, this discouragement did not change the 
emphasis on the need for such a method of power production. The balance between 
‘necessity, approval and legitimacy’ was nearly collapsing during this time.534 Like the 
Chernobyl incident, the Fukushima accident also made it necessary to revamp the safety 
and security measures that were in existence until then. Does this suggest that 
international regimes are only subject to amendment after an incident has occurred? Both 
international and national regimes should be routinely vetted to suit contemporary 
changes and this could be a viable lesson for the UAE. 
 
The issue of liability was another major reason why many debates were held after the 
Fukushima accident. Like the Chernobyl accident, Japan was also not party to any of the 
Conventions relating to nuclear safety and accidents. But there was a difference in the 
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circumstances since Japan had a strong domestic system of law that dealt with the issue. 
The Fukushima incident was different from that of Chernobyl, since the effect of the 
accident did not breach Japan’s borders. The legal system in Japan recognised liability 
per international instruments. Therefore, the operator of the nuclear power plant in 
Fukushima took both responsibility and liability for the incident535.  
 
It is interesting to note that the Act of Compensation for Nuclear Damage of Japan 
provides for the exoneration from third party liability when there is a ‘grave natural 
disaster’ that caused the injury. In the case of Fukushima, there was an earthquake 
coupled with a tsunami and the nuclear accident. Although it was explained by many of 
the parties in Japan, that the operator of the nuclear reactor in Fukushima Daichi, TEPCO, 
can be exonerated from third party liabilities, since this was damage due to a grave natural 
disaster, the Japanese ruling party decided that as Japan is more vulnerable to earthquakes 
than any other country, an earthquake of this nature cannot automatically be accepted as 
being serious enough as to exempt TEPCO from its liability. TEPCO agreed with the 
government and accepted liability since their corporate policy was to take voluntary 
responsibility for the damage caused by the accident536. Therefore, this suggests that 
based on experience, TEPCO is already aware of its responsibilities in case of nuclear 
disaster and will bring this to bear in the UAE, having been selected as the operator there. 
 
4.6.5 Causes and impacts of nuclear incidents and lessons learned from them 
 
Nuclear incidents have different causes and impacts. These are further discussed, as well 
as lessons that the UAE could learn from them. The impacts of nuclear accidents include 
health effects, evacuation of polluted areas and impacts on energy strategies and nuclear 
safety work in different nations.537 Lars Högberg (2013) further maintains that important 
purposes for nuclear reactor safety work must be to prevent disasters from developing 
into harsh core damage, whether they are set off by very improbable normal or man-made 
actions, and, considering that catastrophes with severe core damage may however take 
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place; and to avoid massive and sustained ground defect by preventing discharges of 
radioactive nuclides such as cesium to smaller than about 100 TBq.538  
 
The lessons learned from past nuclear incidents should have wider application to all 
nuclear related organisations. The intent of this analysis is not to discover error through 
the conducts engaged, but to identify ways to lessen the possibility for such events and to 
be primed to take action if faced with similar situations in the future. Therefore, to realise 
the objectives of the reactor, the significance of upholding high universal principles of 
safety management and safety traditions cannot be accentuated sufficiently.539 
 
4.6.5.1 Prepare for the Unexpected 
 
During occasional surveys, the potential for conditions ought to be guaranteed. This could 
totally decrease the security parameters or surpass the present ideas, or a formal, 
convenient and complete evaluation of the potential for generous outcomes to be 
arranged.540 To completely comprehend the atomic security implications and objective, 
protective survey with a review of each section should be arranged. On the off chance 
that the outcomes could involve usual errors or malfunctions of security systems, safety 
measures should be taken as soon as possible which include early notification and 
contingency planning. 
 
4.6.5.2 Operational response 
 
4.6.5.2.1 Core cooling 
 
Adequate knowledge about core cooling status must be kept as the prime focus of 
attention.541 The authorities concerned in the UAE should take necessary steps to maintain 
the cooling systems in good condition. In case of any doubts regarding the working of 
systems, required actions must be taken to resolve the issue. 
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If an incident takes place, the control room and the Emergency Response Control (ERC) 
staff must be communicated clearly so that rescue actions can be planned accordingly. 
Moreover, the authorities must provide comprehensive guidance to their personnel 
beforehand, in order to ensure effective execution of rescue plans.542 The researcher 
suggests that training of staff in the UAE should be ensured in order to implement a 
successful nuclear programme. 
 
4.6.5.2.2 Containment venting 
 
The recovery plans devised for emergency or accidental situations must provide complete 
assistance for facilitating ejection of containment to uphold integrity, eliminate hydrogen 
and ensure injection with low-pressure systems543. 
 
The rescue plans must be applicable in the areas with vent valves, under special conditions 
like during power losses, raised levels of radiation and high temperatures544.  The 
researcher argues that based on liability, the effectiveness of the above measures is on 
sound operational management which should do with expertise. This will be further 
discussed in the next Chapter Five. 
 
4.6.5.2.3 Accident response 
 
Nuclear operators should arrange for the emergency response setups beforehand to deal 
with any kind of accidental situations and to lessen the damages to the systems. These 
arrangements must include fully trained and efficient staff, necessary equipment and long 
term strategies able to be deal with any kinds of accidents, including beyond-design-basis 
incidents as well.545 
 
There must be adequate facilitations provided to involve corporate and industrial sector 
aid during the times of damage to nuclear operating infrastructures. To minimise risk in 
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nuclear energy development, the operator or the authority concerned must devise plans to 
ensure that zero tolerance is put into practice. In a situation, whereby an incident has 
occurred, acceptable plans must be in place to contain general reporting and emergencies. 
There is great benefit in a quick response to nuclear accidents, as this would help to reduce 
likelihood of harm the incident poses. The researcher concludes that the practical steps to 
be adopted here also fall under the morally acceptable duties expected of the nuclear 
plants’ operator, as discussed in Chapter Two of the thesis. 
 
4.6.5.3 Staffing 
 
In case of any kind of accidental incident, there must be clear and comprehensive 
strategies (emergency plans) developed that can serve for a longer period of time in the 
very initial stages of the accident. It must also be ensured these strategies are 
communicated to nuclear operating personnel, internal and external emergency response 
teams and other operating staff.546 The UAE is taking this seriously, to avoid negligence. 
 
4.6.5.4 Human limitations 
 
It must be ensured that the emergency response strategies and trainings may also help the 
personnel to deal with the emotional dilemma that comes because of any catastrophe. 
Emotional strife can affect an individual’s decision making and receptive abilities to cope 
with accidental situations.547These should form part of staff training and monitoring 
processes. 
 
4.6.5.5 Emergency preparedness 
 
Various levels of monitoring methods, for keeping nuclear plants’ functioning under 
critical examination, must be provided. The emergency response personnel must be 
provided with regular trainings so that they might be fully skilled to use monitoring tools 
and methods.548 This should be regular practice drills. 
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There must be made complete on-site and off-site arrangements to coordinate emergency 
response activities as well as ensure their functionality application in case of any 
emergency. 
 
Experts of every relevant sector who might help in dealing with emergency situations and 
must also be able to operate accident response tools must be kept available. This can be 
achieved by either making contracts with experts or by providing professional and high 
quality training to internal emergency response staff to hold this position. 
 
4.6.5.6 Design and equipment 
 
The emergency response equipment must be able to function for a longer period even in 
shortage of alternation current (AC), direct current (DC) and heat energy. It must be 
designed and maintained as such, that it may be readily available and functional at critical 
and emergency situations.549 
 
The nuclear plants must also be modified in order that they may perform basic functions 
safely during multi-unit emergencies which may lead to long term shortage or loss of AC 
power, DC power and the heat sink. 
 
4.6.5.7 Procedures 
 
The organisations supervising the nuclear power plants must develop adequate strategies 
and corresponding implementation plans to deal with any kind of accident or emergency 
situation with the help of utilising communication tools and methods to exchange 
information with the reactor vendors.550 Authorities must not divert from these plans and 
procedures unless they have thoroughly assessed the standard technical and safety 
parameters and have also devised alternative strategies to replace the earlier ones. 
 
Natural disasters or internal accidents may affect the operations and the plant personnel 
during and after the incident. This may hinder the responding actions to the situation. 
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Therefore, while devising emergency plans and strategies such hindrances and barriers 
must be acknowledged. 
 
4.6.5.8 Knowledge and skills 
 
Both internal and external emergency response personnel must have complete knowledge 
and understanding of methods and equipment to be used to counter accident situations. 
They must be trained effectively so that they might be able to perform effectively in actual 
disaster conditions.551 
 
4.6.5.9 Operating experience 
 
The personnel must be able to perform and employ their learning acquired during training 
actively and efficiently. They must also be aware of the international standards and latest 
trends about their field. 
 
When exposed to international events and response mechanisms employed to them, the 
personnel tend to form their perceptions within that perspective and expect to counter 
similar situations. As such they completely overlook the actual causes of the accident. 
Therefore, timely actions must be taken to enable the personnel to develop wide-ranged 
perceptions and strengthen their response abilities.552 
 
4.6.5.10 Nuclear Safety culture 
 
The behavioural patterns observed before and during the Fukushima Daiichi incident 
proved that nuclear safety culture is yet to be strengthened and developed. The nuclear 
operating organisations must review their practices and work on the areas which require 
development, considering studies conducted upon this incident. They must take the 
necessary steps to spread awareness of safety culture, principles and qualities.553 Every 
staff member of a nuclear plant must be aware of the safety procedures in place for said 
plant and ensure that routine trainings and developments are carried out. 
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4.6.6 Lessons for the UAE 
 
In 2011, the world witnessed another episode of a nuclear accident following Chernobyl. 
This was Fukushima I nuclear Power Plant, due to radioactive emission. Radiation was 
even expected in Tokyo’s tap water because of the incident554. The same situation 
occurred in Chernobyl, after which the international community worked hard for safer 
nuclear power generation. These two incidents have reduced public support for nuclear 
power plants in various countries. Since the legislations relating to civil liability and 
nuclear accidents were not effective in providing relief to the victims and to 
simultaneously encourage new investment in the area, there was need for a system 
overhaul. The researcher admits that the UAE has learned enormously from the four 
outstanding nuclear incidents discussed above. The country seriously reflects upon the 
various lapses which led to those accidents, as it pursues its own nuclear development. 
The country also benefits from the changes that have taken place in the international laws 
following the incidents. 
 
Since a balance is required between the public’s interests and commercial development, 
two Conventions were entered by the UAE, namely: the Paris Convention on Third Party 
Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (see Appendix 9) and the Vienna Convention on 
Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (see Appendix 8)555. After the adoption of these two 
Conventions, the Chernobyl accident took place which had significant effects on both 
man and environment. The UAE was already on board with these Conventions. 
 
There were several shortcomings to these Conventions, which became evident after the 
Chernobyl incident in 1986. First, the restriction in the claim was too small for the victims 
to be substantially compensated556. Secondly, not all countries were signed up to the 
Conventions and finally, within them, all possible injuries that could be potentially caused 
                                         
554 Elaine Kurtenbach and Shino Yuasa, Anxiety in Tokyo over radiation in tap water, (The Associated 
Press, Tokyo, 2011) also available at: http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9M59 PR00.htm 
Accessed on 03-06-2013. 
555 The Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy entered into force in 1968. 
For the text of convention visit: http://www.oecdnea.org/law/nlparis_conv.html Accessed on 02-06-2013; 
The Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage entered into force in 1977. For the text of 
convention Visit: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1996/inf500.shtml Accessed on 
02-06-2013. 
556 OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, Liability and Compensation for Nuclear Damage, (Paris-1994), 12. 
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by nuclear accident(s) were not sufficiently covered557. The limitation period of the claims 
was also too short a time for the injured to make claims, especially since the effects of 
nuclear accidents become prevalent after many years and generations. The complexity in 
the prescribed method for claiming the damages also acted against the injured558. 
 
It was due to these shortcomings, that the Joint Protocol relating to the application of the 
Vienna Convention, The Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for 
Nuclear Damage, the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, 
1997 and finally, the Paris Protocols to amend the Paris Convention and the Brussels 
Supplementary Convention were entered into559. Once again, the UAE has adopted all the 
instruments. 
 
From the Chernobyl and Fukushima accidents, it can be deduced that the absence of 
ratification of the international conventions dealing with nuclear accidents and emissions 
has proved to be detrimental at various stages. When it comes to paying damages to the 
injured in a nuclear accident, it is much easier if there are international teams and 
economic measures that can help the country(ies) in which such an accident takes place. 
In the case of Fukushima, there was no ratification of international instruments relating 
to nuclear accidents and this made it difficult for Japan to pay back damages to the 
accident victims, since only the national team and financial security measures were in 
existence - external, international aid was lacking560. The UAE has ratified international 
instruments relating to nuclear accidents. The country is aware of what is required when 
a nuclear incident occurs, as well as the ways in which to deal with claims. 
 
                                         
557Ibid. 
558Ibid. 
559For the text of protocol, visit: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/protamend 
.html Accessed on 2 April 2011; 
For the text of convention, visit: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1998/infcirc 
567.pdf Accessed on 2 April 2011; 
2004 Paris Protocol to Amend the Paris Convention visit: http://www.oecdnea.org/law/paris_ 
convention.pdf Accessed on 02-06-2013;  
2004 Paris Protocol to Amend Brussels Supplementary Convention visit: http://www.oecdnea.org/law/ 
Unofficial%20consolidated%20Brussels%20 Supplementary%20Convention.pdf Accessed on 02-06-
2013.  
For Joint Protocol visit: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/inf402.shtml 
Accessed on 02-06-2013. 
560 Gabor Kecskes, ‘The Nuclear Liability Issue after Fukushima - The Role of International Law in 
Liability Theory’, available at http://www.burges-salmon.com/INLA_2012/10148.pdf Last accessed on 
10th June, 2013. 
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Japan and Ukraine did not have the necessary support from the international community 
since they were not party to any of the international instruments, hence, the need for UAE 
to adopt all relevant instruments. Recently, there has been a three-tier system of 
compensation entered by countries, through the Paris-Brussels protocol.  Unfortunately, 
since Japan was not party to any of these instruments, such mechanisms were not 
available to Japan. Despite Japan having a strong domestic legal system which 
enumerated the procedure for compensation payments, the accident in 2011 showed their 
system’s inability to deal with the situation when the amount of secured payment that 
could be raised by the operator was not enough to compensate those injured in the 
accident. The Compensation Act of Japan provided for the government’s payment of the 
balance amount. In this situation, a corporation was established to pay the rest of the 
amount to the victims. However, the operator is bound to repay the amount to the 
corporation by resorting to methods of cost reduction561. 
 
However, it is an astonishing fact Japan failed to ratify the international instruments 
relating to nuclear reactors and emissions, particularly when the country is a forerunner 
for nuclear power generation projects and especially as it is more vulnerable to natural 
disasters than any other country. Hence the risk factor was (still is) exceptionally high in 
Japan for this reason562. This emphasises the fact that all nuclear energy producing 
countries should ratify international Conventions on nuclear energy.  The UAE would 
like to avoid the above scenario so has ratified international Conventions. 
 
4.6.7 Possible scenarios showing how the liability system may work 
 
Some possible scenarios are postulated below to provide examples of how the liability 
system may work in practice. Some of the countries in Asia do not ratify Vienna and Joint 
Conventions on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and this can cause conflict between 
Member and Non-Member States. Therefore, this section shows how the UAE can learn 
from these incidents, and has the necessary procedures and plans in place to manage any 
eventuality. Here are some hypothetical scenarios which highlight the approved 
approaches with nuclear damage. 
 
                                         
561Vasquez-Maignon et al, op.cit. 
562Ibid. 
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a. A shipment bearing a UK flag carries a nuclear product sent from a Korean 
operator to UAE. In the middle of the sea a nuclear accident takes place, emitting 
high range radiations in the surroundings. The incident adversely affected the 
fishing and tourist industry along with damaging Japanese, Chinese and 
Philippines fishing fleets. Though there is not solid proof that the accident has 
contaminated tuna or not, the fish caught from within the affected area is 
prohibited from being sold. Also, no traces of radioactivity on surrounding 
beaches have been found, but nonetheless, tourists have been restricted from 
visiting the area.563.  
 
In this case, the UK and South Korea are liable to Paris and Brussels Supplementary 
Convention, while China and Japan are exempt from any such condition because they are 
not parties. The fishing operators will be provided with the choice of either to begin a law 
suit in the UK, UAE, or their own respective countries. If they choose to sue in their own 
country, they will ensure to implement the decision at any cost either through multilateral 
agreement or bilateral reciprocal judgement enforcement treaty. In such a situation, there 
are very limited chances of success, as the damage is claimed to be purely economic 
because the contamination of fish might not be proved with solid evidence. 
 
It is open to discussion whether the fishing businesses in any of those countries make 
progress with their claims in terms of possibilities, if States link any of the accountability 
Conventions. As China and the UK are not a part of the Joint Protocol, the only option is 
to join the Paris Convention. Because the Paris Convention is not effective, the only 
option the countries are left with is the Vienna Convention which the UAE is signatory 
to. UAE is also ratifying the Joint Protocol for the amendment of Paris and Vienna 
Conventions. There are reduced chances for improvement, as the statement is not for loss 
to possessions caused by a nuclear occurrence including nuclear materials in the sequence 
of transport. If there was an improvement, accusations would be restricted to the £140 
million on condition under the Nuclear Installations Act 1965, outside which the 
Paris/Brussels system influences. 
 
                                         
563 US Department of States-Diplomacy in Action. Convention on Supplemental Compensation for Nuclear 
Damage: Article by Article Analysis. Available at: http://www.state.gov/t/isn/trty/5951.htmLast Accessed 
on 4 June 2013. 
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b. A ship carrying nuclear material to Dubai ports via the coast of India is hit by an 
aircraft manned by terrorists. The incident resulted in emitting radioactive 
radiations into the Indian Ocean, Southern India and Sri Lanka. The incident 
caused economic loss to the tune of hundreds of millions, even billions of dollars. 
Many people died in the incident while thousands began to suffer from radiation 
poisoning. 564.   
 
India is not an associated partner of the Paris and Brussels Convention; it is the same 
situation for Sri Lanka.  Therefore, applicants in those states would have to forward their 
claims and demands in UAE or South Korea. They would be dependent on the claims 
made by the worker or its guarantors that the exclusion in Article 9 of the 1960 Paris 
Convention, being ‘armed dispute, conflicts, aggression, civil war, and insurgency’ was 
included. They have an additional option of putting up their statements or claims in India 
or Sri Lanka, in courts of their own state. If they did so they would be exempted from all 
kinds of liabilities. Here, the operator shall not be liable for damage caused by a nuclear 
incident directly and therefore there would be dispute between territorial countries 
whether Members or Non-Members. The researcher suggests that in this scenario, the 
UAE should undertake bilateral agreements should this happen. 
 
c. The UAE nuclear power plant encountered an accident which caused the release 
of significant amounts of radiation in Saudi Arabia, Oman and Yemen. This 
incident adversely affected the date and poultry farmers. 565 
 
The UAE is a member of the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, 
BSC and Paris Conventions, while Oman, Yemen and Saudi Arabia are not. In this case, 
the compensation would be made in terms of a limited definition and only damages or 
losses of life, health or property would be addressed. The farmers would be required to 
provide the cost of the damage caused to their property if they want to receive the 
compensation. The author notes that this will place burden of proof on the farmers, 
                                         
564 See US Department of States-Diplomacy in Action. Convention on Supplemental Compensation for 
Nuclear Damage: Article by Article Analysis. Available at: http://www.state.gov/t/isn/trty/5951.htmLast 
Accessed on 4 June 2013. 
565See US Department of States-Diplomacy in Action. Convention on Supplemental Compensation for 
Nuclear Damage: Article by Article Analysis. Available at: http://www.state.gov/t/isn/trty/5951.htmLast 
Accessed on 4 June 2013. 
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meaning that they would have to seek experts’ opinion to be able to do what is required. 
The author says that other GCC countries will not use the above Conventions for 
compensation because most of them are not Members. Here the UAE needs a bilateral 
agreement to avoid any dispute from nuclear incidence or other counties ratify the 
Conventions. 
 
4.7 Analysis of the nature of criminal and civil liability areas 
 
The effects of nuclear emission are not comparable to other methods of power production. 
Radioactive materials can ruin a large tract of land that goes beyond the geographical 
boundaries of a nation. This results in heavy loss of both lives and finances. The IAEA 
has formulated an action plan which requires the international community to build an 
international system that deals with the compensation for nuclear damages566. The UAE 
has also formulated action plans to enable coping with compensations for damages. 
 
The liabilities that are in existence regarding the nuclear accidents and emissions are seen 
in the Paris Convention and the Vienna Convention, along with its protocols. These 
liabilities are discussed below. 
 
4.7.1 Strict liability 
 
The liability under tort is not restricted and there is no mandatory provision to insure such 
obligation567. The obligation of the operator of a nuclear power project is not according 
to the usual tort law, which places the burden of proof on the claimant to prove that it is 
the conduct of the operator which resulted in the said fault. On the other hand, all the 
legislation in the UAE that deals with nuclear installations, the possible damage caused 
by it and damages caused by the movement of radioactive materials to and from the 
installation are covered by the strict liability principle.  
 
                                         
566Nuclear Safety Review for the year 2012, IAEA, (Austria, 2012). 
567 Marcus Radetzki, ’Limitation of Third Party Nuclear Liability’ (1999), Nuclear Law Bulletin No. 63, 7. 
Available at:  http://www.oecd-nea.org/law/nlb/NLB-63/radetzki.pdf Accessed on 2 June 2013. 
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According to the strict liability principle, it is not necessary for the claimant to show that 
the operator’s action(s) resulted in such injury568. The liability regime provides for 
exceptions in the strict liability rule to the operator so far as the accident or injury is 
caused by an Act of God or by war or hostilities. In such circumstances, strict liability 
will not be applicable569.   
 
4.7.2 Exclusive liability 
 
Exclusive liability is attributed only to radioactive incidents. This kind of liability is not 
available for other kinds of torts or activities570. Exclusive liability means that the operator 
of the nuclear power plant is the only individual who is responsible for answering the 
injured party(ies) claims, even if there are other persons who have played a part in the 
cause of injury571. By providing for exclusive liability on the operator of the nuclear 
incident, the injured is saved of the time to find as to what caused such injury and who is 
behind such cause. All claims of the injured can be answered by the operator of the power 
station.  
 
Another reason for making the operator of the power plant responsible is to cut the costs 
of the suppliers of nuclear raw materials and the technology providers, from taking out 
insurance policies to fulfil their obligations to the possible victims every time they supply 
the raw material or the technology. The transporters of radioactive materials are also 
saved from exclusive liability, since they will not be held liable for the accidents caused 
during the transit572. 
 
While many of the scholars believe exclusive liability is required in the case of nuclear 
incidents, there are some scholars who opt against it. The reason for such opposition is 
                                         
568 Julia A. Schwartz, ‘International Nuclear Third Party Liability Law: The Response to Chernobyl’, 
OECD 2006. Available at: http://www.oecd-nea.org/law/chernobyl/SCHWARTZ.pdf Accessed on 2 June 
2013. 
569 Duncan E. J. Currie, (2007). ‘Liability of Nuclear Power Incidents: Limitations, Restrictions, and Gaps 
in the Vienna and Paris Regimes’, in Heinz Stockinger, Jon M. Van Dyke, Michael Geistlinger, Sarah K. 
Fussek and Peter Machart (Eds) Updating International Nuclear Law, (Wien-Gra: Intersentia) 75. 
570 Norbert Pelzer, ‘Focus on the Future of Nuclear Liability Law’, (1999), 17 (4) Journal of Energy & 
Natural Resources Law, 332. Available at: http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?collection=journals 
&handle=hein.journals/jenrl17&div=38&id=&page= Accessed on 2 June 2013. 
571Karine Fiore, (2008). ‘The Nuclear Limit on the OECD Conventions: An Implicit Subsidy’, (Maastricht 
University), available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1086290 Accessed 2 June 2013. 
572 Elaine Kurtenbach and Shino Yuasa,op.cit. 
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that the exclusion of the suppliers and transporters from liability to address the claims of 
the injured would result in a lack of responsibility on their part573. According to Pelzer, 
exclusive liability is the edifice on which the whole legal regime relating to nuclear 
incidents is based. On the other hand, Mehmet SuatKayikci (2011) opines that the 
providers of raw materials and technology should be made responsible for materials or 
technology supplied along with the profit574.  
 
4.7.3 Restriction in claim amount(s) 
 
The complex liability is unrestricted and the person responsible must pay all the damages 
caused to the victim. In environmental law, the person liable must pay an unrestricted 
amount for the claim. However, in cases involving the nuclear field, there is a restriction 
in the claim amount taking into consideration the fact that a nuclear incident can lead to 
unimaginable harm to life and property. This would result in fewer numbers of nuclear 
power plant operators and would discourage the development of nuclear power. To avert 
such a situation, the legislators have made the claim amount restricted, thus helping the 
operator(s) to obtain insurance policies for a lesser amount575. Notwithstanding the 
restrictions on the claim amount, it is good that such policies may provide a boost to the 
industry; on the other hand, it could lead to failure of preventive steps being taken by the 
operator to avoid the usual risk(s) of nuclear power plants576. This could also lead to a 
situation where the victims are not properly compensated for their injury(ies)577.  
 
The Paris Convention and the Vienna Convention increased the restriction levels of 
compensation payable by the operator and also provided with it, a step by step scheme 
for paying the compensation, whereby the operator is liable for the first stage of damages, 
then the country in which the nuclear project is situated will be considered liable for the 
second step of damages; with the third step being where the parties to the instruments 
become collectively liable578. This step by step procedure of determining the liability 
                                         
573Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, op.cit. 
574Mehmet SuatKayikci, “The International Civil Liability Regime for Nuclear Energy. How Would it 
Respond to a Chernobyl Disaster of 2011?” Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2102175,                                                                                                                                                  
Last accessed on 11 June 2013. 
575Duncan Curie, op.cit. 
576 Marcus Radetzki, ’Limitation of Third Party Nuclear Liability’ (1999), Nuclear Law Bulletin No. 63, 7. 
Available at:  http://www.oecd-nea.org/law/nlb/NLB-63/radetzki.pdf Accessed 2 June 2013. 
577 Duncan Currie, op.cit. 
578 Ibid. 
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amount ensures a universal liability of all the states concerned to be accountable for 
making (limited) reparation contributions for the destruction caused by nuclear activity.  
 
4.7.4 Economic safety measures 
 
Since there is exclusive liability for the operators of nuclear plants, they are required to 
provide economic safety measures which satisfy the highest limit of damages repayable 
via bank, insurance or State guarantees579.   
 
It is also stipulated that the safety measures such as insurance policies and bank 
guarantees that are given as security for operator liability can only be released for 
compensation purposes. 
 
4.7.5 Limitation period for claims 
 
The insurers and other financial institutions which guarantee the liability amount of the 
operators of nuclear power plants believe nuclear accident claims should not be 
entertained after a decade has passed580. According to them, this provides conviction to 
the legal proceedings. 
 
The Vienna Convention has increased the limitation period for personal injuries from ten 
to twenty years. This may be a point of concern since money must be reserved for claims 
even after twenty years, when it relates to personal injuries581. But this extension of 
limitation period is reasonable and much expected, since the effects of radiation are 
known to endure a long period and even through the generations.  
 
 
4.7.6 Territorial applicability 
 
The Paris and Vienna Conventions’ provisions are applied only to those accidents and 
injuries that happen within the territorial boundaries of countries which are parties to these 
Conventions. The criteria are that the source of damage as well as the damage itself should 
                                         
579Schwartz, op.cit. 
580Ibid. 
581 Anthony Aust, (2007). Modern Treaty Law and Practice, second Edition, (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press), p 200. 
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occur within the boundaries of States that are party to the Convention. If the damage 
occurs in a non-party state, then the Vienna Convention cannot be applied. 
 
A Joint Protocol is in effect when the cause of damage if it happens within the boundaries 
of a state which is a party to the Vienna Convention can be made liable for the damage 
which occurred within the boundaries of a state that is a party to the Paris Convention582. 
 
The most surprising factor is that the major players (USA, China, Canada and Japan) of 
nuclear power projects are not yet signatories to Paris or Vienna Convention.  
 
4.7.7 Injury 
 
The Paris Convention and the Vienna Convention provide for compensation to injury 
sustained by the occurrence of a nuclear incident. But neither of the Conventions provides 
for the compensation of financial injury which may have taken place during the 
occurrence of the nuclear accident. Therefore, for the effective management of 
compensation for financial injury, the UAE should enact laws to this purpose.  
 
4.7.8 Jurisdiction of courts 
 
According to the Paris convention and the Vienna Convention, the court of law within 
the State wherein the incident took place, has the jurisdiction to entertain the claim. But 
there may be circumstances whereby the incident’s location could not be ascertained. In 
such circumstances, the place where the plant is situated has the jurisdiction to the claims 
arising from the incident.  
 
The major limitation of such a provision to try the claims of nuclear accidents is that there 
is no independent body or authority to deal with the claims arising from nuclear accidents 
that happen during transportation of nuclear active products from one country to another 
and in which the claimants may be from different nations. The stipulation is that the rule 
of law of the country wherein the claims are entertained will also affect the interests of 
                                         
582 Joint Protocol. Available at: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/jointprot_ 
status.pdf Accessed 2 June 2013. 
 173 
 
the claimant, since it is the courts in the country wherein the operator holds its plant that 
holds the jurisdiction583. 
 
In addition to the civil and criminal liabilities concerning nuclear risks, there are 
environmental liabilities also. The increased climatic change has not brought a change in 
the way the nations view nuclear power generation. There is just as much protection given 
to such plants as there was when nuclear power generation first started. There are 
governmental subsidies for the starting and running of nuclear power projects. However, 
the increasing climatic changes are an issue which gain more importance in the present 
scenario, which needs to quantify the compensation for environmental damage584.  
 
4.8 Summary of Chapter Four 
 
Nuclear power generation is the cheapest and most durable method of commercial 
production of power in recent times that has proved to be successful form any 
industrialised nations. The decision of the UAE to embark upon nuclear power generation 
methods is a prudent one when compared to the enormous growth of industry in the 
country and the requirement for more power. The constantly depleting fossil fuels also 
promote the growth of nuclear power production. 
 
The greatest threat of nuclear power projects are as possible health and environmental 
hazards, usually caused by a leak or accident in the nuclear power plant. The UAE needs 
to take all precautionary measures possible to reduce the odds of such accident(s) or 
leakage by following the international standards for plant construction and operation. 
Since the operator of the nuclear power plant has the exclusive liability to claims that 
arise from nuclear accidents, according to the international Conventions, if the UAE is 
planning a state-owned project, it needs to procure all financial securities to be prepared 
for such claims. 
 
                                         
583 Duncan Currie, op.cit. 
584 Faure, M., (1995). ‘Economic Models of Compensation for Damage Caused by Nuclear Accidents: 
Some Lessons for the Revision of the Paris and Vienna Conventions’. European 
Journal of Law and Economics, 2, pp 21- 43. 
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The country can accede to the international Conventions that deal with the compensation 
of victims in a nuclear accident, to receive help from the international organisations when 
there is a nuclear accident or leakage. This is because the repercussions of such accidents 
may have unimaginable outcomes which can affect persons from various countries. In 
such a situation, if there is a limitation in the liability amount as per the international 
Conventions, it would be helpful if there are other countries to support in a crisis.  
 
The international framework has found a balance between the public interest and the 
interest of the nuclear power plant(s) operator. Since the operation of nuclear power plant 
carries such high risks, if too much stringent control is focused on the method of working, 
the investment in nuclear power projects would decline, consequently affect commercial 
progress. Thus, it is advised, a more stable method should be followed by the UAE. 
International co-operation is the key factor in having a successful nuclear age in the 
future. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE ORGANISATIONAL AND LEGAL STRUCTURES OF THE 
UAE’S NUCLEAR PROGRAMME: THE NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL CO-
OPERATION AND THE BENEFITS OF IMPLEMENTING THE PEACEFUL 
NUCLEAR PROGRAMME 
 
5.1 Introduction to Chapter Five 
 
The focus of this chapter is on the UAE and lessons learnt applicable to its future 
development of nuclear energy production. The benefits of nuclear power projects are 
numerous and include stable production of electricity in a more cost effective way, but 
their possible negative impacts are immeasurable particularly concerning radioactive 
emissions. This makes it necessary for a state to formulate effective legislations and 
regulations to control nuclear activities in the country. There are international instruments 
that deal with this aspect.585 Many countries, including the UAE, ratify such instruments 
to avoid possible negative effects of nuclear activities in the state. In addition to the effects 
of nuclear activities, the use of nuclear power for electricity generation, or for other 
peaceful purposes, would require the assistance of the international community, since it 
constantly necessitates the transportation of nuclear products between countries. 
Therefore, it is necessary to adhere to standards set in international tools.  
 
The states have found it necessary to formulate a common code of regulations regarding 
the nuclear liabilities and standards of conduct, since there are limitations to the national 
legislations in various aspects. Examples of the instruments include UAE Law No 4 of 
20012 and UAE Law No 6 of 2009. It is imperative to note that a nuclear mishap will 
likely incur potentially extensive fallout beyond the geographical boundaries of a country, 
which would result in difficulties forecourts of jurisdiction in deciding on claim petitions. 
The civil law that deals with such mishaps is not obvious when it comes to nuclear 
accidents. This makes it problematic for claimants to dispense their burden of proof. The 
                                         
585 The international instruments include: The 1957 Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field 
of Nuclear Energy, The 1997 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, The 1997 Joint 
Protocol, The 1997 Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, The Joint 
Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management, The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) etc.  
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author argues that if there no viable international regulations, it is possible that domestic 
laws could be used as the main form of dispute resolution and that UAE can benefit from 
this. This could possibly also be a substitute utilised by non-contracting parties for 
individual jurisdiction. 
 
In the absence of an international code of regulations, the persons responsible for nuclear 
accidents may be burdened with unrestricted liabilities and such a situation would 
detrimentally affect investors in nuclear power projects586. This is dealt with by domestic 
law and consensus is that international instruments are necessary to deal with accidents 
caused by nuclear activity. The Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage 
and the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage were formed 
when: “It was felt that the adoption of an international regime for nuclear liability would 
facilitate the bringing of actions and the enforcement of judgments without too much 
hindrance by national legal systems”587.  
 
The researcher perceives the above as being beneficial to the claimants or victims of 
nuclear incidents, believing that there is possibility that domestic laws may suffer from 
some interpretational and enforcement setbacks. To have detailed analysis of the issue of 
international assistance and cooperation it is necessary to understand the different 
international Conventions which deal with nuclear power projects. The nature of legal 
responsibility is different in the case of nuclear projects when compared to other industrial 
power activities. Therefore, it is necessary to understand the scope of legal responsibility 
under the various international Conventions. 
 
Chapter Five evaluates the organisational and legal structures of the UAE nuclear 
programme, the legal responsibilities for nuclear activities from the international 
perspectives and the benefits of peaceful exploitation. The chapter also analyses the 
challenges facing peaceful nuclear programmes, ratification of global nuclear 
responsibility systems by non-member states, as well as the formulation of a single legal 
code for nuclear liability. 
                                         
586 Schwartz, Julia A. (2010). “Liability and Compensation for Third Party Damage resulting from a 
Nuclear Incident”, 10th Anniversary of the International School of Nuclear Law, (2010, OECD) p. 308.   
587 Explanatory Texts, - The 1997 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and the 1997 
Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage. p. 5.   
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5.2 Legal Responsibilities for nuclear activities in the International Regime 
 
Although a detailed analysis of the nuclear liability regime has been discussed in the 
previous chapter, it is appropriate to understand the international system of ascertaining 
the legal responsibilities.  
 
From the international perspective, the burden of proof of the victim that an accident 
occurred due to the act or omission of the nuclear power operator is dispensed with. This 
means that the operator will be held strictly liable for any accident due to nuclear activity 
within the nuclear power plant. The Paris Convention (see Appendix 9) and the Vienna 
Convention (see Appendix 8) have included the strict liability principle within its scope 
in Article 3 and Article II (1) and IV (1) respectively. The researcher observes that the 
Paris and the Vienna Conventions were developed after the 1957 Windscale incident had 
happened. The 1957 Paris Convention was the first to be developed, following the 
Brookhaven Report published in the same year (1957) which was based on the Windscale 
disaster. The 1979 Three Miles Island, the 1986 Chernobyl and the 2011 Fukushima 
incidents all happened after the Paris and the Vienna Conventions were adopted. 
Therefore, it can be noted that this illustrates a positive approach from the international 
community. It is possible that the successes of these treaties can be enhanced through 
countries, including the UAE, taking them seriously. 
 
The international Conventions that deal with nuclear power plants have made the operator 
of the plant wholly responsible for the damages caused by the nuclear activity. The Paris 
Convention, Vienna Convention and the Convention on Supplementary Compensation on 
Nuclear Damage’s Annex (see Appendix 11) provides for the sole responsibility of the 
nuclear operator. The Paris Convention provides for the need of the operator to take out 
insurance. While the three international instruments provide for exceptions to the 
exclusive liability of the operator, the nuclear accidents that have attracted international 
attention have not been the result of any of the circumstances in the exceptions. In cases 
of moving nuclear active materials from one place to another, it is the sender who will be 
responsible for any damage(s) because of such transportation. Such liability will be 
imposed on condition that the sender is from a ratifying country. If the materials have 
reached the buyer, however, but have not been removed from the carrier, the 
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responsibility would still lie with the sender of the nuclear active product(s)588. The UAE 
will get its source of nuclear materials from South Korea. 
 
According to most the international instruments there are no limitations to the 
responsibility of the nuclear power plant operator, except when the agreement clearly 
mentions that the operator will be limited in his responsibility or when an accident 
happens due to the act or omission of a person who undertakes action with the clear 
intention of causing damage(s). Although, Article X of the Vienna Convention clearly 
makes the sovereign state responsible also, if government money is involved in founding 
the power plant.589 The UAE will deal with this through ENEC, which is the official body 
to supervise the country’s nuclear power programme. 
 
Unlike the national laws, there is an upper limit of compensation payable by the person 
responsible for nuclear damages. The absence of the upper limit for compensation renders 
national laws insufficient for meeting those requirements specific to nuclear accidents. 
To assist and increase investments in the nuclear arena, such measures are taken to 
international level590. Such a method is widely criticised, since the upper limit on the 
compensation amount is fixed on the basis of insurance coverage available and not on the 
gravity of risks posed by nuclear accidents591. In contradiction to this principle, Austria, 
Germany, Japan and Switzerland have all removed any upper limit on the compensation 
amount payable from the operator’s obligation592. Japan and Austria have not acceded to 
the international Conventions so far. The researcher assumes that the upper limit on the 
compensation amount can be determined by countries based on their involvement in the 
power programme and should be provided in the tort law. 
 
The international instruments confer the power to restrict the amount liable by the nuclear 
project operator by the sovereign state where the plant is run. The method of restricting 
compensation payable differs with each international instrument. While there is a 
maximum limit for compensation and all of it is to be paid by the nuclear project’s 
                                         
588Stoiber, C, Baer, A, Pelzer, N, Tonhauser, W, P, (2003). Handbook on Nuclear law, (IAEA, Vienna, 
Austria), p. 116.   
589 Article X of the Vienna Convention. 
590 Julia A. Schwartz (2010op.cit.) 
591Norbet Pelzer “Main futures of the revised International Regime Governing Liability - Progress and 
Standstill”, 10th Anniversary of the International School of Nuclear Law (OECD), p. 368   
592 Ibid. 
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operator, the 1963 Brussels Supplementary Convention593created the method of 
computation of compensation with three stages. It limits the exclusive liability of the 
operator to five million SDRs594 while between 5 million to 175 million should be paid 
by the state in which the power plant is situated.595Any amount above 175 million, up to 
300 million can be borne out from the combined funds of all the ratifying states. The 
upper limit of compensation was later increased to 1.5 billion.596 
 
The Vienna Convention does not have a tier system but enables the sovereign state to put 
a limit on the compensation to be paid by the operator up to 300 million SDRs.597 It also 
empowers the state to make national laws which allow the use of state funds to pay 
compensation above 150 million SDRs without exceeding 300 million SDRs.598 
 
According to the 1997 Convention on Supplementary Compensation (CSC) on Nuclear 
Damages, while there is no upper limit for the compensation payable by the operator 
within the Convention, it does facilitate the installation state’s authorities to make such 
prescribed upper limits. This can be 300 million SDRs or above. The UAE sets it at 450 
SDRs.599 The second tier of the Convention on Supplementary Compensation on Nuclear 
Damages allows the use of funds procured from the collection of all the ratifying states 
to pay for the damages above the limit in the first tier.600 
 
Another concept in the international instruments relating to nuclear accidents is the 
limitation(s) placed on time in raising a claim. Since the corporate sector providing 
insurance for nuclear power projects limits the terms of insurance to a decade, maximum, 
this inflicts time limit restrictions within which nuclear damages claims need to be raised 
by victims601. Although this seems a fair system, since the effects of nuclear activity might 
                                         
593The Supplementary Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy of 31 January 
1963. 
594SDRs (Special Drawing Rights) are a mixture of currency values determined by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). One SDR is currently equal to US$1.54 (Dh5.66). 
595 The Brussels Convention. 
596 The Brussels Convention. 
597 The Vienna Convention. 
598 The Vienna Convention. 
599 “The liability of the Operator to compensate for Nuclear Damage for any one Nuclear Incident shall not 
exceed 450 million SDRs.” (See: Article 5(1) of UAE law No 4 of 2012). 
600 Article 4 of Chapter 2 of the Convention on Supplementary Compensation (CSC) on Nuclear Damages. 
601Sebastiaan M. S. Reitsma and Mark G. Tetley (2010). “Insurance of Nuclear Risks”, 10th Anniversary 
of the International School of Nuclear Law, (2010, OECD), pp. 398   
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only be known several years after being exposed to such radiation, there can be no 
precision regarding the time of occurrence of the disease. The time lapse in identifying 
the occurrence of the disease after exposure to radioactivity will make it difficult to 
ascertain the real cause of the disease. According to the civil law in most of the states, 
including the UAE, the limitation period is set at 30 years602.  
 
However, Article 8(a) of the Paris Convention enforces the limitation period of nuclear 
damages that result in harm to life or hurt, stating it will come to an end ten years after 
the nuclear accident. This is mainly because the insurance providers limit the term of 
insurance to ten years (which is contractual and can vary). The Paris Convention provides 
for the freedom to expand the limitation period in each country through domestic 
legislation, if there are adequate measures taken to provide insurance covering the 
expanded period. The provision in the Paris Convention and the Convention on 
Supplementary Compensation on Nuclear Damages stipulates that such member state can 
mandate the victim to raise the claim within two and three years respectively.  
 
The Vienna Convention further extends the limitation period to three decades after the 
nuclear accident if such claims relate to the harm to life or hurt of the person and if it 
relates to other types of compensation, the limitation period of the claims ends within a 
decade of the nuclear accident.603 The Vienna Convention has also left open the choice 
of expanding the limitation period by the sovereign state, if such expanded period can be 
appropriately covered by insurance policies. The Convention under Article VI (3) 
provides that such claims should be brought up within three years of the knowledge of 
the damage caused by nuclear accident.604 The UAE is equally aware of these and 
considers them in its nuclear laws. 
 
The Vienna Convention, Paris Convention and the Convention on Supplementary 
Compensation on Nuclear Damages make it a mandatory condition for the operator to 
subscribe to an insurance policy that would cover the liability of the operator in the event 
of a nuclear accident. All three international instruments stipulate the same. Norbert 
Pelzer (2007) states that the mandatory provisions to subscribe to insurance policies that 
                                         
602Stoiber, C, Baer, A, Pelzer, N, Tonhauser, W, P op.cit. 
603 The Vienna Convention. 
604 Article VI (3) of the Vienna Convention. 
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would cover the operator’s liability would help both the harmed and the operator since 
the harmed persons will be guaranteed payment of claim through the insurance policy and 
the operator would be protected from huge amounts of claims with increasing 
claimants605.  
 
Other than the method of insurance, there are other methods which are not as popular as 
insurance policies. One such is the collective use of funds from different operators to 
satisfy the claims that may arise in case of nuclear accidents. Another approach is to 
enable the state to assist the operators in covering the operator liability with state funds, 
provided the operator is made to pay a fixed amount606. The researcher argues that 
limitation on compensation is fair if it considers as basis the scale of injury/harm.  
 
The international instruments also provide that if the methods used by the operators to 
cover their liability through insurance policies or other methods, are not enough to cover 
the entire liability, it is the state’s responsibility to make up the remainder of the amount 
through state funds. Though the method of covering the rest of the amount with public 
funds is not desired, sometimes it becomes a necessity. According to Norbert Pelzer 
(2007), the use of public money to cover liabilities is not an appropriate choice. It is not 
appropriate because if it is granted without any condition for repayment even if one takes 
into account that the installation state (by licensing the installation), assumes 
responsibility for protected operation and preventing nuclear incidents, state coverage 
becomes detrimental to the economy of the market and may not comply with the ‘polluter 
pays principle’. These notwithstanding, States use this option when private coverage does 
not work.607 The researcher also observes that, notwithstanding the above argument, it is 
possible that State coverage can be afforded by the UAE. This is because the country is 
economically buoyant enough to handle it possibly in such a way that would not affect 
the economy negatively. One clear reason for this is to ensure that the nuclear programme 
is operational and meeting required standards. 
 
                                         
605 Norbert Pelzer, (2007). International Pooling of Operators’ Funds: An Option to Increase the Amount 
of Financial Security to Cover Nuclear Liability? Discussion Paper for the IAEA INLEX Group Meeting 
on 21-22 June 2007. 2007 Nuclear Law Bulletin No. 79, p. 38.   
606Stoiber, C, Baer, A, Pelzer, N, Tonhauser, W, P op.cit. 
607Ibid. p. 39. 
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In addition to the appropriation of liability when a nuclear accident happens, it is 
important to determine the jurisdiction of courts to decide on the claims arising from such 
accidents. Importantly, the international instruments have definite rules in deciding on 
which courts have jurisdiction over claims from nuclear accidents. The routing of claims 
to a single court that has jurisdiction, according to the international rules and regulations, 
will help in making the legal aspects clear and certain. This will also prevent the claimants 
from misusing the option of choosing the forum according to their interests608. The courts 
of the coastal states members are burdened with jurisdiction over nuclear accidents or 
activities that happen within the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Such principle does 
not consider the fact that victims of the nuclear accident reside in a different country609.   
 
After a claim is settled by a court that has jurisdiction over the issue according to the 
international instrument, the next stage would be implementation of the judgements. 
According to all the international instruments, the ratifying countries are duty bound to 
enforce the judgement of the court of a contracting state and to eliminate any instances of 
reviewing such judgements within another contracting state. The researcher observes 
lacking is an appeal system associated with judgements, which makes it difficult for 
injured parties to bring actions and enforce any judgements. The researcher therefore 
opines that UAE should consider a system whereby all parties involved in claim cases are 
accorded due treatment based on fair hearing. 
 
No intolerance can be made based on caste, creed, religion or nationality while deciding 
or enforcing claims arising from nuclear accidents. This is to protect the interests of the 
casualties of nuclear accidents in the state in which the incident(s) took place, as well as 
those from other countries.610 
 
The international legal principles concerning nuclear accident claims are detailed above. 
The need to adhere to these principles arises because of various factors. The UAE aims 
to maintain appropriate standards in pursuing its nuclear power programme. The next 
                                         
608Stober et al, op. cit., Ulrich Magnus (1999). Intercontinental Nuclear Transport from the Private 
International Law Perspective, in Reform of Civil Nuclear Liability: Budapest Symposium, p. 282.  
609 A paper by the International Expert Group on Nuclear Liability (INLEX), Civil Liability for Nuclear 
Damage: Advantages and Disadvantages of Joining the International Nuclear Liability Regime, p.5.   
610 Stoiber et al, op.cit. 
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section therefore, scrutinises the way the UAE imbibes these principles in their legal 
system.  
 
5.3 The organisational and legal structures of the UAE nuclear programme 
 
The UAE, in a bid to increase power generation through nuclear energy has taken two 
main steps which include: the enactment of a Policy on the Evaluation and Potential 
Development of Peaceful Nuclear Energy and the Federal Law by Decree No. 6 of 
2009611. The Federal Law of 2009 Concerning the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy is 
termed as the UAE Nuclear Law (see Appendix 6). According to the UAE Nuclear Law, 
the country’s objective is to comply with the international instruments that have been 
ratified by the country in relation to nuclear power. 
 
According to the Policy on the Evaluation and Potential Development of Peaceful Nuclear 
Energy, it is clearly indicated that the domestic system which deals with nuclear energy 
related claims is inadequate to meet the global impact of nuclear incidents and therefore, 
it is necessary to comply with the provisions of the international instruments that relate 
to damages to be paid for nuclear incidents. It also stipulates that the independent system 
of nuclear responsibility would lead to the formation of a system that relates to third-party 
damages in line with the IAEA guidelines612. 
 
Regarding the provisions of the Nuclear Law of 2009, the Federal Authority for Nuclear 
Regulation (FANR) was formed to control nuclear activity in the country. FANR is 
bestowed with the power to control and standardise the conduct of nuclear reactors. 
 
As stated above, the Policy on Nuclear Energy aims to comply with the provisions of 
international instruments, while running nuclear power projects. In order to achieve this 
objective, the UAE has ratified the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear 
                                         
611The Policy of the United Arab Emirates on the Evaluation and Potential Development of Peaceful 
Nuclear Energy, http://www.fanr.gov.ae/En/Documents/whitepaper.pdf last accessed on 15-07-2013 and  
Federal Law by Decree No 6 of 2009 Concerning the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, UAE Official 
Gazette, Ministry of Justice, Issue No. 498, September 2009, p.11. Also at: 
http://www.fanr.gov.ae/SiteAssets/PDF/20101024_nuclear-law-scan-eng.pdf. Last accessed on 15-7-2013. 
612 The Policy of the United Arab Emirates on the Evaluation and Potential Development of Peaceful 
Nuclear Energy, op.cit. 
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Damage613 and the 1988 Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna 
Convention and the Paris Convention614. After the ratification of the Vienna Convention 
in the year 2012, the UAE enacted the Federal Law Decree No. 4 of 2012, enumerating 
the rules and regulations regarding the responsibility for harm caused by nuclear 
accidents615. The country has incorporated the legal principles in the Vienna Convention 
to the domestic legislation, to prepare for the nuclear energy programme. It has also taken 
most of the basic legal principles of liability that are enshrined in the Vienna Convention. 
 
The Nuclear Liability Law of the UAE has adopted the principle of routing the entire 
liability of a nuclear damage to the operator of the nuclear power plant. The principle of 
strict liability is also enshrined in the domestic legislation of the UAE. There is strict 
provision to have the operator’s liability wholly covered by insurance policies to a 
maximum limit of 450 million SDRs.616 In circumstances whereby the companies that 
provide indemnity benefit to the operator are unable to cover the whole amount; the 
government undertakes to pay the excess amount to the victims. The national legislation 
of the UAE also provides for a limitation period of 30 years (for any damage caused to 
either human health or life) and 10 years (for other losses). It also provides for damages 
payable. The state additionally complies with the international instruments in ensuring 
equal treatment of all claimants without any bias based on colour, nationality, place of 
birth or residence.  
 
According to the UAE Nuclear Liability Law, it aims at controlling and fixing the extent 
of civil responsibility and damages for harm caused by nuclear accident and the radiation 
occurring thereby. The law also necessitates the operator to be economically supported 
through all possible methods to tackle the financial need that may arise from a nuclear 
accident. The lacunae in the said legislation are to be fulfilled by the provisions in the 
Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, 1997.617 
 
                                         
613 Reproduced in IAEA document INFCIRC/566   
614 Reproduced in IAEA document INFCIRC/402   
615 Federal Law by Decree No. 4 of 2012 Concerning Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, Addendum to 
the UAE Official Gazette, Ministry of Justice, Issue No. 45, August 2012, p. 9. Also at:  
http://www.fanr.gov.ae/En/AboutFANR/OurWork/Documents/Federal-Law-by-Decree-No-4-of-2012-
Concerning-Civil-Liability-for-Nuclear-Damage-English.pdf Last accessed on 15-7-2013. 
616 The Principle of Strict Liability. 
617 The UAE Nuclear Liability Law. 
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The regulatory authority established under the legislation has the power to exempt nuclear 
projects or materials from the purview of the said Act.618To make such exemptions, 
however, there are certain conditions to be fulfilled: it is mandatory the nuclear project 
intended for exemption by the authority established under the UAE legislation needs to 
satisfy the conditions laid down by the IAEA. Once and only if such conditions are 
fulfilled, are they accepted by the FANR and exemption of the nuclear project is valid.619 
To exclude tiny amounts of nuclear reactive material from the coverage of the legislations 
in the UAE, such a quantity should not exceed the upper limits specified by the IAEA’s 
Board of Governors. A decision of the FANR to exempt such measures of the nuclear 
active material within such upper limit, should then follow. 
 
The Vienna Convention gives a choice to the contracting nation to exclude itself from 
harm, resulting in a nation that has not complied with the Convention by Article I A (2) 
and (3) of the Convention. Nevertheless, the UAE has not opted to exempt itself from the 
liability of damages caused in a non-ratifying country. So, the operator in the UAE will 
be made liable for damage that happens in any part of the world, if that arises due to 
radiation emitting from the plant for which he is responsible.  
 
According to the arguments put forth, if the damages suffered in non-ratifying countries 
are also to be compensated, the upper limit on the liability of the operator would affect 
the interests of the injured parties. When the extent of liability increases, the distribution 
of the compensation to a larger number of victims would reduce each victim’s 
compensation amount, without anything in return620. Since the UAE has ratified the Joint 
Protocol of 1988, the scope of paying compensation has been expanded to victims in 
countries that have also ratified the Joint Protocol. According to the Article 12 (1) of the 
UAE Law No 4 of 2012, Federal Courts in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi shall have exclusive 
jurisdiction over actions arising pursuant to this Law by Decree. The courts are the 
competent courts of jurisdiction for such cases. 
 
 
                                         
618 Article 3 of the UAE Nuclear Liability Law. 
619 See: The UAE Nuclear Liability Law. 
620 Explanatory Texts: The 1997 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and the 1997 
Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage. p. 29.   
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5.4 Definition of and conditions for nuclear damage 
 
A ‘nuclear incident’ can be described under the 1997 Protocol (see Appendix 10) as 
“some incidences or sequence of incidences holding the similar source which initiates 
nuclear loss or produces a severe and looming risk of producing such loss.”621 The last 
turn of phrase was added to the 1963 Convention. So far, there is no explanation of ‘severe 
and major loss’ as could be seen in Level 7 on the INES (see Chapter 4), but it is obvious 
that it must be a severe as well as major risk of causing ‘nuclear damage’. Being a major 
cause would not be sufficient. Moreover, it is also not mentioned who will determine 
whether a risk is ‘severe and major’. A serious and severe threat as labelled by coastal 
state(s), may not be perceived as such by others, which have an opposite view; however, 
the ‘grave’ may be defined under the lexfori, although suitable steps were taken. 
 
Nevertheless, precautionary steps are an area under discussion by those capable 
establishments where the steps were determined,622which might be held responsible for 
the rise of a debate that rules and guidelines that government should choose what 
precautionary steps represent a severe and major threat. Nonetheless, this is counteracted 
by the description of ‘reasonable measures’, which are to be understood per se by the ‘law 
of competent court’,623 that clearly means that rules of the court having authority under 
the Convention, involving any principles of such law and relevant to disagreement of 
regulations. 
 
The 1997 Protocol could have focused on and deliberated about this but did not: 
precautionary measures can be explained as the suitable steps adopted right after a nuclear 
occurrence, dependent on the approval of capable and knowledgeable establishments by 
the regulations of the State where the steps were determined.624 Suitable steps can be 
                                         
621 Article 2 3(1) of Revised Vienna Convention. The IAEA 1997 Protocol to Amend the Vienna 
Convention on Civil Liability. 
622 Article 2 4(n) of Revised Vienna Convention. The IAEA 1997 Protocol to Amend the Vienna 
Convention on Civil Liability. 
623 Article 2 4(o) of Revised Vienna Convention. The IAEA 1997 Protocol to Amend the Vienna 
Convention on Civil Liability. 
624Article 2 4(n) of Revised Vienna Convention. The IAEA 1997 Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention 
on Civil Liability. 
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explained as the steps which are found under the law of the capable court, to be suitable 
and balanced, having concern with all the conditions.625 
 
Hence, the reviewed Convention is in the investigative state where ‘nuclear occurrence’ 
is to involve incidents which generate a risk of creating nuclear loss, regarding 
precautionary steps, but where remedial steps are described as steps taken ‘after a nuclear 
incident has happened’. If we consider good judgement and practical understanding, it 
may look like a ‘nuclear mishap involves a sequence of incidents which create a severe 
and significant threat that precautionary steps are intended to prevent; this gives the 
impression of being a potential ‘catch-22’ where a government facing risk of a nuclear 
incident, in a case where the only nuclear loss is endangered, will have to make a decision 
without any doubt of reimbursements. 
 
Similarly, a dispute can be initiated on the issue of whether a risk is severe and major. 
Whether a drifting radioactive cloud goes with a flow in a certain direction or for an 
indeterminate distance could intensify heated discussion as to whether an occurrence is 
expected to give rise to radioactive discharge at all. Whether a radioactive transference 
which is confronting problems like a crash, fire or terrorist activity comprises a severe 
and significant threat is where further dispute(s) can arise. A worker may debate that a 
risk was not significant, and if in case it was, that it was not severe by way of threatening 
enormous destruction. 
 
The 1963 phrasing was used by the Paris 2004 Protocol,626while the Paris Convention 
succeeds it by introducing enhancements on the condition that such incidents or series of 
incidents, or any other loss caused, is a consequence of radioactive characteristics, or an 
amalgamation of characteristics of radioactivity with poisonous, explosive or other 
dangerous characteristics of nuclear fuel or radioactive items or waste or with any of 
them, or from the ionised form of radiations discharged by any source of radiation within 
a nuclear connection.627 
 
                                         
625 Article 2 4(o) of Revised Vienna Convention. The IAEA 1997 Protocol to Amend the Vienna 
Convention on Civil Liability. 
626 The Paris 2004 Protocol. 
627 The Paris Convention. 
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The reviewed Vienna Convention is, therefore, the most progressive when it comes to the 
description. Regarding the warnings in mind, the definition of nuclear loss is explained 
as follows: 
 
I agreement with the 1963 Vienna Convention, the UAE Nuclear Law has specified 
certain conditions for compensating damages. As analysed above, the operator of the 
nuclear project is responsible exclusively for the damages caused by nuclear accidents. 
The liability of the operator is strict liability, which dispenses with the burden of proof of 
the victim to show recklessness on the part of the operator in causing such accident or 
damage.628 
 
Therefore, nuclear damage according to the UAE Nuclear Law, deriving from the Article 
2 (2) of the IAEA 1997 Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability and 
as existing international instrument, is defined as: 
“(i) Loss of life or any personal injury;  
(ii) Loss of or damage to property;  
(iii) Economic loss arising from loss or damage not referred to in paragraphs (1) or 
(2) above, incurred by a person entitled to claim for compensation in respect of such 
loss or damage;  
(iv) The costs of measures of reinstatement of impaired environment, unless such 
impairment is insignificant, if such measures are taken or to be taken, and insofar 
as not included in paragraph (2) above;  
(v) Loss of income deriving from an economic interest in use or enjoyment of the 
environment, incurred because of a significant impairment of that environment, and 
insofar as not included in paragraph (2) above;  
(vi) The costs of preventive measures, and further loss or damage caused by such 
measures;  
(vii) Any other economic loss, other than loss caused by the impairment of the 
environment, to the extent that the loss or damages referred to in paragraphs 1-5 
and 7 above have emerged from or resulted from ionizing radiation emitted from 
any radiation source within a Nuclear Installation, or emitted from Nuclear Fuel, 
Radioactive Products or Waste in a Nuclear Installation, or of Nuclear Material 
                                         
628 The UAE Nuclear Law. 
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coming from, originating in or sent to a Nuclear Installation, whether arising from 
the radioactive properties of such material or from a combination of radioactive 
properties with, toxic, explosive or other hazardous properties of such material. The 
Cabinet may issue instructions related to the implementation of the provisions of 
paragraphs 1-7.”629 
 
The court that has jurisdiction to decide on the damages to be paid has no prudence or 
discretion to decide on the payment of certain types of compensation that are enumerated 
above. The definition of nuclear damage also includes other financial damage not 
including the loss of environmental standards. It also excluded the power of the law of 
the court to decide on such injuries. The relevant ministry of the UAE was given power 
to decide on the types of compensation available. The influence of politics is undeniably 
present in such a system of deciding on the types of compensation that would be available 
to the victims of a nuclear accident, rather than giving such power to the courts to decide 
on the kind of damages to be paid. It is often argued by observers that although the power 
to give instructions are left open to the ministry of cabinet in the UAE, these instructions 
do not bind them and there is no obligation for the deciding court to go by such 
instructions.  
 
The mandatory provision to cover the liability of the operator by insurance policies or 
other financial instruments exists in the UAE.630 The maximum limit of the operator has 
been fixed as 450 million SDRs. It is mandatory for the operator to have insurance 
policies to an extent of 450 million SDRs or up to five million SDRs if there are research 
reactors, reactors that run on less power and convenience for storage of radioactive 
material. But whereby the whole liabilities are not covered through insurance, the UEA 
Nuclear Law provides that public money could be used to make up for the rest of the 
amount.631 
 
According to paragraph 5 of Article 8 of the UAE Nuclear Liability, if the operator fails 
to obtain insurance policies for the required amount of liability, the government can 
immediately provide coverage for the amount for which the insurance coverage is 
                                         
629 Article (1) of the Federal Law by Decree No. 4 of 2012 Concerning Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage   
630 Ibid.  Federal Law by Decree No. 4 of 2012 Concerning Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage.   
631Ibid. Federal Law by Decree No. 4 of 2012 Concerning Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage.   
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required. The government could also give an alternative method of granting time to 
procure insurance coverage for the said amount while covering the liability through 
government funds directly632. This is a good thing. The Vienna Convention stipulates that 
if the operator fails to get insurance coverage in part or in full for the amount of liability, 
the government must provide the public funds to cover such liabilities. The UAE Nuclear 
Law however, offers the power to decide whether public funds should be used to cover 
the liabilities of the operator as opposed to the provisions in the Vienna Convention633.  
 
The UAE Nuclear Law provides that the operator could turn to another person to satisfy 
the liability of the operator in some circumstances which would otherwise have to be 
borne by the operator himself. Article 11 of the UAE Nuclear Liability Law stipulates 
that if the contract has an express condition that the operator has the right of recourse or 
the accident was purposefully caused by another person.634 In the second circumstance, 
the operator could sue such a person deemed responsible for the accident. 
 
The UAE’s ratification to the 1988 Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the 
Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention has made it possible to extend the scope of 
damages payable by the operator and has helped in reducing the chances of disputes 
regarding the application of a convention, since it provides that only one convention 
would be applied to a nuclear incident635.  
 
The provisions of the Joint Protocol become helpful in cases of nuclear accidents that 
occur during the movement of nuclear active materials from one country to another636. 
According to the Vienna Convention, when nuclear material is moved from one place to 
another, the operator who transmits the material will be responsible until the other 
                                         
632 Article 8 (5) of the Federal Law by Decree No. 4 of 2012 Concerning Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, 
p. 6 and Johan G. Lammers, International Responsibility and Liability for Damage Caused by 
Environmental Interferences, ENVTL. POL’Y & LAW (2001), at 99 available at: http://iospress.meta 
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633 Explanatory Texts, op.cit., p. 44 and Jason Zorn, Note: Compensation in the Event of a Terrorist Attack 
on a Nuclear Power Plant: Will Victims Be Adequately Protected? 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1087, 1128 n. 
310 (2003) and 2002 Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development. World 
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634 Article 11 of the UAE Nuclear Liability Law 
635 Julia A. Schwartz op.cit.  
636 Explanatory Texts, op.cit. 
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operator takes on the responsibility of the material637. When a radioactive material is 
transmitted to a country which has not acceded to the Conventions, the sender will be 
responsible until the radioactive material is taken out of the transporting vehicle. If the 
sender is from a non-ratifying country, then the receiving operator will be responsible 
from the time the material is shipped from the non- ratifying state to the ratifying state638.  
 
In case of a nuclear accident during the relocation of the radioactive material from one 
country to another, the operator in the UAE will be liable for the harm caused by such 
incident in a state that has not accepted the Vienna Convention or the Joint Protocol. 
Therefore, the accession to the Joint Protocol has extended the scope of the application 
of the international Convention.  
 
An important aspect of acceptance of the Vienna Convention and the Joint Protocol is 
that physically, the UAE is located far away from the other countries which have acceded 
to the Convention and the Protocol.  Therefore, the application of the Vienna Convention 
in relation to such countries may be remote. On the other hand, the UAE’s accession to 
the Vienna Convention and its acceptance of the Convention and the Joint Protocol has 
effectively demonstrated its interest in joining the other international participants in 
helping to assist each other in building a strong nuclear culture. 
 
The operator is responsible for the damages caused by a nuclear accident.639 A person or 
company that provides economic backing to the operator can also be made the opposite 
party for a claim for damages due to nuclear accident. The UAE Nuclear law also 
incorporates the mandates of the Vienna Convention in Article 10 and includes the 
stipulation that a claim for nuclear damage should be raised within three decades if it 
concerns damage to life or body and within a decade if it relates to harm of any other 
kind. According to Article 10 of the UAE Nuclear Law, if the claim exists after the 
                                         
637Ibid. Explanatory Texts, op., cit. 
638Stoiber et al, (1992). op.cit and H.J. Ewers and K. Rennings, Economics of Nuclear Risk - a German 
Study, in Social Cost of Energy, Present Status and Future Trends, 150, 157 (O. Homeyer and R. Ottinger 
eds., Springer-Verlag, 1992).   
639 Article 10 of the United Arab Emirates Nuclear Liability Law. 
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limitation period and if the financial security of the operator becomes invalid the claim 
cannot be made.640 
 
The jurisdiction of courts is another issue when it comes to the decision on claims of 
damages arising from nuclear accidents. Wherever the law is silent the provisions of the 
Vienna Convention apply.641 The court of the country wherein the nuclear project runs is 
deemed competent to decide on claims of damages if such accident occurs within a 
ratifying state.642 But if the accident occurs outside a ratifying State, the jurisdiction of 
the court is determined according to the nationality of the operator. For damages that 
occur from nuclear incidents within the EEZ of a ratifying state, the courts of such 
contracting state will have the jurisdiction over the claims for damages. The UAE Nuclear 
Law provides that the courts in Abu Dhabi are the only courts having power to deal with 
the claims that arise from the provisions of the UAE Nuclear Liability Law. 
 
The implementation of the provisions of the UAE Nuclear Law is on FANR. FANR 
formulates the guidelines for the execution of the country’s Nuclear Liability Law. The 
provisions of the insurance scheme, employee benefits or other plans of damages will not 
be affected by the stipulations in the Nuclear Law.643 
 
The above analysis shows the importance given to the international assistance and 
international instruments by the UAE`s authorities. Accordingly, “the establishment of 
such a robust nuclear liability regime is another step forward in the UAE Government’s 
responsible approach towards developing a solid regulatory framework for the peaceful 
nuclear energy programme.”644 
 
                                         
640 Article 10 (2) of the Federal Law by Decree No. 4 of 2012 Concerning Civil Liability for Nuclear 
Damage, pp.7 and Greenpeace International, Review of Estimates of the Costs of Major Nuclear Accidents, 
prepared for the 9th Session of the Standing Committee on Nuclear Liability of the IAEA, Feb. 7-11, 1994.   
641 The UAE Nuclear Law. 
642 The Vienna Convention. 
643 The United Arab Emirates Nuclear Liability Law. 
644Khaleej Times, UAE Newspaper, “UAE issues Nuclear Liability Law, Explanation of the Law was made 
today by Hamad Al Kaabi, the UAE’s permanent representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) and Special Representative for International Nuclear Cooperation, during a press conference held 
at the Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation (FANR) headquarters in Abu Dhabi, 15 October 2012 and 
Ben McRae, The Compensation Convention: Path to a Global Regime for Dealing with Legal Liability and 
Compensation for Nuclear Damage, 61 NUCLEAR LAW BULLETIN 25, 33 (1998).   
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The country’s policy on nuclear peace projects makes the governmental authorities also 
responsible to an extent, for the liabilities of the operator. It increased the maximum limit 
of compensation from the limit specified in the Vienna Convention and gives a part of 
the responsibility to the government of the UAE.  
 
Unlike the Vienna Convention, the nuclear liability regime of the UAE makes the 
operator liable for harm caused by the nuclear incident arising from the nuclear power 
plant run by him/her, irrespective of the country in which such harm occurred. Thus, the 
extent to which the liability to which the country’s Nuclear Law applies has been widened 
by the domestic legislation.  
 
The UAE has shown its agreement with the international community by cooperating with 
other nations toward building a robust international standard for dealing with the damages 
caused by nuclear accidents. Although joining the Joint Protocol does not, in effect, make 
much difference to the responsibilities of the operator or government authorities, since 
other countries that have ratified to the Paris Convention are situated so far, 
geographically speaking, from the UAE. However, the ratification of the Joint Protocol 
illustrates the positive attitude the UAE government has towards the international 
assistance and mutual support.  
 
5.5 Benefits of peaceful exploitation of nuclear energy 
 
As stated previously, there has been continuous growth in the demand of energy due to 
increased globalisation and industrialisation. The increasing costs incurred in the 
traditional methods using coal and water for energy production has increased the need for 
voluminous and cheap production of energy through nuclear reaction645. Another 
important factor that increases the use of nuclear energy for power production is the 
change in energy policies among countries, to include all possible sources of power 
generation to reduce dependence on only one source of energy production. There are other 
important reasons that heighten the need for a change in the method of electricity 
production, including the ill effect the old-fashioned methods of electricity production 
                                         
645 World Energy Outlook 2006, 2007, and 2008 and Global Conference on the Sustainable Development 
of Small Island Developing States, Bridgetown, Barbados, April 25 - May 6, 1994; Programme of Action 
for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States, U.N. Doc A/CONF.167/9 (Oct. 1994).   
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have on the environment and climate. This also encouraged the government authorities to 
consider nuclear power generation. 
 
There is possibility of nuclear energy being used for aggressive and violent methods of 
warfare. The production of power through nuclear energy goes through two stages of 
collecting nuclear active materials and the augmentation of technology and skills that can 
be used for destructive purposes646. 
 
Nuclear energy, if used for peaceful purposes can reduce its effects on the environment 
and can offer a remedy for the increasing demand of energy. This can also replace other 
fuels that are depleting rapidly and take millions of years for generation. Nuclear active 
products can be re-treated and used multiple times and the amount of fuel required to 
produce energy is a lot less when compared to the old methods of power production. The 
UAE is looking at retreatment and reprocessing of nuclear fuels. 
 
5.6 Challenges of Peaceful Nuclear Activities 
 
As previously discussed, there are various challenges to the peaceful use of nuclear 
activities. The most important is the fear that nuclear active materials which are capable 
of being deployed for destructive purposes may be misused by countries using nuclear 
power projects. The treatment of uranium products to be reused as fuel is one of how such 
countries can have unaccounted nuclear active material that can be used for destructive 
purposes. Countries like Pakistan, Malaysia and the UAE have not ratified the Nuclear 
NPT (see Appendix 13) which could lead to the misuse of nuclear active materials, since 
these countries are not duty bound to have a system restricting the export of such 
materials647. The failure of countries to formulate effective policies and regulations to 
keep surveillance on the export of nuclear active materials has affected the steps taken 
internationally for effective control of proliferation of nuclear energy. The author opines 
                                         
646 ‘Addressing verification challenges’, Proceedings of the International Safeguards Symposium on 
addressing verification challenges; IAEA and Institute of Nuclear Materials Management and European 
Safeguards Research and Development Association; Vienna, 16-20 Oct. 2006. [Online]: available at: www-
pub.iaea.org/mtcd/publications/pdf/pl298/pl298_book.pdf. Last accessed on 15-7-2013. 
647 G. Milholin and K. Motz, “Nukes ‘R’ Us”, The New York Times, March 4, 2004, p. A31; D. Albright 
and C. Hinderstein, “Uncovering the Nuclear Black Market: Working Toward Closing Gaps in the 
International Proliferation Regime”, Institute for Science and International Security, July 2, 2004; F. 
Stockman, “U.S. Prods U.N. for a Nuclear Export Rule Measure Sought to Halt the Spread of Weapons 
Data”, The Boston Globe, April 4, 2004, p. A4 
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that it should be made compulsory that countries considering nuclear power should ratify 
the NPT. It should be a major requirement and should be enforced accordingly. 
 
The invention of energy production from nuclear active materials has led to a revolution 
in the field of energy generation. The international community is aware of the extent of 
the harm that nuclear accidents can cause. The Chernobyl accident was the first of its kind 
that affected millions of people across the world. The effects of nuclear incidents have 
been felt through the generations. Hence, the need for an organised structure to combat 
nuclear accidents and responsibilities became necessary. The effect of nuclear accidents 
transcends geographical boundaries of nations.  This makes radioactive accidents an 
international concern.  
 
During the latter half of the twentieth century, the need for international assistance was 
agreed upon by sovereign states. This brought about the formation of international 
conventions and treaties that provided a basic structure of liability of the operators and 
the nation states. The fact that the victims of a nuclear accident will be spread across 
different countries would mean that their claims may have to be implemented in different 
nations and if there is no uniformity in the method of fixing the liability and the 
implementation of the judgements, it would make it difficult for already harmed 
persons648.  
 
As analysed in the earlier part of this chapter, there are various international instruments 
established by the international community. These include: the Vienna Convention, the 
Paris Convention, the Brussels Convention, the CSC, the Joint Protocol, the Brussels 
Convention and the Protocol to the Paris Convention. While much has been done to enact 
various international instruments, out of all the nuclear power structures around the world 
only fifty percent is situated within countries that have ratified these international 
instruments649. This means that not more than fifty percent of the existing nuclear power 
                                         
648 Explanatory Texts, op.cit. 
649 A paper by the International Expert Group on Nuclear Liability (INLEX), - Civil Liability for Nuclear 
Damage: Advantages and Disadvantages of Joining the International Nuclear Liability Regime, pp.1  and 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 2004/35/EC, on environmental liability with 
regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage, art. 4, 2004 O. J. (L 143/56), available 
at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2004/l_143/l_14320040430en 00560075.pdf Last accessed on 
15-7-2013. 
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projects are covered by the international instruments now in force650. The UAE is well 
placed to meet the requirements for embarking on its nuclear power programme. 
 
5.7 Summary of Chapter Five 
 
The most important aspect of the international law on nuclear liability is that the 
compensation available for the injured in a nuclear incident has been limited to an amount 
as mentioned in various international instruments. Even though there has been an increase 
in the limit by recent Conventions, states that have not harnessed nuclear energy for power 
production but are vulnerable to the effects of nuclear incidents may not accept such upper 
limits of compensation available to the injured.  
 
The applicability of the law of the operators` country and the power given to such states 
to determine the maximum limit of damages that needs to be paid by the operator have 
become a concern for non-nuclear states. It is also required to have a supplementary 
financial backing for nuclear accidents, lest the operator who is the sole liable person 
refuses to pay the victims the compensation for such injury when a nuclear accident 
occurs, the supplementary financial fund can be used to compensate the injured for the 
injury caused. According to the Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage 
in Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea, if the 
injured is not satisfactory compensated for the injury suffered, the Convention provides 
for an additional financial set up that can be used to fully compensate the injured651. 
 
On the overall analysis of the provisions in the existing international Conventions, it can 
be deduced that provisions are made to cater for the needs of nuclear investors and are 
less bothered about the wellbeing of the injured in nuclear accidents. Since there is an 
increase in harnessing nuclear energy, there should be effective provisions to also 
safeguard the interests of the injured. The provisions in the Conventions were intended to 
                                         
650 Simon Carroll, ‘Perspective on the pros and Cons of a Pooling-type Approach to Nuclear Third Party 
Liability’, 2008 Nuclear Law Bulletin No 81, pp.82; Testimony by Anna Aurilio of the U.S. Public Interest 
Group to the Committee on Energy and Commerce. Available at: http://energycommerce.house. 
gov/107/hearings/06272001Hearing305/Aurilio492print.htm Last accessed on 15-7-2013; Renewable 
Energy Policy Project, July 2000, “Federal Energy Subsidies: Not all technologies are created equal,” 
available at http://www.crest.org/repp_pubs/pdf/subsidies.pdf Last accessed on 15-7-2013.   
651 The Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of 
Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea, art. 38, 3(b), May 3, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1406 (1996).   
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increase investment in nuclear projects. Since there has been drastic increase in such 
investments and the number of nuclear projects and, although the countries would be 
economically affected by such investments, there is need to cater for the injured since the 
nuclear accidents can be extremely disastrous.  
 
The researcher therefore suggests that as the UAE is embarking on its peaceful nuclear 
programme, it should consider the wellbeing of the public whether they become victims 
of any possible incidents or not. The protection of the populace should be considered 
paramount in the overall aspects of the programme. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF RESEARCH RESULTS 
 
6.1 Introduction to Chapter Six 
 
Chapter Six marks the commencement of the PhD elements of the research. It is the data 
analysis and discussion part of the study. Here, the primary data collected during 
interviews with experts in the field of nuclear energy is analysed and discussed. In doing 
so, some local and international legal instruments, case laws and best practices are 
explored and utilised for balanced arguments. This is to further explore and address 
different views on issues of concerns related to nuclear power development in the UAE. 
 
To achieve this, various views of persons working in and closely associated with the 
nuclear energy programme in the UAE, as well as those involved in nuclear energy 
generation programmes in other countries are critically discussed. In order to attain a 
comprehensive discussion on the area of research, this chapter considers how the law is 
used to address various concerns raised on the course of interviews with experts in the 
field of nuclear energy development as in the case of the UAE. This chapter builds upon 
the knowledge and information of nuclear developments within UAE and is particularly 
helpful in light of the lack of published research in the field. Thus, it serves to provide 
primary information on the developments in the UAE. 
 
As discussed in Chapter One, very important officers who have vast experience and are 
directly involved in the development of the UAE’s nuclear programme were interviewed.  
In all, ten officials were interviewed. Three of them responded to legal and liability 
questions, three responded to political questions, two for the economic and two for the 
safety, security and environmental questions.  
 
Officials A, B and C work with FANR and have experience in legal issues regarding 
nuclear power programme. Officials D, E and F are coordinators between departments of 
government (FANR and ENEC) and have experience in international relations. Officials 
G and H work with economic department and have links with FANR and ENEC. Finally, 
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officials I and J work with FANR and ENEC respectively, and both of them work in the 
safety and security departments. 
 
The researcher is an employee of the Dubai Police employed in the Central Investigation 
Department (CID) related to the safety and security of Dubai, UAE. Also, the researcher 
is a member of the Committee dealing with the nuclear power programme of the UAE. 
Thus, reflexivity is part of the research process here, since the researcher has some pre-
conceived notions about the imminent dangers involved in industrial catastrophe - 
safeguarding the safety and security aspect of lives and properties being central to his 
duties. Nuclear disaster is one such occurrence but the fallout is more tragic and long 
lasting.  
 
Reflexivity has to do with the researcher’s ‘positionality’. This is self-imposed position 
of incorporating continual self-reflection - when undertaking qualitative methods of 
research particularly, in which interactive data collection, such as interviews, takes 
place.652 Knowledge gets produced both by the interviewer and the respondents.653 The 
ideas about the research, the research aims and further research questions take shape 
through reflections upon the incidents and experiences.654 Living in the era of 
globalisation, the researcher is aware of nuclear accidents and/or incidents across the 
globe over the past few years. The reflections of such occurrences have prompted the 
researcher to consider the extent and types of liabilities the state should bear.  
 
The research is not yet a part of, nor in any other way associated with any of these 
organisations or departments, like the FANR, ENEC and economic department. Hence, 
he has no knowledge regarding the actual legal, political and safety and security issues 
related to a nuclear project.  So, he is an ‘outsider’ among the respondents. But he is aware 
that the requirements of stringent safety measures need to be implemented both in the 
nuclear plants and in their vicinities.  
 
                                         
652 Bourke, Brian (2014). ‘Positionality: Reflecting on the Research Process’, The Qualitative Report No. 
19, pp 1-9. 
653Lives and Legacies: A Guide to Qualitative Interviewing by Ping-Chun Hsiung is licensed under 
a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported License, August 2010.   
Available at http://www.utsc.utoronto.ca/~pchsiung/LAL/reflexivity  last accessed:  May, 2016. 
654 See Bourke, Brian (2014). 
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The safety and security requirements are complemented by the liabilities and 
compensations procedures in case of nuclear accidents occurrence. Thus, the researcher 
is both an outsider as well as an insider in this regard. 
 
6.2 Basis for thematic analysis and discussion of research results 
 
Thematic analysis is the simplest and most basic form of qualitative analysis with 
flexibility.655 The researcher can read into the data, assess and discover patterns in the 
information gathered.656 
 
The questions presented to the participants comprised of four categories. These include 
the legal and liability; political; economic as well as safety, security; and environmental 
categories. The idea behind this selection was to generate a wider and more robust 
informed decision on the area of interest. It is important at this point to know that the 
research questions, as well as the analysis and discussions of issues expressed are drawn 
from and cover the 19 milestones for nuclear power infrastructure development (2007) as 
outlined by the IAEA657 The answers presented by the participants are analysed in the 
next section below.  
  
  
                                         
655 Braun, V. and Clarke, V. ‘Using thematic analysis in psychology. Qualitative Research in Psychology, 
2006, 3 (2). pp. 77-101. ISSN 1478-0887 Available from: http://eprints.uwe.ac.uk/11735Last accessed 01 
May 2016. 
656Foundations of Qualitative Research in Education, Thematic Analysis available at 
http://isites.harvard.edu/icb/icb.do?keyword=qualitative&tabgroupid=icb.tabgroup117226 Last accessed 9 
May 2016. 
657 These milestones include: National Position, Management, Legislative Framework, Regulatory 
Framework, Stakeholder Involvement, Site and Supporting Facilities, Environmental Protection, Nuclear 
Fuel Cycle, Industrial Involvement and Procurement.  Others are Nuclear Safety, Safeguards, Radiation 
Protection, Electrical Grid, Human Resources Development, Emergency Planning, Security and Physical 
Protection, Radioactive Waste, Funding and Financing, Role of Government, Leadership / Commitment, 
Legal Framework and Rule of Law and Institution Building.657 The 19 milestones are further classified into 
four basic Categories. These are:  
i. Milestones that are common to all (even fuel)  
ii. Those that area more specific to nuclear (even grid)  
iii. All impact financing as opposed to funding  
iv. Those that indicate that government role is pervasive throughout all the milestones, but 
there is a unique impact on financing. 
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6.3 Legal and liability issues 
 
This section focuses on the legal and liability issues of the UAE nuclear energy 
programme, with specific interest in the aspects of who has legal responsibility and bears 
potential liability for any nuclear incidents that may arise from the programme.                                              
Questions on legal and liability issues were presented to lawyers engaged in nuclear and 
environmental law practices. Also, officials from FANR and ENEC were targeted for this 
category of questions. The discussions of the feedbacks on these issues are given below: 
 
a. Does the UAE have any specific domestic laws regarding nuclear liabilities?  
 
From responses, it was gathered that the UAE has enacted two national laws to deal with 
its nuclear energy activities.658 These include the Federal Law by Decree No. 6 of 2009 
(see Appendix 6) and the Federal Law Decree No. 4 of 2012 (see Appendix 5). These 
laws enumerate the rules and regulations regarding the responsibility for harm caused by 
nuclear accidents. The UAE Law Decree No. 4 of 2012 is more comprehensive and has 
tried to incorporate several aspects vis-à-vis nuclear liabilities. In addition, the country 
has enacted Policy on the Evaluation and Potential Development of Peaceful Nuclear 
Energy. 
 
b. How can an actual claim be brought in the UAE? 
 
The actual claim can be brought in the UAE, by following the same procedure as in the 
Vienna Convention (see Appendix 8), although the latest modifications to the Vienna and 
Paris Conventions are seriously ducked through exclusions and the modified Protocols 
(see Appendix 10) enjoy even more sparse participation than the original Conventions. 
For others such as the Supplementary Compensations (see Appendix 11), many major 
nuclear countries including UAE do not ratify them, because they are not enforced; those 
that are enforced are ratified.659 
 
  
                                         
658 Official A (FANR, 20-08-2013). 
659 Official B (FANR, 20-08-2013). 
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c. How long have the UAE nuclear energy laws been established? 
 
Data gathered indicated that the UAE nuclear regime has been in existence for over four 
years with the Federal Laws Decree No. 6 and Decree No. 4 commencing in 2009 and 
2012 respectively.660 
 
d. What are the current legal sources for provision of the UAE nuclear energy 
programme? 
 
According to the respondents, the current legal sources for the provision of the UAE 
nuclear energy programme include the international nuclear law, international treaties, 
Vienna Convention, Paris Convention and the UK Nuclear Law.661 
 
e. Are the UAE’s national laws regarding nuclear energy programme enacted in line 
or compliance with international legal instruments? 
 
Yes, it was gathered that the UAE nuclear laws were enacted in line or compliance with 
international legal instruments.662 
 
f. What are the legal bases for the development of these laws? 
 
The respondent(s) said that the legal basis for the development of UAE’s nuclear laws are 
the international nuclear laws, conventions and treaties.663The legal issues involved in a 
nuclear power project are within the scope of common laws regarding operations, safety, 
security and the environment. The basic laws and standards to do with nuclear power 
projects need to be resolutely followed. Besides, the19 milestones for nuclear power 
infrastructure development (2007) set out by IAEA have also been considered. 
 
  
                                         
660 Official B (FANR, 20-08-2013). 
661 Official C (FANR, 20-08-2013). 
662 Official C (FANR, 20-08-2013). 
663 Official A (FANR, 20-08-2013). 
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g. What is the specified role of the Emirates’ Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC)? 
 
The specified role of ENEC is to oversee the operation of the UAE nuclear programme 
in conjunction with selected companies e.g. KEPCO.664 
 
h. What legal principles does the ENEC follow (specifically about questions of 
potential liability)?  
 
The legal principles that ENEC follows are contained in the UAE nuclear laws decrees 
No. 6 of 2009 and No. 4 of 2012.665 
 
i. What does a construction licence entail (areas of provision)? 
 
A construction licence involves the building of the nuclear plants. The international 
instruments make it mandatory to obtain license for operating, designing as well as 
building a nuclear power plant.666 The security measures are compulsory and need to be 
adhered to.667 
 
The responsibilities and obligations set by international instruments revolve around the 
license holder. Article 9 of the Convention on Nuclear Safety states:  
 
“[each] Contracting Party shall ensure that prime responsibility for the safety of a 
nuclear installation rests with the holder of the relevant licence and shall take the 
appropriate steps to ensure that each such operator meets its responsibility.”668 
 
  
                                         
664 Official A (FANR, 20-08-2013). 
665 Official A (FANR, 20-08-2013). 
666 Official C (FANR, 20-08-2013). 
667Reece R, Garancher T and Cousin A, ‘Nuclear Projects in the 21st Century’, 2009 IBLJ 437. 
668Article 9 of the Convention on Nuclear Safety 
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A licence can be defined as:  
“Any authorisation granted by the regulatory body to the applicant to have the 
responsibility for the siting, design, construction, commissioning, and operation 
or decommissioning of a nuclear installation”.669 
 
Article 21 of The Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management also burdens 
the license holder with outlined responsibility670. In addition, the UAE Federal Law 
Decree No. 4 of 2012 Concerning Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage confers on the 
operator strict liability for nuclear damage upon proof that such damage has been caused 
by a nuclear incident as described in Article II of the 1997 Vienna Convention.671 
 
j. Do current regulations cover all aspects of liability? Is there scope for any 
improvement? 
 
It was gathered from respondents that current regulations cover several aspects of 
liability.672 Some argued that the current regulations do not cover all aspects of liability 
since current regulations are still new and are not yet tested.673  Therefore, if there is any 
damage beyond territorial boundaries, the country cannot be held responsible. In this 
situation, the Vienna Convention would cover the damage. This observation is to be 
examined in the latter part of this chapter.  
 
k. How will UAE or the environment at large cope with the risks exceeding the 
insurance market’s capacity? 
 
The Vienna Convention has determined a standard amount to be paid as compensation, 
along with the relevant rules. The time duration and amount of payment has been set to a 
standard value, because unlimited responsibility may lead to the operator’s ruination 
while holding the responsibility for a limited time and ceiling amount may affect the 
victims detrimentally, causing distress.674 
                                         
669Article 2 of the Convention on Nuclear Safety. 
670Article 21 of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management 
671 Article 3 of the UAE Federal Law Decree No. 4 of 2012 Concerning Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage. 
672 Official B (FANR, 20-08-2013). 
673 Officials A and C (FANR, 20-08-2013). 
674 Official C (FANR, 20-08-2013). 
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l. The 1997 Vienna Convention does clearly expand the geographical coverage of 
damage and leaves direct control with the Installation State; and while extending 
the definition of damage, it provides sufficient caution to the laws of the Installation 
State. How does this impact UAE? 
 
The Vienna Convention has directed to insure damages or loss ranging from that of life, 
health and property so far. However, in case of any damage other than the specified ones, 
compensation would be provided as per the orders of the court (usually Installation 
State).675 For example, in case of any damage(s) to tourism and fisheries that does not 
include any kind of loss or harm to human life or physical property, cover may not be 
provided by the operator. Moreover, in the case of ‘rumour damage’ i.e. the losses which 
do not hold any proof, but are still claimed by the victim, this is an issue which is not 
addressed by the Convention. The UAE government and concerned authorities must 
consider this matter. 
 
m. In the Gulf region, is there need for a neutral tribunal for settlement of claims? 
 
At the moment, Law 4 of 2012 and the Vienna Convention are the legislations that cover 
the issues pertaining to nuclear liability. The court in UAE shall be responsible for 
deciding on matters relating to nuclear liability, however it might be a cause for concern 
as UAE is surrounded by several other countries and any kind of damage that occurs in 
UAE could potentially have an impact upon several nations, thus a neutral tribunal might 
prove to be essential.676 
 
n. Many significant countries like UK and France are not signatories to the Joint 
Protocol and are not linked to Vienna Convention parties by treaty system. Are 
there any problems for the UAE or gulf region or Middle East if they do not 
ratify? 
 
                                         
675 Official B (FANR, 20-08-2013). 
676 Official A (FANR, 20-08-2013). 
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For the UAE, the technology to develop nuclear power plants on its own is limited; the 
assistance of several countries has to be sought if nuclear power is to be developed.677One 
of the preconditions for assisting the UAE is that the country has to ratify the treaties - 
without ratification it might not be possible for UAE to legitimately develop nuclear 
energy. Moreover, since UAE is committed to using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, 
it is also committed to ratifying the treaties. 
 
o. How will the compensation to residents of a non-contracting party be handled, if 
there is any (nuclear) effect on the Gulf State or Middle Eastern State, because 
some of them are not contracting parties? 
 
The liabilities both joint and exclusive should be accepted by the parties involved.678 In 
fact, the UAE is likely to rely on the IAEA introductory text which states: 
 
“Like the principle of strict liability, the principle of exclusive liability of the 
operator facilitates the bringing of claims on the part of the victims of a nuclear 
incident, since it relieves them of the burden of proving the liability of parties other 
than the operator. But the principle also obviously favours the manufacturer, 
supplier or carrier of the material or equipment, since it obviates the necessity for 
them to take out insurance, as well as any other person who may have contributed 
to the nuclear incident.”679 
 
p. How is the UAE going to manage liabilities stemming from accidents that may 
arise from the nuclear plants? 
 
The UAE will manage liabilities stemming from accidents that may arise from the nuclear 
plants by applying its nuclear energy laws, which have been enacted in compliance with 
international legal instruments.680 
 
  
                                         
677 Official A (FANR, 20-08-2013). 
678 Official C (FANR, 20-08-2013). 
679 IAEA introductory text 
680 Official C (FANR, 20-08-2013). 
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q. What considerations, if any, are given to the potential liability of nuclear 
operators, (a strict liability approach)? 
 
The nuclear operators would be responsible for potential nuclear damages. This is 
considered to be a strict liability approach. This is the main reason for the enactment of 
Decree No. 4 of 2012 Concerning Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage.681 
 
r. Who is going to be liable for any nuclear accidents arising from the proposed 
UAE’s nuclear energy programme? 
 
The operator, overseen by ENEC, would be liable for any nuclear accidents arising from 
the proposed UAE’s nuclear energy programme.682 
 
s. In a situation where damage occurred to a nuclear shipment whilst it was out of 
the source country and on its way to the destination country (damage in transit), 
who will remain liable for any damage? 
 
The transporter would be responsible for any damage in transit as soon as the wastes are 
taken from the source country. This is in line with provision of the Vienna Convention.683 
 
t. What jurisdiction would apply in case of third party liabilities/operator’s 
liabilities? 
 
The UAE Federal Law Decree No. 4 of 2012 would apply in case of third party liabilities 
and operator’s liabilities.684 
 
Huge insurance cover was noted to be the main issue in the UAE’s nuclear power project 
plans. The nuclear power operator requires an enormous insurance policy. According to 
some respondents, the insurance issue was seen to be an obstacle to the development of 
nuclear power in the UAE, while others opined that huge insurance cover is in fact a 
                                         
681 Official B (FANR, 20-08-2013). 
682 Official A (FANR, 20-08-2013). 
683 Official A (FANR, 20-08-2013). 
684Official B (FANR, 20-08-2013).  
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necessity, owing to the severe nature and effects as a result of nuclear accidents. However, 
those associated with the approval and running of nuclear power projects opined that in 
order to adhere to the international standards of safety and practices, it is necessary to fix 
the insurance policy requirement at a high amount.685 
 
The law relating to nuclear damage in the UAE was formulated in line with the Vienna 
Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and was ratified by the country’s 
President, Sheikh Khalifa on August 13, 2012. The officials have also described the law 
as being in line with international best practices.686 The law states that all claims against 
nuclear power operators have to be made through the federal court.687 
 
Although this is normal in a sovereign state, the researcher views that there may arise 
situations whereby the decisions of the federal court are skewed in favour of the 
government, since it is also the government which is responsible for operating the nuclear 
power plants. As the federal court is constituted by the government, there is likelihood of 
ensuring that the court’s loyalty to the government is maintained. In this situation, what 
then is the fate of the victim of a nuclear accident? In other words, the influence of 
government in the claims decisions cannot be overruled. 
 
According to the law relating to nuclear liability, the operator is liable for injuries caused 
by the nuclear activity arising from the nuclear reactor for which he holds the licence. 
The claim for damages needs to be filed before three years elapse from the date of the 
injury or from the date on which the sufferer ought to have known about the injury. 
Injuries that relate to life or person(s) can be claimed within thirty years of such injury. 
The UAE law provides that the operator will be exempted from the liability, if the injury 
caused by nuclear activity was the result of negligence on the part of the injured, or if it 
was caused by an act of the injured carried out with the intention to cause damage. The 
court can partly or fully exempt the operator from such liability.  
  
There are several other exemptions to the liability of the operator when the supplier or 
person(s) working under contract has acted or committed to act with intention to cause 
                                         
685Officials B and C (FANR, 20-08-2013).  
686 Officials B and C (FANR, 20-08-2013). 
687 UAE Federal Law Decree No. 4 of 2012. 
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damage. Such a provision is also available to any person who acts or omits to act with an 
intention to create damage. The operators in the above-mentioned cases can turn to such 
persons for liability caused to the operator by their action or omission. There are 
provisions that can be used by the nuclear operator to indemnify the loss suffered if the 
injury was caused by the wilful act or omission of the supplier or contractor, or any other 
person. These exemption provisions can also be made applicable in the UAE based on 
the 1997 Protocol. 
 
The officials who were interviewed regarding the jurisdiction of courts on the issue of 
liability in a nuclear accident, said that the country wherein the nuclear accident took 
place, will have jurisdiction over the claims that arise from such accident.688 The 
limitation period for claiming the damage is restricted to three years from the time when 
the injured realises the injury.  
 
If the claim is made after a lapse of thirty years from the time of injury, when the injury 
is that of life or person and, if the injury is that of any other nature, the limitation period 
is ten years. If the claim of the individual suffering from an injury caused by nuclear 
accident is based on an insurance policy or any other scheme, this limitation will not be 
applicable. The limitation is only in relation to the liability of the nuclear reactor’s 
operator alone.  
 
u. What are the financial arrangements in terms of the amounts to be paid to victims 
of possible nuclear accidents? 
 
The set amount to be paid by the operator to the victims of a nuclear accident is 2.5 billion 
Dirhams.689 The compensation amount must not be more than 450 million SDRs.690The 
UAE government is liable to pay for the excess amount. 
 
However, there is no standard limit for the potential damage caused to the people and 
their environment. Therefore, as per the ‘polluter pays principle’, there must not be any 
                                         
688 Officials B and C (FANR, 20-08-2013). 
689 Official A (FANR, 20-08-2013). 
690 Article 5 of the UAE Federal Nuclear Law Decree No. 4 of 2012 Concerning Civil Liability for Nuclear 
Damage.  
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limit for the compensation either. In this regard, the IAEA’s Explanatory Test provides 
that the Vienna Convention has not determined a maximum liability limit for which the 
Installation State imposes unlimited liability amounts.691 
 
v. What is the time limit, if any, for liability? 
 
According to the decree passed at the Vienna Convention, in case of: 
 any damage caused to either human health or life, the time limit would be 30 
years; 
 other losses, the time limit would be 10 years. 
 
Said declaration is also included in Law No. 4 of 2012.692 
 
w. In the transportation of nuclear and related cargo, both the shipper handling the 
cargo and the owner holding title to the shipment bear responsibility for the safe 
transportation of the consignment to its destination. In the present instance, will the 
UAE government bear ultimate responsibility for ensuring the safe handling of the 
cargo? 
 
It was ascertained that while handling nuclear and fissile material, all stakeholders share 
the responsibility for ensuring the safe transportation of the consignment.693 Hence, the 
shipper certainly bears a responsibility towards ensuring the safe delivery of the 
radioactive cargo and, in ensuring that no damage is caused to the consignment during its 
delivery.  
 
x. What about liabilities in countries like India or South Korea, what impact does it 
have on UAE? 
 
In the coming age, countries like China, South Korea, Japan and India are expected to 
invest heavily in acquiring nuclear hardware and technology. Unfortunately, none of 
these countries are seemingly bound by specific stipulations, limitations and conventions 
                                         
691 Official A (FANR, 20-08-2013). 
692 Official B (FANR, 20-08-2013). 
693 Official B (FANR, 20-08-2013). 
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governing their use. Acquiring nuclear hardware and technology, including power 
stations entails huge investments in terms of finances; paying environmental costs; 
handling issues of waste; the fuel; addressing health concerns; addressing security and 
proliferation issues and the political fallout. All of this has international repercussions and 
dimensions to be considered.694 
 
Both the IAEA and the IEA project that, as an increasing number of nations try to set up 
nuclear power stations on their territories, issues of nuclear liability and their adherence 
to existing treaties, obligations and conventions, will gain increasing prominence. 
Further, complying with all the various obligations and treaties in operation, while 
ensuring that compliance with the same is not detrimental to existing national laws of the 
individual countries, would also give rise to specific and new challenges, in terms of 
ensuring the safety of nuclear facilities.  
 
y. What exactly amounts to a nuclear accident or incident? 
 
Whatever the consequences of the event, a nuclear accident could be classified to 
constitute damage originating due to malfunction(s) of a nuclear nature.695 Hence, the 
1997 Protocol aptly describes the parameters of such incidences to constitute nuclear 
damage, irrespective of the origins of such incidents. Such damage would also include 
other aspects if there is serious possibility of nuclear damage, and not just restricted to 
the actual damage caused. This is in addition to the explanations provided in the 1963 
Convention, all of which nevertheless excludes a clear definition of what would constitute 
a ‘grave and imminent threat’, other than the fact that it could cause loss of life.   
 
Any number of reasons could end up contributing towards a nuclear incident, ranging 
from issues related to mechanical malfunctions in nuclear installations, to simple human 
errors. Nevertheless, the extent of damage caused by such actions could be immense.  
 
 
 
 
                                         
694 Official C (FANR, 20-08-2013). 
695 Official A (FANR, 20-08-2013). 
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z. What is the limit, if any, for any compensation awards? 
 
Information gathered showed it is the responsibility of the insurance company to decide 
on the limit of compensation awards.696 
 
Regarding the issues of liability, it was discovered that the UAE law covering the 
country’s first nuclear power plants has placed liability for damages strictly on the 
operators. One of the requirements for operating a nuclear power plant is that the operator 
should have over Dh2.5billion in insurance to cover any possible claims against it.697 On 
the issue of the operator having such a huge insurance cover, the officials in the ENEC 
do not feel that this is a huge constraint, but instead that having insurance is essential.698 
 
A senior official said that according to the Vienna Convention, in the case of damages 
overseas, if the country is a signatory of the convention, the claimant should lodge their 
grievance with the Abu Dhabi federal courts.699 Such case(s) would be treated and 
possible outcomes duly implemented. Many had opined that the law was enacted 
following a re-evaluation procedure involving the IAEA, international consultants, as 
well as local stakeholders. “This new liability regime provides a clear and predictable 
process for the public and nuclear industry to deal with compensation for damages that 
may arise in the case of a nuclear accident.”700 “The definition of a nuclear incident under 
UAE law is wide and varies from a nuclear plant accident resulting in loss of life, to 
environmental and financial damages”.701 According to the law, ENEC can take 
indemnity coverage from wherever in the world. 
 
The higher compensation value was agreed to after thoroughly reviewing the insurance 
market and in light of the strict operating standards being followed. It is also part of the 
law, which specifically says that the claimants can make a claim without needing to 
establish neglect or any type of fault from the operator. A senior official said that this 
complies with the standard international principles on nuclear liability.702 
 
                                         
696 Official A (FANR, 20-08-2013). 
697 The UAE Nuclear Law. 
698 See: The UAE Nuclear Law. 
699 Official C (FANR, 20-08-2013). 
700 Official B (FANR, 20-08-2013). 
701 UAE Federal Law Decree 4 of 2012. 
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6.3.1 Analysis of legal and liability issues 
 
Considering that almost any nuclear accident has consequences extending well beyond 
the national borders of an individual country, the national laws governing the use and 
operation of a nuclear power plant are supplemented by a range of legally binding 
international conventions and treaties. Generally, the operator’s liability is somewhat 
limited in scope and is usually adequately covered within the national laws of the 
individual countries and the international conventions and treaties. This translates to the 
individual country accepting major and ultimate responsibility for the operations of the 
nuclear power plant within its borders. In this regard, the UAE is a signatory to the 
IAEA’s Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, which has been 
ratified by the UAE earlier this year, with the agreement having been last amended in 
1997 (see Appendix 8).  
 
Domestic UAE law regarding this has been drawn up to be in alignment with the 
parameters recommended by the IAEA, towards ensuring that all aspects of the law 
ratified are in agreement with associated international obligations and treaties. The FANR 
has been deputed as the legal entity overseeing the laws within the UAE borders in this 
regard.  
 
Generally, Law 4 dictates that in case of any major nuclear incident and associated 
damage, the civil liability arising from the same is exclusively handled either by the 
operator of the facility, or by the entity contracted to transport the nuclear waste. The 
relevant section of the legislation lays out the operator’s liability in Article 2 of the 1997 
Protocol. It explains the extent of the operator’s liability in the event of a nuclear 
catastrophe and covers provisions for the transportation of nuclear waste overland within 
the UAE.703 
 
Therefore, Law 4 states that the operator is wholly responsible for the consequences in 
the event of an incident occurring while transporting waste from one location to another. 
In this regard, it is also pertinent to note that ‘nuclear damage’ is not specifically defined, 
and is vague, to cover a range of possibilities consistent with the 1997 Protocol. 
                                         
703 The UAE Law Decree No. 4 of 2012. 
 214 
 
Therefore, this could include any number of possibilities, including fatalities; physical 
and environmental damages; economic losses; repair costs and expenses; and the 
magnitude of lost income opportunities, where the environment is dramatically and 
drastically altered by a specific action or incident. In the event of permanent damage, the 
operator is very much liable to accept responsibility, irrespective of the extent of 
responsibility of the operator in this regard.  
 
Law 4 requires the operator to obtain adequate insurance towards covering the possibility 
of damage and restitution in case of a nuclear incident. General claims against damages 
can be filed within 3 years of the incident, after which the claim would not necessarily be 
entertained. However, exceptions do exist where there has been a loss of life or grievous 
bodily harm, wherein the claim can be filed within up to 30 years of its occurrence, or 
within 10 years for associated damages.704 
 
In describing damages, it is assumed this includes instances where environmental damage 
is caused to the ecosystem and to the marine life, which extends to areas beyond and 
adjacent to the national and maritime borders of the UAE, irrespective of observable 
health risks. It is considered that only allowing for claims on incidents affecting areas 
inside the national borders of the country would be inadequate, since nuclear accidents 
inevitably affect far and beyond the national borders of the country itself. Nevertheless, 
the 1997 Protocol does not necessarily make any specific reference to environmental or 
marine damages, or curbs imposed on fishing or tourism because of an incident. Instead, 
such damage encompasses all aspects of lost economic opportunities and losses incurred. 
Nevertheless, specific provisions explicitly governing these aspects are not part of the 
laws of the UAE or the Vienna Convention.  
 
Although the operator is handed significant responsibility in this regard, also enshrined 
in Law 4is the proviso that a degree of protection and support is also due to the operator, 
in that the latter is not held fully and/or wholly responsible, materially or financially, for 
the consequences, if the damage has been as a result of the affected individual’s personal 
actions and gross negligence. The operator is also not wholly liable if the individual has 
undertaken action specifically with the intention of causing grievous bodily harm.   
                                         
704 The UAE Law Decree No. 4 of 2012. 
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Equipment and service providers are also offered protection and safeguards in that the 
operator has recourse to legal remedy if such provisions are agreed upon beforehand, 
while executing a contract, or if the incident is because of some deliberate action(s) on 
the part of certain individuals. In such instances, the operator has recourse to contractual 
indemnity against the supplier or the individual identified as causing the intentional harm 
and damage. As per the 1997 Protocol, such remedy may also be claimed from the UAE 
government, pending the availability of public finances.  
 
Interviews with the officials concludes that civil claims would generally be heard in the 
courts where the legal bodies would have jurisdiction to decide on such matters, hence 
the location of the incident would determine the specific legal system which would be 
hearing cases corresponding to such instances. Generally, civil damages would only be 
entertained and implemented if the appellant files suit within three years of the incident.705 
 
The appellant would lose all rights to claim any damages if a case is not filed within 30 
years of an incident involving the loss of life, or within 10 years in other instances of 
damages.706 Nevertheless, it is to be noted that the Law of Decree would continue to 
support individuals claiming benefits against individual health insurance schemes, 
employee compensation programs or associated occupational disease schemes. 
 
Multiple nuclear accidents as in Fukushima and Chernobyl have revealed that the true 
scale and nature of the damage caused in a nuclear accident is only brought to light over 
a long period of time, since damages incurred take an indefinite period to manifest their 
true costs. Nevertheless, the majority of treaties have recognised 30 years to be a 
reasonable time period for perceiving the real scale of the loss, in consideration of the fact 
that it is often difficult to identify the true range and extent of damage immediately after 
a nuclear mishap. Nevertheless, in this regard, it is very important that the claimant should 
file his deposition in the courts as soon as the situation has manifested clearly. 
 
An associated aspect to be considered is the jurisdiction of the courts if the claimant is 
outside and beyond the political borders of the UAE. In this case, as per the provisions of 
                                         
705 Officials A and C (FANR, 20-08-2013). 
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the Vienna Convention, it is agreed that cases and claims have to be filed in the UAE 
federal courts if the claimant’s country of origin is also part of the Convention.   
 
Gathered data revealed that the UAE had undergone many discussions, negotiations and 
study on the issue of claims and liabilities.707 Accordingly, the law relating to nuclear 
liability in the country is clear on the issues of claims and liabilities and makes it possible 
for anyone involved in the UAE’s nuclear liability regime to forecast the result of a claim. 
The law relating to nuclear liability was finally accepted after discussions with the IAEA 
and extensive international consultations with stakeholders. The officials are therefore 
confident about the clarity of nuclear liability regime in the country.708 The definition of 
nuclear damage also allows the operator to get the insurance coverage from any country 
and does not limit it to insurance companies within the UAE. The researcher sees this as 
a welcome move, as the operators are given a wider range of choice to pick out the 
insurance policy. 
 
Apparently, a good deal of debate was made regarding the strict liability principle being 
applied to nuclear accidents. Senior officials of the UAE nuclear power plant rather 
preferred that the applicable strict liability principle is that which does not require the 
claimant to prove operator fault; this is in line with international instruments and 
provisions on liability arising from a nuclear accident. This argument renewed UAE 
authorities’ commitment to adhere to the international standards. The author therefore 
maintains that since injuries from nuclear accidents are unconstrained and their effects 
incalculable, it is difficult to prove the cause and effect of such nuclear injuries, thus it 
can be discouraging to claimants. 
 
It is envisaged that the nuclear laws and policies of the UAE have been formulated 
circumspectly, after numerous consultations and will help the country attain a safe, 
transparent and secure system of nuclear power development. There are various standards 
that have been enshrined in the laws and policies. These standards emphasise key 
principles which include: comprehensive operational clarity; the premier principles 
of non-proliferation; standards of care and security; working directly with the IAEA and 
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conforming to its standards; co-operating with other nations, as well as ensuring long-
standing sustainability. 
 
According to international practice, it is the operator of the nuclear power reactor who is 
solely responsible for injuries caused by the reactors709. The strict liability principle only 
requires a relationship between the nuclear accident and operator flaw. It is not necessary 
to show that such injury is caused by the operator’s fault. Therefore, it is expected that 
the nuclear operator takes all possible measures to evade a nuclear reactor leak or mishap. 
The international instruments thus necessitate the license holder be very careful to avoid 
pecuniary claims by the victims. 
 
Except in certain circumstances, the operator of a nuclear reactor is the only person who 
can be made liable for the mishaps that ensue from the nuclear reactor for which he holds 
the license710. These exemptions are only when there is armed conflict, aggression, war 
or rebellion. Other contractors or suppliers of nuclear reactive materials or any other 
person involved in the working of the nuclear power reactor are not made liable for the 
damage caused by nuclear accidents711. This is the reason why the operator is obliged to 
take out a huge insurance cover. This is to equally help in providing remedy to claimants. 
 
Unlike other accidents, nuclear accidents have trans-boundary effects. These can pose 
various concerns to nations outside the boundary of the country where a nuclear plant is 
situated. This necessitates each country adopting the international Convention on civil 
liability for nuclear damage.  
 
According to the respondents, by making the nuclear reactor’s operator nuclear solely 
responsible for injuries caused by the nuclear reactor, more contractors and suppliers have 
become involved in the operation of nuclear reactors, on the understanding that they 
cannot be made liable for any injuries caused by reactors.712Apropos the fact that the sole 
liability for nuclear damage rests on the operator who is covered by insurance and the 
                                         
709Nathalie L. J. T. Horbach and P. Blanchard, “Responsabilitécivilenucléaire des transports internationaux: 
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710Reece. R et al, op.cit. 
711Julia A. Schwartz, International law and Civil Nuclear Liability after Chernobyl (OECD, 2006), 
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 218 
 
limitations, if any, are in tune with the national and international instruments, such a 
provision would entitle the state to be involved in the liability scenario as is the case in 
all other sectors. The most important international instrument that deals with the 
international nuclear regulatory regime is the IAEA’s Vienna Convention on Civil 
Liability for Nuclear Damage, amended in 1997, which the UAE has formally ratified. 
 
According to Heffron, R. J. et al (2016), it is possible that an accident within the nuclear 
sector may unavoidably surpass the amount stated in the legal liability limit, however to 
what extent, will be determined by the description and the reaction to the accident. On 
the other hand, it is obvious that the issue of liability in the nuclear energy sector is not 
an exceptional question where accidents regarding the energy sector are considered. If 
anything, the sector is further along in the process of determining this issue than in other 
parts of the energy sector, for example, in the offshore oil and gas industry713. Any injury 
caused to the international community by an act of state has to be compensated by that 
state and this is a legal principle.714Setting up nuclear power plants in the UAE is a state-
conceived project, thus it cannot neglect the responsibility of compensating victims of 
mishaps caused by the nuclear reactors. It is doubtful as to what extent the state can avoid 
such liability even if another individual has been given the license to run the nuclear 
reactor. There are various international instruments that deal with the responsibilities of 
the state towards the international community.  
 
One aspect that many of the respondents forgot to mention was the issue regarding 
terrorism. The Middle East being a very sensitive area, is prone to terrorist attacks. Yet, 
the Conventions exclude acts of terrorism, armed conflict, hostilities, civil war and 
insurrection. It was essential that Law No. 4 of 2012 take this fact into consideration, 
especially since the Middle East is a volatile area and especially given the recent Arab 
spring uprisings, the threat could be more of an issue.  
 
Provisions of the Vienna Convention allow for the installation state to have whole, 
complete and exclusive jurisdiction over a case where the incident has originated. This 
                                         
713Heffron, R. J., Ashley, S. F. & Nuttall, W. J. (2016). The global nuclear liability regime post Fukushima 
Daiichi. Progress in Nuclear Energy: Vol. 90, pp 1-10. [Online]. Available from: 
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714 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Act, G.A. Res. 56/83, Annex Art. 
1, U. N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Dec. 12, 2001)   
 219 
 
prevents the claimant from trying to implement the national laws of his own country 
determining and imposing upon the outcome of a petition. This provision is also 
applicable in cases where a carrier causes an incident outside the political boundaries of 
the country of origin and, is an important aspect of Law 4 of 2012 towards limiting the 
UAE’s liability.  
 
Legal systems where claims should be filed in the source country are a disadvantage to 
under-privileged claimants. This makes it important that the claimant should have 
recourse to a justice system which is impartial and not inclined to favour the economically 
stronger nuclear state or the financially stronger state against which the claim is being 
filed and brought forward. Implementing this aspect would be consistent to the IAEA’s 
recommendation in that claims be heard in a non-discriminatory environment and all 
victims have unbiased and equal recourse to legal remedy against their claims. 
Nevertheless, the current situation of claimants being forced to process their petitions 
exclusively through the UAE justice system could be considered discriminatory and 
disadvantageous to the petitioner, to an extent. 
 
The Declaration on Environment and Development; the Convention on the Law of the 
Sea; the Convention on Biological Diversity and the International Court of Justice have 
laid down guidelines concerning the accountability of States on the use of nuclear active 
substances. The Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment deals with the cross-
boundary issues of conducting nuclear activities715.  
 
Before embarking on nuclear power projects, every nation shall assess the consequence 
of such power plant on the environment716. The transportation of nuclear active materials 
that could be used as fuel for nuclear power plants needs to abide by the Code of Practice 
on the International Trans-Boundary Movement of Radioactive Waste that was adopted 
in the year 1991717. Even though the provision of the Code is not mandatory but merely 
recommendations, almost all the countries abide by such rules. 
 
                                         
715Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context app. I (2) -(3), Feb. 25, 
1991, 1989 U.N.T.S. 309.   
716Ibid.Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context 
717 IAEA, Code of Practice on the International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste, Gen. 
Conf. Res. 530, IAEA Doc. GC(XXXIV)/RES/530 (Sept. 21, 1990).   
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During the interview, the authorities of the UAE said that there were various discussions 
held with the IAEA. It was also pointed out by the authorities that the IAEA legal team 
had studied the policy and been positive the policy was in tune with the agency’s 
guidelines and other international instruments. The UAE’s FANR is the authority 
executing the law. 
 
Law 4 provides for some exemption in the case of an injury due to the nuclear activity or 
accident in a nuclear plant.718In all other cases however, the nuclear reactor operator is 
made liable. According to Article 2 of the 1997 protocol, the liability of the operator 
includes injury caused by a nuclear accident including if the injury is caused while 
transiting a nuclear active material in and out of the nuclear plant.719 As per the UAE law, 
the operator is liable for the injury caused by the nuclear plant exclusively. The meaning 
of the term ‘nuclear damage’ under the 1997 protocol is wide-ranging and it deals with 
injury to person and property, monetary loss and loss caused to the environment. The 
UAE follows the Vienna Convention regarding environmental issues. However, the 
convention is limited to costs of reinstatement. The subparagraph is silent as to 
compensation where replacement is not probable. This is the case with extensive fault, 
predominantly of the aquatic setting.720 
 
Another legal issue that arises in the international arena when a country ventures into the 
nuclear field is the misuse of nuclear active materials. The Treaty on Non- Proliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons (see Appendix 13) has reduced the fear of the international 
community regarding the use of nuclear active materials for destructive purposes. The 
NPT also led to various issues amongst the nations721. The fate of Iran is one of the effects 
of the NPT was used by the powerful nations with some ulterior motive722.  
 
In order to erase the international community’s fear regarding the misuse of nuclear active 
materials, the UAE ratified the NPT. According to the officials, the UAE was committed 
                                         
718 The UAE Nuclear Law. 
719Article 2 of the 1997 protocol. 
720 The Vienna Convention. 
721The Embassy of the United Arab Emirates in Washington DC, Available at http://www.uae-
embassy.org/uae/foreign-policy/non-proliferation , Last accessed on 01-07-2012. 
722 Ibid. The Embassy of the United Arab Emirates in Washington DC, 
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to eliminating the international community fears over the use of nuclear active materials 
for destructive purposes723.  
 
According to the officials, the UAE is fully aware of the consequences of using nuclear 
active materials for destructive purposes.724  The officials also were of the view that UAE 
was against the dangers caused by unethical use of nuclear active materials. According to 
the respondent(s), the UAE’s intention is aimed at only producing the electricity required 
for fulfilling the country’s needs and as such, the country has been particularly open in 
making the whole process transparent to the international community725. The view 
expressed by the official was that the UAE is against the use of nuclear active materials 
for destructive use726. The country seems to be aware of the need for improving the 
Middle East’s reputation in relation to terrorism and other extremist activities. 
 
The UAE accepted membership of the IAEA which shows the country’s intention in 
fighting against the use of nuclear active materials for destructive purposes727. The 
country has also joined hands with other nations to fight against nuclear terrorism. Thus, 
the international community can be sure about the motives of the country as it begins 
stepping into the nuclear field and can be assured of the fact that only peaceful use of 
nuclear active materials is on the agenda728.  The UAE also fought against the use of mass 
destructive weapons, which were allegedly accumulated by Iran729. Therefore, the issue 
of misuse of nuclear active materials need not be raised in the case of the UAE, based on 
their adherence to the internationally accepted standards of nuclear reactors.   
  
The dumping of radioactive wastes is another issue faced by the UAE. Many of the 
countries try to dispose of the nuclear active wastes within their boundaries, but in certain 
cases there are instances of transporting such materials to another country, or at least 
                                         
723 Officials A and C (FANR, 20-08-2013). Ibid. The Embassy of the United Arab Emirates in Washington 
DC, 
724 Officials B and A (FANR, 20-08-2013). 
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beyond its geographical boundaries. The ecological balance is known to be disturbed 
when radioactive materials are dumped in the high seas730.  
 
The Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes stipulates 
that the license holder of the nuclear reactor is responsible for handling the nuclear active 
wastes from the reactor. The duty of supervising the reactor operator is cast on the State 
by the Convention731. The UAE needs an agency within the country to monitor the license 
holder and it should also make provisions for issuing licenses to those in charge of 
disposal of nuclear active wastes. 
 
Above all, the respondents reiterated that as a Member State, the UAE in its desire to 
maintain highest standards in the nuclear power programme, takes on board the 19 
milestones for nuclear power infrastructure development (2007) as outlined by the IAEA. 
It is believed that with special attention paid to these milestones, it is possible that to a 
considerable degree many hazards could be reduced in the development and operation of 
the country’s nuclear power programme. 
 
The aim of the UAE is to yield power through nuclear energy to fulfil the growing needs 
of the country’s industrial sector. This aim is reasonable when compared to those 
countries which use it for reinforcing their armed forces. The early planning of the country 
is notable. The necessity for clarity in nuclear dealings is a significant factor to be 
followed by all the international entities that use nuclear energy. That example can be 
followed by other international entities. 
 
6.4 Political issues 
 
These discussions are generally focused on the political decisions leading to the 
development of the nuclear energy programme and consideration of any future 
developments and plans for dealing with any problems that may arise.  
 
                                         
730 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and other Matter Annex I (6), 
Dec. 29, 1972, 1046 U.N.T.S. 120, 26 U.S.T. 2403. 
731Ibid Article 21. 
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a. How would you rate your knowledge and understanding of the UAE nuclear 
energy programme? 
 
The participants attested that their understanding of the UAE nuclear energy programme 
is great and interesting.732 The UAE has been totally in compliance with all IAEA 
directives regarding its nuclear programme and policies. This is amply demonstrated by 
how the IAEA has conducted an Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review mission (INIR) 
in 2011 within the UAE, to assess the UAE’s nuclear initiatives. On the conclusion of the 
tour, IAEA officials certified the UAE’s complete compliance with all IAEA directives, 
including the ‘Milestones’ approach, all of which is uploaded on the IAEA website.  
 
The IAEA also conducted an Integrated Regulatory Review Service Mission (IRRS) in 
2011, for the UAE to appraise itself of the FANR regulated activities conducted by the 
country, which was also intended to understand the safeguards incorporated within the 
system being mindful of the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station debacle.  
 
The INIR studies encompass all aspects related to the construction of nuclear power 
plants. Once member states file an application for review, a team of international experts 
is assembled and reviews all paradigms associated with the applicant’s programme. In 
consideration of the country’s internal review and assessment, the IAEA team itself 
undertakes a thorough review of the entire project and personally interviews and assesses 
viability and feasibility. On conclusion, weak areas are highlighted and corresponding 
correction measures and actions are recommended.   
 
b. What is the UAE’s involvement in the management of the nuclear plants in terms 
of funding and management? 
 
The UAE government funds the nuclear programme; government departments like ENEC 
will be responsible for managing the programme, while FANR issues the licence as well 
as the regulations concerning the nuclear programme.733 The licence application for the 
nuclear reactor was enormous and required a large team of about sixty persons from the 
                                         
732 Officials D, and E (FANR, 20-08-2013). 
733 Official D (FANR, 20-08-2013). 
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FANR to monitor and evaluate the application. The review team also had persons from 
three consulting firms.  
 
The official maintains that as the premier UAE nuclear regulatory watchdog in the 
country, the agency undertook an 18-month review of all aspects of the proposal 
submitted by the ENEC, besides satisfactorily fielding some 1600 queries from the 
regulator. Furthermore, a permanent and revolving review and compliance board would 
be established at Baraka, some 300 km west of Abu Dhabi.734 To support and execute the 
initiative, about 5000 workers from 10 nations have already settled at the site, with 
directives and signs posted all around in various languages, especially English, Arabic 
and Korean.735 “Some 600 cubic meters of concrete are expected to roll out of a batch 
plant installed on-site, which is currently utilised to construct at least two workers villages 
before subsequently progressing to providing concrete for the foundations of the 
project”.736 
 
c. Why did ENEC select KEPCO and the Advanced Power Reactor 1400 MWe 
(APR1400) for its programme? 
 
The official said that the reason ENEC selected KEPCO for its nuclear programme was 
based on the company’s affordability and training of indigenous personnel compared with 
the American and European companies. The Advanced Power Reactor 1400 MWe 
(APR1400) is economical and easy to run. It is also a third generation and 
environmentally friendly.737 
 
d. How will the UAE’s nuclear power plant operate? 
 
The nuclear power plant in Abu Dhabi will be operated by ENEC with KEPCO.738 The 
Advanced Power Reactor 1400 MWe (APR1400) is economical and easy to run.739 It is 
                                         
734 Official E (FANR, 20-08-2013). 
735 Official D (FANR, 20-08-2013). 
736 Official D (FANR, 20-08-2013). 
737 Official F (ENEC, 20-08-2013). 
738 Official F (ENEC, 20-08-2013). 
739 Safety design features in the APR1400. [Online]: Available at: https://www.google.co.uk/search?hl= 
en&site=imghp&tbm=isch&source=hp&biw=1024&bih=676&q=jelly&oq=jelly&gs_l=img.1.1.0l10.113
91.20688.0.24563.7.6.1.0.0.0.218.624.5j0j1.6.0....0...1ac.1.31.img..0.7.609.3yDPcVt-0sw#hl=en&q= 
safety+design+features+in+the+APR1400&tbm=isch&imgdii=_Accessed on 04-12-2013. 
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also a third generation and environmentally friendly. It is a pressurised light water reactor 
with capacity of 1,400 MW. Its design life time is 60 years, with the seismic design basis 
of SSE 0.3g.740 
 
KEPCO will also help to develop the local skills and talents of the UAE’s citizens to be 
utilised in developing the power generation programme of the UAE741. According to 
ENEC publication, the contract for the development of nuclear power plants “call[s] for 
extensive training, human resource development, and education programs as the UAE 
builds the capacity to eventually staff the clear majority of the nuclear energy programme 
with national talent. The KEPCO team is a dedicated and highly experienced team to our 
project and has shown a serious commitment to transferring the knowledge gained into 
the UAE programme.”742 
 
e. What are the levels of involvement of the USA and UK in the UAE’s nuclear 
programme? 
 
It was gathered that the USA and the UK have agreed to co-operate with the UAE in the 
exchange of technical know-how toward a successful UAE nuclear power programme.743 
 
An institute for the development of human resources and skill set in UAE nationals was 
to be formed by the UAE government with the co-operation of the Gulf Nuclear Energy 
Infrastructure Institute (GNEII), Sandia National Laboratories, the Nuclear Security 
Science and Policy Institute of the USA and the University of Khalifa744.  
 
In order to succeed in the construction and running of the nuclear power plants, it is 
important that the labour force is well equipped with the much-required knowledge on 
every aspect of nuclear power plants, from the very lowest level to the highest level. Only 
if this knowledge is imbibed at all levels, can the nuclear programme be successful745.   
 
                                         
740 See Safety design features in the APR1400. 
741 Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation Press Release, December 27, 2009, op.cit. 
742 Ibid. Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation Press Release, December 27, 2009, op.cit 
743 Official E (FANR, 20-08-2013). 
744 Official F (ENEC, 20-08-2013). 
745 Official F (ENEC, 20-08-2013). 
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f. Does it really matter that communities in the region would be affected by building 
a nuclear plant near them? 
 
The officials said that all the communities in the region have been informed about the 
building of a nuclear power plant near them and have been duly consulted. The UAE has 
educated the society about the concerns of nuclear plants.746 
 
g. Will the UAE be re-processing or enriching fuel? 
 
The officials said that UAE will not be re-processing or enriching fuel. The country has 
agreed with the international community not to venture into these practices.747 
 
h. To what extent would you agree that the UAE should decide not to enrich or re-
process used fuel? 
 
Presently, the country is not interested in enriching or reprocessing Uranium used fuel, 
only in the peaceful use of nuclear materials.748 
 
i. What are the plans for the local people where the plants are located? 
 
The plants will be established in the non-inhabited areas and it is also envisaged that the 
nuclear plants will be radiation free. The government plans to always orientate the local 
people on issues concerning the nuclear programme.749 
 
6.4.1 Analysis of political issues 
 
The UAE’s nuclear energy policy aims at ensuring operational transparency and non-
proliferation and these will be achieved through genuine commitment to the good 
management of its nuclear programme.750 The country’s choice of the nuclear power 
                                         
746 Official F (ENEC, 20-08-2013). 
747 Official D (FANR, 20-08-2013). 
748 Official D (FANR, 20-08-2013). 
749 Official D (FANR, 20-08-2013). 
750The Policy of the UAE on the Evaluation and Potential Development of Peaceful Nuclear Energy. 
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programme followed an all-embracing nationwide consultative process and determination 
to comply with detailed requirements to enhance safety and security.  
 
The IAEA recommends that all nuclear states perform their responsibilities to nuclear 
safety. Therefore, the UAE policy on nuclear energy is anchored on the highest possible 
standards of safety and security. To achieve the above, the following should be 
significantly considered: 
 
The researcher suggests that the UAE should meet the IAEA principles and promise the 
utmost dogmatic standards by ensuring that stipulated procedures are followed and 
maintained as well as considering the enacting of national regulations to also guide 
nuclear processes. 
 
Also, the country should establish a tradition of safety that pervades and persuades 
resolutions as well as accomplishments of all the programme’s stakeholders. Developing 
local, sustainable human resources will encourage the nuclear programme. Here, human 
capacity and manpower development become important for the running of the nuclear 
plant(s). 
 
The author equally proposes that the UAE should build robust ‘risk aware’ security 
arrangements to protect plants and facilities. This ranges from standardised building of 
every facet of the plant, as well as clamping down on external threats. The country should 
plan for long term decommissioning, which involves careful and systematic complete 
closure of non-functional nuclear plants. 
 
6.5 Economic issues 
 
These analyses and discussions are generally focused on the economic decisions leading 
to the justification and rationale for the development of the nuclear energy programme in 
the UAE. 
  
a. Why did the UAE decide to pursue nuclear energy? 
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The official said that the UAE’s decision to pursue nuclear energy was informed by the 
need to improve the local economy and research development in the area; and added that 
nuclear energy is safer and economical if used for peaceful purposes and follows pre-set 
conditions.751 
 
The development of the nuclear power projects will benefit the UAE economically and 
the mass generation of power in the country would help in the development of commerce 
which will in turn increase the GDP rate of the federation.752 
 
According to the official, the demand for more energy happened during a period of huge 
industrialisation and it was realised that after some years, energy generation through 
conventional methods would not be able to cater for the growing needs.753 It is important 
to ensure that the UAE’s electricity generation should be sufficient to meet prospective 
demand.754 For this reason, there was necessity for expansion, through nuclear power 
generation. 
 
b. How does nuclear energy compare to other sources of electricity in terms of fuel 
efficiency, cost and stability? 
 
The official pointed out that nuclear energy is economical, safer and environmentally 
friendly compared with other sources of energy; hence the cost of nuclear power is 
competitive and stable and uranium is limitless. It is found everywhere and could be 
recovered from sea water when dissolved.755 
 
The UAE has contracted to the supply of natural gas to Japan756. Petroleum reserves may 
not be sufficient to produce the massive demand for energy and it is also not encouraged, 
due to the adverse effects on the environment757. There is a low reserve of coal in the 
                                         
751 Official G (FANR, 22-08-2013). 
752 Official H (ENEC, 22-08-2013). 
753 Official G (FANR, 22-08-2013). 
754“Policy of the United Arab Emirates on the Evaluation and Potential Development of Peaceful Nuclear 
Energy,” Released April 20, 2008. Available at: https://pcs.enec.gov.ae/Content/Home.aspx, last accessed 
on 3-01-2014. 
755 Official G (FANR, 22-08-2013). 
756Middle East Economic Digest, “UAE purchases gas from Dolphin pipeline at reduced rate,” May 16, 
2008. For more information on the pipeline, see http://www.oxy.com/Our_Businesses/oil_and_gas/Pages/ 
og_mena_dolphin.aspx last accessed on 3-1-2014. 
757Christopher Blanchard M. et al, op.cit. 
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UAE and it was not found feasible for power generation758. Although wind and solar 
energy productions are also useful, they could not produce electricity in high capacity. 
Based on the above reasons, the UAE consented to nuclear energy as the best possible 
source for energy production to meet the needs of 2020.759 
 
c. How does a nuclear energy plant produce electricity? 
 
The official said that a nuclear reactor produces and controls the release of energy from 
splitting the atoms of uranium and uranium-fuelled nuclear power is a clean and proficient 
means of steaming water to drives turbine generators.760 A nuclear power station works 
like most coal or gas-fired power stations, except for the reactor itself.761 
 
The power generation through nuclear energy is made possible through various nuclear 
reactors set up with the help of innovative methods to ensure safety and security762.  
 
d. How will the host communities benefit economically from this nuclear power 
plant? 
 
Data gathered indicated that the local communities will essentially gain extra energy with 
least cost and this affordability would help promote economic development in the local 
communities.763 
 
Nuclear power generators will provide more employment opportunities to the nationals 
of the UAE. This can help the country achieve a better economic position764.  
 
e. Is there an expanding plan for nuclear energy stations in other cities? 
 
                                         
758 Ibid. Christopher Blanchard M. et al, op.cit. 
759 Official H (ENEC, 22-08-2013). 
760 Official H (ENEC, 22-08-2013). 
761 Official H (ENEC, 22-08-2013). 
762 Ibid. Christopher Blanchard M. et al, op.cit. 
763 Official H (ENEC, 22-08-2013). 
764 Official G (FANR, 22-08-2013). 
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The official said that the UAE plans to expand the nuclear power projects to other 
cities.765 
 
f. Is there a detailed cost-benefit plan devised to support the arguments for the 
development of nuclear energy? 
 
The official said that the UAE will sell electricity to the Gulf region and the African 
countries.766 
 
6.5.1 Analysis of economic issues 
 
This section presents an analysis of the economic issues concerning nuclear energy 
development in the UAE, about which information was collated during interviews with 
officials at FANR and ENEC. It also looks at the discrepancy with the IAEA’s laws and 
the nuclear law of UAE in this regard. 
 
The UAE intends to use nuclear power generation programmes to suit the economic 
purposes of the country and improve local economies. Nuclear power is economical and 
stable. The author posits that the use of skilled labourers from other nations in the UAE 
nuclear power projects will benefit the economy and foreign exchanges of other nations. 
Thus, the nuclear power project conceived by the UAE will benefit the country, catering 
for its power needs and simultaneously will benefit other nations through having their 
skilled labourers working in the UAE. 
 
On the other hand, the growing population of labourers from other nations has affected 
the growth of national skilled labourers from within the UAE. This would in turn result 
in labourers from other countries monopolising the nuclear power project. The lack of 
national skilled labourers will eventually affect the work culture and workforce in the 
country. This needs to be addressed, if the UAE wants to provide more employment 
opportunities to its own nationals.    
 
                                         
765 Official H (ENEC, 22-08-2013). 
766 Official H (ENEC, 22-08-2013). 
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The generation of electricity through conventional methods would have increased the 
opportunities for low skilled, medium skilled and high skilled labourers767. The ENEC’s 
objective was to increase the participation of the local inhabitants in the building of the 
nuclear power generators768. Extensive training, human resource development, and 
education programmes are required for the UAE to build enough competence to run the 
nuclear energy programme with local endowments.  
 
The researcher argues that although the country has set up a training institute to impart 
knowledge and skills to the indigenous population and thee local labourers, it is a highly 
expensive procedure, because the training of individuals relating to nuclear reactors 
cannot be confined to classroom teaching and requires practical expertise. This would 
lead to increase in expenditure for the country. When the cost-effective analysis regarding 
the employment opportunities is conducted, the training costs involving the idea of 
imparting technical and scientific expertise to the indigenous population needs to be 
seriously thought out.  
 
The Federal regulation of UAE in Clause (7), defines nuclear damage as any other 
economic loss, other than loss caused by the impairment of the environment.769 However 
in the IAEA’s amended regulation, there is a statement, if permitted by the general law 
on civil liability of the competent court. Whatever the case, the author views that any 
economic damage should be duly compensated. 
 
6.6 Safety, security and environmental issues 
 
These discussions are focused on those aspects of the development and treatment of 
nuclear energy, with a specific view to the continuing assurance of safety for the 
communities served. 
 
a. Are nuclear energy plants safe?  
 
                                         
767 Official G (FANR, 22-08-2013). 
768 Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation Press Release, December 27, 2009. 
769 The UAE Federal Law Decree No. 4 of 2012. 
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The official said that nuclear energy plants are safe only if pre-set conditions for their 
operation are strictly followed.770 
 
b. Is it safe to live near to, or work within, a nuclear energy plant? 
 
The official also said that it is safe to live or work within a nuclear power plant, because 
it is radiation free.771 
  
c. Who will license radioactive sources? 
 
The officials said that FANR will be responsible for licensing radioactive sources.772 
 
d. What are the safety design features in a nuclear reactor? 
 
The official773 responded that safety designs in the APR1400 chosen by the UAE for its 
nuclear power programme possess Core Damage Frequency of less than 10-6/RY; 
Containment Failure Frequency of 10-6/RY; Occupational Radiation Exposure of 1 man-
Sv/RY or less; Thermal Margin of 10% of higher; Station blackout Copping Time of 8 
Hours minimum; and the Containment boiling of PS Concrete Structure.774 
 
It was also gathered that in constructing the building which is ultimately slated to house 
the nuclear reactor, ENEC intends to pour in a total of around 1500 cubic meters of 
concrete for a foundation slab at the Barakah Unit 1 Reactor Containment Building.775 
Generally, containment structures are amongst the safest construction endeavours in 
consideration of the thickness of their walls, the magnitude of steel used to reinforce the 
structures and the interior steel liner plate utilised during the construction process.  
 
In the next phase, the concrete is intended to be poured into the reactor containment 
building, auxiliary and turbine buildings are intended to be constructed, besides raised 
                                         
770 Official I (ENEC, 22-08-2013). 
771 Official I (ENEC, 22-08-2013). 
772 Official J (FANR, 22-08-2013). 
773 Official I (ENEC, 22-08-2013). 
774Ibid. Safety design features in the APR1400. 
775 Official I (ENEC, 22-08-2013). 
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cooling structures. The onsite fabrication and installation of the Reactor Building 
Containment Liner Plate would have commenced by the end of 2012, utilising heavy-lift 
cranes and equipment.  
 
e. What will you do with nuclear waste - will it be stored? 
 
The official said that UAE will store it in the country for 20 years, after which it will be 
removed using new techniques.776 
 
f. How is the UAE going to transport waste from the nuclear plants? 
 
The respondent said that the highest waste will be sent back to South Korea for treatment 
and reprocessing, to be imported again into the UAE.777 See the Diagram 10 below for 
illustration. 
 
  
                                         
776776 Official J (FANR, 22-08-2013). 
777 Official J (FANR, 22-08-2013). 
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Diagram 10: Nuclear material shipping line between UAE and South Korea 
 
 
Source: China India Middle East Express, 2014778 
 
g. Which country are the nuclear wastes going to be transported to? 
 
It was gathered that the nuclear wastes will be transported to South Korea.779 
 
h. How is the UAE going to manage environmental concerns arising from the 
nuclear plants? 
 
The official said that the UAE’s Department for the Environment will collaborate with 
the Department for Health to ensure that environmental concerns arising from the nuclear 
plants are well managed.780 
 
  
                                         
778China India Middle East Express, 2014. Nuclear material shipping line between UAE and South Korea. 
[Online]: Available: http://www.cma-cgm.com/products-services/line-services/flyer/CIMEX Accessed on 
16/09/2014. 
779 Official I (ENEC, 22-08-2013). 
780 Official I (ENEC, 22-08-2013). 
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i. What is the potential impact of nuclear materials in the marine environment? 
 
It was gathered that if the marine environments are polluted by radioactive materials, 
there is some possibility of danger to marine lives and maritime crews.781 
 
j. How does nuclear energy compare with other energy sources in terms of 
environmental impact? 
 
The official said that nuclear energy is less harmful and more environmentally friendly 
than other energy sources. In other words, nuclear energy helps to reduce carbon dioxide 
(CO2) emissions during its processing.782 
 
It was gathered that nuclear energy saves huge CO2 emissions annually and helps in 
reducing the carbon footprint and that the ecological effects of nuclear power plants are 
not only limited to the emission of carbon dioxide, but also the emissions of radioactivity 
from nuclear active wastes.783 
 
Proper disposal of nuclear active materials is a concern for the UAE, since the 
international conventions prohibit the dumping of such wastes in the high seas and it is 
also not encouraged to take such wastes beyond a country’s geographical boundaries.784 
 
k. What systems do you have in place in case of emergency? 
 
It was gathered that presently, there are no systems in place in case of emergency, but 
there are plans in progress for the release of emergency systems in the year 2015.785 
 
  
                                         
781 Official I (ENEC, 22-08-2013). 
782 Official I (ENEC, 22-08-2013). 
783 Official I (ENEC, 22-08-2013). 
784 Official J (FANR, 22-08-2013). 
785 Official I (ENEC, 22-08-2013). 
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l. Who is responsible for the security of the plants? 
 
It was gathered that the UAE’s Critical Infrastructure and Coastal Protection Authority 
will be responsible for the security of the nuclear plants.786 In addition, the country 
considers using the services of its joint security forces, which include the army and the 
police. 
 
6.6.1 Analysis of safety, security and environmental issues 
 
Officials at ENEC view safety as a primary concern. They mostly follow the guidelines 
that have been set by international organisations. These guidelines are often imbibed by 
other industries. They are constantly developing a safety culture at ENEC and their main 
concern is to ensure the safety of the UAE population, the workers, as well as that of the 
environment. At ENEC, staffs are expected to raise any issue relating to security and 
recognise areas for upgrading. Nuclear plants are safe to work in as they are known to be 
radiation free. 
 
The researcher maintains that the liability covered by the law includes loss of or damage 
to property; cost of restoring the impaired environment; death and personal injury; loss 
of income because of such impairment; preventative measures; and any other economic 
loss caused by the accident. The nuclear law in the UAE provides for injury caused to 
person and property, as well as compensation for injury caused economically and 
ecologically.787 
 
Licensing in the UAE nuclear industry is basically controlled by FANR. ENEC, to 
maintain safety in the UAE’s nuclear plant considers improving on set standards during 
construction, by reinforcing the foundation slab and the reactor containment building. 
 
Nuclear energy is environment friendly. Arguably, nuclear power entails the formation 
of waste products of changing levels of radioactivity, some of which will still present as 
                                         
786 Official I (ENEC, 22-08-2013). 
787 The UAE Nuclear Law Decree No. 4 of 2012. 
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dangerous thousands of years on788. The treatment of nuclear wastes will be by storage 
for a considerable number of years, then it will be transported for treatment and 
reprocessing, depending on the type of waste. 
 
The UAE has a formidable environmental and public health department, which will 
ensure that related concerns are well contained.  Emergency responses should be 
enhanced to cater for such issues when need arises. The UAE also considers the reduction 
of its carbon footprint up to 12 million tonnes annually.  
 
6.7 Summary of Chapter Six 
 
Chapter Six presents the analysis and discussions on the excerpts gathered during 
interviews with experts in the UAE, in the field of nuclear energy, using qualitative 
research methodology. This helped to explore issues relating to the UAE’s possession of 
nuclear power. Using prepared and approved questions, different views on pertinent 
issues to do with the legal and liability, political, economic as well as safety, security and 
environmental aspects of the country’s nuclear energy development were gathered. The 
research results are critically discussed. 
 
While ensuring maximum requirements in the nuclear power programme, the UAE 
complies with international standards to ensure safety and security. As a member nation, 
the country seriously considers the 19 milestones for nuclear power infrastructure 
development. The country has also been successful in initialising the nuclear power 
project, with the assistance of the IAEA and their timely reviews. The country’s nuclear 
policies have also attained a consensus from the international community. This is because 
the country’s policy is viewed as transparent.  
 
The UAE is party to the international conventions on nuclear safety including The 
Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident; The Convention on Assistance 
in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency; and the comprehensive 
Convention on Nuclear Safety. 
                                         
788Tromans, Stephen (2010). Nuclear Law: The Law Applying to Nuclear Installations and Radioactive 
Substances in its Historic Context. Hart Publishing: Oxford. Page 2. 
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UAE also collaborates with other nations which uphold peaceful use of nuclear active 
materials and have ratified the NPT to be accepted within the international community. 
The country’s genuine need to mobilise its citizens to control the nuclear power plant is 
evident with the establishment of an institute to produce personnel in the fields of science 
and technology and particularly, nuclear power generation.  
 
The UAE has also been seen to have gained vast experience from previous nuclear 
accidents that have happened in various parts of the world. The country places the utmost 
importance on the safety and security of its nuclear power plants, the inhabitants of the 
communities where the plants and the environment. UAE tries to staunchly abide by the 
international conventions and guidelines relating to the operation of nuclear reactors.  
 
The UAE’s nuclear policy has undertaken issues in the liability regime which is in line 
with international instruments, thereby making the operator fully responsible for the 
damage caused by nuclear accidents. The country also limits the period within which a 
claim for damages can be brought by the claimants.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
7.1 Introduction to Chapter Seven 
 
Chapter Seven forms the Conclusion part of the thesis.  Here, the researcher reviews the 
study, presents the original contributions that the research has made to the area of study 
and makes some recommendations on how the law can be used to determine issues 
regarding state and civil liabilities in the UAE’s nuclear power programme. These 
recommendations are made based on the outcome of the research and are offered for the 
intensification of nuclear energy development in the UAE. This chapter therefore presents 
how the research aims and objectives have been met through the research process. 
 
7.2 Highlights of the UAE’s nuclear power programme 
 
7.2.1 Motivations for UAE’s nuclear power programme and its economic 
importance 
 
The UAE has commenced its nuclear power programme, aimed at meeting the country’s 
increasing demand for electricity. The programme benefits from the support of the IAEA 
and their regular reviews. The nuclear policies of the country have also achieved global 
acceptance having been viewed as being transparent. The author believes that the country 
has gained from the experiences of previous nuclear accidents and has paid utmost 
importance to the safety and security of the nuclear power plants, inhabitants and the 
environment. The country also abides by the international conventions and guidelines 
relating to nuclear reactors.  
 
Undoubtedly, the use of nuclear energy for power production has increased the pace of 
development in many countries and has aided industrial development more than 
renewable sources of energy have. UAE plans to build about fourteen nuclear power 
plants. It will construct and run four nuclear plants by the year 2020. The country started 
the construction of the power plant in Abu Dhabi in collaboration with a Korean 
consortium (KEPCO). The company was awarded the contract after bidding along with 
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seven other companies. While UAE wants to possess nuclear energy to promote national 
development, the researcher also believes that the country weighed up possible 
constraints related to embarking on the programme. 
 
The UAE was meticulous in maintaining the transparency in running the nuclear 
programme. To make this possible, the ENEC was formed. It was given the status of a 
public entity. The corporation was to evaluate the workings of the UAE’s nuclear power 
programme. The development of the nuclear power plant in Barak was given the licence 
for construction by the ENEC. After the approval for the first site was obtained, the UAE 
was successful in getting the approval for building the other two nuclear power plants 
also. The commercial viability of nuclear power generation is useful for countries that 
expect tremendous development in the commercial arena.  
 
The researcher argues that the distinctive nature of the risks created by leakages of 
radioactive materials significantly restricts dealing with eventual nuclear liability claims 
under the present state compensation laws. The UAE, having recognised this has 
structured its national law in compliance with the law of obligations contained in nuclear 
liability conventions and incorporates the fundamental principles included therein. These 
principles include the following:  
 
i. The operator of a nuclear plant being entirely and legally responsible for nuclear 
damage.789 
ii. Ascertaining the liability of the operator without the need to demonstrate 
negligence.790 
iii. Making sure the local courts in the place of incidence undertake exclusive 
jurisdiction of claim cases.791 
iv. The possibility of setting a time limit for liability and the amount of liability. 
v. The payment of damage, devoid of bias or favouritism based on ethnic grouping 
or residence.   
                                         
789 As contained in International Nuclear Laws example Vienna Convention etc. 
790 See in particular Callow v. Tillstone sited from http://e-lawresources.co.uk/Strict-liability.php Accessed 
on 13/04/2013. 
791 See http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/liability_status.pdf+ Accessed on 
18/05/2013. 
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7.2.2 Safety and non-proliferation of nuclear materials 
 
The UAE’s objective to produce power through nuclear energy to meet the needs of the 
country seems to be an incredibly justifiable use of nuclear power. This is unlike many 
countries that use it to strengthen military forces. The UAE’s approach towards the use 
of nuclear energy is another factor that needs appreciation and appears to be a model for 
other countries. The need for transparency in nuclear dealings is an important factor to be 
adopted by all international entities that use nuclear energy.  
 
The international community has apprehensions about more states possessing nuclear 
energy, especially after the nuclear accidents in power plants like the Chernobyl and 
Fukushima which were preceded by the Three Mile Island and the Windscale disasters. 
Various augmentations about nuclear power developments show such developments are 
predominantly viewed with suspicion around the world. The effects of nuclear incidents 
can last more than one generation and are alarming. This has made the international 
community very cautious about allowing member states to engage in nuclear 
programmes.  
 
Countries that already own nuclear weapons are not interested in allowing others to 
augment nuclear weapons for fear of being attacked. The author posits that the restrictions 
on the possession of nuclear weapons are laudable developments for the international 
community, since the uncontrolled use of nuclear power would mean increased 
competition among the member states.  
  
The UAE co-operates with other nations that work towards the peaceful use of nuclear 
active materials and has ratified the NPT to be accepted by the international community. 
The researcher argues that the peaceful use of nuclear energy for scientific and 
technological development helps a country to attain growth when compared to other 
countries that do not venture into exploiting this form of energy. 
 
The international community has accepted the IAEA’s guidelines on safety, security and 
protection. These guidelines are carefully drafted by the agency, taking into consideration 
the flaws of nuclear installations that were damaged and the reasons for such accidents. 
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The IAEA guidelines are not made mandatory unless assistance is sought from the 
agency. The author also argues that this position would not ensure the eradication of risks 
involved in nuclear power reactors.  
 
The UAE has gained from abiding by international conventions and instruments that deal 
with nuclear safety, ranging from the protection of nuclear power plants and materials to 
the safe disposal of nuclear wastes. This has stimulated global confidence in accepting 
the use of nuclear energy for power production. The difference is in the outcomes of the 
Three Miles Island and the Chernobyl nuclear accidents, making it evident that if all the 
safety standards are followed, there is a possibility that nuclear activity will not affect the 
host population of the nuclear plant and that nuclear reactors can produce substantial 
amount of power at low cost with unparalleled reliability.  
 
The use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is not restricted by any international 
conventions or treaty. The ill effects of nuclear energy can be devastating. This has made 
the international community sceptical about the use of nuclear energy, even for peaceful 
purposes since it requires high levels of safety and security measures to make sure that it 
will not lead to a catastrophe. It is also necessary to consider the future generation while 
encouraging the use of nuclear energy for power production or other peaceful purposes. 
The use of nuclear energy is a serious issue and requires stringent planning for enabling 
development. 
 
The UAE is aiming only at peaceful nuclear programme rather than for any illegal 
purpose(s). Therefore, there has been increased need for the protection of transparency in 
the programme. The UAE consciously avoids the enrichment of nuclear fuel, since that 
would create doubt regarding the intentions of the country, because enriched uranium or 
re-processing of plutonium is used to produce weapons.  
 
The UAE adheres strictly to the rules and regulations of the international codes 
monitoring the safe management of nuclear energy. The country is open to external advice 
and input in these regards. In addition to the domestic agencies, there are international 
agencies that regulate the affairs of nuclear power programmes. The World Association 
for the Nuclear Operators is a union of countries that use nuclear energy for power 
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production. These countries help each other and offer recommendations for safer handling 
of the nuclear energy.  
 
The UAE has also become a member of various organisations. Primarily, the UAE is a 
member of the IAEA, thus subjects itself to the regulations and rules of IAEA thereby 
has given its acceptance to the peaceful usage of nuclear energy. The ratification of NPT 
by the country strengthens its resolve to follow the treaty guidelines and the regulations 
of the IAEA.  
 
7.2.3 Legal and liability issues 
 
The nuclear policy of the UAE, along with the liability regime has been prepared in line 
with the international instruments to make the operator exclusively liable for the damage 
caused by nuclear accidents. It also limits the period within which a claim for damages 
can be brought by the claimants.  The UAE has passed to Phase 3 of the IAEA’s review, 
with the signing of the international convention on civil liability in cases of nuclear 
accidents and the Joint Protocol to the conventions in 2012.792 Though only 
recommendatory in nature, the country adheres to the above international guidelines.793 
Victims may not be able to attain compensation from the nuclear operators when a nuclear 
accident happens if countries fail to accept these guidelines. 
 
From the analysis, the researcher subsequently discovered the following ambiguities in 
the proposed UAE Federal regulation, as well as some discrepancy between the IAEA’s 
laws and the country’s nuclear law. 
 
In the Federal regulation of UAE, nuclear damage is stated in Clause (7) of the definition 
as “Any other economic loss, other than loss caused by the impairment of the 
environment”794. However, the IAEA’s amended regulation provides that only if such 
loss is permitted by the international law on civil liability of the competent court.  
 
                                         
792 Ali Vaez, Karim Sadjadpour, (2013). Iran’s Nuclear Odyssey: Costs and Risks Report April 2, 2013. 
[Online]: Available at: http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/04/02/iran-s-nuclear-odyssey-costs-and-risks/ 
Accessed on 26/02/2015. 
793 See Ali Vaez, Karim Sadjadpour, (2013). 
794 Nuclear Law Decree No. 4 of 2012. 
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Clause 4 makes nuclear damage to include: “the costs of measures of reinstatement of 
impaired environment, unless such impairment is insignificant, if such measures are 
actually taken or to be taken, and insofar as not included in paragraph (2) above”. This 
means that the UAE Law recognises damage to the environment but depends on the level 
of damage caused whether significant or insignificant 
 
Under the definition of nuclear incident, the UAE’s federal law does not include the 
IAEA’s statement “creates a grave and imminent threat of causing such damage”.795 
 
Article 3 states that the operator of the nuclear installation shall be liable for any 
damage.796 Nothing is mentioned about the state or the country. A reading of this 
provision indicates that if there is any damage caused because of the operation of the 
nuclear installation, the responsibility shall rest with the operator. So, if the operator of 
the nuclear installation is a private party, this means that operator shall be fully liable and 
the state does not have any kind of liability at all. However, if the operator is bankrupt, 
whose responsibility is it to compensate the victims of nuclear incidents?  
 
Again, Article 4 clearly states that the operator shall be solely responsible for any liability 
whatsoever.797 However, as per the Convention, the installation state has a shared 
responsibility, yet this is totally excluded in the UAE’s Federal law. The installation state 
can exclude liability only for carriage that happens within that territory.  
 
Article 7 of the Federal law states that “If the operator proves that the nuclear damage 
resulted wholly or partly either from the gross negligence of the person suffering the 
damage or from an act or omission of such person done with intent to cause damage, the 
court may relieve the operator wholly or partly from the obligation to pay compensation 
in respect of the damage suffered by such person.”798 However in the Vienna Convention, 
it speaks about exclusion such as armed conflict, hostilities, civil war and insurrection. 
These aspects are not mentioned in the Federal law of UAE.  
 
                                         
795 IAEA’s amended Protocol. 
796 See Nuclear Law Decree No. 4 of 2012. 
797 See Nuclear Law Decree No. 4 of 2012. 
798 Nuclear Law Decree No. 4 of 2012. 
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Liability during transportation is not mentioned in detail in the Federal law.799 What 
happens in case there is an accident during transportation? Whose liability is it then? 
These aspects are not clearly explained in the federal law.  
 
Under Article 12 (2) of the jurisdictional clause, it is stated that “The provisions of this 
Law by Decree shall apply to actions related to civil liability for nuclear damage. The 
provisions of the 1997 Vienna Convention shall apply wherever no provisions are made 
in this Law by Decree.”800 However does that mean in the case of jurisdiction, or in the 
case of the entire law? Also, the criminal liability is totally avoided. Will this involve any 
criminal action at all? 
 
Though the Federal law is not as comprehensive as the IAEA regulation, it is nevertheless 
stated therein that any absence in law or lack in the law, will be addressed by the IAEA 
law, but whether the whole law applicable or not is not clearly stated.  
 
The author learned that the Federal Law No. 4 of 2014 does not regulate acts of terrorism 
or extremist activities. In other words, the law does not say whether the operator would 
be held responsible for damage because of the afore-mentioned activities. However, in 
Japan, the operator is held responsible for damages caused by natural disaster, for 
example an earthquake or tsunami. In Europe, the law stipulates that operators are not 
responsible for harm caused by natural disasters or war. 
 
The researcher recommends that the UAE should conduct a detailed study of the possible 
liabilities that might arise from nuclear power plant project(s) and prepare the national 
legislations accordingly. It should also be admitted that the national legislations should 
have a restriction on the liability amount, to encourage more promoters for nuclear power 
generation.  
 
The researcher also suggests that national legislations should include liability for 
environmental damage too. The state can also endeavour to frame a set of guidelines for 
safety and security of the plant, along with measures to reduce damage to the 
environment. The state should ensure that all precautionary methods are adopted to 
                                         
799 See Nuclear Law Decree No. 4 of 2012. 
800 Article 12 (2) Nuclear Law Decree No. 4 of 2012. 
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minimise damage to flora, fauna and mankind. This could lead to a more successful power 
generation programme in the country. 
 
7.2.4 Sustainable use of energy 
 
The present scenario in the international community is such that non-renewable sources 
of energy are unable to meet the growing needs of power, due to industrialisation and 
ever-growing populations. Therefore, it is necessary to exploit the possibilities of nuclear 
energy and to keep pace with the changing environment for industrial, as well as 
ecological, reasons. Such exploitation however, needs to take care of the security, safety 
and safeguard of the nuclear plants and nuclear active materials. 
 
The conventional methods of electricity production would mean the use of water, natural 
gas or oil. Even though the UAE is rich in petroleum resources, its constant use would 
mean continuous depletion of petroleum resources that could not be replenished in the 
foreseeable future. Not only this, but these resources will also not be able to provide for 
the ever-increasing power requirements of the economically developing nation. 
Therefore, the cheaper option, capable of producing the required commercial quantity of 
power in the UAE was found to be nuclear energy.  
 
The generation of power using nuclear energy is to meet the increasing needs of the 
present population. It is factual that the generation of power from nuclear sources equally 
generates nuclear wastes that can last for many, many years and can affect the generations 
to come. The author therefore argues that the current generation has a duty towards the 
future one, which is to protect them, by making sure that no harm is, or will be caused. 
This can be achieved to some extent by using a reactor that can re-use the nuclear fuel, 
thus reducing the nuclear wastes. Partitioning and transmutation is one method that can 
reduce the production of nuclear wastes. Such a reactor can provide for the current 
generation’s increasing demand for power, while reducing the amount of nuclear waste 
that is produced, which in turn reduces any harm done to the future population. 
 
The legal framework provides for the moral needs of the society. The standards of safety 
and security as provided by the IAEA strive to achieve the safest method of operation of 
nuclear power plants. The legal framework provides for strict liability to the operator, 
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which means that the operator will be cautious enough to prevent any accident or leakage 
in the nuclear power plant that can affect the generations to follow.  
 
7.2.5 Local content and manpower development 
 
The construction of a nuclear plant in the UAE meant training the inhabitants of the 
country to run it. It is rather unusual that most the employees in the UAE are from foreign 
countries. The researcher observes that Emirate nationals are not technically skilled or 
trained to take on the higher posts in the nuclear power plant. The construction of the 
power plant thus meant imparting skills to the Emirate nationals. The contractual 
obligations between UAE and the Korean Consortium involve imparting the former with 
the knowledge and skills to work in the plant through GNEII.  
 
The country’s genuine need to mobilise the inhabitants to control the nuclear power plant 
is evidenced by the establishment of an institute to imbibe expertise in the field of science 
and technology. Since the operation and management of a nuclear power plant is risky, it 
requires a large amount of experience. Thus, the running of a nuclear power plant requires 
veteran skilled personals.  
 
7.3 Recommendations  
 
Having analysed the various issues that are intrinsic in the development of the nuclear 
power programme in the UAE, this section therefore offers some recommendations that 
can be adopted for the pursuit of peaceful nuclear power development in the country. 
These are presented below: 
 
7.3.1 Gaining from peaceful and sustainable use of nuclear power by the UAE 
 
It can be concluded that nuclear power generation is important for the development of a 
country and caters for its growing needs. With the decreasing non-renewable sources of 
energy production, nuclear energy would enable the UAE to sell the extra power 
produced, thereby increasing its financial capacity. Without exporting energy, the country 
can attain economic development with proceeds from commercialising nuclear power 
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generation when compared to other sources. Therefore, the UAE is expected to grow 
economically in the future.  
 
7.3.2 Formulation of safety and security measures 
 
The International Conference on the Safety of Nuclear Power and the suggestions of the 
IAEA General Conference has given hope that there would be an international consensus 
on the safety measures to be adopted in nuclear power plants801. This way, to some extent, 
the moral obligations are met.  
 
The safety measures need to be formulated on a national basis, but the basic ideas on 
which these measures are formulated need to be the same all around the globe. The IAEA 
can take the lead in formulating international criteria of safety. The Agency can be 
inspired by the works of Euratom in creating a standardised method of safety in nuclear 
power plants. The Vienna Convention on Nuclear Safety aims at addressing the need for 
a standardised approach to the safety measures802.  
 
The peaceful use of nuclear energy can be encouraged only with stringent rules that 
prevent its use for military or destructive purposes. In addition to nuclear non-
proliferation, strict rules are required regarding the safeguarding of nuclear power plants. 
 
It would be appropriate that the UAE should make laws to prohibit any acts of terrorism 
in the country. It would also be better if the Gulf region or the Middle East could make a 
regional decree in this regard, to ensure the safety and security of particularly nuclear 
power plants in the region. 
 
7.3.3 Emergency Preparedness and Response 
 
Another important instance which requires an international framework is when there is a 
nuclear accident. There is need for emergency planning should there be any disaster(s). 
Such plans should be ready to be utilised immediately, since the time available to respond 
                                         
801 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database. [Online]: Available at: 
http://www-ns.iaea.org/security/itdb.htm, last Accessed August 7, 2012. 
802IAEA, http://www-ns.iaea.org/conventions/nuclear-safety.asp , Last Accessed August 24, 2012. 
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to such cases is often limited. The ‘Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or 
Radiological Emergency document published by the IAEA is now a part of the safety 
Standards of the IAEA.803 It is important to note that the emergency response systems in 
each country may differ, but are assessed based on this criterion as well as international 
standards. UAE is committed to meeting the IAEA standards of safety, as well as 
complying with their stipulated regulations.  
 
In the past, there have been various instances of nuclear mishaps, notably Chernobyl and 
Fukushima. An emergency response system that is set up internationally helps in reducing 
the impact of such mishaps, but it is not sufficient to prevent such accidents from 
happening. There should be a domestic system that deals with the required steps to be 
followed in case of a nuclear accident and the public should be warned of the effects of 
such nuclear accidents to minimise the shock of a nuclear mishap804.  
 
The Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological 
Emergency makes the IAEA responsible for helping nations to identify the useful steps 
in developing their own mechanisms for early response to nuclear mishaps805. It is 
therefore important that countries should adopt the ‘Preparedness and Response for a 
Nuclear or Radiological Emergency’ formulated by the IAEA. This forms a 
comprehensive and single set of regulations and standards to be followed by all the 
countries in a unified manner806.  
 
The above should be unreservedly considered and maintained, since the three steps of 
nuclear power plant operation which include mining, milling and waste disposal are most 
risky and can bring harm to human beings. The international community therefore needs 
to formulate standards to be maintained while performing these steps to avoid harm to 
living beings.  
 
  
                                         
803Ibid. IAEA 
804Srikanth Hariharan, “Nuclear Safety, liability and non - proliferation: a legal insight’, 2012 IELR 108. 
805 International Atomic Energy Agency, International Atomic Energy Agency Illicit Trafficking Database, 
see:http://www-ns.iaea.org/tech-areas/emergency/preparedness.asp?s=1&l=1,  Last Accessed June 7, 
2013. 
806 Ibid. IAEA 
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7.3.4 Prosecution of defaulting operators 
 
The nature and implications of a strict liability system, as opposed to a fault-based system, 
should be developed. Operators of nuclear power plants in the UAE must operate in line 
with the provisions as stipulated in the licences granted them. Anything short of this 
should cause their licences to be revoked. Also, proper jurisdiction and prosecution 
should be invoked on them. This will make operators carry out their functions morally 
and ethically. 
 
7.3.5 Compliance with national and international laws 
 
High level scrutiny is required in nuclear power production. This is to ensure that the 
operation and control of the plant(s) follow national laws and regulations807. To increase 
the use of nuclear energy for useful purposes, there should be an unambiguous assurance 
to the international community that the use of nuclear energy will not result in health 
issues through radiation, if the safety guidelines are followed.  
 
7.3.6 Control of operations and enforcement of liabilities 
 
While private nuclear power plant operators could be theoretically constrained in 
operating the installation under stringent checks and balances, nevertheless, government 
agencies are believed to be more proficient in running such sensitive establishments. In 
this regard, proper legislation is required regarding aspects associated with insurance, the 
contractual obligations and the required licences towards ensuring the efficient 
functioning of the installation.  
 
Although the bottom line limitations have been somewhat relaxed in the reviews 
conducted in 2004 in comparison to the 1997 Protocols, non-nuclear states are 
nevertheless encouraged to adhere to the pre-review limitations. This is for the benefit of 
the nuclear operators even if the associated benefits to victims do require further 
clarification and study. In consideration of the fact that victims are generally required to 
initiate any litigation in the justice system of the nuclear state, the fact remains that the 
                                         
807 Reece R. et al, op.cit. 
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avenues of recourse are nevertheless limited. Even if there could be certain options for 
the victims, they would still be constrained utilising the full range of benefits due them. 
And, if the claims are in the range of sever billion Euros, they would certainly be at a 
disadvantage.  
 
7.3.7 Need for State liability 
 
As earlier discussed, the responsibility of running the nuclear power plant(s) rests with 
the holder of the licence. According to Article 21 of the Joint Convention, primarily, the 
responsibility of nuclear active waste management rests with the licenced operator. But 
if there is no such operator who can be held liable, the liability rests with the state itself. 
Thus, the state authorities must take the necessary measures to deal with radioactive 
materials808.  
 
Generally, a sovereign state is liable for any act within its territory resulting in harm to 
the international community. Even if the state does not have the intention to cause such 
harm, the liability lies with the state to compensate for the damage caused809. In practice, 
though, if the state has taken all the necessary available measures to ensure the operation, 
maintenance and management of nuclear active substances, no liability would be induced 
on such state810.  
 
The 1963 Vienna Convention deals with nuclear accidents. It provides for the liability of 
the individual responsible for the nuclear power project and not the liability of state811.  
From this analysis, it can therefore be inferred that it is not the installation of a nuclear 
plant that should be given caution, but its constant supervision. It is therefore 
recommended that an authority should be set up to keep track of work progress on the 
installation of nuclear power plants. It is also rewarding if the state is made liable for all 
                                         
808Ibid, Article 21. 
809 Rudolf Bernhardt, Ulrich Beyerlin, Karl Doehring and Jochen Abr. Frowein, Restatement of the Third 
Law: The Foreign Relations Law of the U.S., Vol. 1 (St. Paul MN: American Law Institute Publishers, 
1987).   
810 Alexandre Kiss & Dinah Shelton (2004).  International Environmental Law 624 (3d ed.); World Nuclear 
Transport Institute, Fact Sheet no. 1, Safety Regulations Governing the Transport of Radioactive Material. 
Available a:thttp://www.wnti.co.uk/UserFiles/File/public/publications/factsheets/ wnti_fs_2007 /FS-1.pdf 
Last accessed on 6th June 2013. 
811Alexander Kiss, ‘State Responsibility and Liability for Nuclear Damage’, 2008 Denv. J. Int`LL&Pol`y 
35:1, 67 
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the damage caused by nuclear activity to the environment, or any damage caused by a 
nuclear mishap. The state should be obliged to ensure that the operators of nuclear power 
plants abide by the international rules and regulation regarding safe operation of said 
plants812.  
 
It is also mandatory that even if a violation of international obligation does not result in 
damage, it should give a cause of action for other rule abiding nations to bring an action 
against such state. Only then would the obligation of states to abide by such rules have 
the desired result.  
 
7.3.8 The need for legislative fortification 
 
In the revised version of the Vienna Convention, states are liable for damages across a 
broad spectrum. Hence, non-nuclear states and non-contracting states would perhaps do 
well to consider the pros and cons of signing the revised version of the Convention, 
especially in consideration of the time limitations offered to victims to file claims in the 
event of damages. Hence, national governments should draft the necessary legislative 
measures before joining and signing up to such treaties, to at least ensure their 
installations would not be liable where radiation and damages is caused by terrorist 
attacks to their installations, or other similar grave and unforeseen circumstances.  
 
The CSC does not set any specific bar on the minimum time for which the nuclear 
installation is liable to pay damages, although it does recommend that the upper limit be 
determined by each individual state’s national legislation. The UAE imposes the 
limitations recommended by the Vienna Convention.  
 
When a country becomes a full-fledged member of the Vienna Convention, they are 
required to specifically indicate their compliance to Article 19 of the Convention. Such 
an initiative would ensure that the nation would disassociate with countries which have 
only ratified the un-amended Vienna Convention, if these nations would always try 
fulfilling their obligations at the lower levels only. Such nations have declined to be liable 
in case of terrorist attacks on their installations, which is of major global concern.  
                                         
812Ibid. 
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National governments are responsible for all aspects of the safety of a nuclear installation 
erected within their sovereign boundaries and may not refuse responsibility in the event 
of terrorist attacks on their facilities. It is imperative that they should be willing to provide 
required funding for the operation of an international tribunal, if there is such a need and, 
should fulfil all their obligations in monetary terms if the situation arises. It is not 
encouraged for national governments to try limiting their liabilities or capping the same.    
 
The establishment of a compensation fund instead of backup funding is encouraged. This 
is agreeable, even if the former stipulates stringent provisions determining its usage. The 
UAE should ideally set up a fund which should contribute towards fulfilling the damages 
inadvertently caused to individuals. This would help in significantly building the 
credibility of the national government in this regard, besides meeting the Convention’s 
stipulations.  
 
Nevertheless, the mechanisms dealing with nuclear power projects and nuclear reactive 
materials are controllable for the time being, but the absence of a global law that deals 
with nuclear power production generally is of concern. The trade relating to nuclear active 
wastes and spent fuel have restrictions, if GATT is made applicable to them. The WTO 
and the IAEA must work complementarily to bring about the required changes in the 
international business relations and to create new rules for trade in spent fuel and nuclear 
wastes. The national initiatives also require proper professional training for the nuclear 
power operators and increased public awareness to deal with the fears the public have 
regarding the hazards of nuclear power plants.  
 
7.3.9 The need for legal provision for compensation for financial injury 
 
It is important that the UAE enact governmental legislation to set limits on the liability of 
nuclear power plants in case of claims arising against them. Normally, private insurers 
have balked at providing insurance coverage in this regard; the government’s actions 
could encourage the private sector to step up their efforts and reduce the gaps currently 
observed. Presently, private insurers are reluctant to cover unlimited claims and would 
contest the same if they were made to do so.  
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It is recommended to establish a civil liability regime related to the nuclear power sector, 
which could delineate the responsibilities of a nuclear power plant operator vis-à-vis the 
public. Usually, the operator is bound to ensure that the public is not affected by nuclear 
radiation at any time during the plant’s operation or during the movement of radioactive 
material from one location to another.  
 
The legislation enacted by the government should make the operator fully liable in the 
event of any breach in this regard. The laws ought to be such that the operator should be 
made liable, even if they could perhaps plead that they were not directly responsible for 
the damages caused, since even indirect culpability in such instances should be enough 
to prosecute the operator. If multiple operators were found to be culpable, it could be 
arranged for them to be jointly and severally liable.   
 
The text of the legislation should provide the contractor the benefit of not allowing the 
operator to be indemnified against any individual and should not allow an individual 
alone, to be liable in the case of damages caused by the operator’s actions. Thus, even 
when a contractor working on behalf of the operator is responsible for a malfunction 
which causes damages, the operator alone should ultimately be responsible. On the face 
of it, this could be in divergence to the laws of negligence.  
 
7.3.10 Ratification to international instruments relating to nuclear accidents and 
damages 
 
Gaining from the analysis of the nuclear accidents, the UAE while entering a phase of 
nuclear power generation in 2017 should ratify the international instruments relating to 
nuclear accidents and damages. Even if there is a strong national legal system which deals 
with such a scenario, only if the country is party to the international instruments, can it 
avail itself of the international system of liability restrictions and receive support from 
international agencies when required, for compensating the victims in case of an accident. 
The adherence to international instruments in relation to safety and security measures 
would also help in realising enhanced safety for the nuclear power plants. In addition to 
adhering to the safety standards, the UAE being characterised by specific features like 
high petroleum reserves can bring about changes to the international regime that suits its 
specific characteristics by imbibing such changes in their national legislations.  
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After each nuclear accident, it is realised that the existing system of international 
regulations and methods of calculating liability is not sufficient to compensate the victims 
and to promote nuclear power generation. After the Fukushima accident, it was also 
realised that the domestic system of regulations and quantifying compensation is not 
effective when it comes to accidents that result in drastic damage(s) to mankind and the 
environment. A lone operator of the nuclear project cannot raise the amount to fulfil his 
liability towards such victims. Therefore, the adherence to international systems of 
regulation, as well as quantifying compensation became necessary.  
 
It is common law that the liability to compensate victims of nuclear accidents rests on the 
operator who holds the licence. At times, the compensation amount to be paid to the 
victims may be too high for the operator alone to pay with insurance policies and other 
financial securities available to him. Then the state has the liability to pay the remaining 
amount. The obligations of the state in such circumstances can be fulfilled with the help 
of international organisations and institutions like the IAEA and OECD, through their 
mechanisms of pooling in the international funds. This might not be possible if the 
country in which the nuclear mishap occurs is not a party to any of the international 
conventions or associations.  
 
Since nuclear accidents may have a wide-ranging, extensive effect, which may sometimes 
travel beyond the geographical boundaries of a state, it is possible that domestic systems 
of regulations and liabilities will not be sufficient813. The liability of the state is a de-facto 
liability to the victims of a nuclear accident that has harmful effects on a large area of 
land, possibly extending beyond geographical/national boundaries, without any means of 
human control.  
 
This necessitates a more developed method of quantifying and spreading the liability of 
a nuclear accident. Since the extent of damage is too vast for the operator alone to 
compensate, it is highly necessary to form a liability regime that includes the state in 
which such accident occurs. The international organisations and associations can also take 
up a moral supporting role, to alleviate the damage caused by nuclear accidents.  
                                         
813Lamm, ‘Vanda (2006). The Protocol Amending the 1963 Vienna Convention’. In: ‘International Nuclear 
Law in the Post-Chernobyl Period’, OECD-NEA, (Paris, 2006), p 174. 
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It is high time that there is a liability clause which makes the state that gives the licence 
to the operator responsible for at least the trans-boundary harm a nuclear accident may 
result in. It is recommended that the state is made responsible for alleviating the injury 
caused to persons within the country, above the limitation of the operator’s liability. In 
the absence of such a liability, the public grievously affected by the nuclear accident that 
resulted from a project intended to benefit the whole State would be left without much 
support, since there is a limit on the amount payable by the operator.  
 
The fact that the UAE has decided to develop nuclear power generation highlights interest 
more countries have in wishing to start developing nuclear power generation projects. But 
the enthusiasm for this endeavour can only be protected for the long term, if the necessary 
safety precautions and security measures are taken. It is also recommended the country 
has a clear system of liability quantification and compensation payments in case of 
damage resulting from nuclear mishaps. It is also possible to augment public support by 
increasing the responsibility of the State to protect the wellbeing of the public and the 
environment, rather than making only the operator liable for damage caused by nuclear 
accident(s).  
 
In order to have a successful nuclear power-driven industrial development in the UAE, 
safety of such projects should be given prime importance. The construction of legal 
responsibilities of the operator and the state is secondary to the safety and security 
concerns.  
 
Recently, the law relating to nuclear power generation has matured. From the occurrence 
of various nuclear disasters, the international community saw the need for changes in 
existing legal systems, both nationally and internationally. Since radioactive substances 
can also cause damage to the environment outside national boundaries, the international 
community deems it necessary to strengthen the international groups and is still working 
on the system.  
 
The management of waste from nuclear power projects poses a higher risk, since it is a 
continuous process. For if the nuclear power projects operate, radioactive wastes will be 
generated. In many of the places where nuclear projects are functioning there are high 
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risks of nuclear contamination. The main reason for this is the unscientific methods 
adopted. After the Fukushima accident, there has been a slow phase for the development 
of nuclear power plants. Many of the countries have resorted to dismantling their existing 
nuclear power plants. This has increased the risks and amounts of nuclear active waste 
products.  
  
The disposal of contaminated material is much more difficult than managing the waste 
from nuclear power plants, because the quantity of contaminated materials is much higher 
when compared to the quantity of waste produced. So, there should be proper regulations 
and procedures set to attain proper management of waste from nuclear power plants. The 
UAE needs to specifically focus on the management of nuclear waste in a scientific way 
to bring about the desired goals without damage to the environment. 
 
7.3.11 Changes that could be brought to the International Regime 
 
There are certain features that make the international regime of nuclear liability less than 
efficient. These factors are discussed as follows. 
 
As stipulated in the Rio Declaration, basic principle should be included in the 
international nuclear liability regime to provide full satisfaction of the harmed and to do 
the needful to minimise its ill effects on the environment814. 
 
The international system of computing the nuclear liability should take the burden of 
proof away from the victim to make the liable person responsible for the accident. A 
restriction or exemption to the liability of the operator would result in giving an upper 
hand to the nuclear investors and at the same time burdens the harmed815.  In this era, 
there is high possibility of attacks from extremists or terrorists. Despite such a possibility 
the international conventions exempt the operator from his liability in case of armed 
conflict, hostilities, civil war and insurrection. When there is nuclear accident due to 
terrorist attack, the victims will not be properly compensated for the damage suffered. 
                                         
814 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, June 3-14, 1992, princ. 16, UN Doc. 
A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I) (June 16, 31 ILM 874 (1992). Available at: http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/ 
environmental.development.rio.declaration1992/doc Last accessed on 15-07-2013. 
815Ibid. Rio Declaration. 
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The operator may be exempted from liability in such circumstances and this would affect 
the injured. There are also chances of drastic climatic conditions that may have been 
predicted already.816 In such circumstances also the injured should be able to raise their 
claim against the operator.  
 
Another significant characteristic of the international conventions is that the amount of 
damages is restricted. The way in which nuclear accidents can affect the person and 
property of individuals in various nations are neither restricted nor limited. Therefore, 
restrictions or upper limits in the compensation amount would result in hardships to the 
injured. According to the Vienna Convention, each State is given the power to decide 
either on increasing the upper limit of compensation, or making it unlimited. However, 
not many States have increased the limit of compensation payable. If the amount liable 
for nuclear injuries is not restricted, the operator would find it difficult to get insurance 
coverage for compensation for which he may be liable after a nuclear accident817.  
 
The steps taken by some of the countries in increasing the cap of compensation amount 
are nowhere near the actual injury that is caused by a nuclear accident. According to the 
IAEA Explanatory note, the cap in the compensation amount is intended to boost nuclear 
investment and acts as an advantage for them818. From the statistics, it can be inferred that 
there is a discount of about twenty billion Euros a year attributable to the cap created in 
the international conventions on the liability amount of the nuclear plant operator819. If 
the liability amount is made unlimited, then the expense that will be incurred by a nuclear 
power operator would increase by three hundred percentages, by way of insurance 
premium820.  
 
                                         
816 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [hereinafter IPCC], Third Assessment Report: Climate 
Change 2001: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability, para. 12.1.5.3. Available at http://www.grida.no/ 
climate/ipcc_tar/wg2/468.htm, last accessed on 15-07-2013, para. 12.1.5.3.  
817 IAEA, The 1997 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and the 1997 Convention 
on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage Explanatory Texts, at, note 230, page 12, IAEA Doc. 
GC(48)/INF/5 (Sept. 2, 2004), available at http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC48/Documents/ 
gc48inf-5expltext.pdf  last accessed on 15-7-2013. 
818IAEA Explanatory Notes, op.cit. 
819 Greenpeace International, (2005). Invest in a Clean Energy Future, 15 (July 2005) (written by Antony 
Froggat and Sven Teske). Available at: http://www.greenpeace.org/raw/content/international/press/reports/ 
SubsidiesReport.pdf Last accessed on 15-07-2013. 
820Ibid. Greenpeace International. 
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Thus, in effect the present international system allows only for a limited amount of 
compensation to nuclear accidents and the damages that occur due to the accident. The 
limitation in compensation would affect the environment at large and the interests of those 
States that have not utilised the nuclear energy. 
 
The present international system of computation of liability arising from a nuclear 
accident has been limited to claims that have been raised within the limitation period of 
10 or 30 years, according to the nature of the injury. The very peculiar feature of nuclear 
active materials however, is that the injury that may be caused by such radioactive 
materials would remain latent for many years and sometimes even for generations. The 
limitation period now in force would make some injuries ineligible for compensation. 
There should be a different mechanism for deciding the time limit, since the injury could 
have arisen many years after the accident. 
 
The present international system of nuclear liability concerns the liability of the operator 
alone, since the operator is made exclusively liable for all the damages that may arise 
from nuclear accidents. This helps all others related to the nuclear power plant secure 
their interests, since only one person will be targeted by the victims to realise their claim. 
The restriction of liability on one person would affect the interest of the injured on the 
other hand. Also, during the movement of radioactive materials from one place to another, 
the parties involved in such transactions should be made liable jointly and severally. 
According to the IAEA Explanatory note, the purpose of limiting the liability of the 
nuclear active damage on the operator alone is to save the injured from having to prove 
the liability of other parties to the incident.821Yet in practice, the injured should be given 
the option of claiming against others, like the suppliers, who are also responsible for the 
nuclear accident to an extent and it is for the injured to decide whether to take a chance 
in proving the guilt of the person against whom the claim is made. 
 
In the present system of nuclear liability law, the operator is the only person made liable 
for the damages caused by nuclear accidents. If under some circumstances, the person 
liable does not pay the compensation amount, or is unable to make good for the loss(es) 
suffered, the injured will not be compensated for the damage suffered by the victim. To 
                                         
821 See IAEA Explanatory Note. 
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avoid such a situation, there should be an alternate arrangement to pay for the damage 
caused by nuclear accidents through an alternate financial security.  
 
According to Burges Salmon LLP (2005), there are general law routes for assert 
compensation resulting from damage to the environmental such as nuisance and 
negligence; nevertheless, a number of torts can as well be exploited and, since they are 
forms of strict liability, might be an additional dominant instrument for claiming for such 
losses. Though in presumption, there is no genuine connection between these torts, 
practically, the courts are expected to use thoughts from any reported cases when taking 
into consideration other legal torts. Statutory environmental torts are infrequently used by 
claimants who have suffered environmental harm, but they are realistic tools in that they 
compel strict liability regimes and as a result avoid the complications drawn in 
establishing mistakes on the part of the defendant.822 Burges Salmon LLP (2005) says 
that they have in recent times used the statutory tort arising from the illegitimate dumping 
of waste to achieve a six-figure settlement for a client in situations where there was no 
other reasonable opportunity of recuperation signifying that consciousness of these 
statutory torts is imperative, to guarantee that chance to recover losses are not ignored. 
 
Under the present international regime, the claims that arise from damage caused by 
nuclear accidents can be brought before courts of law in the State where the nuclear power 
plant is situated. This would affect the victims since their claim would be decided by the 
courts in the operator’s country. The claims of the victims may not be properly ascertained 
since the court that deals with the claim is of the operator’s State. It is often cited by the 
scholars that in Merlin v. British Nuclear Fuels PLC823, the court in the UK was not 
                                         
822 Burges Salmon LLP (October 2005).  Legal Developments Worldwide. Statutory Environmental Torts 
- An Underused but Powerful Resource. [Online]. Available at: http://www.legal500.com/develop 
ments/144 Accessed on 05/09/2016. 
823Merlin v. British Nuclear Fuels, PLC, [1990] 3 All ER 711, 720 - 21, [1990] 3 WLR 383.  
In this case, the claimants found out that their house had high levels of radiation due to the presence of 
radioactive dust from the defendant’s Sellafield Nuclear Installation so they wanted to sell it. The public 
was aware of this and the house was sold at a much-reduced price. Due to this, the claimants decided to 
exploit the statutory tort in order to be compensated for their house value because of radioactive 
contamination and risk of damage to their children from being exposed to the radiation. Both claims were 
dismissed by the High Court holding that radioactive dust could not be ‘property damage’ reason being that 
the radioactive dust did not alter the molecular structure of the house. This was, irrespective that the 
radioactive dust could be removed, the presence of the dust in the atmosphere would subsequently 
contaminate again after a short period of time. Similarly, an increased risk of cancer was not physical 
damage and could not be claimed under a normal understanding of the provision of the 1965 Act. This 
actual interpretation of ‘property damage’ has been argued and following cases have expanded its scope. 
See: Burges Salmon LLP (October 2005).   
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prepared to accept the claim of the plaintiffs that their house was affected by nuclear 
active materials that affected the health of the inhabitants on the long run. The court held 
that since there was no fault found in the house that could be seen such claim cannot be 
entertained. According to the court in the UK a house being affected by radioactive 
nuclides do not necessary lead to an injury that was the result of a nuclear incident since 
there was no physical tampering to the house and the possible effect of the presence of 
nuclides would be cancer that can be caused due to other artificial and natural radio 
activity.  
 
Later, in the year 1998 in Blue Circle Industries plc v. Ministry of Defence case824, the 
court of first instance was pleased to hold that damage has been caused by nuclear 
accident. On appeal, the court of Appeal went by the decision in Merlin’s case and held 
that there was no change in the constituting factors of land and so there was no damage 
caused. 
 
The victims of these two cases would have felt that their case failed since the decision 
was made by a Court of the State that had the nuclear power plant situated. The researcher 
therefore recommends that a neutral authority or tribunal should decide on the claims that 
arise from nuclear accidents so that there will not be a feeling of bias for the victims of 
the nuclear activity. This could be in form of mediation [which is a form of Alternative 
Dispute Resolution (ADR)] where a mediator is appointed by both parties willing to 
engage in face-to-face negotiation. This aims for clear agreement between the participants 
as to how they will deal with specific issues while acknowledging a party’s feelings. Here, 
the mediator focuses upon participants’ future goals rather than a detailed analysis of past 
events and while controlling the process does not overtly try to influence the participants 
                                         
824 Blue Circle Industries plc v. Ministry of Defence [1998] 3 All ER 385, [1999] Ch 289   
In this case, plutonium escaped from the Atomic Weapons Establishment at Aldermaston. This was caused 
by the overflow and contamination of the site pond on neighbour’s marshland caused by storm water. The 
contamination was conspicuous so the claimant spent reasonable amount of money in decontaminating the 
soil and the farmland. It was argued by the defendant that, following Merlin, there had been no alteration 
to the molecular structure of the land as such no harm had been caused under the statutory tort. The 
defendant’s arguments were not accepted by the Court of Appeal. The Courts however admitted that there 
had been physical harm to the soil as it had become radioactive waste with less value. This case was 
different as being a pure economic loss litigation regarding the devaluation of the house. It is disputed 
whether Merlin was actually a case of pure economic loss. This notwithstanding, the Court of Appeal’s 
decision has expanded the class of physical damage that can be recovered and now consist the costs incurred 
in decontamination. See: Burges Salmon LLP (October 2005).   
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or the actual outcome. This process can be completed in one or few sessions. In other 
words, this process is more economical and not time consuming. 
 
It is interesting to note that the Vienna Convention has provided for the application of the 
domestic law of the operator to be put in practice when a claim for damages arise out of 
a nuclear power plant that is situated within the national boundaries of that country 
without any bias or favouritism825. But, the very application of the domestic law of the 
operator’s country is discrimination towards the victims or injured in the nuclear 
accident826.   
 
Normally, when there are different actions maintained in different countries, it is the court 
in the victim’s country that will be the proper forum, or the country in which the first 
action was initiated827. However, while providing for the court of the country in which 
the operator belongs, it is against the victim’s interest since the injured must bear the 
burden of approaching the court in the operator’s country. Instead, if the jurisdiction is 
given to the court of the place where the injury occurred, the difficulty for the injured will 
removed828. This is more important when the damage for which damages are claimed is 
related to the environment829. According to the Oil Pollution Liability Convention, the 
                                         
825Vienna Convention, op.cit. 
826 Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.48/14 (1972), reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972) LouisSohn, The Stockholm Declaration on the 
Human Environment, 15 HARV. J. INT’L. L.423 (1973), and Michael Akehurst, International Liability for 
Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts not Prohibited by International Law, N.Y.J INT’L. L. 3 (1985) 
and International Law Commission, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 
56/83, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Jan. 18, 2002) available at 
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/State_responsibility/responsibilityfra.htm.last accessed on 15-7-2013. See 
Article 3 of the Convention on Biological Diversity signed at Rio de Janeiro on June 5, 1992, entered into 
force Dec.29, 1993, 31 ILM (1992) available at http://www.biodiv.org/doc/legal/cbd-en.pdf Last accessed 
on 15-07-2013. 
827 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 
1968, Article 21 on lispendens. Available at: http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/brussels.jurisdiction.and. 
enforcement.of.judgments.in.civil.and.commercial.matters.convention.1968/doc.html#137 Last accessed 
on 15-07-2013. 
828House of Lords in Spiliada Maritime Corporation v. Cansulex Ltd. [1987] 1 A.C.460 , Andrew Owusu 
v. Nugent B. Jackson, Case C-281/02  , Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 250 (1981)   and Ronald A. 
Brand, Balancing Sovereignty and Party Autonomy in Private International Law: Regression at the 
European Court of Justice (University of Pittsburgh School of Law, Working Paper Series # 25, 2005) 
available at http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1025&context=pittlwps, Last accessed on 
15-07-2013.  
829 Revised Vienna Convention, art. 1(k). See also art. 1(m) and 1(n)   
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court with jurisdiction to entertain a claim for damages is the court of the place where the 
injury occurred830.  
 
About the appropriate law to be applied in claims of damages, it is recommended that the 
law of the injured should be made the practice. Especially when an injury occurs during 
the movement of radioactive material from one place to another, the injury would 
normally be suffered at the place where the victim normally resides. So, if the injury 
happens in a country that is far away from the country of the operator, the victim would 
find it difficult to get his grievance redressed.  
 
Another shortcoming of the existing international system of nuclear liability is that the 
financial loss sustained in the case of a nuclear accident is not addressed or such injuries 
are not properly redressed by the existing international conventions. If the nuclear 
accident results in economic damage or any other damage that is corollary to the nuclear 
accident, then the international regime should be applied to such damage also. The 
definition of damage should also include the injury caused to the environment and marine 
environment by the nuclear incident.  
 
The court of law should be made accessible to the injured. In some countries, an action 
can be maintained only if an amount of security has been paid by the claimant. There are 
also instances when the party which fails in litigation, is made to bear all the litigation 
costs. This would restrict the injured from claiming damages in the court of the operator’s 
country.  
 
The present international system of nuclear liability has recognised strict liability of the 
operator helps the victims from initiating action against the operator without being 
dragged through the process of evidencing the operator’s fault. The relationship between 
the damage and the nuclear incident needs to be proved by the injured and this is a difficult 
affair for some kinds of injuries. In Hope v. BNFL831  the Court held that the radioactive 
substances arising from the Sellafield nuclear facility would not cause cancer, but later 
                                         
830 International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil 
Pollution Damage, art. IX, Dec. 18, 1971, 11 I.L.M. 284, amended by 1992 IMO Protocol to Amend the 
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 1969   
831Hope v. BNFL and Reay v. BNFL (1994) 5 Med. LR 1   
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the scientific research showed that the offspring of men who were exposed to such nuclear 
active materials were at higher risk of blood cancer and non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma832. 
There was a lapse of about eight years in finding the scientific relationship between cancer 
and the radioactive emissions from the said nuclear plant. Thus, as described above, the 
restriction of limitation period to a decade is sometimes not enough to effectively 
compensate the injured, since the relationship between the injury and the nuclear incident 
may be discovered after the lapse of ten years.  
 
Another important hurdle of the international nuclear liability regime is the number of 
ratifying States to the international conventions that relate to nuclear liability. There are 
about five hundred nuclear installations in approximately thirty countries altogether833.  
Even so, many of the big players of nuclear energy production like Canada, Japan, India, 
China and the USA have not accepted the international conventions relating to nuclear 
liability. Countries like the United Kingdom and France have accepted the Paris 
Convention, but have not ratified the Joint Protocol and the Vienna Convention. On the 
other hand, the Vienna Convention has been ratified by Russia834.  
 
Now, the overriding matter for concern is that more and more developing nations are 
harnessing nuclear energy for power production. But some of the countries like India, 
China, South Korea, and Japan have not signed any of the international instruments 
relating to the liability of nuclear accidents835.  
 
 
                                         
832 Heather O. Dickinson & Louise Parker, Leukemia And Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma In Children Of Male 
Sellafield Radiation Workers, 99 INT’L J. OF CANCER 437, 437 – 44, May 2002, available at 
http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/92013261/PDFSTART Last accessed on 15-7-2013 
and Sellafield Increases Cancer Risk, BBC, June 19, 2002, Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1 
/hi/health/2054694.stm. Last accessed on 15-07-2013.   
833 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (2005). Annual report for 2004, IAEA, at 1, G C (49)/5, 
available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Reports/Anrep2004/anrep2004_full.pdf.   
834 Ibid. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (2005). Twenty-six more were under construction at 
the end of 2004, eighteen of them being in Asia and Martin Gardner, Results of Case-control Study of 
Leukaemia and Lymphoma among Young People near Sellafield Nuclear Plant in West Cumbria, British 
Med. J. (1990).   
835 International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2004, at 34 available at 
http://www.iea.org/Textbase/npsum/WEO2004SUM.pdf (last visited July 15 2013) and Uranium 
Information Centre, Plans for New Reactors Worldwide, (Aug. 2006). Available at: http://www. 
uic.com.au/nip19.htm Last Accessed on 15-07-2013. 
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7.3.11.1 Ratification of global nuclear responsibility system by non-member and 
non-contracting states 
 
It is therefore important to have a detailed study of the advantages and disadvantages of 
nuclear liability from the international perspective. This would make more states accede 
to international instruments. The various aspects of a single international mechanism to 
deal with nuclear liability regime are also analysed below. 
 
When a non-member state has not signed any of the international instruments that deal 
with nuclear accidents and liability, victims in such a country will be best rewarded if the 
country’s decision had been to accede to the international regime. The researcher views 
that the major issue with non-contracting states is that their domestic laws do not comply 
with international conventions, for example, after the Fukushima incidence; Japan’s 
domestic law did not cover all the aspects of the disaster, like compensation for victims, 
so this created some ambiguities between national laws and international conventions. 
 
Since there are many international instruments that deal with the liabilities that may arise 
in the event of nuclear accidents, ratification of any of these instruments or more of them, 
would not lead to a uniform method of liability creation. Each international instrument in 
existence differs in various aspects and, such differing aspects make the ratification of 
even just one or two such instruments a failure in resulting a common code of liability. 
The primary factor for having a single method of liability calculation is that every 
sovereign State must have a connection with each other through international or regional 
conventions. According to the International Expert Group on Nuclear Liability, the 
Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage should an extent 
achieved this objective by linking the contracting States of the Paris Convention and the 
Vienna Convention. This Convention has gone beyond the Joint Protocol in augmenting 
an international account for paying damages for nuclear harm836. 
 
At present, there is no unified code of an international nature that relates to nuclear 
damages. There are various international conventions which deal with the same subject, 
                                         
836 The International Expert Group on Nuclear Liability (INLEX), - Recommendations on how to facilitate 
achievement of a global nuclear liability regime as requested by the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, 
IAEA website: http://ola.iaea.org/ola/inlex-group.html last accessed on 15-7-2013.  
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but there are differences in their provisions. The differences in these instruments make it 
difficult to form a complete and uniform set of rules and regulations that deal with nuclear 
accidents and liabilities which arise from such accidents. There is further difficulty 
because some conventions that have been modified. Some countries have ratified both. It 
becomes a concern when both versions exist at the same time. This challenge should be 
overcome, to bring about uniformity and certainty in the sphere of nuclear accidents and 
the liabilities that arise there in837.  
 
7.3.11.2 Formulation of a single legal code of nuclear liability 
 
It is high time that the law concerning nuclear liability is unified and there should be a 
single method of computation of nuclear liability. The principles to be followed while 
prosecuting any person liable for damages caused by nuclear activity need to be uniform, 
certain and definite. This helps both perpetrator as well as the victim. 
 
It is factual that the operator of the nuclear power plant in which the nuclear accident took 
place, is the person exclusively liable for such mishap. He is strictly bound by such 
liability and it is not required by the victim to prove a mistake on the part of the operator 
to claim damages. It is not mandatory or required for the victim to show that there was an 
act or omission due to recklessness that led to such accident. It is only required to prove 
that the victim has suffered damage due to the nuclear accident. This helps the harmed 
from litigating for years to get the compensation and benefits the victims.  
 
The operator of the nuclear plant in which the accident happened is made the sole person 
liable for the damages that arise from such accident. The legal principle of exclusive 
liability in nuclear accidents is different from the usual principles followed in the case of 
torts. This is because when there can be various persons who can be made liable, this will 
lead to lengthy litigation processes and filing of various suits to conclude as to the person 
responsible for the damages caused by the accident. Another important reason for the 
formulation of exclusive liability is that if all those who relate to the operation or 
installation of the nuclear plant are made liable, they all must be financially secured 
                                         
837 Simon Carroll op.cit and Tokai-Mura Accident, Japan: Third Party Liability and Compensation Aspects, 
at 7, Nuclear Law Bulletin No. 66 (Dec. 2000), available at http://www.nea.fr/html/law/nlb/Nlb-66/013-
022.pdf Last accessed on 15-7-2013. 
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through insurance policies or other methods838. This would make it difficult vis-à-vis the 
encouragement of investments in nuclear installations. As the liability of persons 
increase, they will not be readily interested in getting associated with nuclear power 
projects. All those who supplied the raw materials for construction and running of the 
project and those who supplied technological assistance will find it extremely hard to 
follow up with the litigations and its expenses and for deciding for insurance policies839.  
  
Another legal aspect that pertains to nuclear accidents is that all the monetary claims that 
arise from the harm caused by nuclear accidents will be entertained only in a court of law 
in a single State. The competent State party will be determined based on the location of 
the nuclear accident or the location of the nuclear plant. Usually international and regional 
instruments give option to the harmed to choose between the court of law of the opposite 
party’s residence or the place of occurrence and the place of injury.  
 
From one view point, the choice of court of law may sound good for the injured. But in 
practice, giving such options would prove to be difficult for the victims since the funds 
available for their redress would be at the hands of different courts for disposal. Presence 
of suits for damages in different courts would lead to a situation where in some victims 
may be awarded huge amounts of compensation by one court while another court gives a 
moderate amount of compensation. This would lead to disparity in treatment of injured. 
When the funds available and the claims are with the same court, all victims would be 
treated alike and the award of compensation would also be proportional to the injury 
suffered.  
 
It is important to note that domestic legislations are unable to accomplish the routing of 
claims to one court, since victims may be from various courts and the injury could also 
be suffered in different parts of the world. In such circumstances, only an international 
effort can route all the claims to courts in one country840.  
 
                                         
838 IAEA, Overview of the Modernized IAEA Nuclear Liability Regime, Annex to IAEA Document 
GOV/INF/2004/9-GC(48)/INF/5, 2004.  
839 Julia A. Schwartz , op.cit. 
840 A paper by the International Expert Group on Nuclear Liability (INLEX), - Civil Liability for Nuclear 
Damage: Advantages and Disadvantages of Joining the International Nuclear Liability Regime, p.14   
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The downside of routing all claims to the courts of one country is that the injured may 
sometimes be forced to raise the claim in a different country to their own. However, the 
difficulty that may arise due to the need for filing of claims outside one’s own country is 
much less than compared to the merits of routing all claims to the courts of one single 
country841. 
 
Yet another benefit of an international regime of nuclear liability is that the judgements 
of a country can be enforced in another through international instruments only. The 
judgement of a country can be implemented in another when both countries have ratified 
the international instrument. In the absence of an international regime, the 
implementation of judgements would be difficult and the terms of acceptance and 
implementation of the court orders of one country to another would differ greatly842.  
 
The main issue with regards to the international system of nuclear liability is that there is 
not much participation from the States around the globe in accepting such conventions 
and instruments843. Even though the Chernobyl accident led to the formulation of a Joint 
Protocol, many countries that ratified the Paris Convention or the Vienna Convention did 
not ratify the Joint Protocol844. The giants, the UK and France maintained distance from 
the Joint Protocol.  
 
7.3.12 Development of a nuclear regulatory group in the Middle East - gaining 
from the EU model 
 
With the UAE being surrounded by several countries, it might be essential to have a 
regulatory body that oversees UAE’s nuclear activity in the region. If UAE were to go by 
the current system, any dispute with the UAE’s nuclear activity would have to be brought 
in the courts of UAE, which might not be very comforting for other GCC member 
countries.  
                                         
841Ibid. A paper by the International Expert Group on Nuclear Liability (INLEX), 
842Ibid. A paper by the International Expert Group on Nuclear Liability (INLEX), 
843Duncan E. J. Currie, ‘The Problems and Gaps in the Nuclear Liability Conventions and an Analysis of 
How an Actual Claim Would be Brought Under the Current Existing Treaty Regime in the Event of a 
Nuclear Accident’, 2006 Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 35:1, 85. 
844 Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear 
Damage and the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, opened for 
signature Sept. 21, 1988, 1672 U.N.T.S. 302, available at: http://www.nea.fr/html/law/nljoint_prot.html   
Last accessed on 15-07-2013 Last accessed on 15-07-2013. 
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Following the European Commission’s decision to oversee all nuclear power regulatory 
issues in 2007, they created The European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG). 
This independent body oversees all nuclear related issues across the EU.845 The body is 
composed of representatives from all 27 member states and includes professionals related 
to aspects of national nuclear safety, the handling of nuclear waste and ensuring adequate 
protection and safeguards in handling the same.846 
 
The ENSREG is tasked with improving all aspects of nuclear safety and waste 
management within the member states. Back in 1957 when the European Economic 
Community (EEC) was being established, the ‘Treaty of Rome’ had also established the 
European Atomic Energy Union, also known as the Euratom Treaty. This now works on 
ensuring uniform nuclear standards throughout the EU, besides ensuring that adequate 
safety standards amongst workers are maintained and associated information is 
disseminated across the population residing within their borders.847 
 
The Euratom Treaty has provided the basis for handling multiple nuclear issues, including 
aspects of radiation and nuclear protection, coordinating the disposal of nuclear waste and 
the movement of spent fuel rods, besides coordinating how nuclear power would be 
utilised for medicine, scientific and industrial applications.848 The Treaty therefore draws 
up the safety standards and determining the use of this power source during peacetimes. 
Member countries are also in coordination with Euratom within the EU Framework 
Programmes related to Research and Technological Development. In coordination with 
Euratom and the related bodies, multiple legislative efforts have materialised, including 
the framework for establishing nuclear safety at multiple installations and the Council 
Directive 2011/70/Euratom of 19 July 2011, which details the handling of nuclear fuel 
and radioactive waste.849 
                                         
845See, The role of ENSERG. Available at: http://www.ensreg.eu/ 
846European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG). [Online]. Available at: http://www.ensreg. 
eu/members-glance/role-ensreg Accessed on 24/02/2015. 
847See, Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), Available at: 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/treaties_euratom_en.htm Accessed on 
15-07-2013. 
848See, Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), Available at: 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/treaties_euratom_en.htm Accessed on 
15-07-2013. 
849 See European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG). [Online]. Available at: http://www.ensreg. 
eu/members-glance/role-ensreg Accessed on 24/02/2015. 
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In the EU, there are several countries which possess nuclear capabilities, however in the 
GCC, the UAE is the only country that would be introducing nuclear energy soon. Saudi 
Arabia is also moving in the direction of getting nuclear capabilities, however currently, 
it is only UAE. Nevertheless, a GCC wide and independent body like ENSERG might be 
essential.  
 
7.4 Case study of the UAE and contributions to knowledge  
 
The section presents the case study of the UAE and the contributions that this research 
has made to the knowledge of the field of study.  
 
The UAE was chosen as a ‘case study’, one that is pervasive through this thesis, because 
not only is it the researcher’s home country but, more importantly, the UAE is a new and 
developing provider of nuclear energy and therefore creates the opportunity for evaluation 
of international legal and political obligations, and the ways and means by which a new 
country can assess and learn from existing providers on matters pertaining to legal and 
economic regulation and development. 
 
There seemed to be an absence of clarity about the responsibilities of the UAE 
government in terms of liability during incidents of misuse of the nuclear plants. The 
research therefore, considered the determination of the efficacy of the country’s nuclear 
energy laws in dealing with potential liabilities arising from the energy programme. 
Rather than see the UAE as a discrete paradigm, the thesis develops the issues with 
relation to the UAE in a consistent and informed manner. This pervasive approach allows 
for the full contextualisation of the numerous issues within the UAE’s development of 
peaceful nuclear energy. 
 
The UAE requires tremendous power supplies to meet their demands. As a new and 
growing provider of nuclear energy, the UAE is required to assess the potential pitfalls 
and liabilities associated with this important and potentially hazardous activity. The thesis 
considered these aspects in the following manner: 
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The establishment of international, regional and local liabilities was presented within a 
review of the nature of relevant organisations. Thus, the platform for specific review of 
the UAE was created via the comparative analysis of these international obligations. The 
research provides (chapter 2) an analysis of the development of international liability 
regimes, and looks to both current and established authors in reviewing the nature of 
provision. Thus, the available literature included Heffron (2009), Stoiber (et al) (2010) 
and Khan (2015). This was reviewed in addition to the established law within the UAE 
(Nuclear Law No 6, 2009 and Nuclear Law No 4, 2012). This was supplemented by the 
various international (IAEA) and UAE government reports.  
 
Having established the platform, the research then looked at what were the emerging 
trends in the development of nuclear energy and liabilities. Established sources such as 
Nuttall (2004), Findley (2010 and the IEA (2009) were used to identify thee trends and 
these were then connected to developments within the UAE. As a counter point to this, 
pitfalls associated with these trends were also considered, in order to achieve a balanced 
review (Holt (et al) (2010) and Grimes (et al) (2010)). 
 
When looking to apply the factors within this platform to the UAE, the researcher was 
able to access the available source materials form academics and industry providers, 
although it was noted that such material was limited given the novelty of developments 
within UAE. Blanchard and Kerr (2010), Mulvey (2011) and Supersberger (2011) 
provided a solid base for analysis here. The researcher was then able to cross-refer this to 
the developments within the international arena (Skagen (2004) and Shrader-Frechette 
(1997) to provide a theoretical underpinning to the work. This was then updated with 
reference to more recent critics, including Heffron (2009) and Stoiber (et al) (2010). 
 
Having set a platform for theory and development within chapter 2, the researcher was 
then able to extend the study to look specifically at the UAE. Thus chapter 3 looks 
specifically at the UAEs motivation and constraints in providing nuclear energy. UAE 
Government Reports (2010) set the tone, with critical appraisal from the available 
literature being used to assess the reports such as Blanchard (2010), Kumetat (2011). 
FANR was reviewed fully, this being the regulatory body of nuclear energy within the 
UAE. Thus, chapter 3 can be seen to build on the platform provided within chapter 2, and 
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seeks to place the development of nuclear energy, and the related legal responsibilities, 
within a practical setting. 
 
The next step was to consider the nature of potential liabilities, the pitfalls that the UAE 
may face when developing nuclear energy. Analyses of major incidents, and the legal and 
academic fallout from them was analysed, to see where the UAE could learn from past 
incidents. Adede (1987), Boyle (1989) and Kemeny (1979) provided clear guidance on 
the nature of international obligations. Studies of individual incidents (Chernobyl, 
Fukishima etc) within chapter 4 allowed for the identification and potential application 
of factors to the UAE. Thus, international legal obligations were considered from source 
(Paris and Vienna Conventions) as well as the academic reviews of the incidents and the 
consideration of both international and domestic liabilities (Arnold (1957), Wakeford 
(2007). 
 
Chapter 5 builds upon the central thesis by looking at the nature and scope of legal 
liabilities within the international domain. This is then enhanced by specific coverage and 
application to the UAE. At this stage the thesis has provided a critical review of the 
literature and direct legal source materials necessary for the evaluation of the nuclear 
programme development within the UAE. The lessons from the past, the international 
and domestic approaches, and the ways to move forward have been established. The latter 
chapters show how the UAE is currently engaged in the implementation of its goals and 
policies. 
 
Chapters 6 and 7 show clearly the original contribution to knowledge, by reviewing and 
evaluating the primary sources data obtained from structured interviews. After the 
presentation of the findings, the thesis moves to the conclusion and the establishment of 
recommendations and proposals for future development. 
 
The research evaluates the extent to which the new UAE nuclear law addresses potential 
liabilities and further makes recommendations towards the effective and safe use of 
nuclear energy by the UAE through compliance with international best practices. 
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The non-ratifications to international instruments relating to nuclear accidents and 
damages by states make it difficult to estimate their levels of sincerity and dedication to 
decent nuclear power production. From global perspective, this act could show countries’ 
non-readiness for to consider standards of practice to ensure harmless power production. 
Nuclear power generation follows suit with regulatory resoluteness and strict adherence 
to led down and required standards and as a matter importance should not in any way be 
jeopardised. 
 
The changes that could be brought to international regime may not be limited to but bases 
on complete removal of excessive burden of proof on the part of the sufferer of nuclear 
accident. This if considered will make liable person responsible for damages or accidents. 
Burden of proof in practice can be inhibitory to fair hearing, justice and equity as a lot 
would be required for it to be completely achieved. In view of this, would it be fair to 
admit or conclude that the sufferer of nuclear damages will be exposed to all needed for 
a burden of proof to be fully exhausted? This may not be possible and could influence 
fair judgement. 
 
From the analysis of the research data concerning UAE as the case study, the researcher 
proposes that with strict readiness and bold commitment to sensitive venture like nuclear 
power generation as in the UAE, it is possible that despite the huge challenges associated 
with nuclear production, a sovereign state through its constituted authorities, stringent 
laws and setting up of compensation limits can deal with harms that may arise from this 
venture. Although the primary aim of the programme is to better the economy of the state 
and the standard of living of the citizens when properly harnessed, but in the event of 
catastrophe, the state takes on the blame (State or Civil Liability) when all other avenues 
of settling damages prove abortive. 
 
It could also be proffered that the formulation and institution of a regulatory body as well 
as single legal mechanism dealing with all aspects of nuclear power and especially nuclear 
liability issues within the GCC member countries can encourage ethical nuclear power 
production in the region. This equally forms a level playing platform relayed litigations 
where both the claimants and the defendants can operate within the dictates of such 
regional laws and as well understand the interpretations of such laws.  
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Therefore, the researcher proposes that gulf regional states should develop a model for 
the urgent notification of nuclear incidents occurring in any country within the region. 
This will ensure immediate response to nuclear incidents to avoid further damage for such 
incidents. 
 
7.5 Further Research 
 
The author is of the view that this research is the first of its kind to address issues 
surrounding how the law would be used to manage potential liability in the UAE’s nuclear 
power programme. 
 
The findings of this research will be more beneficial to the development of nuclear energy 
in the UAE. Also, for the fact that there is little or no research in this area, it is believed 
that the research outcomes will augment future research in this area. This study has 
investigated all aspects of the law and liability regarding the development of nuclear 
energy in the UAE which include: policies and implementations, liability laws, political 
issues, economic issues, safety and security issues as well as environmental concerns and 
policies. It is therefore suggested that each aspect can be a subject for further study and 
be separately examined in depth. 
 
The UAE nuclear law and the implementing regulations are very new and have not yet 
been tested. Moreover, there are no nuclear energy related cases so far handled in the 
country and this is one of the precincts of this research. Once the law and the 
implementing regulations are implemented examining cases under this area, the 
effectiveness and clarity of the guidelines of implementing regulations in the future will 
be other areas for further study. Through suggestions, such examination will help to 
strengthen and enhance the enforcement system. 
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APPENDIX 1: Research Questionnaire 
 
1. Legal and liability issues 
 
a) Does the UAE have any specific national laws regarding nuclear liabilities? 
b) How can an actual claim be brought in the UAE? 
c) How long have the UAE nuclear energy laws been established? 
d) What are the current legal sources for provision of the UAE nuclear energy 
programme? 
e) Are the UAE’s national laws regarding nuclear energy programme enacted in line or 
compliance with international legal instruments? 
f) What are the legal bases for the development of these laws? 
g) What is the specified role of the Emirates’ Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC)? 
h) What legal principles does the ENEC follow (specifically as regards questions of 
potential liability)? 
i) What does a construction licence entail (areas of provision)? 
j) Do current regulations cover all aspects of liability? Is there scope for any 
improvement? 
k) How will UAE or the environment at large cope with the risks exceeding the insurance 
market’s capacity? 
l) The 1997 Vienna Convention does clearly expand the geographical coverage of 
damage and leaving direct control on the Installation State; and while extending the 
definition of damage, it leaves sufficient caution to the laws of the Installation State, 
how does this impact UAE? 
m) In the Gulf region, is there need for a neutral tribunal for settlement of claims? 
n) Many significant countries like UK and France are not signatories to the Joint Protocol 
and are not linked to Vienna Convention parties by treaty system. Are there any 
problems for the UAE or gulf region or Middle East if they do not ratify? 
o) How will the compensation to residents of a non-contracting party be handled, if there 
is any (nuclear) effect on the Gulf State or Middle Eastern State, because some of them 
are not contracting parties? 
p) How is the UAE going to manage liabilities arising from accidents that may arise from 
the nuclear plants? 
q) What considerations, if any, are given to the potential liability of nuclear operators, (A 
strict liability approach)? 
4 
 
r) Who is going to be liable for any nuclear accidents arising from the proposed UAE’s 
nuclear energy programme? 
s) In a situation where damage occurred to a nuclear shipment whilst it was out of the 
source country and on its way to the destination country (damage in transit), who will 
remain liable for any damage? 
t) What jurisdiction would apply in case of third party liabilities/operators liabilities? 
u) What are the financial arrangements in terms of the amounts to be paid to victims of 
possible nuclear accidents? 
v) What is the time limit, if any, for liability? 
w) In the transportation of nuclear and related cargo, both the shipper handling the cargo 
and the owner holding title to the shipment bear responsibility for the safe 
transportation of the consignment to its destination. In the present instance, will the 
UAE government bear ultimate responsibility for ensuring the safe handling of the 
cargo? 
x) What about liabilities in countries like India or South Korea what impact does it have 
on UAE? 
y) What exactly amounts to a nuclear accident or incident? 
z) What is the limit, if any, for any compensation awards? 
 
2. Political issues 
 
a) How would you rate your knowledge and understanding of the UAE nuclear energy 
programme? 
b) What is the UAE’s involvement in the management of the nuclear plants in terms 
of funding and management? 
c) Why did ENEC select KEPCO and the Advanced Power Reactor 1400 MWe 
(APR1400) for its programme? 
d) How will the nuclear power plant in Abu Dhabi actually operate? 
e) What are the levels of involvement of the USA and UK in the UAE’s nuclear 
programme? 
f) Does it really matter that communities in the region would be affected by building 
a nuclear plant near them? 
g) Will the UAE be re-processing or enriching fuel? 
h) To what extent would you agree that the UAE should decide not to enrich or 
reprocess used fuel? 
i) What are the plans for the local people where the plants are located? 
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3. Economic issues 
 
a) Why did the UAE decide to pursue nuclear energy? 
b) How does nuclear energy compare to other sources of electricity in terms of fuel 
efficiency, cost and stability? 
c) How does a nuclear energy plant produce electricity? 
d) How will these communities benefit economically from this nuclear power plant? 
e) Is there an expanding plan for nuclear energy stations in other cities? 
f) Is there a detailed cost-benefit plan devised to support the arguments for 
development of nuclear energy? 
 
 
4. Safety and Security and Environmental issues 
 
a) Are nuclear energy plants safe? 
b) Is it safe to live near to, or work within, a nuclear energy plant? 
c) Who will license radioactive sources? 
d) What are the safety design features in a nuclear reactor? 
e) What will you do with nuclear waste - will it be stored? 
f) How is the UAE going to transport waste from the nuclear plants? 
g) Which country are the nuclear wastes going to be transported to? 
h) How is the UAE going to manage environmental concerns arising from the nuclear 
plants? 
i) What is the potential impact of nuclear materials in the marine environment? 
j) How does nuclear energy compare with other energy sources in terms of 
environmental impact? 
k) What systems do you have in place in case of emergency? 
l) Who is responsible for the security of the plants? 
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APPENDIX 2a: Letter of approval by the research supervisory team to 
administer research questionnaire 
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APPENDIX 2b: Recommendation Letter fro The Chhief Scientist at 
FANR 
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APPENDIX 3: Certificate of Competent Authority for Radioactive 
Material Package Design Source: UAE Federal Authority for Nuclear 
Regulation (FANR). 
 
 
 
 
i
  
 
    
CERTIFICATE OF COMPETENT AUTHORITY FOR RADIOACTIVE 
MATERIAL PACKAGE DESIGN 
1.  CERTIFICATE 
NUMBER: 
UAE/0001/AF-96 (Rev 0) 
2.  EXPIRY DATE: 1 Jan 2018 
3.  ISSUED TO: KEPCO Nuclear Fuel Co., Ltd. 
  989 Beon-Gil, Daedeok-daero, Yuseong-gu, Daejeon, 
305-353, Korea www.knfc.co.kr 
The Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation (FANR), certifies that the 
package described below has been demonstrated to meet the 
regulatory requirements for the packaging for fissile radioactive 
materials as described in FANR regulations, FANR-REG-13 "Regulation 
for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials" and IAEA Safety 
Requirements TS-R-1, "Regulations for the Safe Transport of 
Radioactive Material", 2009 Edition. 
 4. PACKAGE IDENTIFICATION: HERMES-L (from certificate ROK/0040/AF-
96(Rev 2)) 
 5. PACKAGE DESCRIPTION AND AUTHORIZED RADIOACTIVE 
CONTENTS: 
 
[1] Description: 
[2] Drawings: 
[3] Contents: 
HERMES-L may carry up to two (2) 
unirradiated uranium dioxide fuel 
assemblies for an APR1400 nuclear 
power plant. 
HERMES-L packaging is manufactured in accordance 
with KEPCO Nuclear Fuel Co., Ltd, Drawing No. A0-
7A7D2-951-P01. 
Unirradiated uranium in the form of uranium 
dioxide fuel pellets contained within fuel rods. The 
235U enrichment shall not exceed five (5) percent 
by weight total uranium. 
[4] Cr i t i c a l i t y  Saf e t y  Ze ro  (0 )  
Index (CSI): 
The criticality safety analysis of the 
package is documented in "Request for 
FANR's Multilateral Approval of the Fresh 
Fuel Shipping Cask", Enclosure 3, dated 27 
April 2012, and "Safety Analysis Report for 
the HERMES PWR Fresh Fuel Shipping 
Package", Rev C. 
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[5] QA Requirements The QA requirements are documented in 
"Request for FANR's Multilateral Approval 
of the Fresh Fuel Shipping Cask", Enclosure 
4, dated 27 April 2012. 
6. CONDITIONS: 
 
 
a. Each user of the HERMES-L package must have in its possession a copy 
of this certificate and all relevant documents necessary to properly 
prepare the package for transportation. 
b. Each user must prepare the HERMES-L package in accordance with the 
relevant documentation and FANR applicable regulations. 
c. This certificate does not relieve the consignor or carrier from 
compliance with any of the requirements of the government ny-
csuatry-through or into which the package will be transported. 
 
_____________________ 
William D. Travers  
Director General  
Issued in Abu Dhabi  
24 December 2012 
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APPENDIX 4: Licence for the Construction of a Nuclear Facility Source: 
United Arab Emirates Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation (FANR) 
 
United Arab Emirates Federal Authority for Nuclear 
Regulation 
 
License No: FANR/NF/2010/001 
License for Selection of a Site for the Construction of a Nuclear 
Facility 
 
Under the powers provided in Articles (6) and (28) of Federal Law by Decree No. 
6 of 2009 Concerning the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (the Law), the Federal 
Authority for Nuclear Regulation (the Authority) hereby issues a licence to: 
The Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC) 
Being a corporation established by Abu Dhabi Law Number 21 of 2009. 
This license authorizes ENEC to conduct the following Regulated Activity set 
forth in Article (25) 1 of the Law: 
Selection of a Site for the Construction of a Nuclear Facility. 
This site selection license (this License) is subject to the conditions set out in 
Schedule 3. 
This License shall continue in full force until suspended or revoked by the 
Authority or until surrendered by the Licensee. 
This License comprises this page and the following Schedules: 
Schedule 1: (1 page) Interpretation; 
Schedule 2: (2 pages) Specification Required under Article (24) of the Law; 
Schedule 3: (1 page) License Conditions; 
Schedule 4: (1 page) Application Documents; 
 
Issued at Abu Dhabi 
This 28th of February, 2010 
 
 
William D. Travers 
Director General of the Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation
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Schedule 1 
Interpretation 
 
For purposes of this License, the following terms shall have the meanings set 
forth below. Other capitalized terms used but not defined herein shall have the 
meaning ascribed to them in Article (1) of the Law. 
 
Selection of a Site for the Construction of a Nuclear Facility means only the 
regional analysis and identification of potential sites; screening of potential sites 
and identification of candidate sites; and evaluation of candidate sites so as to 
characterize fully the site-specific conditions pertinent to the Safety and security of 
a Nuclear Facility and activities reasonably associated with the foregoing. 
Schedule 2 
Specification Required under Article (24) of the Law  
1. The Facilities, Activities or inventories of Sources covered by this License. 
This License covers the Regulated Activity Selection of Site for the Construction 
of a Nuclear Facility as defined in Schedule 1. 
2. The requirements for notifying the Authority of any modifications to 
Safety-related aspects. 
License condition 2 in Schedule 3 sets out the requirements for notifying the 
Authority of any modifications to Safety related aspects. 
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3. The obligations of the Operator in respect of its Facility, 
equipment, Radiation Source(s) and Personnel. 
The obligations of the Operator related to the site selection Activities 
are set out in Schedule 3. 
Any use of Radiation Sources shall be subject to licensing by the Authority. 
4. Any restrictions imposed on Operation and use (such as Dose or 
Discharge limits, action levels or limits on the duration of this License). 
The duration of this License is specified in the body of this License, no other 
restrictions on Operation and use apply 
5. Criteria and conditions for Radioactive Waste Processing for existing or 
foreseen Radioactive Waste Management Facilities. 
No Radioactive Waste Processing is foreseen under this License. 
6. Any additional authorizations that the Operator is required to obtain 
from the Authority. 
As indicated in item 3 above the Operator is required to obtain a separate 
License 
for the use of Radiation Sources. 
7. The requirements for incident reporting. 
No requirements for incident reporting are foreseen under this License. 
8. Criteria of the reports that the Operator is required to submit to 
the Authority. 
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Criteria of the reports that the Operator is required to submit are 
set forth in License condition 5 in Schedule 3. 
9. The records that the Operator is required to retain and the time periods 
for which such records must be retained. 
The obligations of the Operator related to the recording of Activities are 
set out in License condition 7 in Schedule 3. 
10. Emergency Preparedness. 
No Emergency Preparedness provisions are foreseen under this License. 
11. Any other requirements determined by the Authority in 
implementing regulations. 
There are no other requirements beyond those specified in the License 
conditions in Schedule 3. 
Schedule 3  
License Conditions 
1. ENEC shall conduct the Activities authorized by this License in accordance 
with: 
a. the Law; 
b. any applicable regulations issued by the Authority pursuant to the Law; 
c. the terms and conditions of this License; 
d. the documents referenced in and/or submitted with ENEC’s 
application for this License (the Application Documents). 
2. ENEC shall notify the Authority of any modification to Safety-related 
aspects of the Application Documents at least 30 days prior to their 
implementation. Such modifications shall be subject to the Authority’s re-
assessment and approval. 
3. ENEC shall provide the Authority with a plan and timetable for specific 
Activities to be undertaken under the general authority of this License at 
least 30 days prior to such Activities commencing. 
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4. ENEC shall provide the Authority with access to any place, to any document 
or to any authorized person, and shall provide all assistance necessary to 
enable the Authority to inspect the licensed Activity in accordance with 
Articles (5), (35) and (36) of the Law. 
5. ENEC shall provide to the Authority within one month of the end of each 
calendar year a report on the Activities carried out under this License 
during the previous year. 
6. ENEC shall obtain any necessary licenses, permits and authorizations from 
any other competent authority prior to conducting any Activities 
authorized by the Authority under this License. 
7. ENEC shall retain any Safety-related information gathered and recorded 
during the site selection process for the life time of the Nuclear Facility. 
Schedule 4 
APPLICATION DOCUMENTS  
Applicant’s Documents Used as a 
Basis for the Review 
1. License for the Selection of a Site for the Construction of a Nuclear 
Facility ENEC/FANR/10/0001L/LNP, February 2, 2010, including four 
enclosures and one attachment. 
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APPENDIX 5:UAE Federal Law by Decree No. 4 of 2012 Concerning Civil 
Liability for Nuclear Damage. Source: UAE Federal Authority for Nuclear 
Regulation (FANR). 
 
PRIVILEGED & CONFIDENTIAL                           Unofficial Translation 
 
FEDERAL LAW BY DECREE NO. 4 OF 2012  
CONCERNING CIVIL LIABILITY FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE 
We, Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan, President of the United Arab Emirates, 
- Having reviewed the Constitution; 
- Federal Law No. 1 of 1972 Concerning the Jurisdictions of the Ministries and 
the Competences of the Ministers, and the amending laws thereof; 
- Federal Law by Decree No. (6) of 2009 Concerning the Peaceful Uses of 
Nuclear Energy; 
- Federal Decree No. 32 of 2012 Ratifying the Protocol to Amend the Vienna 
Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage of 1997; and 
- Federal Decree No. 33 of 2012 Ratifying the Joint Protocol Relating to the 
Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention of 1988; 
and 
- Acting upon the proposal of the Minister of Energy and the consent of the 
Cabinet, have issued the following Federal Law by Decree: 
 
DEFINITIONS  
 
Article (1) 
 
In the implementation of the provisions of this Law by Decree, and regardless of 
provisions of any other legislation, the following terms and phrases shall have the 
meanings set forth below unless the context requires otherwise: 
State: The United Arab Emirates. 
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Authority: Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation. 
IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency. 
Operator: The person licensed by the Authority to operate a Nuclear Installation 
pursuant to Federal Law by Decree No. (6) of 2009 and designated as the Operator 
in such license. 
Nuclear Fuel: Any material which is capable of producing energy by a self-
sustaining chain process of nuclear fission. 
Radioactive Products or Waste: Any radioactive material produced in, or any 
material made radioactive by exposure to the radiation incidental to, the production 
or utilization of Nuclear Fuel, but does not include radioisotopes which have 
reached the final stage of fabrication so as to be usable for any scientific, medical, 
agricultural, commercial or industrial purpose. 
Nuclear Material: 
(1) Any Nuclear Fuel, other than natural uranium and depleted uranium, 
capable of producing energy by a self-sustaining chain process of 
nuclear fission outside a Nuclear Reactor either alone or in combination 
with other material. 
(2) Radioactive Products or Waste. 
Nuclear Reactor: Any structure containing Nuclear Fuel in such an arrangement 
that a self-sustaining chain process of nuclear fission can occur therein without an 
additional source of neutrons. 
Nuclear Installation: 
(1) Any Nuclear Reactor other than one with which a means of sea or air 
transport is equipped for use as a source of power, whether for propulsion 
thereof or for any other purpose. 
(2) Any factory using Nuclear Fuel for the production of Nuclear Material, or 
any factory for the processing of Nuclear Material, including any factory for 
the re-processing of irradiated Nuclear Fuel. 
(3) Any facility where Nuclear Material is stored, other than those storehouses 
used to store Nuclear Material during carriage. 
(4) Other facilities in which there are Nuclear Fuel or Radioactive Products or 
Waste as the Board of Governors of the IAEA shall from time to time 
determine. 
Several Nuclear Installations of one Operator which are located at the same site 
shall be considered as a single Nuclear Installation. 
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Nuclear Damage: 
(1) Loss of life or any personal injury; 
(2) Loss of or damage to property; 
(3) Economic loss arising from loss or damage not referred to in paragraphs 
(1) or (2) above, incurred by a person entitled to claim for compensation 
in respect of such loss or damage; 
(4) The costs of measures of reinstatement of impaired environment, unless 
such impairment is insignificant, if such measures are actually taken or to 
be taken, and insofar as not included in paragraph (2) above; 
(5) Loss of income deriving from an economic interest in use or enjoyment 
of the environment, incurred as a result of a significant impairment of that 
environment, and insofar as not included in paragraph (2) above; 
(6) The costs of preventive measures, and further loss or damage caused by 
such measures; 
(7) Any other economic loss, other than loss caused by the impairment of the 
environment, 
to the extent that the loss or damages referred to in paragraphs 1-5 and 7 above have 
emerged from or resulted from ionizing radiation emitted from any radiation source 
within a Nuclear Installation, or emitted from Nuclear Fuel, Radioactive Products 
or Waste in a Nuclear Installation, or of Nuclear Material coming from, originating 
in or sent to a Nuclear Installation,, whether arising from the radioactive properties 
of such material or from a combination of radioactive properties with , toxic, 
explosive or other hazardous properties of such material. 
The Cabinet may issue instructions related to the implementation of the provisions 
of paragraphs 1-7. 
 
Nuclear Incident: Any occurrence or series of occurrences having the same 
origin which causes Nuclear Damage or creates a grave and imminent threat of 
causing such damage only with respect to preventive measures. 
Special Drawing Right (SDR): The unit of account as defined by the 
International Monetary Fund and used by it for its own operations and 
transactions. 
1997 Vienna Convention: The consolidated text of the 1963 Vienna Convention 
as amended and attached to the Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention on 
Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage dated 12 September 1997. 
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OBJECTIVES OF LAW 
Article (2) 
The objective of this Federal Law by Decree is to: 
(1) Regulate the provisions and determine the scope of the civil liability and 
compensation for Nuclear Damage. 
(2) Determine the financial security that the Operator must maintain. 
(3) Apply the 1997 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage 
wherever no provision is made in this Law by Decree. 
SCOPE OF APPLICATION  
Article (3) 
The Operator of a Nuclear Installation shall be absolutely liable for damages upon 
proof that such damage has been caused by a Nuclear Incident as described in 
Article II of the 1997 Vienna Convention. 
The Authority may, if the small extent of the risks involved so warrants, exclude 
any Nuclear Installation or small quantities of Nuclear Material from the 
application of this Law by Decree, provided that: 
(1) With respect to Nuclear Installations criteria for such exclusion have been 
established by the Board of Governors of the IAEA and the Authority 
issues a resolution that such exclusion satisfies such criteria. 
(2) With respect to small quantities of Nuclear Material, maximum limits for 
the exclusion of such quantities have been established by the Board of 
Governors of the IAEA and the Authority issues a resolution that such 
exclusion is within such established limits. 
LIABILITY FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE  
Article (4) 
The Operator is solely liable for any Nuclear Damage caused by a Nuclear Incident, 
in accordance with the provisions of Article II of the 1997 Vienna Convention. 
Article (5) 
19 
 
(1) The liability of the Operator to compensate for Nuclear Damage for any one 
Nuclear Incident shall not exceed 450 million SDRs. 
(2) The Authority, having regard to the nature of the Nuclear Installation or the 
Nuclear Material involved and to the likely consequences of an incident 
originating therefrom, may establish a lower limit for the liability of the 
Operator for compensating for Nuclear Damage referred to in paragraph (1) 
of this Article in relation to Nuclear Installations consisting of research 
reactors, low-power reactors and facilities that process or store Nuclear 
Material, provided that in no event shall any amount so established be less 
than 5 million SDRs. The State shall ensure coverage of the difference 
between the lower limit which the Authority establishes pursuant this 
paragraph and the higher liability limit set forth in paragraph (1) of this 
Article. 
Article (6) 
Upon the request of a carrier of Nuclear Material or a person handling Radioactive 
Products or Waste, and with prior written consent of the Operator, the Authority 
may designate or recognize him as an Operator in place of the Operator identified 
by the Authority, solely for purposes of Article II of the 1997 Vienna Convention 
and upon compliance with the insurance and financial security coverage 
requirements set forth in Article 8 of this Law by Decree. 
In this event, such carrier or such person referred to in the first paragraph of this 
Article shall be considered as an Operator of a Nuclear Installation situated in the 
territory of the State. 
Article (7) 
 
If the Operator proves that the Nuclear Damage resulted wholly or partly either 
from the gross negligence of the person suffering the damage or from an act or 
omission of such person done with intent to cause damage, the court may relieve 
the Operator wholly or partly from the obligation to pay compensation in respect of 
the damage suffered by such person. 
FINANCIAL SECURITY AND INSURANCE  
Article (8) 
(1) The Operator shall obtain and maintain insurance and guarantees required 
by the Authority with respect to its liability for Nuclear Damage. 
(2) For the purposes of issuing a license to operate a Nuclear Installation, the 
Operator of the Nuclear Installation shall obtain and maintain insurance or 
other financial security up to 450 million SDRs, or up to the limit which the 
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Authority may determine in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (2) 
of Article 5 of this Law by Decree, to cover his liability for any one Nuclear 
Incident, provided that this insurance or other financial security shall be of 
such type and on such terms as approved by the Authority. 
(3) The Operator may obtain the insurance or the financial security from any 
sources approved by the Authority within or outside of the State. 
(4) The provisions of this Law by Decree complies with the priority in the 
distribution of compensation given to claims for loss of life or personal 
injury set forth in paragraph (2) of Article VIII of the 1997 Vienna 
Convention. 
(5) If the Operator is not able, after exhausting all efforts, to obtain insurance 
coverage or any part thereof referred to in paragraph (2) of this Article, the 
Authority may determine that the required insurance under the provisions 
of this Law by Decree is not available in domestic or international insurance 
markets, or that the insurance coverage is not available or is temporarily 
suspended. In these cases, the risks covered under the insurance coverage 
will be covered directly by the State, up to the limit provided for in 
paragraphs (1) or (2) of Article 5 of this Law, as the case may be, until such 
time as the Authority announces the availability of the insurance coverage 
and gives the relevant parties a period of time set by the Authority, upon it 
sole discretion, to obtain such insurance. 
Article (9) 
(1) An Operator shall provide the carrier with a certificate issued by or on behalf 
of the insurer or any other financial guarantor furnishing financial security 
pursuant to Article 8 of this Law by Decree. 
 
(2) The certificate referred to in the first paragraph of this Article shall comply 
with the requirements set forth in this Law by Decree and with Article III of 
the 1997 Vienna Convention. 
(3) This Article shall not apply to transportation which occurs wholly within the 
territory of the State. 
ACTIONS FOR COMPENSATION  
Article (10) 
(1) Actions for compensation for Nuclear Damage shall be brought only against 
the Operator or the person furnishing insurance or financial security 
pursuant to paragraph (1) of Article 8 of this Law by Decree. 
21 
 
(2) Action for compensation against the Operator shall lapse on the expiry of 
valid insurance or financial security if it continues to be valid for a period 
longer than the period set forth in paragraph 1(a) of Article VI of the 1997 
Vienna Convention 
(3) The rights for claiming compensation of any person who suffered Nuclear 
Damage shall expire if an action is not brought within three years from the 
date on which the person suffering damage had knowledge, or ought 
reasonably to have had knowledge of the damage and of the Operator liable, 
provided that the periods established pursuant to paragraph 1(a) of Article 
VI of the 1997 Vienna Convention or paragraph (2) of this Article have not 
been exceeded. 
Article (11) 
The Operator shall have the right of recourse in the following two cases: 
(1) If this is expressly provided for in a contract in writing. 
(2) If the Nuclear Incident results from an act or omission done with intent to 
cause damage. In such case the action shall be brought against the person 
who acted or participated in causing the act or omitted to act with such 
intent. 
(3) The recourse provided for under this Article may extend to benefit the State 
insofar as it has provided public funds pursuant to 1997 Vienna Convention. 
JURISDICTION  
Article (12) 
(1) The Federal Courts in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi shall have exclusive 
jurisdiction over actions arising pursuant to this Law by Decree. 
(2) The provisions of this Law by Decree shall apply to actions related to civil 
liability for Nuclear Damage. The provisions of the 1997 Vienna 
Convention shall apply wherever no provisions are made in this Law by 
Decree. 
(3) Upon the submission of an action for compensation for Nuclear Damage 
under the jurisdiction of the court referred to in the paragraph 1 of this 
Article, the court may appoint one or more specialists or experts to assist the 
court in accordance with the applicable laws and legislation. 
 
 
 
 
COMPETENT AUTHORITY  
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Article (13) 
The Authority shall be the competent authority with respect to implementation of 
the provisions of this Law by Decree, including: 
(1) Determining whether to exempt small quantities of Nuclear Material or 
Nuclear Installations from application of the provisions of the 1997 Vienna 
Convention and Article 3 of this Law by Decree; 
(2) Determining the lower limit of liability in the case of Nuclear Installations 
consisting of research reactors, low-power reactors and facilities that 
process or store Nuclear Material, pursuant to paragraph (2) of Article 5 of 
this Law by Decree; and 
(3) Determining whether the civil liability insurance or any other financial 
security of the applicant or the Operator is in accordance with the terms of 
financial protection required by paragraph 1(a) of Article VII of the 1997 
Vienna Convention and paragraphs (1) and (2) of Article 8 of this Law by 
Decree. 
(4) Issuing rules and regulations relating to the application of provisions of this 
Law by Decree. 
GENERAL PROVISIONS  
Article (14) 
(1) Nothing in this Law by Decree shall be construed as limiting or restricting 
any right or obligation of any person arising under any scheme or system of 
health insurance, employees’ compensation or occupational disease 
compensation. A beneficiary of any scheme or system of insurance or 
compensation referred to in paragraph (1) of this Article shall be eligible for the 
compensation provided in this Law by Decree in accordance with its terms. 
Article (15) 
This Law by Decree shall be published in the Official Gazette and shall come into force 
on the date of its publication. 
 
Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan President of the United Arab Emirate 
Issued at the Presidential Palace in Abu Dhabi 
Date: 25 Ramadan 1433 A.H. 
Corresponding to: 13 August 2012 A.D. 
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Appendix 6: UAE Federal Law by Decree No. 6 of 2009 Concerning a Peaceful 
Uses of Nuclear Energy Source: UAE Federal Authority for Nuclear 
Regulation (FANR). 
Unofficial Translation 
A FEDERAL LAW BY DECREE NO. 6 OF 2009 
CONCERNING THE PEACEFUL  
USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY 
We, Khalifa Bin Zayad Al Nahyan, President of the United Arab Emirates, 
 Having reviewed the provisions of the Constitution, and 
 Federal Law No, (1) of 1972 Regarding the Functions of Ministries and 
Powers of Ministers and the amending laws thereof; 
Federal Law No. (8) of 1984 Regarding Commercial Companies and the 
amending laws thereof; 
Federal Law No. (5) of 1985 Issuing the Civil Transactions Code and the 
amending laws thereof; 
 Federal Law No. (3) of 1987 Issuing the Penal Code and the amending laws 
thereof; 
Federal Law No. (10) of 1992 Issuing the Law of Evidence in Civil and 
Commercial Transactions and the amending laws thereof; 
Federal Law No (24) of 1999 Regarding the Protection and Development 
of the Environment and the amending laws thereof; 
Federal Law No. (1) of 2002 Regarding the Regulation and Control of the 
Use of Radiation Sources and Protection Against their Hazards and the 
amending laws thereof: 
Federal Law No (13) of 2007 Concerning the Commodities Subject to the 
Export and Import Control and the amending laws thereof; 
Federal Law by Decree No (11) of 2008 Concerning the Human Resources 
in the Federal Government; 
Federal Decree No (38) of 1996 Concerning The Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1968); 
 Federal Decree No. (84) of 2000 regarding the Comprehensive Nuclear 
Test Ban Treaty (1996) and the protocol thereto; 
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Federal Decree No. (66) of 2003 regarding the Convention on the Physical 
Protection of Nuclear Material; 
Federal Decree No. (46) of 2003 regarding the Agreement 
between the United Arab Emirates and International Atomic 
Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection 
with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and 
the Additional Protocol (2009): and 
Federal Decree No. (95) of 2007 regarding the International Convention 
for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism: 
on the basis of the proposal of the Minister of Energy and the agreement of 
the Council of Ministers, we have issued the following Law by Decree: 
Chapter One 
DEFINITIONS- JURISDICTION 
Article (1)  
In applying this Law by Decree, the following terms shall have the following 
meanings unless the context specifies otherwise. 
Accident 
Any intended or unintended event, including operating errors, 
equipment failures, initiating events, accident precursors, near misses 
or other mishaps, or unauthorized act, malicious or  non-
malicious, the consequences or potential consequences of which 
are not negligible from the point of view of protection or Safety. 
Activity 
The production, use, import and export of Radiation Sources for 
industrial, research and medical purposes; the transport of Radioactive 
Material; the Decommissioning of Facilities; and Radioactive Waste 
Management activities. 
Assessment 
The process and the result of a systematic analysis and the 
evaluation of the extent of hazards associated with Regulated 
Activities and Regulated materials and associated protection and 
Safety measures for the purpose of meeting requirements, 
achieving efficiency of the process and encouraging  
improvements including safety improvements. 
 
 Assessment 
Activities 
Includes reviewing, checking, inspecting, testing, surveillance. 
auditing, peer evaluation and technical review activities, which 
can be carried out either through independent assessment or Self-
assessment. 
Board 
The board of management of the Authority. 
Chairman 
The chairman of the Board. 
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Closure 
Administrative and technical actions directed at a repository at 
the end of its operating lifetime - such as covering of the  
disposed waste (for a near surface repository) or backfilling and/or 
sealing (for a geological repository and the passages leading to it) 
- and the termination and completion of activities in any 
associated structures. 
Commissioning 
The process by means of which systems and components of 
Facilities and Activities, having been constructed, are made 
operational and verified to be in accordance with the Design and 
to have met the required performance criteria. 
Commissioning may include both non-nuclear and/or non-
radioactive and nuclear and/or radioactive testing. 
Construction The process of manufacturing and assembling the components of 
a Facility, the carrying out of civil works, the installation of 
components and equipment and the performance of associated 
tests. 
Decommissioning Administrative and technical actions taken to allow the removal of 
some or all of the Regulatory Controls from a Nuclear Facility 
(except for a Radioactive Waste Repository or for certain Nuclear 
Facilities used for the Disposal of residues from the mining and 
processing of Radioactive Material, which are closed and not 
decommissioned). 
Design The process of developing a concept, detailed plans, supporting 
calculations and specifications for a Facility or one of its parts.. 
Director General The director general of the Authority. 
Discharge Planned and controlled release of (wither gaseous, liquid or 
otherwise) Radioactive Material to the environment. 
Disposal Emplacement of waste in an appropriate Facility without the 
intention of retrieval. 
Dose(s) A measure of the energy deposited by radiation in a target. 
Emergency/ies A non-routine situation that necessitates prompt action, 
primarily to mitigate a hazard or adverse consequences for human 
health and Safety, quality of life, property or the 
environment.  This includes nuclear and radiological emergencies 
and conventional emergencies such as fire, release of hazardous 
chemicals, storms or earthquakes. It includes situations for which 
prompt action is warranted to mitigate the effects of a perceived 
hazard. 
Emergency Action An action performed to mitigate the impact of an Emergency. 
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Emergency Plan A description of the concept, policy and objectives of operations 
for the response to an Emergency and of the structure,  authorities 
and responsibilities for a systematic, coordinated and effective 
response. The Emergency Plan serves as the basis for the 
development of other plans, procedures and checklists. 
Emergency 
Preparedness 
The capability to take actions that will effectively mitigate the 
consequences of an Emergency. 
Emergency Response The performance of actions to mitigate the consequences of an 
Emergency. It may also provide a basis for the resumption of 
normal social and economic activity. 
Emergency Zone 
The precautionary action zone and/or the urgent protective 
action planning zone. 
Enforcement Action actions taken by the Authority for the purpose of ensuring operator's 
compliance with this Decree by Law, regulation and requirements 
specified by the Authority, including corrective actions, written 
warnings, revoking of a license and any other administrative 
penalties or fines the authority may impose according to this Decree 
by Law ,and regulations in force. The Authority shall, when taking 
an Enforcement Action, take into consideration the suitability of the 
action with the Enforcement Action to be adopted. 
Enrichment A process or operation the purpose of which is to produce uranium 
containing a greater mass percentage of uranium - 235 than 0.72% 
Exemption The determination by the Authority that a Source or practice is 
exempted from some or all aspects of Regulatory Control on the 
basis that the exposure (including potential exposure) due to the 
Source or practice is too small to warrant the application of those 
regulatory aspects or that this is the optimum option for prevention 
irrespective of the actual level of the Doses or risks. 
Facility Includes Nuclear Facilities, irradiation
 installations, some 
mining and raw material processing facilities such as uranium 
mines; Radioactive Waste Management Facilities, and any 
other places where Radioactive Material is
 produced,  
processed. used, handled, stored or disposed of, or where 
radiation generators are installed, on
 such a scale that 
consideration of protection and Safety is
 required. 
Government The G vernment of the State. 
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency. 
IAEA 
Safety Standards 
Standards of safety provided for in the Statute of the IAEA. 
Inspection An examination, observation, measurement or test undertaken to 
assess structures, systems and components and materials, as
 well as operational activities, technical processes, 
organizational processes, procedures and personnel. 
Ionizing Radiation Radiation capable of producing ion pairs in biological materials. 
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License The approval issued by the Authority granting authorization to the 
Licensee to perform one or more specific Regulated Activities related to 
a Facility or Activity. Or any other authorization granted by the 
Authority to the applicant to have the responsibility for the siting, 
Design, Construction, Commissioning. Operation or Decommissioning 
of a nuclear installation or granted to carry out any Activity related to 
management of nuclear spent fuel or of Radioactive Waste. 
 
Licensee A Person holding a valid License 
Maintenance The organized activity, both administrative and technical, of 
keeping structures, systems and components
 in good  
operating condition, including both preventive and corrective (or repair) 
aspects. 
Management System A set of interrelated or interacting elements (system) for establishing 
policies and objectives and enabling the objectives to be achieved in an 
efficient and effective manner. 
Nuclear Facility A Facility including associated buildings and equipment in which 
Nuclear Material is produced, processed, used, handled, stored or 
disposed of including Radioactive Waste Repository. 
Nuclear Fuel Fissionable nuclear material in the form of fabricated elements for 
loading into the reactor core of a civil nuclear power plant or research 
reactor 
Nuclear Material Plutonium except that with isotopic concentration exceeding 
80% in plutonium-238; uranium-233; uranium enriched in the  
isotope 235 or 233: thorium or uranium containing the mixture of 
isotopes as occurring in nature other than in the form of ore or ore 
residue; any material containing one or more of the foregoing. 
Nuclear Reactor 
A device in which nuclear fuel is used in to control nuclear fission 
reactions, and to sustain the required environment for controlled 
fission reactions without causing an explosion during chain 
reactions. It includes research and power reactors 
Nuclear Safety The achievement Of proper operating Conditions, prevention Of 
Accidents or mitigation of Accident consequences, resulting in 
protection of workers, the public and the environment from undue 
radiation hazards. 
Nuclear Sector The Sector related to the Regulated Activities. 
Nuclear Security The prevention and detection of. and response to, theft, 
sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal transfer or
 other  
malicious acts involving Nuclear Material, other radioactive 
substances or their associated facilities. 
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Occupational 
Exposure(s) 
Exposure of workers incurred in the course of their work, with the 
exception of excluded exposures and exposures from 
exempt practices or exempt Sources
 according to  
specifications set by the Authority. 
Operation All activities performed to achieve the purpose for which an 
authorized Facility, by the Authority, was constructed. 
Operator Any person authorized and/ or responsible for nuclear safety, 
radiation safety, Radioactive Waste or transport Safety when 
undertaking activities or in relation to any Nuclear Facilities or 
Sources of Ionizing Radiation. This
 includes, inter alia,  
individuals in their personal capacity, governmental bodies, 
consignors or carriers. Licensees, hospitals, self-employed  
persons, etc. Orphan Sources A Radioactive Source which is not under the Regulatory 
Control, either because it has never been
 under such  
Regulatory Control or because it has been abandoned, lost, 
misplaced, stolen or whose possession or ownership has otherwise 
been transferred in the absence of an appropriate License. A 
systematic reassessment of the Safety of an existing Facility. 
Periodic 
Safety Review 
(or Activity) carried out at regular intervals to deal with the 
cumulative effects of ageing, modifications, operating  
experience, technical developments and siting aspects, and aimed at 
ensuring a high level of Safety throughout the service life Of the Facility 
(or Activity). 
Person Natural or juridical persons whether in the public or private sector. 
Physical Protection Measures for the protection of Nuclear Material or authorized Facilities, 
designed to prevent unauthorized access or removal of fissile material or 
sabotage with regard to safeguards, as, for example, in the Convention 
on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material or other related 
international agreements, to which the State is a party. 
Processing Any operation that changes the characteristics of waste, 
including pre-treatment, treatment and conditioning. 
Public Exposure(s) Exposure incurred by members of the public from Radiation sources, 
excluding any occupational or medical exposure and the normal local 
natural background radiation but including exposure from authorized 
sources and practices and from intervention situations. 
Quality Assurance The function of a Management System that
 provides confidence that specified requirements will be fulfilled. 
Radiation Protection The protection of people from the effects of exposure to Ionizing 
Radiation, and the means for achieving this. 
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Radiation Source A radiation generator, or a Radioactive
 Source or other Radioactive Material outside the nuclear fuel 
cycles of research and power reactors. 
Radioactive Material Material designated by the Authority as being subject to Regulatory 
Control because of its radioactivity. 
 
Radioactive Source Radioactive Material that is permanently sealed in a capsule or closely 
bonded and in a solid form and which is not exempt from Regulatory 
Control. This also includes any Radioactive Material released if the 
Radioactive Source is leaking or broken, but does not include 
material encapsulated for Disposal, or Nuclear Material within the 
nuclear fuel cycles of research and power reactors. 
 
 
Radioactive Source Radioactive Material that is permanently sealed in a capsule or closely 
bonded and in a solid form and which is not exempt from Regulatory 
Control. This also includes any Radioactive Material released if the 
Radioactive Source is leaking or broken, but does not
 include material encapsulated for  
Disposal, or Nuclear Material within the nuclear fuel cycles of research 
and power reactors. 
 
Radioactive Waste Waste that contains, or is contaminated with, radionuclides at 
concentrations or activities greater than levels as established by the 
Authority. 
 
Radioactive Waste 
Management 
All administrative and operational activities involved in the handling, 
pretreatment, treatment, conditioning, transport, Storage and Disposal of 
Radioactive Waste. 
 
Radioactive Waste 
Management Facilities 
Facility specifically designated to handle, treat,
 condition, temporarily store or permanently
 dispose of Radioactive  
Waste, 
 
Radioactive Waste 
Repository 
A repository to deposit Radioactive Waste
 for disposal purposes. 
 
Regulated Activities The activities identified in Article 25 of this Law by Decree.  
Regulated Material Any Radioactive Material, special materials
 and  equipment, Radioactive Waste, nuclear spent fuel and any 
other material, product, service or asset whether 
tangible or intangible which, in the opinion
 of the Authority, is or may in the future be related to or connected 
with the Nuclear Sector and designated as such from time to time by 
implementing regulations: and 
Any other Radioactive Material and Sources of Ionizing Radiation as 
designated by the Authority from time to time as requiring its direct 
oversight. 
 
Authority The Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation.  
Regulatory Control Any form of control or regulation applied to Facilities or 
Activities by the Authority for reasons relating to Radiation Protection 
or to the Safety or security of Radioactive Sources. 
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Regulatory Inspection Inspection undertaken by or on behalf of the Authority to ensure the 
Licensee's compliance with the provisions of this Law by Decree, the 
implementing regulation, regulation in force and the terms of the 
License. 
 
Reprocessing A process or operation, the purpose of which is to extract radioactive 
isotopes from nuclear spent fuel for further use. 
 
Safeguards Agreement The Agreement between the State and IAEA for the application of 
Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (2003) and the Protocol Additional to that Agreement 
(2009) 
 
Safety The protection of people and environment from exposure to 
Radiation risks, the safety of facilities including
 safety of nuclear facilities and radiation safety and
 safety of management of radioactive materials and the safety 
transport of radioactive material s, and the means for
 preventing Accidents and for mitigating the consequences of 
Accidents, and does not include safety aspects not related to radiation 
feild. 
 
Safety Assessment Assessment of all aspects of a practice that is relevant to protection and 
Safety: for an authorized Facility, this includes siting, Design and Operation 
of the Facility. 
Analysis to predict the performance of an overall system and its impact, 
where the performance measure is the radiological impact or some other 
global measure of the impact on Safety. 
The systematic process that is carried out throughout the design process to 
ensure that all the relevant Safety requirements are met by the proposed (or 
actual) design. Safety assessment includes, but is not limited to, the formal 
Safety analysis required by the Authority. 
 
Spent Nuclear Fuel 
Nuclear fuel removed from a reactor following irradiation that is no 
longer usable in its present form 
 
State United Arab Emirates  
Storage The holding of Radioactive sources, nuclear spent fuel or Radioactive 
Waste in a Facility that provides for their/its containment, with the intention of 
retrieval. 
 
 
Article (2) 
1. This Decree by Law aims to develop and regulate the Nuclear Sector in 
the State towards peaceful purposes only in accordance with the Policy 
of the State on the Evaluation and Potential Development of Peaceful 
Nuclear Energy, the international treaties and the agreements acceded 
by the State in this regard. The development and regulation of the 
Nuclear Sector in the State will afford priority to Safety, Nuclear Safety, 
Nuclear Security, Radiation Protection and safeguards. 
2. The Design, Construction, development and Operation of 
Facilities for Enrichment or Reprocessing shall be prohibited 
in the State. 
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Article (31 
This Law by Decree shall apply in the State, including free zones, special 
zones,  
Chapter Two 
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE AUTHORITY AND ITS OBJECTS 
Article (41 
1. A public organization under the name of "Federal Authority for Nuclear 
Regulation" shall hereby be established with independent balance sheet 
and it shall have an independent legal personality, full legal competence 
and financial and administrative independence in all its matters. 
2. The Authority aims to regulate and develop the Nuclear Sector in the 
State toward the peaceful purposes only and to ensure Safety, Nuclear 
Safety, Nuclear Security and Radiation Protection. 
3. The headquarters of the Authority shall be in the city of Abu Dhabi, and it 
may establish branches or offices within the State by a decision from the 
Board thereof. 
Article (5) 
The Authority shall determine all matters relating to the control and supervision 
of the Nuclear Sector in the State, particularly those related to Safety, Nuclear 
Safety, Nuclear Security, Radiation Protection, Safeguards and implement any 
obligations under the relevant international treaties, conventions or 
agreements entered into by the State. 
The Authority shall ensure the compliance with the prevention of the use of 
Nuclear Facilities and Nuclear Materials and technology for non-peaceful 
purposes in order to attain effective control of Safety, Nuclear Safety, Nuclear 
Security, Radiation Protection and Safeguards. 
The Authority shall, for the purpose of carrying out its functions under this Law 
by Decree, have power to; 
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1. Carry out and support research and develop studies relevant to the 
scope of work of the Authority; 
2. set up the procedure and measures that must be followed and, without 
prejudice to Safety requirements, reconsider the issued decisions by 
it: 
3. coordinate with the competent authorities in the State to ensure 
nuclear nonproliferation and to liaise in relation to Nuclear Security; 
4. establish and maintain a State system of accounting for and control 
of Nuclear Material in accordance with the requirements of the 
Safeguards Agreement; 
5. establish and manage a special register of Radioactive Sources; 
6. establish and operate a register of occupational Doses and of 
radioactive releases to the environment arising from Regulated 
Activities: 
7. ensure that appropriate records relating to the Safety of Facilities and 
Activities are retained and easily retrievable 
8. enter into the relevant sites and Facilities at any time to carry out an 
Inspection and to enable the Authority to perform its functions 
efficiently; 
9. ensure the extent of the application of the regulatory requirements; 
10. communicate directly with governmental authorities when necessary; 
11. Clarify the regulatory and control requirements, decisions and opinions of 
the Authority to the public: 
12. provide governmental bodies, national organizations, international 
organizations through the State's representatives and the public with 
information on Incidents and abnormal occurrences, and other 
information, as appropriate; 
13. liaise and co-ordinate with other governmental bodies and expert firms 
having competence in such areas as health and safety, environmental 
protection, security, and transport of hazardous goods; 
14. liaise with other regulatory bodies outside the State, international 
organizations through the State's representatives and expert firms to 
enhance the co-operation and the exchange of regulatory information in 
relation to nuclear energy; 
15. review and assess submissions on Safety from Operators both prior and 
after the granting of a License; 
16. ensure that corrective actions are taken if unsafe cases are detected; 
17. take the necessary Enforcement Actions in the event of violations of 
Safety; 
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18. establish a process for dealing with applications, such as applications for 
the issuing of a License, accepting a notification or the granting of an 
Exemption from Regulatory Control; 
19. provide guidance on developing and presenting Safety Assessments or 
any other required Safety related information to the Operator; 
20. ensure that proprietary and security-related information is protected in 
accordance with the provisions of this Law by Decree; 
21. provide information to governmental bodies, international organizations 
through the State's representatives and the public in accordance with the 
regulations issued for that purpose; 
22. evaluate the operating experience in the area of Nuclear Safety for the 
benefit of the Authority's work ; 
23. establish the requirements for systematic Safety Assessment or Periodic 
Safety Review and inform the Operator and ensure its compliance 
24. advise and provide consultations to the government entities on matters 
related to Safety, Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Security and the activities of the 
Authority; 
25. ensure the competence of the Operators personnel to operate the 
Facility and carry out the activities in safe means; 
26. ensure that Nuclear Safety and Nuclear Security are managed 
effectively and accurately by the Operator; 
27. ensure that the relationship with the Operator is based on transparency; 
28. monitor radiation in the areas around Nuclear Facilities; 
29. test the quality control measurements; 
30. initiate, coordinate and follow up with other authorities Safety related 
research and development works; 
31. Monitor radiological exposure and conduct independent medical 
examinations if necessary; 
32. develop a strategy to ensure Radiation Protection from Orphan 
Sources; and 
33. apply the Quality Assurance principals on all procedures related to its 
functions. 
Article (61 
The Authority shall be exclusively responsible for issuing all Licenses to 
practice any of the Regulated Activities in the State and any other license 
stipulated in this Law by Decree, its implementing regulation or any other 
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regulation issued by the Authority or amending, suspending, revoking such 
Licenses or refusing to grant it, provided that such refusal is bereasoned. The 
Authority may impose conditions on Licenses pursuant to this Law by Decree, 
its implementing regulations and regulations issued hereby. 
Article (71 
The Authority shall co-operate with the relevant government entities, advise 
them, and provide information on matters related to Nuclear Security 
Radiation Protection and Security concerning following areas: 
1. Environmental protection; 
2. Public and occupational health; 
3. Emergency planning and Emergency Preparedness; 
4. Radioactive Waste; 
5. Public liability (including the implementation of national regulations and 
international conventions concerning the liability of a third party); 
6. Physical Protection and safeguards; 
7. Water use and consumption of food; 
8. Land use and planning; and 
9. Safety in the transport of dangerous goods. 
Article (81 
The Authority shall examine and investigate any matter which appears to be 
a breach of this Law by Decree, the implementing regulation, regulations 
issued thereby, decisions of the Authority or any License condition of which it 
becomes directly aware of or through a third party. 
Without prejudice to any other penalty prescribed by another law, the breaching 
Person shall indemnify the Authority against the costs and expenses incurred by 
the Authority in carrying out the investigation, and any fines or actions resulting 
from the investigation. 
Article (91 
(A) The Authority shall maintain the highest standards of transparency 
whilst performing its functions and towards this, it shall facilitate the 
public's access to all relevant information to its activities, in particular: 
1. every License issued and every modification, suspension or 
revocation of a License; 
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2. information about licensing applications with regard to a 
Regulated Activity including the reasons for a decision to grant, 
grant with conditions or refuse a License; 
3. all requirements on the conditional licensing and details of any 
derogation from performance of a condition of a License issued 
pursuant to this Law by Decree; 
4. all applicable regulations and any amendments thereto; 
5. all guidelines issued by the Authority pursuant to this Law by 
Decree; 
6. summaries of the findings of each investigation and Inspection 
carried out by the Authority; 
7. all penalties imposed for violation of the provisions of this Law by 
Decree, implementing regulations, regulations, decisions and 
instructions issued by the Authority; and 
8. summaries of decisions granting a member or members of the 
Board authority to issue decisions pursuant to the provisions of 
this Law by Decree. 
9. (B) As an exception, the Authority may restrict, conceal or 
amend any document or information it considers confidential or 
which may in its opinion unduly prejudice a Person or may 
prejudice the Nuclear Safety, Physical Protection, Nuclear 
Security or contains detailed technical or commercial information 
of a proprietary nature as classified by the Operator in 
accordance with the relevant measures issued by the Authority. 
 
 
 
Chapter Three 
 
THE MANAGEMENT OF THE AUTHORITY 
Article 10 
1. The Authority shall be managed by the Board comprising of not less 
than five members in addition to a Chairman, and a deputy Chairman. 
The Board shall be appointed by a resolution of the Cabinet for a period 
of three years renewable for other similar periods by the same 
appointing instrument. 
2. The Board shall be constituted entirely by qualified nationals of the 
State. Such nationals shall not engage, whether directly or indirectly, 
in the conduct of any Regulated Activity and must not have any 
personal interest that conflicts the Authority interest. 
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3. The Board shall meet upon the Chairman's call once every two months 
at least, or whenever needed. No meeting of the Board shall be 
quorate unless the majority including the Chairman or his deputy are 
in attendance. 
4. Decisions of the Board shall be taken by majority vote of attending 
members and, in the event of equal votes, the Chairman shall have a 
casting vote. 
5. Meetings of the Board may take place in person, by conference call or 
by video-conference. The Board meetings shall be recorded and 
signed by the Chairman and the members of the Board. 
6. The remuneration of Board members shall be determined by a 
resolution of the Cabinet. 
7. The Director General shall, unless the Board decides otherwise, attend 
Board meetings, however without voting rights. 
8. The Board shall issue its bylaws to regulate its meetings. 
Article 11 
The Board shall have the functions and authorities provided in this Law by 
Decree, implementing regulations, regulations and the decisions issued 
thereby, including: 
1 set up the general policy of the Authority, its strategic plans and the 
appropriate agenda to execute the plans; 
2. adopt the Authority's annual budget and balance sheet; 
3. adopt the Authority's organizational structure; 
4. issue the implementing, administrative, financial, technical, 
employment related regulations required for the Authority's operation 
and the requirements, criteria and measures related to its functions 
and the instructions and guidelines that govern the Authority, 
including; 
a- to protect the individuals, society and the environment from 
radiation hazards, both for the present and in the future 
b- specify what is excluded from the requirements of the 
Regulatory Control and to set up the relevant criteria and 
actions, provided that the potential magnitude and nature of the 
hazard associated with the Facility or Activity shall be taken into 
consideration; 
c- specify the process for removal of a Facility or Activity from 
Regulatory Control; 
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d- specify the responsibility when Activities are carried out by 
several Operators successively and record the transfers of 
responsibility; 
e- form advisory bodies to provide expert opinion and 
consultation to the Authority; 
f- define the mechanism of involving government and private 
bodies to the regulatory process set by the Authority and specify 
the extent of the application of new requirements to existing 
Facilities and current Activities; 
g- establish and develop the control and regulatory principals 
including the measures of Safety, Nuclear Safety and Nuclear 
Security and ensure its validity and adequacy in addition to its 
compliance with international measures and recommendations; 
h- impose administrative fines and penalties for breaching the 
terms or conditions of a License pursuant to regulations 
endorsed by the Cabinet according to the Authority's 
recommendations; 
i- Exercise Regulatory Control on the design of Facilities and 
Activities; and 
j- establish, develop or adopt regulations and guidelines upon 
which its regulatory actions are based, including special 
regulations for Safety, Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Security, 
Radiation Protection, Emergency Preparedness, Emergency 
Response and Decommissioning. 
5. propose the fees for Licenses and services provided by the Authority 
and submit it to the Cabinet for approval; 
6. approve regulations related to work at the Authority, provided it is 
issued by the Chairman's resolution; 
7. establish specialized technical committees and define their functions; 
8. appointing the Director General of the Authority; and 
9. any other functions designated to it by the Cabinet. 
The Board may designate any of its powers to the Chairman or any member 
of the Board. 
The Chairman shall submit at the end of each financial year a report, in 
relation to Authority's activities, to the Minister of the Presidential Affairs. 
 
Article 12 
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1. A Board member may at any time resign his office by serving a notice to 
the Chairman, such notice shall not be less than sixty days and shall be 
referred to the Cabinet. 
2. A Board member shall, unless the Board decides otherwise, be deemed 
to have given the required resign notice if he fails to attend three 
consecutive meetings of the Board without giving an acceptable 
justification for his absence. 
3. Throughout their mandate and following the elapse of their membership. 
Board members shall not, without the Board's consent express any 
public position on matters that have come before the Board, a Board 
Member shall also maintain the confidentiality of proprietary or security-
related information. 
 
Article 13 
1. A Board member shall be replaced, by a resolution of the Cabinet, for 
one of the following reasons: 
a. physical or mental incapacity which prevents the Board member 
from carrying out his duties for more than ninety days, such 
incapacity shall be proved by the relevant medical committee in 
the State; 
b. the Board member is convicted of Felony or misdemeanor 
related to honor or trust; 
c. breach of any of the conditions stated in this Law by Decree; 
and 
2. A Board member may be replace for maladministration serious 
misconduct or when carrying out any conduct that contravenes the 
interests of the Authority. 
Article 14 
The Board shall appoint a Director General to exercise the functions 
specified in this Law by decree, implementing regulations, regulations 
issued thereby and the resolutions issued by the Board. 
Article 15 
The Director General shall manage the Authority's business and oversee its 
financial, administrative and technical affairs under the Board's control. The 
Director General shall represent the Authority before the courts and third 
parties and shall also: 
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1. propose the general policy of the Authority and its strategic and 
operational plans for the Board's approval; 
2. prepare and the submit to the Board the Authority's annual budget and 
the balance sheet; 
3. propose the organizational structure and relevant regulations related 
to work at the Authority; 
4. coordinate with other entities within the state and abroad in relation to 
the Authority's work and activities; 
5. review all License applications and make appropriate 
recommendations to the Board; 
6. propose the amendment and revocation of a Licenses: 
7. propose and submit to the Board for approval policies for the 
protection of confidential information held by the Authority; 
B. delegate to senior staff the appropriate powers granted to the Director 
General pursuant to this Law by Decree, implementing regulations or 
the resolutions issued thereby; and 
d. Implement the decisions taken by the Board and carry out other 
duties designated to the Director General of the Board. 
Article 16 
The Director General shall be replaced for one of the following reasons: 
a. physical or mental incapacity which prevents the Director General 
from carrying out his duties for more than ninety days, such incapacity 
shall be proved by the relevant medical committee in the State; 
b. the Director General is convicted of any Felony or misdemeanor 
related to honor or trust; 
c. proved maladministration or serious misconduct of the Director 
General or carrying out any activity which contravenes the interests 
or objectives of the Authority; 
d. for requirements of public interest; and 
e. Expiry of his appointment term. 
Article 17 
I. The Authority shall appoint its employees according to the applicable 
regulations and decisions. 
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Chapter Four 
FINANCIAL AFFAIRS OF THE AUTHORITY 
Article 18 
The Authority shall be entitled to receive all funds allocated to it and shall be free 
to deal with its funds and income, including opening and managing bank 
accounts in its own name and withdrawal there from according to auditing and 
financial regulations applicable in the Authority The Authority's funds shall 
consist of the following: 
1. funds allocated to it by the Government; 
2. income generated by carrying out its functions; and 
3. Gifts, grants and loans which the Board resolves to accept and do not 
conflict with the Authority's objectives. 
 
 
Article (19) 
 
The financial year of the Authority shall commence on the 1st January and end on  
the 31st December of each year; notwithstanding this, the first financial year of 
theAuthority shall commence upon this Law by Decree becoming effective 
and shall end on the 31st December of the following year. 
Article (20) 
1. The Authority shall be subject to the provisions of the tender and 
procurement laws applicable in it. 
2. The Authority shall manage its financial resources according to the 
applicable financial and auditing regulations in it. 
Article 21 
The Authority shall be exempt from all federal taxes, including custom duties 
in relation to material, machinery, equipment and spare parts imported for the 
purposes of achieving its objectives. 
Article (221 
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The Board shall appoint an independent auditor registered with the appropriate 
authorities in the State to audit the annual accounts of the Authority and 
prepare reports regarding the results of the audit. The Authority shall submit a 
copy of it audited accounts, after the Board approves them, with a copy of the 
auditors report attached there, to the Cabinet for endorsement. 
Chapter Five  
LICENCES   
(Granting- Revocation- Suspension}  
Article 23 
1. It is prohibited for any person to conduct any Regulated Activity in the State 
including free zones, unless licensed to do so by the Authority. 
No License shall be issued unless for juridical persons approved by the 
competent authorities in the State. 
3. It shall be prohibited to conduct any activity in the surrounding areas of 
Nuclear Facilities which may affect the operation of such Facilities. The 
applicable regulations shall determine the scope of these areas, licensing 
requirements and activities that may affect the safety operation of the facilities. 
Article (24) 
The License issued by the Authority shall specify: 
1. the Facilities, Activities or inventories of Sources covered by the 
License: 
2. the requirements for notifying the Authority of any modifications to 
Safety related aspects; 
3. the obligations of the Operator in respect of its Facility, equipment, 
Radiation Source(s) and personnel; 
4. any restrictions imposed on Operation and use (such as Dose or 
Discharge limits, action levels or limits on the duration of the License); 
5. criteria and conditions for Radioactive Waste Processing for existing 
or foreseen Radioactive Waste Management Facilities; 
6. any additional authorizations that the Operator is required to obtain 
from the Authority; 
7. the requirements for Incident reporting; 
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8. Criteria of the reports that the Operator is required to submit to the 
Authority; 
9. the records that the Operator is required to retain and the time 
periods for which they must be retained; and 
10. the Emergency Preparedness; and 
11. any other requirements determined by the Authority in the 
implementing regulations. 
Article 25 
The Regulated Activities are: 
 
1. selection of a site for the Construction of a Nuclear Facility; 
2. preparation of a site for the Construction of a Nuclear Facility; 
3. Construction of a Nuclear Facility; 
4. Commissioning of a Nuclear Facility; 
5. Operation of a Nuclear Facility; 
6. closure or a change in the Closure date of any Nuclear Facility; 
7. Decommissioning of a Nuclear Facility; 
8. modifications having significance on Safety to the Management System 
and organizational arrangements of the structures, systems and 
equipment of or contained in any Nuclear Facility. The Authority shall 
determine the nature of the modifications that require its approval; 
9. possession, use, manufacture or handling of any Regulated Material or part 
of any Regulated Material in the State; 
10. import or export of any Regulated Material into or from the State, subject 
to any consents required pursuant to the provisions of Law No 13 of 2007; 
11. transportation of any Regulated Material within the State; 
12. introduction or removal of any Regulated Material to or from any Nuclear 
Facility; 
13. Storage of any Regulated Material within the State; 
14. Disposal of any Regulated Material within the State; and 
15. any other activity designated as such from time to time by the 
implementing and the applicable regulations to this Law by Decree to 
provide for the effective control of Safety, Nuclear Safety, Nuclear 
Security, Radiation Protection or any part or stage of any activities referred 
to above or previously designated as a Regulated Activity by the 
implementing and the applicable regulations. 
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The Board, with the guidance of the IAEA measures, shall issue all related 
regulations and decisions to regulate the procedure of the transport of the 
Regulated Material and the used means of transport in this regard. 
Article (261 
1. The Board shall issue the decisions related to the duration and general 
terms and conditions of any License to operate a nuclear reactor. A 
License to operate a nuclear reactor may be issued for a period of up to 
60 years. The Board shall issue the regulations concerning the duration 
and general terms and conditions of any License to be issued by the 
Authority. 
2. The Board may, within the limits of the international commitments and 
agreements, exempt certain Facilities and Activities from the License 
requirements, provided that such Facilities or Activities do not represent 
a substantial threat to achieving the priorities and objectives set out in 
this Law by Decree. 
Article 27 
1. With exception to acquiring the nationality of the State, the provisions of 
Federal Law No. (8) of 1984 Regarding Commercial Companies and the 
amending or replacement laws thereof shall not apply to juridical 
Licensee licensed pursuant to this Law by Decree to the extent provided 
in their memoranda and articles of association as approved by the 
Authority. The competent authorities shall register such juridical 
Licensee. 
2. Foreign companies may set up branches in the State to conduct or assist 
in the conduct of a Regulated Activity after obtaining the prior approval 
of the Authority, without the need to appoint a local service agent. 
Article 28 
1. Prior to the granting of a License, the applicant shall be required to 
submitdetailed evidence of Safety, which shall be reviewed and 
assessed by the Authority in accordance with defined procedures. The 
extent of the control applied by the Authority shall be commensurate 
with the potential magnitude and nature of the hazard as determined 
by it. 
2. The Authority shall issue guidance on the format and content of the 
documentsthat should be submitted by the applicant in support of its 
applications for License. The Operator shall be required to submit or 
make available to the Authority, in accordance with agreed time-
scales, all pertinent information that is specified or requested. 
3. Following regulatory review and Assessment the Authority shall: 
 
a. Grant a License or a conditional or restrictive License on the 
Operator's subsequent Activities. 
b. Refuse a License. 
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4. The Authority shall formally record the basis for these decisions. 
5. An applicant for a License that is refused a License by the Authority or is 
granted a conditional License may seek a review of that decision by 
submitting a reasoned request before the Board. 
6. Any subsequent amendment, renewal, suspension or revocation of the 
License shall be undertaken in accordance with the regulations issued 
by the Authority and a clearly defined and established procedure. 
Article 29 
The Operator shall comply with the following: 
1. to perform a Safety Assessment; 
2. to perform a systematic Safety Assessment or a Periodic 
Safety Review over the lifetime of Nuclear Facilities; and 
3. to provide the Authority with any information it deems 
necessary to perform its duties, including the information 
related to the Operator's suppliers, even if such information 
is proprietary. 
Article 30 
Obtaining a License pursuant to the provisions of this Law by Decree shall not 
operate to relieve a Person to obtain any other license, permit or 
authorizations that may be required from any other competent authority for 
purposes connected with the conduct of its business. 
Article 31 
The Board may suspend or revoke the License in the following circumstances: 
1. in the event of serious violations which, according to the Board's 
discretion, pose an imminent radiological hazard to workers, public 
or environment. 
2. Operator's continuous non-compliance with the Board's 
decisions and instructions. 
3. release of Radioactive Material to the environment due to 
malfunctioning at or damage to a Facility. 
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any other event determined by the Board as hazard to the Nuclear Safety. 
Chapter Six  
INSPECTION AND CONTROL 
Article 32 
1. Review and Assessment of the Activity or Facility subject to Review and 
Assessment shall be performed in every stage of the regulatory process 
according to the Authority's requirements and the nature and potential 
magnitude of the hazard. 
2, The Authority shall define and provide the Operator with the principles and 
criteria on which its judgments and decisions are based. 
3. A primary basis for review and Assessment is the information submitted 
by the Operator. 
A thorough review and Assessment of the Operators technical submission shall 
be performed by the Authority in order to determine whether the Facility or 
Activity complies with the relevant Safety objectives, principles and criteria. In 
doing this.the Authority shall acquire an understanding of the Design of the 
Facility or equipment, the Safety concepts on which the Design is based and 
the operating principles proposed by the Operator, to satisfy itself that: 
a. the available information demonstrates the Safety of the Facility or 
proposed Activity: 
b, the information contained in the Operator's submissions is accurate 
and sufficient to enable confirmation of compliance with regulatory 
requirements: 
c. the technical solutions, and in particular any novel ones, have been 
proven or qualified either by competent authorities, experience or 
testing, and are capable of achieving the required level of Safety; 
4. the Authority shall prepare its own program of review and Assessment of 
the Facilities and Activities under scrutiny which includes development of 
a Facility or Activity, as applicable, from initial selection of the site, 
through Design, Construction, Commissioning, and Operation, to 
Decommissioning or Closure; and 
5. any modification to Safety related aspects of a Facility or Activity shall be 
subject to review and Assessment, with the potential magnitude and 
nature of the associated hazard being taken into account. 
Article 33 
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The Board may issue reasoned decisions to exempt any of the practices 
related to the Radiation Sources from Regulatory Control or any part of it, in 
accordance with international safety standards and the valuation of the 
Authority. 
Article 34 
1. The Operator may, after complying with the License terms and 
conditions, contract with a contractor for the conduct of all or a material 
part of the Regulated Activities. In such cases, the Operator shall provide 
the Authority with the conditions in the contract with regard to the 
exercise of the Operators responsibilities as defined in this Law by 
Decree, implementing regulations, applicable regulations and the terms 
of the Operators License(s). 
2. The Operator remains responsible before the Authority according to this 
Law by Decree, applicable regulations and the terms of its License even 
if certain activities are conducted by contractors. 
Article 35 
1. The Authority shall set up a planned and systematic Inspection program. 
The extent to which Inspection is performed will depend on the potential 
magnitude and nature of the hazard associated with the Facility or 
Activity. 
2. Inspection by the Authority, both announced and unannounced, shall be 
a continuing activity. The Authority may take any actions on the basis of 
these Inspections. 
3. In addition to routine Inspections, the Authority shall carry out 
Inspections at short notice, determined in the implementing regulations, 
if an abnormal occurrence warrants immediate investigation. Such 
Regulatory Inspection shall not diminish the responsibility of the 
Operator to investigate any such occurrence immediately. 
Regulatory inspectors shall be required to prepare reports of their Inspections 
and findings, which shall be fed back into the regulatory process. 
Article 36 
1. The Authority shall conduct Regulatory Inspection programs which shall 
cover all areas of regulatory responsibility in relation to the regulatory 
Activity to ensure that the Operator is in compliance with this Law by 
Decree, implementing regulations, applicable regulations and the 
conditions set out in 
the License. In addition, the Authority shall take into account, as 
necessary, the activities of suppliers of services and products to the 
Operator. 
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 2. The Authority may take any necessary Enforcement Actions on Operator 
in the 
event of its breach or defaulting to remedy the breach and compel it to 
take necessary actions pursuant to the provisions of this Law by Decree, 
applicable regulations and the conditions set out in the License. 
 3. If the Operator fails to remedy the breach related to Safety, Nuclear 
Safety and 
Nuclear Security within the period specified by the Authority. The 
Authority shall remove any breach and the consequences thereon by its 
own resources or through whomever it deems appropriate in order to 
limit the consequences of such breach. The Operator shall bear the 
costs of this procedure and the Authority's estimate of such costs shall 
be final. 
 4. In carrying out Inspections, the Authority shall seek to ensure that: 
a. Facilities, equipment and work performance meet all necessary 
requirements provided this Law by Decree, implementing regulations 
and the applicable regulations; 
b. relevant documents and instructions are valid and are being complied 
with; 
c. individuals employed by the Operator (including contractors) 
possess the necessary competence for the effective performance 
of their functions; 
d. deficiencies and deviations are identified and corrected by the 
Operator or justified without undue delay; 
e. any lessons learned in the area of Nuclear Safety are identified and 
applied as appropriate; and 
f. the Operator is managing Safety in a proper manner. 
 5. Regulatory Inspections shall not diminish the Operator's prime 
responsibility for 
Safety or substitute for the control, supervision and verification activities 
that the Operator must carry out. 
Article 37 
The Operator shall comply with the Authority's decisions, shall remedy 
any breach, perform a thorough investigation in accordance with an 
agreed time-scale with the Authority and take all necessary measures to 
prevent recurrence. In all cases, the Operator must remove all unsafe 
aspects. 
3. The Authority shall ensure that the Operator has taken the required 
remedial actions to remove any breach. 
48 
 
4. If there is evidence of a deterioration in the level of Safety, or in the event 
of  
serious violations the Authority shall require the Operator to curtail 
Activities and to take any further action necessary to restore an adequate 
level of Safety. 
5. The Authority shall determine the extent of the powers and Enforcement 
Actions which the inspectors are entitled to take immediately during 
their Inspection. 
6. Where inspectors are not entitled to take immediate Enforcement Actions, 
The Operator must furnish the Authority with requested information 
immediately if the inspectors judge that the health and safety of workers 
or the public are at risk, or the environment is endangered. 
Chapter Seven 
REGULATIONS-GUIDELINES-SAFEGUARDS 
Article 38 
The Board shall issue the regulations specifying the requirements which all 
Operators must comply with and follow. 
1. The Authority shall prepare explanatory guidelines on how to comply with 
the regulations. 
2. In developing regulations and guidelines, the Authority shall take into 
consideration comments from stakeholders, information made available 
by experts and internationally recognized standards and 
recommendations, such as IAEA Safety Standards. 
Article 39 
1. There shall be established, by a decision of the Board, a national system 
of accounting and control of Nuclear Materials that complies with the 
State's international commitments, including: 
a. ensure the fulfillment of obligations which the State undertook to 
comply by according to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons, the Safeguards Agreement and any other additional protocols 
at the practices and Facilities under its control and work together with 
other government bodies to fulfill those obligations. 
b. Carry out Inspection in accordance with the Safeguards Agreement, 
bilateral and multilateral agreement which the State has ratified. 
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c. Construct and manage an accounting and Control system of the 
Nuclear materials. 
U. Gather appropriate information, including those attained through 
inspection of Nuclear Facilities in accordance with the terms set 
by the State. 
2. Persons holding Licenses to possess Nuclear Materials are required to: 
a. keep accounting and operational records of Nuclear Materials 
and submit to the Authority reports of accounting records at the 
time and in the form specified by the Authority; 
b. notify the Authority and the relevant competent authorities, 
without delay of any loss or misappropriation of Nuclear 
Materials: 
c. inform the Authority of any interference with equipment under 
surveillance by the Authority; any interference with equipment 
under surveillance by an international organization which has 
signed an agreement with the State on safeguards for Nuclear 
Materials subject to which Nuclear Materials are controlled; and 
any Accident with led to or could have led to violation of the 
integrity of Nuclear Material, as soon as such a fact has been 
ascertained; and 
d. enable access by inspectors delegated by the Authority. 
3. The Board shall issue the regulations on the manner of keeping the 
accounting and operational records, performance of control activities, 
drafting and submission of reports on accounting records and on the 
method of notifying the Authority of any Incident relating to Nuclear 
Materials. 
Chapter Eight 
RADIOACTIVE WASTE AND DECOMMISSIONING 
Article 40 
1. Persons holding Licenses to possess Regulated Materials are 
responsible for the safe management and Storage of Radioactive Waste 
from its generation until its delivery to the entity designated by a decision 
of the Cabinet for the purposes of Disposal. 
2. The Licensee shall comply with the duties and responsibilities of the safe 
conduct of the Radioactive Waste in addition to the commitment of 
applying the Nuclear Security and Nuclear Safety rules determined by 
the Authority. 
50 
 
3. The Board shall, by detailed rules, determine the requirements, 
responsibilities and duties for the safe conduct of Radioactive Waste. 
Article 41 
1. The Cabinet shall issue policy regarding the long term management and 
disposal of the Spent Nuclear Fuel, the Radioactive Waste and identify 
the entity in charge of implementing such policy. Radioactive Waste and 
Spent Nuclear Fuel shall become property of the State from the time of 
its delivery to the State or to the entity designated by a decision of the 
Cabinet. 
2. The regulations shall specify the terms and procedure for Radioactive 
Waste delivery to the entity designated by the Cabinet, including the 
Radioactive Waste which is not subject to delivery, the time limits for 
such delivery and the fees to be paid by the Radioactive Waste 
producers to the State.. 
3. It shall be prohibited by this Law by Decree to import Radioactive Waste 
and Spent Nuclear Fuel derived from nuclear energy applications outside 
the State for the purpose of a long term storage or disposal in the State's 
lands and sites. 
Article 42 
1. A juridical Person that is licensed to operate a Nuclear Facility that 
generates or will generate Radioactive Waste shall pay fees into a trust 
fund called "Decommissioning Trust Fund", established by a decision of 
the Cabinet according to the Board's recommendation. The fees shall 
cover: 
a. costs for the Construction, Operation and Closure of a 
Radioactive Waste Management Facility including costs for any 
research and development activities essential for this purpose; 
b. costs for Decommissioning of the Nuclear Facility; 
c. costs for regulatory oversight of the Activities referred to in this 
Article; and 
d. costs for the management of the trust fund. 
2. The fees that are required to be paid by the Licensee shall be 
determined by the Cabinet according to the Authority's proposal, based 
on the cost to accomplish the Licensee's part of the total costs for the 
Activities referred to in clause 1 of this Article and shall be paid by the 
Licensee over the time its License to operate a Nuclear Facility is valid. 
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If the Licensee is a company owned or controlled by the State or its 
political subdivisions, the Licensee maydeposit a payment with the trust 
fund to cover all or part of the Licensee's financial obligations with regard 
to the Activities referred to in the aforementioned clause. Surplus 
amounts shall be returned to the Licensee to cover a Licensee's part of 
the total costs. 
3. Implementing regulation promulgated by the Board shall specify the 
procedures for: 
a. calculating and collecting the fees to the Decommissioning Trust 
Fund; 
b. amount and character of the securities to be deposited with the 
Decommissioning Trust Fund to cover the Licensee's financial 
obligations with regard to the Activities referred to in this Article 
that are not covered by fees already paid; 
c. management of the assets of the Decommissioning Trust Fund; 
and 
payment from the Decommissioning Trust Fund for the costs referred to in this 
Article. 
Chapter Nine  
MANAGEMENT OF SAFETY AND QUALITY ASSURANCE 
(Physical Protection- Emergency Planning- Emergency 
Preparedness and 
Response) 
Article 43 
1. Each Licensee shall be responsible for taking all steps necessary to 
reduce the risk of an Accident to a level that is as low as reasonably 
achievable. 
2 The Licensee shall ensure that there is a Management System in place 
and adequate financial and human resources to ensure Nuclear Safety. 
The Licensee shall determine the responsibility and authority of 
individual bodies within its Management System in order to achieve the 
requirements of the previous paragraph. 
3. Each Licensee shall ensure that human and organizational factors are 
considered in the performance of Regulated Activities. 
4. If requested by the Licensee, the Authority shall give reasonable priority 
to the resolution of Safety issues arising during the Construction of the 
Facilities. 
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The Licensee shall perform comprehensive and systematic Safety 
Assessments and take steps to address any deficiencies that are 
identified during Design, Construction and Operation of a Nuclear Facility 
or any other Facility which is subject to the provisions of this Law by 
Decree, includingprovisions for Decommissioning. During Operation, the 
evaluation is to be performed at intervals and with a scope to be 
established by the Authority through the implementing regulations. 
6. The Licensee shall ensure that Occupational Exposures and Public 
Exposures to Ionizing Radiation and any releases of Radioactive Material 
to the environment caused by the conduct of Regulated Activities are kept 
below the prescribed limits during all operational states and Activities, and 
shall undertake to achieve Doses as low as reasonably achievable. The 
Licensee shall keep records of measured and estimated Doses and 
release data and report them to the Authority as specified in the applicable 
regulations. 
7. The Licensee shall make Safety matters related to its licensed Regulated 
Activities that is not a subject of State secrecy, official secrecy or 
commercial secrecy a public information. 
B. The Licensee shall issue procedures guide concerning the 
performance of its Activities, especially for the Operation, Maintenance, 
surveillance and testing of selected equipment. These procedures shall 
be in line with the approved limits and conditions for safe Operation, and 
with the approved Quality Assurance programs. When necessary, the 
Licensee shall update and amend these procedures. The Licensee shall 
establish a work program for the performance of Safety-related 
Activities, which are not covered in the procedures guide. 
Article (44) 
As part of its Management System for Safety, the Licensee shall set up 
management Safety system and adopt policies and procedures to define 
and adhere to appropriate Quality Assurance requirements and to 
categorize equipment necessary for Nuclear Safety according to 
regulations issued by the Authority. 
Quality Assurance Programme set by the Operator shall be subject to 
approval and Inspection by the Authority. 
The Licensee shall be responsible for defining and adhering to Quality 
Assurance Criteria, including provision of equipment and services during 
all stages in the life of a Facility. 
Implementing regulations of the Law by Decree shall determine the 
requirements of Quality Assurance systems and the procedures and 
scope of their approval, and also the categorization of equipment 
selected as important to Nuclear Safety. 
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Article (45  
1. The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Facilities shall be 
ensured according to the requirements of the international treaties and 
agreements entered into by the State in this regard. 
2. The Authority shall regulate the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 
in accordance with the previous clause. 
Article 46 
1. Licensees engaged in a Regulated Activity must prepare a Physical 
Protection plan and obtain the Authority's approval hereto. Such Physical 
Protection plan must describe the technical measures, internal rules, and 
instructions which the Licensee will abide by in order to ensure Physical 
Protection and the areas in which Nuclear Material is or may be present 
at any time. 
2. The Physical Protection plan must be submitted to the Authority together 
with the application for a License. 
3. The Authority may, from time to time, require changes to be made to the 
Physical Protection plan of any Licensee. 
4. The Authority may impose additional terms and conditions on the 
Physical Protection plan through regulations and decisions. 
Article 47 
1. A Facility, as well as the locations where related functions take place. 
may be determined as vital to Physical Protection by a decision of the 
Cabinet. 
2. competent authorities in the State shall provide necessary security to the 
areas stated in sub-clause (1) of this Clause. 
Article 48 
Any individual who, by permission, is present within an area identified 
in any Physical Protection plan as being an area in which  Nuclear 
Material is or may be present at any time must comply with all Physical 
Protection requirements 
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established by the applicable regulation or by the relevant Licensee subject to 
being excluded temporarily or permanently from such areas in the future in 
case of breach of this Clause. 
Article 49 
1. The competent authorities and Licensees shall establish measures for 
Emergency Preparedness and Emergency Response. 
2. Emergency Planning measures shall be established: 
a. for protection of the population (off-site Emergency Plan), which 
regulates the Emergency Zones and determines the actions to be 
taken by the competent authorities to protect the population, 
property and environment in case of an Accident; 
b. for each Nuclear Facility and the facility that contains sources of 
nuclear radiations (on-site Emergency Plan), which determines 
the actions to be taken by the Licensee for Accident mitigation and 
remediation of consequences in co-ordination with the off-site 
Emergency Plan. 
Article 50 
The preparation, Maintenance and co-ordination of the off-site Emergency 
Plan shall be organized by the competent authorities and Licensees in order 
to provide civil protection and protection of the public against disasters, 
accidents and catastrophes. 
Article 51 
The preparation and maintenance of the off-site Emergency Plan, the 
provision of material and technical and human resources for its 
implementation shall be financed by the State's national budget. 
Article 52 
1. Prior to the Commissioning of a Nuclear Facility, the Licensee shall submit 
the on-site Emergency Plan to the Authority and the other competent 
authorities in the State. 
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2. The Emergency Plan shall be practically tested prior to Nuclear Facility 
Commissioning and during the course of Operation, and the separate 
parts of the Emergency Plan shall be periodically tested and evaluated. 
3. The Authority shall approve the on-site Emergency Plan prior to 
Commissioning. 
Article 53 
Licensee shall be required to familiarize its employees with the Emergency 
Plans and to conduct special training of employees designated to perform 
functions in implementing the Emergency Plans. 
Article 54 
In case of an Accident, Licensees shall be obligated to: 
a. notify the Authority immediately; 
b. warn the population and municipalities within the Emergency Zones 
and other competent authorities immediately; 
c. take Emergency Action to mitigate and remedy the consequences of 
the Accident; 
d. control and regulate the exposure of the individuals engaged in 
Accident mitigation and elimination; 
e. ensure continuous monitoring of radioactive releases into the 
environment; and; 
f. perform any other obligations as may be established in the 
Emergency Plans, this Law by Decree, the implementing regulations 
and the applicable regulations. 
Article 55 
The terms and procedures for preparation of Emergency Plans, the 
responsibilities and duties for implementation, the measures for mitigation and 
remediation of the consequences, the arrangements for warning of the public 
and the measures for testing Emergency Preparedness shall be established 
by the applicable regulations of this Law by Decree. 
Article 56 
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The Authority shall coordinate with the relevant official entities for the purposes 
of the effective monitoring and surveillance of Radioactive Sources at the 
State's borders and all other areas subject to the provisions of this Law by 
Decree. 
Chapter Ten  
CIVIL LIABILITY- PENALTIES 
Article 57 
The Operator shall be liable on all matters related to Safety, Nuclear Safety, 
Nuclear Security and Radiation Protection. 
Article 58 
The civil liability for nuclear damage shall be determined according to the 
provisions of the international treaties and agreements entered into by the 
State and the relevant legislation issued in this regard. The Operator shall be 
solely responsible for compensating any damages that may occur to individuals 
or properties as a result of its own negligence in operating the Nuclear Facility 
or not following the Safety and Nuclear Safety requirements according to the 
international treaties and agreements and the relevant legislations. 
Article 59 
Any Person who abandons or otherwise causes Sources of Ionizing 
Radiation to be in an unacceptable condition shall be liable to those costs 
incurred by the Authority for proper controls or custody and/or disposal in 
order to assure protection of public health and Safety. 
Article 60 
There shall be penalized by imprisonment for a period not more than one year 
and a fine not less than AED 1,000,000 (One Million UAE Dirhams) and not 
more than AED 10,000,000 (Ten Million UAE Dirhams) or by one of these two 
penalties everyone who operates a Nuclear Facility without a License from the 
Authority. 
Article 61 
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There shall be penalized by a fine of 500,000 (Five Hundred Thousand UAE 
Dirhams) any one who carry out any action related to the sources of Nuclear 
Radiation without a License from the Authority. 
Article 62 
There shall be penalized by imprisonment for a period of not more than one 
year and a fine not less than AED 500,000 (Five Hundred Thousand UAE 
Dirhams) and not more than AED 50,000,000 (Fifty Million UAE Dirhams) or 
by one of these two penalties: 
1. Any one who conducts any of the Regulated Activities without 
License to do so or without being exempted from obtaining a License 
pursuant to the provisions of this Law by Decree: 
2. Any one who intentionally fails to comply with this Law by Decree, 
any regulations or any License condition: 
3. Any one who intentionally alters, destroys or otherwise suppresses a 
document or information required by the Authority pursuant to this 
Law by Decree: 
4. Any one who intentionally submits false information required by the 
Authority in order to make a determination on the issuing of a 
License: or 
5. Any one, without having the right to do so, publishes, transfers or 
discloses any information or document regarding a Nuclear Material 
or Nuclear Facility in a way that affects the Physical Protection of the 
Nuclear Material. 
Article 63 
A person shall be punished with a temporary jail sentence and a fine of not 
less than AED 2,000,000 (Two Million UAE Dirhams) and not more than AED 
50,000,000 (Fifty Million UAE Dirhams) or by one of those two penalties for 
committing any of the following: 
1. act, without lawful authority, which constitutes the receipt, 
possession, use, transfer, alteration, disposal or dispersal of Nuclear 
Material and which causes or is likely to cause death or serious injury 
to any Person or substantial damage to property; 
2. a theft or robbery of Nuclear Material; 
3. embezzlement or the fraudulent obtaining of Nuclear Material; 
4. an act constituting a demand for Nuclear Material by threat or use of 
force or by any other form of intimidation; and 
58 
 
5. a threat to use Nuclear Material to cause death or serious injury to 
any individual or substantial property damage, or to commit any other 
offence. 
6. any act that breaches the provisions of the International Convention 
for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism ratified by the 
Federal Decree No (95) of 2007. 
Article 64 
1. The imposition of the punishments set out herein shall be without 
prejudice to any severer penalties set out in any other law. 
2. In case of repeated offence, the above punishment terms shall be doubled. 
Chapter ELEVEN  
CLOSING PROVISIONS  
Article 65 
 
The personnel entrusted by the Minister of Justice after consulting with the 
Chairman, shall have powers of the judicial police to report and prove the breaches 
that occur in violation of the provisions of this Law by Decree, the regulations, 
instructions and decisions issued in implementation thereof. 
 
Article 66 
1- The functions of the competent department in the Federal 
Environmental Agency and the radiation protection committee specified in the 
Federal Law No 1 of 2002 regarding the Regulation and Control of the Use of 
Radiation Sources and Protection Against Their Hazards shall be transferred 
to the Authority. 
2- The employees working in the competent department mentioned in the 
previous clause shall be transferred from the Federal Environmental Agency 
to the Authority, and they shall keep all their rights and earned benefits as 
continuing their service period with the Authority; and that all instruments, 
laboratories, tools, materials and other existing items used in the Federal 
Environmental Agency for supervising, regulating and controlling the use of 
Radiation Sources and protection against the hazards shall be transferred into 
the Authority. 
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Article 67 
The Board shall establish, by a decision, a committee to be named "the 
Radiation Protection Committee in the State", the decision shall specify the 
authorities and bylaws of such committee. 
Article 68 
Save for what is stipulated by special provision in this Law by Decree, the 
employees of the Authority shall be subject to Federal Law No (11) of 2008 
regarding Human Resources in the Federal Government until the issuance of 
the relevant regulations and decisions in this regard. 
Article 69 
The Board shall issue the implementing regulations, other regulations, 
decisions and instructions required to implement the provisions of the Law 
by Decree. 
Article 70 
Current radioactive material licenses issued by any government departments 
shall remain valid as per their procedures and conditions for a transition 
period. Licensees shall adjust their status pursuant to the provisions of this 
Law by Decree within twelve (12) months from the date of publication of this 
Law by Decree. 
Article 71 
Any provision that contravenes this Law by Decree shall hereby be repealed. 
Federal Law No 1 of 2002 Regarding the Regulation and Control of the Use 
of Radiation Sources and Protection Against Their Hazards shall hereby be 
repealed. 
Article 72 
This Law shall be published in the Official Gazette and shall become 
effective on the following date of its publication. 
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Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan 
President of the United Arab Emirates 
Issued at the Presidential Palace in Abu Dhabi 
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APPENDIX 7: International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of  
Nuclear Terrorism Source: United Nations 
 
 
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR  
THE SUPPRESSION OF ACTS OF  
NUCLEAR TERRORISM
 
UNITED NATIONS 
2005 
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of  
Nuclear Terrorism 
The States Parties to this Convention, 
Having in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of 
the United Nations concerning the maintenance of international peace 
and security and the promotion of good-neighbourliness and friendly 
relations and cooperation among States, 
Recalling the Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth 
Anniversary of the United Nations of 24 October 1995, 
Recognizing the right of all States to develop and apply nuclear 
energy for peaceful purposes and their legitimate interests in the 
potential benefits to be derived from the peaceful application of 
nuclear energy, 
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Bearing in mind the Convention on the Physical Protection of 
Nuclear Material of 1980, 
Deeply concerned about the worldwide escalation of acts of 
terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, 
Recalling the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate 
International Terrorism annexed to General Assembly resolution 
49/60 of 9 December 1994, in which, inter alia, the States 
Members of the United Nations solemnly reaffirm their 
unequivocal condemnation of all acts, methods and practices of 
terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable, wherever and by 
whomever committed, including those which jeopardize the 
friendly relations among States and peoples and threaten the 
territorial integrity and security of States, 
Noting that the Declaration also encouraged States to review 
urgently the scope of the existing international legal provisions on 
the prevention, repression and elimination of terrorism in all its 
forms and manifestations, with the aim of ensuring that there is a 
comprehensive legal framework covering all aspects of the matter, 
Recalling General Assembly resolution 51/210 of 17 December 
1996 and the Declaration to Supplement the 1994 Declaration on 
Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism annexed thereto, 
Recalling also that, pursuant to General Assembly 
resolution 51/210, an ad hoc committee was established to 
elaborate, inter alia, an international convention for the 
suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism to supplement related 
existing international instruments, 
Noting that acts of nuclear terrorism may result in the 
gravest consequences and may pose a threat to international peace 
and security, 
Noting also that existing multilateral legal provisions do not 
adequately address those attacks, 
Being convinced of the urgent need to enhance international 
cooperation between States in devising and adopting effective and 
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practical measures for the prevention of such acts of terrorism and 
for the prosecution and punishment of their perpetrators, 
Noting that the activities of military forces of States are 
governed by rules of international law outside of the framework 
of this Convention and that the exclusion of certain actions from 
the coverage of this Convention does not condone or make 
lawful otherwise unlawful acts, or preclude prosecution under 
other laws, 
Have agreed as follows: 
Article 1 
For the purposes of this Convention: 
1. “Radioactive material” means nuclear material and other 
radioactive substances which contain nuclides which undergo 
spontaneous disintegration (a process accompanied by emission of one 
or more types of ionizing radiation, such as alpha-, beta-, neutron 
particles and gamma rays) and which may, owing to their radiological 
or fissile properties, cause death, serious bodily injury or substantial 
damage to property or to the environment. 
2. “Nuclear material” means plutonium, except that with isotopic 
concentration exceeding 80 per cent in plutonium-238; uranium-233; 
uranium enriched in the isotope 235 or 233; uranium containing the 
mixture of isotopes as occurring in nature other than in the form of ore 
or ore residue; or any material containing one or more of the 
foregoing; 
Whereby “uranium enriched in the isotope 235 or 233” means 
uranium containing the isotope 235 or 233 or both in an amount such 
that the abundance ratio of the sum of these isotopes to the isotope 238 
is greater than the ratio of the isotope 235 to the isotope 238 occurring 
in nature. 
3. “Nuclear facility” means: 
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(a) Any nuclear reactor, including reactors installed on 
vessels, vehicles, aircraft or space objects for use as an energy source 
in order to propel such vessels, vehicles, aircraft or space objects or for 
any other purpose; 
(b) Any plant or conveyance being used for the production, 
storage, processing or transport of radioactive material. 
4. “Device” means: 
(a) Any nuclear explosive device; or 
(b) Any radioactive material dispersal or radiation-emitting device 
which may, owing to its radiological properties, cause death, serious bodily 
injury or 
 
5.  “State or government facility” includes any permanent or 
temporary facility or conveyance that is used or occupied by 
representatives of a State, members of a Government, the legislature or 
the judiciary or by officials or employees of a State or any other public 
authority or entity or by employees or officials of an intergovernmental 
organization in connection with their official duties. 
6. “Military forces of a State” means the armed forces of a State which 
are organized, trained and equipped under its internal law for the primary 
purpose of national defence or security and persons acting in support of 
those armed forces who are under their formal command, control and 
responsibility. 
Article 2 
1. Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this 
Convention if that person unlawfully and intentionally: 
(a) Possesses radioactive material or makes or possesses a 
device: 
(i) With the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury; or 
(ii) With the intent to cause substantial damage to property or to 
the environment; 
(b) Uses in any way radioactive material or a device, or uses or 
damages a nuclear facility in a manner which releases or risks the release 
of radioactive material: 
(i) With the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury; or 
(ii) With the intent to cause substantial damage to property or to 
the environment; or 
(iii) With the intent to compel a natural or legal person, an 
international organization or a State to do or refrain from doing an act.  
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2. Any person also commits an offence if that person: 
(a) Threatens, under circumstances which indicate the 
credibility of the threat, to commit an offence as set forth in paragraph 
1 (b) of the present article; or 
(b) Demands unlawfully and intentionally radioactive 
material, a device or a nuclear facility by threat, under circumstances 
which indicate the credibility of the threat, or by use of force. 
3. Any person also commits an offence if that person attempts to commit 
an offence as set forth in paragraph 1 of the present article. 
4. Any person also commits an offence if that person: 
(a) Participates as an accomplice in an offence as set forth in 
paragraph 1, 2 or 3 of the present article; or 
(b) Organizes or directs others to commit an offence as set forth 
in paragraph 1, 2 or 3 of the present article; or 
(c) In any other way contributes to the commission of one or 
more offences as set forth in paragraph 1, 2 or 3 of the present article by 
a group of persons acting with a common purpose; such contribution 
shall be intentional and either be made with the aim of furthering the 
general criminal activity or purpose of the group or be made in the 
knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the offence or 
offences concerned. 
Article 3 
This Convention shall not apply where the offence is committed 
within a single State, the alleged offender and the victims are nationals 
of that State, the alleged offender is found in the territory of that State 
and no other State has a basis under article 9, paragraph 1 or 2, to exercise 
jurisdiction, except that the provisions of articles 7, 12, 14, 15, 16 and 
17 shall, as appropriate, apply in those cases. 
Article 4 
1. Nothing in this Convention shall affect other rights, obligations and 
responsibilities of States and individuals under international law, in 
particular the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations 
and international humanitarian law. 
2. The activities of armed forces during an armed conflict, as those 
terms are understood under international humanitarian law, which are 
governed by that law are not governed by this Convention, and the 
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activities undertaken by military forces of a State in the exercise of their 
official duties, inasmuch as they are governed by other rules of 
international law, are not governed by this Convention. 
3. The provisions of paragraph 2 of the present article shall not be 
interpreted as condoning or making lawful otherwise unlawful acts, or 
precluding prosecution under other laws. 
4. This Convention does not address, nor can it be interpreted as 
addressing, in any way, the issue of the legality of the use or th reat of 
use of nuclear weapons by States. 
Article 5 
Each State Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary: 
(a) To establish as criminal offences under its national law the 
offences set forth in article 2; 
(b) To make those offences punishable by appropriate penalties 
which take into account the grave nature of these offences. 
Article 6 
Each State Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary, 
including, where appropriate, domestic legislation, to ensure that 
criminal acts within the scope of this Convention, in particular where 
they are intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general 
public or in a group of persons or particular persons, are under no 
circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, 
ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature and are 
punished by penalties consistent with their grave nature. 
Article 7 
1. States Parties shall cooperate by: 
(a) Taking all practicable measures, including, if necessary, 
adapting their national law, to prevent and counter preparations in their 
respective territories for the commission within or outside their 
territories of the offences set forth in article 2, including measures to 
prohibit in their territories illegal activities of persons, groups and 
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organizations that encourage, instigate, organize, knowingly finance or 
knowingly provide technical assistance or information or engage in the 
perpetration of those offences; 
(b) Exchanging accurate and verified information in 
accordance with their national law and in the manner and subject to the 
conditions specified herein, and coordinating administrative and other 
measures taken as appropriate to detect, prevent, suppress and 
investigate the offences set forth in article 2 and also in order to institute 
criminal proceedings against persons alleged to have committed those 
crimes. In particular, a State Party shall take appropriate measures in 
order to inform without delay the other States referred to in article 9 in 
respect of the commission of the offences set forth in article 2 as well 
as preparations to commit such offences about which it has learned, and 
also to inform, where appropriate, international organizations. 
2. States Parties shall take appropriate measures consistent 
with their national law to protect the confidentiality of any 
information which they receive in confidence by virtue of the 
provisions of this Convention from another State Party or through 
participation in an activity carried out for the implementation of this 
Convention. If States Parties provide information to international 
organizations in confidence, steps shall be taken to ensure that the 
confidentiality of such information is protected. 
3. States Parties shall not be required by this Convention to provide any 
information which they are not permitted to communicate pursuant to 
national law or which would jeopardize the security of the State concerned 
or the physical protection of nuclear material. 
4. States Parties shall inform the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations of their competent authorities and liaison points responsible 
for sending and receiving the information referred to in the present 
article. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall 
communicate such information regarding competent authorities and 
liaison points to all States Parties and the International Atomic Energy 
Agency. Such authorities and liaison points must be accessible on a 
continuous basis. 
Article 8 
For purposes of preventing offences under this Convention, 
States Parties shall make every effort to adopt appropriate measures to 
ensure the protection of radioactive material, taking into account 
relevant recommendations and functions of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency. 
Article 9 
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1. Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to 
establish its jurisdiction over the offences set forth in article 2 when: 
(a) The offence is committed in the territory of that State; or 
(b) The offence is committed on board a vessel flying the flag of 
that State or an aircraft which is registered under the laws of that State at 
the time the offence is committed; or 
(c) The offence is committed by a national of that State. 
2. A State Party may also establish its jurisdiction over any such 
offence when: 
(a) The offence is committed against a national of that State; 
or 
(b) The offence is committed against a State or government 
facility of that State abroad, including an embassy or other diplomatic 
or consular premises of that State; or 
(c) The offence is committed by a stateless person who has his or 
her habitual residence in the territory of that State; or 
(d) The offence is committed in an attempt to compel that State to 
do or abstain from doing any act; or 
(e) The offence is committed on board an aircraft which is 
operated by the Government of that State. 
3. Upon ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to this 
Convention, each State Party shall notify the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations of the jurisdiction it has established under its national 
law in accordance with paragraph 2 of the present article. Should any 
change take place, the State Party concerned shall immediately notify 
the Secretary-General. 
4. Each State Party shall likewise take such measures as may be 
necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offences set forth in 
article 2 in cases where the alleged offender is present in its territory 
and it does not extradite that person to any of the States Parties which 
have established their jurisdiction in accordance with paragraph 1 or 2 
of the present article. 
5. This Convention does not exclude the exercise of any criminal 
jurisdiction established by a State Party in accordance with its national law. 
Article 10 
1. Upon receiving information that an offence set forth in article 2 
has been committed or is being committed in the territory of a State 
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Party or that a person who has committed or who is alleged to have 
committed such an offence may be present in its territory, the State 
Party concerned shall take such measures as may be necessary under 
its national law to investigate the facts contained in the information.  
2. Upon being satisfied that the circumstances so warrant, the State 
Party in whose territory the offender or alleged offender is present shall 
take the appropriate measures under its national law so as to ensure 
that person’s presence for the purpose of prosecution or extradition. 
3. Any person regarding whom the measures referred to in paragraph 2 
of the present article are being taken shall be entitled: 
(a) To communicate without delay with the nearest appropriate 
representative of the State of which that person is a national or which is 
otherwise entitled to protect that person’s rights or, if that person is a 
stateless person, the State in the territory of which that person habitually 
resides; 
(b) To be visited by a representative of that State; 
(c) To be informed of that person’s rights under subparagraphs 
(a) and (b). 
4. The rights referred to in paragraph 3 of the present article shall 
be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the State 
in the territory of which the offender or alleged offender is presen t, 
subject to the 
provision that the said laws and regulations must enable full effect to be 
given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under paragraph 3 are 
intended. 
5. The provisions of paragraphs 3 and 4 of the present article shall 
be without prejudice to the right of any State Party having a claim to 
jurisdiction in accordance with article 9, paragraph 1 (c) or 2 (c), to 
invite the International Committee of the Red Cross to communicate 
with and visit the alleged offender. 
6. When a State Party, pursuant to the present article, has taken a 
person into custody, it shall immediately notify, directly or through the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations, the States Parties which have 
established jurisdiction in accordance with article 9, paragraphs 1 and 
2, and, if it considers it advisable, any other interested States Parties, of 
the fact that that person is in custody and of the circumstances which 
warrant that person’s detention. The State which makes the 
investigation contemplated in paragraph 1 of the present article shall 
promptly inform the said States Parties of its findings and shall indicate 
whether it intends to exercise jurisdiction. 
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Article 11 
1. The State Party in the territory of which the alleged offender is 
present shall, in cases to which article 9 applies, if it does not extradite 
that person, be obliged, without exception whatsoever and whether or 
not the offence was committed in its territory, to submit the case 
without undue delay to its competent authorities for the purpose of 
prosecution, through proceedings in accordance with the laws of that 
State. Those authorities shall take their decision in the same manner as 
in the case of any other offence of a grave nature under the law of that 
State. 
2. Whenever a State Party is permitted under its national law to 
extradite or otherwise surrender one of its nationals only upon the 
condition that the person will be returned to that State to serve the 
sentence imposed as a result of the trial or proceeding for which the 
extradition or surrender of the person was sought, and this State and 
the State seeking the extradition of the person agree with this option 
and other terms they may deem appropriate, such a conditional 
extradition or surrender shall be sufficient to discharge the obligation 
set forth in paragraph 1 of the present article. 
Article 12 
Any person who is taken into custody or regarding whom any 
other measures are taken or proceedings are carried out pursuant to this 
Convention shall be guaranteed fair treatment, including enjoyment of 
all rights and guarantees in conformity with the law of the State in the 
territory of which that person is present and applicable provisions of 
international law, including international law of human rights. 
Article 13 
1. The offences set forth in article 2 shall be deemed to be included as 
extraditable offences in any extradition treaty existing between any of the 
States Parties before the entry into force of this Convention. States Parties 
undertake to include such offences as extraditable offences in every 
extradition treaty to be subsequently concluded between them. 
2. When a State Party which makes extradition conditional on the 
existence of a treaty receives a request for extradition from another 
State Party with which it has no extradition treaty, the requested State 
Party may, at its option, consider this Convention as a legal basis for 
extradition in respect of the offences set forth in article 2. Extradition 
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shall be subject to the other conditions provided by the law of the 
requested State. 
3. States Parties which do not make extradition conditional on the 
existence of a treaty shall recognize the offences set forth in article 2 
as extraditable offences between themselves, subject to the conditions 
provided by the law of the requested State. 
4. If necessary, the offences set forth in article 2 shall be treated, 
for the purposes of extradition between States Parties, as if they had 
been committed not only in the place in which they occurred but also 
in the territory of the States that have established jurisdiction in 
accordance with article 9, paragraphs 1 and 2. 
5. The provisions of all extradition treaties and arrangements between 
States Parties with regard to offences set forth in article 2 shall be deemed 
to be modified as between States Parties to the extent that they are 
incompatible with this Convention. 
Article 14 
1. States Parties shall afford one another the greatest measure of 
assistance in connection with investigations or criminal or extradition 
proceedings brought in respect of the offences set forth in article 2, 
including assistance in obtaining evidence at their disposal necessary for 
the proceedings. 
2. States Parties shall carry out their obligations under paragraph 1 of the 
present article in conformity with any treaties or other arrangements on mutual 
legal assistance that may exist between them. In the absence of such treaties or 
arrangements, States Parties shall afford one another assistance in accordance 
with their national law 
 
Article 15 
None of the offences set forth in article 2 shall be regarded, for 
the purposes of extradition or mutual legal assistance, as a political 
offence or as an offence connected with a political offence or as an 
offence inspired by political motives. Accordingly, a request for 
extradition or for mutual legal assistance based on such an offence 
may not be refused on the sole ground that it concerns a political 
offence or an offence connected with a political offence or an offence 
inspired by political motives. 
Article 16 
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Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as imposing an 
obligation to extradite or to afford mutual legal assistance if the 
requested State Party has substantial grounds for believing that the 
request for extradition for offences set forth in article 2 or for mutual 
legal assistance with respect to such offences has been made for the 
purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on account of that 
person’s race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin or political opinion 
or that compliance with the request would cause prejudice to that 
person’s position for any of these reasons. 
Article 17 
1. A person who is being detained or is serving a sentence in the 
territory of one State Party whose presence in another State Party is 
requested for purposes of testimony, identification or otherwise 
providing assistance in obtaining evidence for the investigation or 
prosecution of offences under this Convention may be transferred if the 
following conditions are met: 
(a) The person freely gives his or her informed consent; and 
(b) The competent authorities of both States agree, subject to 
such conditions as those States may deem appropriate. 
2. For the purposes of the present article: 
(a) The State to which the person is transferred shall have the 
authority and obligation to keep the person transferred in custody, unless 
otherwise requested or authorized by the State from which the person 
was transferred; 
(b) The State to which the person is transferred shall without 
delay implement its obligation to return the person to the custody of the 
State from which the person was transferred as agreed beforehand, or as 
otherwise agreed, by the competent authorities of both States; 
(c) The State to which the person is transferred shall not require 
the State from which the person was transferred to initiate extradition 
proceedings for the return of the person; 
(d) The person transferred shall receive credit for service of 
the sentence being served in the State from which he or she was 
transferred for time spent in the custody of the State to which he or she 
was transferred. 
3. Unless the State Party from which a person is to be transferred 
in accordance with the present article so agrees, that person, whatever 
his or her nationality, shall not be prosecuted or detained or subjected 
to any other restriction of his or her personal liberty in the territory of 
the State to which that person is transferred in respect of acts or 
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convictions anterior to his or her departure from the territory of the 
State from which such person was transferred. 
Article 18 
1. Upon seizing or otherwise taking control of radioactive mater ial, 
devices or nuclear facilities, following the commission of an offence 
set forth in article 2, the State Party in possession of such items shall:  
(a) Take steps to render harmless the radioactive material, device 
or nuclear facility; 
(b) Ensure that any nuclear material is held in accordance with 
applicable International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards; and 
(c) Have regard to physical protection recommendations and 
health and safety standards published by the International Atomic Energy 
Agency. 
2. Upon the completion of any proceedings connected with an 
offence set forth in article 2, or sooner if required by international law, 
any radioactive material, device or nuclear facility shall be returned, 
after consultations (in particular, regarding modalities of return and 
storage) with the States Parties concerned to the State Party to which it 
belongs, to the State Party of which the natural or legal person owning 
such radioactive material, device or facility is a national or resident, or 
to the State Party from whose territory it was stolen or otherwise 
unlawfully obtained. 
3. (a) Where a State Party is prohibited by national or 
international law from returning or accepting such radioactive material, 
device or nuclear facility or where the States Parties concerned so 
agree, subject to paragraph 3 (b) of the present article, the State Party 
in possession of the radioactive material, devices or nuclear facilities 
shall continue to take the steps described in paragraph 1 of the present 
article; such radioactive material, devices or nuclear facilities shall be 
used only for peaceful purposes; 
(b) Where it is not lawful for the State Party in possession of the 
radioactive material, devices or nuclear facilities to possess them, that State 
shall ensure that they are placed as soon as possible in the possession 
of a State for which such possession is lawful and which, where 
appropriate, has provided assurances consistent with the requirements 
of paragraph 1 of the present article in consultation with that State, for 
the purpose of rendering it harmless; such radioactive material, devices 
or nuclear facilities shall be used only for peaceful purposes. 
4. If the radioactive material, devices or nuclear facilities referred 
to in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the present article do not belong to any of 
the States Parties or to a national or resident of a State Party or was not 
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stolen or otherwise unlawfully obtained from the territory of a State 
Party, or if no State is willing to receive such items pursuant to 
paragraph 3 of the present article, a separate decision concerning its 
disposition shall, subject to paragraph 3 (b) of the present article, be 
taken after consultations between the States concerned and any relevant 
international organizations. 
5. For the purposes of paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the present article, 
the State Party in possession of the radioactive material, device or 
nuclear facility may request the assistance and cooperation of other 
States Parties, in particular the States Parties concerned, and any 
relevant international organizations, in particular the International 
Atomic Energy Agency. States Parties and the relevant international 
organizations are encouraged to provide assistance pursuant to this 
paragraph to the maximum extent possible. 
6. The States Parties involved in the disposition or retention of the 
radioactive material, device or nuclear facility pursuant to the present 
article shall inform the Director General of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency of the manner in which such an item was disposed of 
or retained. The Director General of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency shall transmit the information to the other States Parties. 
7. In the event of any dissemination in connection with an offence set 
forth in article 2, nothing in the present article shall affect in any way the 
rules of international law governing liability for nuclear damage, or other 
rules of international law. 
Article 19 
The State Party where the alleged offender is prosecuted shall, in 
accordance with its national law or applicable procedures, communicate 
the final outcome of the proceedings to the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations, who shall transmit the information to the other States 
Parties. 
 
Article 20 
States Parties shall conduct consultations with one another directly or 
through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, with the assistance of 
international organizations as necessary, to ensure effective 
implementation of this Co 
Article 21 
The States Parties shall carry out their obligations under this 
Convention in a manner consistent with the principles of sovereign 
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equality and territorial integrity of States and that of non-intervention 
in the domestic affairs of other States. 
Article 22 
Nothing in this Convention entitles a State Party to undertake in the 
territory of another State Party the exercise of jurisdiction and performance of 
functions which are exclusively reserved for the authorities of that other State 
Party by its national law. 
Article 23 
1. Any dispute between two or more States Parties concerning the 
interpretation or application of this Convention which cannot be 
settled through negotiation within a reasonable time shall, at the 
request of one of them, be submitted to arbitration. If, within six 
months of the date of the request for arbitration, the parties are unable 
to agree on the organization of the arbitration, any one of those parties 
may refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice, by 
application, in conformity with the Statute of the Court.  
2. Each State may, at the time of signature, ratification, acceptance 
or approval of this Convent ion or accession thereto, declare that it does 
not consider itself bound by paragraph 1 of the present article. The other 
States Parties shall not be bound by paragraph 1 with respect to any State 
Party which has made such a reservation. 
3. Any State which has made a reservation in accordance with 
paragraph 2 of the present article may at any time withdraw that reservation 
by notification to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.nvention. 
Article 24 
This Convention shall be open for signature by all States from 14 September 
2005 until 31 December 2006 at United Nations Headquarters in New York. 
This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval. The instruments 
of ratification, acceptance or approval shall be deposited with the Secretary-
General of the United Nations. 
This Convention shall be open to accession by any State. The instruments of 
accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations. 
Article 25 
76 
 
1. This Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following 
the date of the deposit of the twenty-second instrument of ratification, 
acceptance, approval or accession with the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations. 
2. For each State ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to the 
Convention after the deposit of the twenty-second instrument of 
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, the Convention shall 
enter into force on the thirtieth day after deposit by such State of its 
instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession. 
Article 26 
1. A State Party may propose an amendment to this Convention. The 
proposed amendment shall be submitted to the depositary, who circulates it 
immediately to all States Parties. 
2. If the majority of the States Parties request the depositary to convene a 
conference to consider the proposed amendments, the depositary shall invite all 
States Parties to attend such a conference to begin no sooner than three months 
after the invitations are issued. 
3. The conference shall make every effort to ensure amendments are 
adopted by consensus. Should this not be possible, amendments shall be 
adopted by a two-thirds majority of all States Parties. Any amendment 
adopted at the conference shall be promptly circulated by the depositary to 
all States Parties. 
4. The amendment adopted pursuant to paragraph 3 of the present article shall 
enter into force for each State Party that deposits its instrument of ratification, 
acceptance, accession or approval of the amendment on the thirtieth day after the 
date on which two thirds of the States Parties have deposited their relevant 
instrument. Thereafter, the amendment shall enter into force for any State Party 
on the thirtieth day after the date on which that State deposits its relevant 
instrument. 
Article 27 
1. Any State Party may denounce this Convention by written notification to 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 
2. Denunciation shall take effect one year following the date on which 
notification is received by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 
Article 28 
The original of this Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, 
English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be 
deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall send 
certified copies thereof to all States. 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized 
thereto by their respective Governments, have signed this Convention, 
opened for signature at United Nations Headquarters in New York on 14 
September 2005.
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APPENDIX 8: 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear 
Damage Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
 
VIENNA CONVENTION ON CIVIL LIABILITY  
FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE 
Done on 21 May 1963 
THE CONTRACTING PARTIES, 
HAVING RECOGNIZED the desirability of establishing some minimum 
standards to provide financial protection against damage resulting from 
certain peaceful uses of nuclear energy, 
BELIEVING that a convention on civil liability for nuclear damage would also 
contribute to the development of friendly relations among nations, irrespective 
of their differing constitutional and social systems, 
HAVE DECIDED to conclude a convention for such purposes, and thereto 
have agreed as follows - 
ARTICLE I 
1. For the purposes of this Convention - 
(a) “Person” means any individual, partnership, any private or public body whether 
corporate or not, any international organization enjoying legal personality 
under the law of the Installation State, and any State or any of its constituent 
sub-divisions. 
(b) “National of a Contracting Party” includes a Contracting Party or any of its 
constituent sub-divisions, a partnership, or any private or public body whether 
corporate or not established within the territory of a Contracting Party. 
(c) “Operator”, in relation to a nuclear installation, means the person designated or 
recognized by the Installation State as the operator of that installation. 
(d) “Installation State”, in relation to a nuclear installation, means the Contracting 
Party within whose territory that installation is situated or, if it is not situated 
within the territory of any State, the Contracting Party by which or under the 
authority of which the nuclear installation is operated. 
(e) “Law of the competent court” means the law of the court having jurisdiction 
under this Convention, including any rules of such law relating to conflict of 
laws. 
(f) “Nuclear fuel” means any material which is capable of producing energy by a 
self-sustaining chain process of nuclear fission. 
(g) “Radioactive products or waste” means any radioactive material produced in, 
or any material made radioactive by exposure to the radiation incidental to, the 
production or utilization of nuclear fuel, but does not include radioisotopes 
which have reached the final stage of fabrication so as to be usable for any 
scientific, medical, agricultural, commercial or industrial purpose. 
(h) “Nuclear material” means - 
(i) nuclear fuel, other than natural uranium and depleted uranium, capable of 
producing energy by a self-sustaining chain process of nuclear fission 
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outside a nuclear reactor, either alone or in combination with some other 
material; and 
(ii) radioactive products or waste. 
(i) “Nuclear reactor” means any structure containing nuclear fuel in such an 
arrangement that a self-sustaining chain process of nuclear fission can occur 
therein without an additional source of neutrons. 
(j) “Nuclear installation” means - 
(i) any nuclear reactor other than one with which a means of sea or air 
transport is equipped for use as a source of power, whether for propulsion 
thereof or for any other purpose; 
(ii) any factory using nuclear fuel for the production of nuclear material, or 
any factory for the processing of nuclear material, including any factory 
for the re-processing of irradiated nuclear fuel; and 
(iii) any facility where nuclear material is stored, other than storage 
incidental to the carriage of such material; 
provided that the Installation State may determine that several nuclear 
installations of one operator which are located at the same site shall be 
considered as a single nuclear installation. 
(k) “Nuclear damage” means - 
(i) loss of life, any personal injury or any loss of, or damage to, property 
which arises out of or results from the radioactive properties or a 
combination of radioactive properties with toxic, explosive or other 
hazardous properties of nuclear fuel or radioactive products or waste in, 
or of nuclear material coming from, originating in, or sent to, a nuclear 
installation; 
(ii) any other loss or damage so arising or resulting if and to the extent that 
the law of the competent court so provides; and 
(iii) if the law of the Installation State so provides, loss of life, any personal 
injury or any loss of, or damage to, property which arises out of or results 
from other ionizing radiation emitted by any other source of radiation 
inside a nuclear installation. 
(l) “Nuclear incident” means any occurrence or series of occurrences having the 
same origin which causes nuclear damage. 
2. An Installation State may, if the small extent of the risks involved so warrants, 
exclude any small quantities of nuclear material from the application of this 
Convention, provided that- 
(a) maximum limits for the exclusion of such quantities have been established by 
the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency; and 
(b) any exclusion by an Installation State is within such established limits. 
The maximum limits shall be reviewed periodically by the Board of Governors. 
ARTICLE II 
1. The operator of a nuclear installation shall be liable for nuclear damage upon 
proof that such damage has been caused by a nuclear incident - 
(a) in his nuclear installation; or 
(b) involving nuclear material coming from or originating in his nuclear 
installation, and occurring - 
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(i) before liability with regard to nuclear incidents involving the nuclear 
material has been assumed, pursuant to the express terms of a contract in 
writing, by the operator of another nuclear installation; 
(ii) in the absence of such express terms, before the operator of another 
nuclear installation has taken charge of the nuclear material; or 
(iii) where the nuclear material is intended to be used in a nuclear reactor with 
which a means of transport is equipped for use as a source of power, 
whether for propulsion thereof or for any other purpose, before the person 
duly authorized to operate such reactor has taken charge of the nuclear 
material; but 
(iv) where the nuclear material has been sent to a person within the territory 
of a non-Contracting State, before it has been unloaded from the means 
of transport by which it has arrived in the territory of that non-
Contracting State; 
(c) involving nuclear material sent to his nuclear installation, and occurring - 
(i) after liability with regard to nuclear incidents involving the nuclear 
material has been assumed by him, pursuant to the express terms of a 
contract in writing, from the operator of another nuclear installation; 
(ii) in the absence of such express terms, after he has taken charge of the 
nuclear material; or 
(iii) after he has taken charge of the nuclear material from a person operating 
a nuclear reactor with which a means of transport is equipped for use as 
a source of power, whether for propulsion thereof or for any other 
purpose; but 
(iv) where the nuclear material has, with the written consent of the operator, 
been sent from a person within the territory of a non-Contracting State, 
only after it has been loaded on the means of transport by which it is to 
be carried from the territory of that State; 
provided that, if nuclear damage is caused by a nuclear incident occurring in 
a nuclear installation and involving nuclear material stored therein 
incidentally to the carriage of such material, the provisions of subparagraph 
(a) of this paragraph shall not apply where another operator or person is 
solely liable pursuant to the provisions of sub-paragraph (b) or (c) of this 
paragraph. 
 2. The Installation State may provide by legislation that, in accordance with such 
terms as may be specified 
therein, a carrier of nuclear material or a person handling radioactive waste may, at 
his request and with the consent of the operator concerned, be designated or 
recognized as operator in the place of that operator in respect of such nuclear material 
or radioactive waste respectively. In this case such carrier or such person shall be 
considered, for all the purposes of this Convention, as an operator of a nuclear 
installation situated within the territory of that State. 
 3. (a) Where nuclear damage engages the liability of more than one operator, the 
operators involved shall, in 
so far as the damage attributable to each operator is not reasonably 
separable, be jointly and severally liable. 
(b) Where a nuclear incident occurs in the course of carriage of nuclear 
material, either in one and the same means of transport, or, in the case of 
storage incidental to the carriage, in one and the same nuclear 
installation, and causes nuclear damage which engages the liability of 
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more than one operator, the total liability shall not exceed the highest 
amount applicable with respect to any one of them pursuant to Article V. 
(c) In neither of the cases referred to in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of this 
paragraph shall the liability of any one operator exceed the amount 
applicable with respect to him pursuant to Article V. 
 4. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 3 of this Article, where several nuclear 
installations of one and the same operator are involved in one nuclear incident, such 
operator shall be liable in respect of each nuclear installation involved up to the 
amount applicable with respect to him pursuant to Article V. 
 5. Except as otherwise provided in this Convention, no person other than the 
operator shall be liable for nuclear damage. This, however, shall not affect the 
application of any international convention in the field of transport in force or open 
for signature, ratification or accession at the date on which this Convention is opened 
for signature. 
 6. No person shall be liable for any loss or damage which is not nuclear damage 
pursuant to sub-paragraph (k) of paragraph 1 of Article I but which could have been 
included as such pursuant to sub-paragraph (k)(ii) of that paragraph. 
 7. Direct action shall lie against the person furnishing financial security pursuant 
to Article VII, if the law of the competent court so provides. 
ARTICLE III 
The operator liable in accordance with this Convention shall provide the 
carrier with a certificate issued by or on behalf of the insurer or other financial 
guarantor furnishing the financial security required pursuant to Article VII. The 
certificate shall state the name and address of that operator and the amount, type and 
duration of the security, and these statements may not be disputed by the person by 
whom or on whose behalf the certificate was issued. The certificate shall also 
indicate the nuclear material in respect of which the security applies and shall include 
a statement by the competent public authority of the Installation State that the person 
named is an operator within the meaning of this Convention. 
ARTICLE IV 
 1. The liability of the operator for nuclear damage under this Convention shall be 
absolute. 
 2. If the operator proves that the nuclear damage resulted wholly or partly either 
from the gross negligence of the 
person suffering the damage or from an act or omission of such person done with 
intent to cause damage, the competent court may, if its law so provides, relieve the 
operator wholly or partly from his obligation to pay compensation in respect of the 
damage suffered by such person. 
 3. (a) No liability under this Convention shall attach to an operator for nuclear 
damage caused by a nuclear incident directly due to an act of armed conflict, 
hostilities, civil war or insurrection. 
(b) Except in so far as the law of the Installation State may provide to the 
contrary, the operator shall not be liable for nuclear damage caused by a 
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nuclear incident directly due to a grave natural disaster of an exceptional 
character. 
 4. Whenever both nuclear damage and damage other than nuclear damage have 
been caused by a nuclear 
incident or jointly by a nuclear incident and one or more other occurrences, such 
other damage shall, to the extent that it is not reasonably separable from the 
nuclear damage, be deemed, for the purposes of this Convention, to be nuclear 
damage caused by that nuclear incident. Where, however, damage is caused jointly 
by a nuclear incident covered by this Convention and by an emission of ionizing 
radiation not covered by it, nothing in this Convention shall limit or otherwise 
affect the liability, either as regards any person suffering nuclear damage or by 
way of recourse or contribution, of any person who may be held liable in 
connection with that emission of ionizing radiation. 
 5. The operator shall not be liable under this Convention for nuclear damage - 
(a) to the nuclear installation itself or to any property on the site of that installation 
which is used or to be used in connection with that installation; or 
(b) to the means of transport upon which the nuclear material involved was at the 
time of the nuclear incident. 
 6. Any Installation State may provide by legislation that sub-paragraph (b) of 
paragraph 5 of this Article shall not 
apply, provided that in no case shall the liability of the operator in respect of nuclear 
damage, other than nuclear damage to the means of transport, be reduced to less than 
US $5 million for any one nuclear incident. 
 7. Nothing in this Convention shall affect - 
(a) the liability of any individual for nuclear damage for which the operator, by 
virtue of paragraph 3 or 5 of this Article, is not liable under this Convention 
and which that individual caused by an act or omission done with intent to 
cause damage; or 
(b) the liability outside this Convention of the operator for nuclear damage for 
which, by virtue of sub paragraph (b) of paragraph 5 of this Article, he is 
not liable under this Convention 
 
 
ARTICLE V 
1. The liability of the operator may be limited by the Installation State to not less 
than US $5 million for any one nuclear incident. 
2. Any limits of liability which may be established pursuant to this Article shall 
not include any interest or costs awarded by a court in actions for compensation of 
nuclear damage. 
3. The United States dollar referred to in this Convention is a unit of account 
equivalent to the value of the United States dollar in terms of gold on 29 April 1963, 
that is to say US $35 per one troy ounce of fine gold. 
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(4) The sum mentioned in paragraph 6 of Article IV and in paragraph 1 of this Article 
may be converted into national currency in round figures. 
ARTICLE VI 
1. Rights of compensation under this Convention shall be extinguished if an 
action is not brought within ten years from the date of the nuclear incident. If, 
however, under the law of the Installation State the liability of the operator is covered 
by insurance or other financial security or by State funds for a period longer than ten 
years, the law of the competent court may provide that rights of compensation against 
the operator shall only be extinguished after a period which may be longer than ten 
years, but shall not be longer than the period for which his liability is so covered 
under the law of the Installation State. Such extension of the extinction period shall 
in no case affect rights of compensation under this Convention of any person who 
has brought an action for loss of life or personal injury against the operator before the 
expiry of the aforesaid period of ten years. 
2. Where nuclear damage is caused by a nuclear incident involving nuclear 
material which at the time of the nuclear incident was stolen, lost, jettisoned or 
abandoned, the period established pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article shall be 
computed from the date of that nuclear incident, but the period shall in no case exceed 
a period of twenty years from the date of the theft, loss, jettison or abandonment. 
3. The law of the competent court may establish a period of extinction or 
prescription of not less than three years from the date on which the person suffering 
nuclear damage had knowledge or should have had knowledge of the damage and of 
the operator liable for the damage, provided that the period established pursuant to 
paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall not be exceeded. 
4. Unless the law of the competent court otherwise provides, any person who 
claims to have suffered nuclear damage and who has brought an action for 
compensation within the period applicable pursuant to this Article may amend his 
claim to take into account any aggravation of the damage, even after the expiry of 
that period, provided that final judgment has not been entered. 
5. Where jurisdiction is to be determined pursuant to sub-paragraph (b) of 
paragraph 3 of Article XI and a request has been made within the period applicable 
pursuant to this Article to any one of the Contracting Parties empowered so to 
determine, but the time remaining after such determination is less than six months, 
the period within which an action may be brought shall be six months, reckoned from 
the date of such determination. 
ARTICLE VII 
1. The operator shall be required to maintain insurance or other financial security 
covering his liability for nuclear damage in such amount, of such type and in 
such terms as the Installation State shall specify. The Installation State shall 
ensure the payment of claims for compensation for nuclear damage which 
have been established against the operator by providing the necessary funds to 
the extent that the yield of insurance or other financial security is inadequate to 
satisfy such claims, but not in excess of the limit, if any, established pursuant 
to Article V. 
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2. Nothing in paragraph 1 of this Article shall require a Contracting Party or any of 
its constituent sub-divisions, such as States or Republics, to maintain 
insurance or other financial security to cover their liability as operators. 
3. The funds provided by insurance, by other financial security or by the 
Installation State pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article shall be 
exclusively available for compensation due under this Convention. 
4. No insurer or other financial guarantor shall suspend or cancel the insurance or 
other financial security provided pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article 
without giving notice in writing of at least two months to the competent 
public authority or, in so far as such insurance or other financial security 
relates to the carriage of nuclear material, during the period of the 
carriage in question. 
ARTICLE VIII 
Subject to the provisions of this Convention, the nature, form and extent of the 
compensation, as well as the equitable distribution thereof, shall be governed by the 
law of the competent court. 
ARTICLE IX 
1. Where provisions of national or public health insurance, social insurance, social 
security, workmen’s compensation or occupational disease compensation 
systems include compensation for nuclear damage, rights of beneficiaries of 
such systems to obtain compensation under this Convention and rights of 
recourse by virtue of such systems against the operator liable shall be 
determined, subject to the provisions of this Convention, by the law of the 
Contracting Party in which such systems have been established, or by the 
regulations of the intergovernmental organization which has established 
such systems. 
2. (a) If a person who is a national of a Contracting Party, other than the operator, 
has paid compensation for nuclear damage under an international 
convention or under the law of a non-Contracting State, such person 
shall, up to the amount which he has paid, acquire by subrogation the 
rights under this Convention of the person so compensated. No rights 
shall be so acquired by any person to the extent that the operator has a 
right of recourse against such person under this Convention. 
(b) Nothing in this Convention shall preclude an operator who has paid 
compensation for nuclear damage out of funds other than those 
provided pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article VII from recovering from 
the person providing financial security pursuant to that paragraph or 
from the Installation State, up to the amount he has paid, the sum which 
the person so compensated would have obtained under this Convention. 
ARTICLE X 
The operator shall have a right of recourse only - 
(a) if this is expressly provided for by a contract in writing; or 
85 
 
(b) if the nuclear incident results from an act or omission done with intent to 
cause damage, against the individual who has acted or omitted to act with 
such intent. 
ARTICLE XI 
1. Except as otherwise provided in this Article, jurisdiction over actions under 
Article II shall lie only with the courts of the Contracting Party within whose 
territory the nuclear incident occurred. 
2. Where the nuclear incident occurred outside the territory of any Contracting 
Party, or where the place of the nuclear incident cannot be determined with 
certainty, jurisdiction over such actions shall lie with the courts of the 
Installation State of the operator liable. 
3. Where under paragraph 1 or 2 of this Article, jurisdiction would lie with the 
courts of more than one Contracting Party, jurisdiction shall lie - 
(a) if the nuclear incident occurred partly outside the territory of any Contracting 
Party, and partly within the territory of a single Contracting Party, with the 
courts of the latter; and 
(b) in any other case, with the courts of that Contracting Party which is 
determined by agreement between the Contracting Parties whose courts 
would be competent under paragraph 1 or 2 of this Article. 
ARTICLE XII 
 1. A final judgment entered by a court having jurisdiction under Article XI shall 
be recognized within the 
territory of any other Contracting Party, except - 
(a) where the judgment was obtained by fraud; 
(b) where the party against whom the judgment was pronounced was not given a 
fair opportunity to present his case; or 
(c) where the judgment is contrary to the public policy of the Contracting Party 
within the territory of which recognition is sought, or is not in accord with 
fundamental standards of justice. 
 2. A final judgment which is recognized shall, upon being presented for 
enforcement in accordance with the formalities required by the law of the 
Contracting Party where enforcement is sought, be enforceable as if it were a 
judgment of a court of that Contracting Party. 
 3. The merits of a claim on which the judgment has been given shall not be 
subject to further proceedings. 
ARTICLE XIII 
This Convention and the national law applicable thereunder shall be applied 
without any discrimination based upon nationality, domicile or residence. 
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ARTICLE XIV 
Except in respect of measures of execution, jurisdictional immunities under 
rules of national or international law shall not be invoked in actions under this 
Convention before the courts competent pursuant to Article XI. 
ARTICLE XV 
The Contracting Parties shall take appropriate measures to ensure that 
compensation for nuclear damage, interest and costs awarded by a court in 
connection therewith, insurance and reinsurance premiums and funds provided by 
insurance, reinsurance or other financial security, or funds provided by the 
Installation State, pursuant to this Convention, shall be freely transferable into the 
currency of the Contracting Party within whose territory the damage is suffered, 
and of the Contracting Party within whose territory the claimant is habitually 
resident, and, as regards insurance or reinsurance premiums and payments, into the 
currencies specified in the insurance or reinsurance contract. 
ARTICLE XVI 
No person shall be entitled to recover compensation under this Convention to 
the extent that he has recovered compensation in respect of the same nuclear damage 
under another international convention on civil liability in the field of nuclear energy. 
ARTICLE XVII 
This Convention shall not, as between the parties to them, affect the application 
of any international agreements or international conventions on civil liability in the 
field of nuclear energy in force, or open for signature, ratification or accession at the 
date on which this Convention is opened for signature. 
ARTICLE XVIII 
This Convention shall not be construed as affecting the rights, if any, of a 
Contracting Party under the general rules of public international law in respect of 
nuclear damage. 
ARTICLE XIX 
1. Any Contracting Party entering into an agreement pursuant to subparagraph (b) 
of paragraph 3 of Article XI shall furnish without delay to the Director General of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency for information and dissemination to the other 
Contracting Parties a copy of such agreement. 
2. The Contracting Parties shall furnish to the Director General for information 
and dissemination to the other Contracting Parties copies of their respective laws and 
regulations relating to matters covered by this Convention. 
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ARTICLE XX 
Notwithstanding the termination of the application of this Convention to any 
Contracting Party, either by termination pursuant to Article XXV or by 
denunciation pursuant to Article XXVI, the provisions of this Convention shall 
continue to apply to any nuclear damage caused by a nuclear incident occurring 
before such termination. 
ARTICLE XXI 
This Convention shall be open for signature by the States represented at the 
International Conference on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage held in Vienna from 
29 April to 19 May 1963. 
ARTICLE XXII 
This Convention shall be ratified, and the instruments of ratification shall be 
deposited with the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency. 
ARTICLE XXIII 
This Convention shall come into force three months after the deposit of the 
fifth instrument of ratification, and, in respect of each State ratifying it thereafter, 
three months after the deposit of the instrument of ratification by that State. 
ARTICLE XXIV 
1. All States Members of the United Nations, or of any of the specialized agencies 
or of the International Atomic Energy Agency not represented at the International 
Conference on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage held in Vienna from 29 April to 
19 May 1963, may accede to this Convention. 
2. The instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Director General of 
the International Atomic Energy Agency. 
3. This Convention shall come into force in respect of the acceding State three 
months after the date of deposit of the instrument of accession of that State but not 
before the date of the entry into force of this Convention pursuant to Article XXIII. 
ARTICLE XXV 
1. This Convention shall remain in force for a period of ten years from the date of 
its entry into force. Any Contracting Party may, by giving before the end of that 
period at least twelve months’ notice to that effect to the Director General of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, terminate the application of this Convention to 
itself at the end of that period of ten years. 
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2. This Convention shall, after that period of ten years, remain in force for a 
further period of five years for such Contracting Parties as have not terminated its 
application pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article, and thereafter for 
successive periods of five years each for those Contracting Parties which have not 
terminated its application at the end of one of such periods, by giving, before the 
end of one of such periods, at least twelve months’ notice to that effect to the 
Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency. 
ARTICLE XXVI 
1. A conference shall be convened by the Director General of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency at any time after the expiry of a period of five years from 
the date of the entry into force of this Convention in order to consider the revision 
thereof, if one-third of the Contracting Parties express a desire to that effect. 
2. Any Contracting Party may denounce this Convention by notification to the 
Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency within a period of 
twelve months following the first revision conference held pursuant to paragraph 1 
of this Article. 
3. Denunciation shall take effect one year after the date on which notification to 
that effect has been received by the Director General of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency. 
ARTICLE XXVII 
The Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency shall notify 
the States invited to the International Conference on Civil Liability for Nuclear 
Damage held in Vienna from 29 April to 19 May 1963 and the States which have 
acceded to this Convention of the following - 
(a) signatures and instruments of ratification and accession received pursuant to 
Articles XXI, XXII and XXIV; 
(b) the date on which this Convention will come into force pursuant to Article 
XXIII; 
(c) notifications of termination and denunciation received pursuant to Articles 
XXV and XXVI; 
(d) requests for the convening of a revision conference pursuant to Article 
XXVI. 
ARTICLE XXVIII 
This Convention shall be registered by the Director General of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter 
of the United Nations. 
ARTICLE XXIX 
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The original of this Convention, of which the English, French, Russian and 
Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Director General of 
the International Atomic Energy Agency, who shall issue certified copies. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, duly authorized 
thereto, have signed this Convention. 
DONE in Vienna, this twenty-first day of May, one thousand nine hundred 
and sixty-three. 
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APPENDIX 9: The 1960 Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in 
the Field of Nuclear Energy Source: Nuclear Energy Agency 
 
Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of 
Nuclear Energy of 29th July 1960, as amended by the 
Additional Protocol of 28th January 1964 and by the 
Protocol of 16th November 1982 
The GOVERNMENTS of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic 
of Austria, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the 
Kingdom of Spain, the Republic of Finland, the French Republic, the 
Hellenic Republic, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of 
Luxembourg, the Kingdom of Norway, the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands, the Portuguese Republic, the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland, the Kingdom of Sweden, the Swiss 
Confederation and the Turkish Republic¹ ; 
CONSIDERING that the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, established 
within the framework of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (hereinafter referred to as the "Organisation")², is 
charged with encouraging the elaboration and harmonization of 
legislation relating to nuclear energy in participating countries, in 
particular with regard to third party liability and insurance against 
atomic risks; 
DESIROUS of ensuring adequate and equitable compensation for 
persons who suffer damage caused by nuclear incidents whilst taking 
the necessary steps to ensure that the development of the production 
and uses of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is not thereby 
hindered; 
CONVINCED of the need for unifying the basic rules applying in the 
various countries to the liability incurred for such damage, whilst 
leaving these countries free to take, on a national basis, any 
additional measures which they deem appropriate; 
HAVE AGREED as follows: 
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Article 1 
a. For the purposes of this Convention: 
i. "A nuclear incident" means any occurrence or 
succession of occurrences having the same origin which 
causes damage, provided that such occurrence or 
succession of occurrences, or any of the damage 
caused, arises out of or results either from the 
radioactive properties, or a combination of radioactive 
properties with toxic, explosive, or other hazardous 
properties of nuclear fuel or radioactive products or 
waste or with any of them, or from ionizing radiations 
emitted by any source of radiation inside a nuclear 
installation. 
ii. "Nuclear installation" means reactors other than those 
comprised in any means of transport; factories for the 
manufacture or processing of nuclear substances; 
factories for the separation of isotopes of nuclear fuel; 
factories for the reprocessing of irradiated nuclear fuel; 
facilities for the storage of nuclear substances other 
than storage incidental to the carriage of such 
substances; and such other installations in which there 
are nuclear fuel or radioactive products or waste as the 
Steering Committee for Nuclear Energy of the 
Organisation (hereinafter referred to as the "Steering 
Committee") shall from time to time determine; any 
Contracting Party may determine that two or more 
nuclear installations of one operator which are located 
on the same site shall, together with any other 
premises on that site where radioactive material is held, 
be treated as a single nuclear installation. 
iii. "Nuclear fuel" means fissionable material in the form of 
uranium metal, alloy, or chemical compound (including 
natural uranium), plutonium metal, alloy, or chemical 
compound, and such other fissionable material as the 
Steering Committee shall from time to time determine. 
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iv. "Radioactive products or waste" means any radioactive 
material produced in or made radioactive by exposure 
to the radiation incidental to the process of producing or 
utilizing nuclear fuel, but does not include (1) nuclear 
fuel, or (2) radioisotopes outside a nuclear installation 
which have reached the final stage of fabrication so as 
to be usable for any industrial, commercial, agricultural, 
medical, scientific or educational purpose. 
v. "Nuclear substances" means nuclear fuel (other than 
natural uranium and other than depleted uranium) and 
radioactive products or waste. 
vi. "Operator" in relation to a nuclear installation means 
the person designated or recognised by the competent 
public authority as the operator of that installation. 
b. The Steering Committee may, if in its view the small extent of 
the risks involved so warrants, exclude any nuclear installation, 
nuclear fuel, or nuclear substances from the application of this 
Convention. 
 
Article 2 
This Convention does not apply to nuclear incidents occurring 
in the territory of non-Contracting States or to damage 
suffered in such territory, unless otherwise provided by the 
legislation of the Contracting Party in whose territory the 
nuclear installation of the operator liable is situated, and 
except in regard to rights referred to in Article 6(e). 
 
Article 3 
a. The operator of a nuclear installation shall be liable, in 
accordance with this Convention, for: 
i. damage to or loss of life of any person; and 
ii. damage to or loss of any property other than 
1. the nuclear installation itself and any other 
nuclear installation, including a nuclear 
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installation under construction, on the site where 
that installation is located; and 
2. any property on that same site which is used or 
to be used in connection with any such 
installation, 
upon proof that such damage or loss (hereinafter referred to as 
"damage") was caused by a nuclear incident in such 
installation or involving nuclear substances coming from such 
installation, except as otherwise provided for in Article 4. 
b. Where the damage or loss is caused jointly by a nuclear 
incident and by an incident other than a nuclear incident, that 
part of the damage or loss which is caused by such other 
incident, shall, to the extent that it is not reasonably separable 
from the damage or loss caused by the nuclear incident, be 
considered to be damage caused by the nuclear incident. 
Where the damage or loss is caused jointly by a nuclear 
incident and by an emission of ionizing radiation not covered 
by this Convention, nothing in this Convention shall limit or 
otherwise affect the liability of any person in connection with 
that emission of ionizing radiation. 
 
Article 4 
In the case of carriage of nuclear substances, including storage 
incidental thereto, without prejudice to Article 2: 
a. The operator of a nuclear installation shall be liable, in 
accordance with this Convention, for damage upon proof that it 
was caused by a nuclear incident outside that installation and 
involving nuclear substances in the course of carriage 
therefrom, only if the incident occurs: 
i. before liability with regard to nuclear incidents involving 
the nuclear substances has been assumed, pursuant to 
the express terms of a contract in writing, by the 
operator of another nuclear installation; 
ii. in the absence of such express terms, before the 
operator of another nuclear installation has taken 
charge of the nuclear substances; or 
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iii. where the nuclear substances are intended to be used 
in a reactor comprised in a means of transport, before 
the person duly authorized to operate that reactor has 
taken charge of the nuclear substances; but 
iv. where the nuclear substances have been sent to a 
person within the territory of a non-Contracting State, 
before they have been unloaded from the means of 
transport by which they have arrived in the territory of 
that non-Contracting State. 
b. The operator of a nuclear installation shall be liable, in 
accordance with this Convention, for damage upon proof that it 
was caused by a nuclear incident outside that installation and 
involving nuclear substances in the course of carriage thereto, 
only if the incident occurs: 
i. after liability with regard to nuclear incidents involving 
the nuclear substances has been assumed by him, 
pursuant to the express terms of a contract in writing, 
from the operator of another nuclear installation; 
ii. in the absence of such express terms, after he has 
taken charge of the nuclear substances; or 
iii. after he has taken charge of the nuclear substances 
from a person operating a reactor comprised in a means 
of transport; but 
iv. where the nuclear substances have, with the written 
consent of the operator, been sent from a person within 
the territory of a non-Contracting State, after they have 
been loaded on the means of transport by which they 
are to be carried from the territory of that State. 
c. The operator liable in accordance with this Convention shall 
provide the carrier with a certificate issued by or on behalf of 
the insurer or other financial guarantor furnishing the security 
required pursuant to Article 10. However, a Contracting Party 
may exclude this obligation in relation to carriage which takes 
place wholly within its own territory. The certificate shall state 
the name and address of that operator and the amount, type 
and duration of the security, and these statements may not be 
disputed by the person by whom or on whose behalf the 
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certificate was issued. The certificate shall also indicate the 
nuclear substances and the carriage in respect of which the 
security applies and shall include a statement by the 
competent public authority that the person named is an 
operator within the meaning of this Convention. 
d. A Contracting Party may provide by legislation that, under such 
terms as may be contained therein and upon fulfilment of the 
requirements of Article 10(a), a carrier may, at his request and 
with the consent of an operator of a nuclear installation 
situated in its territory, by decision of the competent public 
authority, be liable in accordance with this Convention in place 
of that operator. In such case for all the purposes of this 
Convention the carrier shall be considered, in respect of 
nuclear incidents occurring in the course of carriage of nuclear 
substances, as an operator of a nuclear installation on the 
territory of the Contracting Party whose legislation so provides. 
 
Article 5 
a. If the nuclear fuel or radioactive products or waste involved in 
a nuclear incident have been in more than one nuclear 
installation and are in a nuclear installation at the time damage 
is caused, no operator of any nuclear installation in which they 
have previously been shall be liable for the damage. 
b. Where, however, damage is caused by a nuclear incident 
occurring in a nuclear installation and involving only nuclear 
substances stored therein incidentally to their carriage, the 
operator of the nuclear installation shall not be liable where 
another operator or person is liable pursuant to Article 4. 
c. If the nuclear fuel or radioactive products or waste involved in 
a nuclear incident have been in more than one nuclear 
installation and are not in a nuclear installation at the time 
damage is caused, no operator other than the operator of the 
last nuclear installation in which they were before the damage 
was caused or an operator who has subsequently taken them 
in charge, or has assumed liability therefor pursuant to the 
96 
 
express terms of a contract in writing shall be liable for the 
damage. 
d. If damage gives rise to liability of more than one operator in 
accordance with this Convention, the liability of these 
operators shall be joint and several: provided that where such 
liability arises as a result of damage caused by a nuclear 
incident involving nuclear substances in the course of carriage 
in one and the same means of transport, or, in the case of 
storage incidental to the carriage, in one and the same nuclear 
installation, the maximum total amount for which such 
operators shall be liable shall be the highest amount 
established with respect to any of them pursuant to Article 7 
and provided that in no case shall any one operator be 
required, in respect of a nuclear incident, to pay more than the 
amount established with respect to him pursuant to Article 7. 
 
Article 6 
a. The right to compensation for damage caused by a nuclear 
incident may be exercised only against an operator liable for 
the damage in accordance with this Convention, or, if a direct 
right of action against the insurer or other financial guarantor 
furnishing the security required pursuant to Article 10 is given 
by national law, against the insurer or other financial 
guarantor. 
b. Except as otherwise provided in this Article, no other person 
shall be liable for damage caused by a nuclear incident, but 
this provision shall not affect the application of any 
international agreement in the field of transport in force or 
open for signature, ratification or accession at the date of this 
Convention. 
c.  
i. Nothing in this Convention shall affect the liability: 
1. of any individual for damage caused by a nuclear 
incident for which the operator, by virtue of 
Article 3(a)(ii)(1) and (2) or Article 9, is not 
liable under this Convention and which results 
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from an act or omission of that individual done 
with intent to cause damage; 
2. of a person duly authorized to operate a reactor 
comprised in a means of transport for damage 
caused by a nuclear incident when an operator is 
not liable for such damage pursuant to Article 
4(a)(iii) or (b)(iii). 
ii. The operator shall incur no liability outside this 
Convention for damage caused by a nuclear incident. 
d. Any person who has paid compensation in respect of damage 
caused by a nuclear incident under any international 
agreement referred to in paragraph (b) of this Article or under 
any legislation of a non-Contracting State shall, up to the 
amount which he has paid, acquire by subrogation the rights 
under this Convention of the person suffering damage whom 
he has so compensated. 
e. Any person who has his principal place of business in the 
territory of a Contracting Party or who is the servant of such a 
person and who has paid compensation in respect of damage 
caused by a nuclear incident occurring in the territory of a non-
Contracting State or in respect of damage suffered in such 
territory shall, up to the amount which he has paid, acquire the 
rights which the person so compensated would have had 
against the operator but for the provisions of Article 2. 
f. The operator shall have a right of recourse only: 
i. if the damage caused by a nuclear incident results from 
an act or omission done with intent to cause damage, 
against the individual acting or omitting to act with such 
intent; 
ii. if and to the extent that it is so provided expressly by 
contract. 
g. If the operator has a right of recourse to any extent pursuant 
to paragraph (f) of this Article against any person, that person 
shall not, to that extent, have a right against the operator 
under paragraphs (d) or (e) of this Article. 
h. Where provisions of national or public health insurance, social 
security, workmen's compensation or occupational disease 
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compensation systems include compensation for damage 
caused by a nuclear incident, rights of beneficiaries of such 
systems and rights of recourse by virtue of such systems shall 
be determined by the law of the Contracting Party or by the 
regulations of the inter-Governmental organisation which has 
established such systems. 
 
Article 7 
a. The aggregate of compensation required to be paid in respect 
of damage caused by a nuclear incident shall not exceed the 
maximum liability established in accordance with this Article. 
b. The maximum liability of the operator in respect of damage 
caused by a nuclear incident shall be 15 000 000 Special 
Drawing Rights as defined by the International Monetary Fund 
and used by it for its own operations and transactions 
(hereinafter referred to as "Special Drawing Rights"). However, 
i. any Contracting Party, taking into account the 
possibilities for the operator of obtaining the insurance 
or other financial security required pursuant to Article 
10, may establish by legislation a greater or lesser 
amount; 
ii. any Contracting Party, having regard to the nature of 
the nuclear installation or the nuclear substances 
involved and to the likely consequences of an incident 
originating therefrom, may establish a lower amount, 
provided that in no event shall any amounts so established be 
less than 5 000 000 Special Drawing Rights. The sums 
mentioned above may be converted into national currency in 
round figures. 
c. Compensation for damage caused to the means of transport on 
which the nuclear substances involved were at the time of the 
nuclear incident shall not have the effect of reducing the 
liability of the operator in respect of other damage to an 
amount less than either 5 000 000 Special Drawing Rights, or 
any higher amount established by the legislation of a 
Contracting Party. 
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d. The amount of liability of operators of nuclear installations in 
the territory of a Contracting Party established in accordance 
with paragraph (b) of this Article as well as the provisions of 
any legislation of a Contracting Party pursuant to paragraph 
(c) of this Article shall apply to the liability of such operators 
wherever the nuclear incident occurs. 
e. A Contracting Party may subject the transit of nuclear 
substances through its territory to the condition that the 
maximum amount of liability of the foreign operator concerned 
be increased, if it considers that such amount does not 
adequately cover the risks of a nuclear incident in the course of 
the transit: provided that the maximum amount thus increased 
shall not exceed the maximum amount of liability of operators 
of nuclear installations situated in its territory. 
f. The provisions of paragraph (e) of this Article shall not apply: 
i. to carriage by sea where, under international law, there 
is a right of entry in cases of urgent distress into the 
ports of such Contracting Party or a right of innocent 
passage through its territory; or 
ii. to carriage by air where, by agreement or under 
international law there is a right to fly over or land on 
the territory of such Contracting Party. 
g. Any interest and costs awarded by a court in actions for 
compensation under this Convention shall not be considered to 
be compensation for the purposes of this Convention and shall 
be payable by the operator in addition to any sum for which he 
is liable in accordance with this Article. 
 
Article 8 
a. The right of compensation under this Convention shall be 
extinguished if an action is not brought within ten years from 
the date of the nuclear incident. National legislation may, 
however, establish a period longer than ten years if measures 
have been taken by the Contracting Party in whose territory 
the nuclear installation of the operator liable is situated to 
cover the liability of that operator in respect of any actions for 
compensation begun after the expiry of the period of ten years 
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and during such longer period: provided that such extension of 
the extinction period shall in no case affect the right of 
compensation under this Convention of any person who has 
brought an action in respect of loss of life or personal injury 
against the operator before the expiry of the period of ten 
years. 
b. In the case of damage caused by a nuclear incident involving 
nuclear fuel or radioactive products or waste which, at the time 
of the incident have been stolen, lost, jettisoned or abandoned 
and have not yet been recovered, the period established 
pursuant to paragraph (a) of this Article shall be computed 
from the date of that nuclear incident, but the period shall in 
no case exceed twenty years from the date of the theft, loss, 
jettison or abandonment. 
c. National legislation may establish a period of not less than two 
years for the extinction of the right or as a period of limitation 
either from the date at which the person suffering damage has 
knowledge or from the date at which he ought reasonably to 
have known of both the damage and the operator liable: 
provided that the period established pursuant to paragraphs 
(a) and (b) of this Article shall not be exceeded. 
d. Where the provisions of Article 13(c)(ii) are applicable, the 
right of compensation shall not, however, be extinguished if, 
within the time provided for in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of 
this Article, 
i. prior to the determination by the Tribunal referred to in 
Article 17, an action has been brought before any of the 
courts from which the Tribunal can choose; if the 
Tribunal determines that the competent court is a court 
other than that before which such action has already 
been brought, it may fix a date by which such action 
has to be brought before the competent court so 
determined; or 
ii. a request has been made to a Contracting Party 
concerned to initiate a determination by the Tribunal of 
the competent court pursuant to Article 13(c)(ii) and an 
101 
 
action is brought subsequent to such determination 
within such time as may be fixed by the Tribunal. 
e. Unless national law provides to the contrary, any person 
suffering damage caused by a nuclear incident who has 
brought an action for compensation within the period provided 
for in this Article may amend his claim in respect of any 
aggravation of the damage after the expiry of such period 
provided that final judgment has not been entered by the 
competent court. 
 
Article 9 
The operator shall not be liable for damage caused by a 
nuclear incident directly due to an act of armed conflict, 
hostilities, civil war, insurrection or, except in so far as the 
legislation of the Contracting Party in whose territory his 
nuclear installation is situated may provide to the contrary, a 
grave natural disaster of an exceptional character. 
 
Article 10 
a. To cover the liability under this Convention, the operator shall 
be required to have and maintain insurance or other financial 
security of the amount established pursuant to Article 7 and of 
such type and terms as the competent public authority shall 
specify. 
b. No insurer or other financial guarantor shall suspend or cancel 
the insurance or other financial security provided for in 
paragraph (a) of this Article without giving notice in writing of 
at least two months to the competent public authority or in so 
far as such insurance or other financial security relates to the 
carriage of nuclear substances, during the period of the 
carriage in question. 
c. The sums provided as insurance, reinsurance, or other financial 
security may be drawn upon only for compensation for damage 
caused by a nuclear incident. 
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Article 11 
The nature, form and extent of the compensation, within the 
limits of this Convention, as well as the equitable distribution 
thereof, shall be governed by national law. 
 
Article 12 
Compensation payable under this Convention, insurance and 
reinsurance premiums, sums provided as insurance, 
reinsurance, or other financial security required pursuant to 
Article 10, and interest and costs referred to in Article 7(g), 
shall be freely transferable between the monetary areas of the 
Contracting Parties. 
 
Article 13 
a. Except as otherwise provided in this Article, jurisdiction over 
actions under Articles 3, 4, 6(a) and 6(e) shall lie only with the 
courts of the Contracting Party in whose territory the nuclear 
incident occurred. 
b. Where a nuclear incident occurs outside the territory of the 
Contracting Parties, or where the place of the nuclear incident 
cannot be determined with certainty, jurisdiction over such 
actions shall lie with the courts of the Contracting Party in 
whose territory the nuclear installation of the operator liable is 
situated. 
c. Where jurisdiction would lie with the courts of more than one 
Contracting Party by virtue of paragraphs (a) or (b) of this 
Article, jurisdiction shall lie, 
i. if the nuclear incident occurred partly outside the 
territory of any Contracting Party and partly in the 
territory of a single Contracting Party, with the courts of 
that Contracting Party; and 
ii. in any other case, with the courts of the Contracting 
Party determined, at the request of a Contracting Party 
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concerned, by the Tribunal referred to in Article 17 as 
being the most closely related to the case in question. 
d. Judgments entered by the competent court under this Article 
after trial, or by default, shall, when they have become 
enforceable under the law applied by that court, become 
enforceable in the territory of any of the other Contracting 
Parties as soon as the formalities required by the Contracting 
Party concerned have been complied with. The merits of the 
case shall not be the subject of further proceedings. The 
foregoing provisions shall not apply to interim judgments. 
e. If an action is brought against a Contracting Party under this 
Convention, such Contracting Party may not, except in respect 
of measures of execution, invoke any jurisdictional immunities 
before the court competent in accordance with this Article. 
 
Article 14 
a. This Convention shall be applied without any discrimination 
based upon nationality, domicile, or residence. 
b. "National law" and "national legislation" mean the national law 
or the national legislation of the court having jurisdiction under 
this Convention over claims arising out of a nuclear incident, 
and that law or legislation shall apply to all matters both 
substantive and procedural not specifically governed by this 
Convention. 
c. That law and legislation shall be applied without any 
discrimination based upon nationality, domicile, or residence. 
 
Article 15 
a. Any Contracting Party may take such measures as it deems 
necessary to provide for an increase in the amount of 
compensation specified in this Convention. 
b. In so far as compensation for damage involves public funds 
and is in excess of the 5 000 000 Special Drawing Rights 
referred to in Article 7, any such measure in whatever form 
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may be applied under conditions which may derogate from the 
provisions of this Convention. 
 
Article 16 
Decisions taken by the Steering Committee under Article 
1(a)(ii), 1(a)(iii) and 1(b) shall be adopted by mutual 
agreement of the members representing the Contracting 
Parties. 
 
Article 17 
Any dispute arising between two or more Contracting Parties 
concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention 
shall be examined by the Steering Committee and in the 
absence of friendly settlement shall, upon the request of a 
Contracting Party concerned, be submitted to the Tribunal 
established by the Convention of 20th December 1957 on the 
Establishment of a Security Control in the Field of Nuclear 
Energy. 
 
Article 18 
a. Reservations to one or more of the provisions of this 
Convention may be made at any time prior to ratification of or 
accession to this Convention or prior to the time of notification 
under Article 23 in respect of any territory or territories 
mentioned in the notification, and shall be admissible only if 
the terms of these reservations have been expressly accepted 
by the Signatories. 
b. Such acceptance shall not be required from a Signatory which 
has not itself ratified this Convention within a period of twelve 
months after the date of notification to it of such reservation 
by the Secretary-General of the Organisation in accordance 
with Article 24. 
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c. Any reservation admitted in accordance with this Article may 
be withdrawn at any time by notification addressed to the 
Secretary-General of the Organisation. 
 
Article 19 
a. This Convention shall be ratified. Instruments of ratification 
shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the 
Organisation. 
b. This Convention shall come into force upon the deposit of 
instruments of ratification by not less than five of the 
Signatories. For each Signatory ratifying thereafter, this 
Convention shall come into force upon the deposit of its 
instrument of ratification. 
 
Article 20 
Amendments to this Convention shall be adopted by mutual 
agreement of all the Contracting Parties. They shall come into 
force when ratified or confirmed by two-thirds of the 
Contracting Parties. For each Contracting Party ratifying or 
confirming thereafter, they shall come into force at the date of 
such ratification or confirmation. 
 
Article 21 
a. The Government of any Member or Associate country of the 
Organisation which is not a Signatory to this Convention may 
accede thereto by notification addressed to the Secretary-
General of the Organisation. 
b. The Government of any other country which is not a Signatory 
to this Convention may accede thereto by notification 
addressed to the Secretary-General of the Organisation and 
with the unanimous assent of the Contracting Parties. Such 
accession shall take effect from the date of such assent. 
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Article 22 
a. This Convention shall remain in effect for a period of ten years 
as from the date of its coming into force. Any Contracting Party 
may, by giving twelve months' notice to the Secretary-General 
of the Organisation, terminate the application of this 
Convention to itself at the end of the period of ten years. 
b. This Convention shall, after the period of ten years, remain in 
force for a period of five years for such Contracting Parties as 
have not terminated its application in accordance with 
paragraph (a) of this Article, and thereafter for successive 
periods of five years for such Contracting Parties as have not 
terminated its application at the end of one of such periods of 
five years by giving twelve months' notice to that effect to the 
Secretary-General of the Organisation. 
c. A conference shall be convened by the Secretary-General of 
the Organisation in order to consider revisions to this 
Convention after a period of five years as from the date of its 
coming into force or, at any other time, at the request of a 
Contracting Party, within six months from the date of such 
request. 
 
Article 23 
a. This Convention shall apply to the metropolitan territories of 
the Contracting Parties. 
b. Any Signatory or Contracting Party may, at the time of 
signature or ratification of or accession to this Convention or at 
any later time, notify the Secretary-General of the 
Organisation that this Convention shall apply to those of its 
territories, including the territories for whose international 
relations it is responsible, to which this Convention is not 
applicable in accordance with paragraph (a) of this Article and 
which are mentioned in the notification. Any such notification 
may in respect of any territory or territories mentioned therein 
be withdrawn by giving twelve months' notice to that effect to 
the Secretary-General of the Organisation. 
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c. Any territories of a Contracting Party, including the territories 
for whose international relations it is responsible, to which this 
Convention does not apply shall be regarded for the purposes 
of this Convention as being a territory of a non-Contracting 
State. 
 
Article 24 
The Secretary-General of the Organisation shall give notice to 
all Signatories and acceding Governments of the receipt of any 
instrument of ratification, accession, withdrawal, notification 
under Article 23, and decisions of the Steering Committee 
under Article 1(a)(ii), 1(a)(iii) and 1(b). He shall also notify 
them of the date on which this Convention comes into force, 
the text of any amendment thereto and of the date on which 
such amendment comes into force, and any reservation made 
in accordance with Article 18. 
 
Annex I 
The following reservations were accepted either at the time of 
signature of the Convention or at the time of signature of the 
Additional Protocol: 
 1.6(a) and (c)(i): 
Reservation by the Government of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, the Government of the Republic of Austria and the 
Government of the Hellenic Republic. 
Reservation of the right to provide, by national law, that 
persons other than the operator may continue to be liable for 
damage caused by a nuclear incident on condition that these 
persons are fully covered in respect of their liability, including 
defence against unjustified actions, by insurance or other 
financial security obtained by the operator or out of State 
funds. 
 2.6(b) and (d): 
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Reservation by the Government of the Republic of Austria, the 
Government of the Hellenic Republic, the Government of the 
Kingdom of Norway and the Government of the Kingdom of 
Sweden ³. 
Reservation of the right to consider their national legislation 
which includes provisions equivalent to those included in the 
international agreements referred to in Article 6(b) as being 
international agreements within the meaning of Article 6(b) 
and (d). 
 3.8(a): 
Reservation by the Government of the Federal Republic of 
Germany and the Government of the Republic of Austria. 
Reservation of the right to establish, in respect of nuclear 
incidents occurring in the Federal Republic of Germany and in 
the Republic of Austria respectively, a period longer than ten 
years if measures have been taken to cover the liability of the 
operator in respect of any actions for compensation begun 
after the expiry of the period of ten years and during such 
longer period. 
 4.9: 
Reservation by the Government of the Federal Republic of 
Germany and the Government of the Republic of Austria. 
Reservation of the right to provide, in respect of nuclear 
incidents occurring in the Federal Republic of Germany and in 
the Republic of Austria respectively, that the operator shall be 
liable for damage caused by a nuclear incident directly due to 
an act of armed conflict, hostilities, civil war, insurrection or a 
grave natural disaster of an exceptional character. 
 5.19 : 
Reservation by the Government of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, the Government of the Republic of Austria, and the 
Government of the Hellenic Republic. 
Reservation of the right to consider ratification of this 
Convention as constituting an obligation under international 
law to enact national legislation on third party liability in the 
field of nuclear energy in accordance with the provisions of this 
Convention. 
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Annex II 
This Convention shall not be interpreted as depriving a 
Contracting Party, on whose territory damage was caused by a 
nuclear incident occurring on the territory of another 
Contracting Party, of any recourse which might be available to 
it under international law. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, 
duly empowered, have signed this Convention. 
DONE in Paris, this twenty-ninth day of July Nineteen Hundred 
and Sixty, in the English, French, German, Spanish, Italian and 
Dutch languages in a single copy which shall remain deposited 
with the Secretary-General of the Organisation for European 
Economic Co-operation2 by whom certified copies will be 
communicated to all Signatories. 
Notes by the Secretariat 
1. The designation of the Signatories is the same as that 
in the Protocol of 16th November 1982. It should be 
noted that Finland acceded to the Paris Convention and 
the Additional Protocol of 1964 on 16th June 1972 and 
has signed the Protocol of 1982. 
2. The Organisation for European Economic Co-operation 
(OEEC) was reconstituted as the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) on 
30th September 1961, in accordance with the 
provisions of the Convention on the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development of 14th 
December 1960. 
In addition, following the Decision of the OECD Council 
dated 17th May 1972 [C(72)106 (Final)], the European 
Nuclear Energy Agency (ENEA) is now called the OECD 
Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA). 
3. At the time of the deposit of its instruments of 
accession, the Government of Finland subordinated its 
accession to the present reservation. 
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APPENDIX 10: IAEA 1997 Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention 
on Civil Liability. 
Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
 
PROTOCOL TO AMEND THE VIENNA 
CONVENTION ON  
CIVIL LIABILITY FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE 
Done on 12 September 1997 
THE STATES PARTIES TO THIS PROTOCOL, 
CONSIDERING that it is desirable to amend the Vienna Convention on Civil 
Liability for Nuclear Damage of 21 May 1963, to provide for broader scope, 
increased amount of liability of the operator of a nuclear installation and enhanced 
means for securing adequate and equitable compensation, 
HAVE AGREED as follows, 
ARTICLE 1 
The Convention which the provisions of this Protocol amend is the Vienna 
Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage of 21 May 1963, hereinafter 
referred to as the “1963 Vienna Convention”. 
ARTICLE 2 
Article I of the 1963 Vienna Convention is amended as follows: 
1. Paragraph 1(j) is amended as follows: 
(a) the word “and” is deleted at the end of sub-paragraph (ii) and is inserted at 
the end of sub-paragraph (iii). 
(b) a new sub-paragraph (iv) is added as follows: 
(iv) such other installations in which there are nuclear fuel or radioactive 
products or waste as the Board of Governors of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency shall from time to time determine; 
2. Paragraph 1(k) is replaced by the following text: 
(k) “Nuclear Damage” means - 
(i) loss of life or personal injury; 
(ii) loss of or damage to property; 
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and each of the following to the extent determined by the law of the 
competent court - 
(iii) economic loss arising from loss or damage referred to in sub-paragraph 
(i) or (ii), insofar as not included in those sub-paragraphs, if incurred by 
a person entitled to claim in respect of such loss or damage; 
(iv) the costs of measures of reinstatement of impaired environment, unless 
such impairment is insignificant, if such measures are actually taken or 
to be taken, and insofar as not included in sub-paragraph (ii); 
(v) loss of income deriving from an economic interest in any use or 
enjoyment of the environment, incurred as a result of a significant 
impairment of that environment, and insofar as not included in sub-
paragraph (ii); 
(vi) the costs of preventive measures, and further loss or damage caused by 
such measures; 
 (vii) any other economic loss, other than any caused by the impairment of the 
environment, if permitted by the general law on civil liability of the 
competent court, 
in the case of subparagraphs (i) to (v) and (vii) above, to the extent that the loss 
or damage arises out of or results from ionizing radiation emitted by any source 
of radiation inside a nuclear installation, or emitted from nuclear fuel or 
radioactive products or waste in, or of nuclear material coming from, 
originating in, or sent to, a nuclear installation, whether so arising from the 
radioactive properties of such matter, or from a combination of radioactive 
properties with toxic, explosive or other hazardous properties of such matter. 
3. Paragraph 1(l) is replaced by the following text: 
(l) “Nuclear incident” means any occurrence or series of occurrences having the 
same origin which causes nuclear damage or, but only with respect to 
preventive measures, creates a grave and imminent threat of causing such 
damage. 
4. After paragraph 1(l) four new paragraphs 1(m), 1(n), 1(o) and 1(p) are added 
as follows: 
(m) “Measures of reinstatement” means any reasonable measures which have been 
approved by the competent authorities of the State where the measures were 
taken, and which aim to reinstate or restore damaged or destroyed components 
of the environment, or to introduce, where reasonable, the equivalent of these 
components into the environment. The law of the State where the damage is 
suffered shall determine who is entitled to take such measures. 
(n) “Preventive measures” means any reasonable measures taken by any person after 
a nuclear incident has occurred to prevent or minimize damage referred to in 
sub-paragraphs (k)(i) to (v) or (vii), subject to any approval of the competent 
authorities required by the law of the State where the measures were taken. 
(o) “Reasonable measures” means measures which are found under the law of the 
competent court to be appropriate and proportionate having regard to all the 
circumstances, for example - 
(i) the nature and extent of the damage incurred or, in the case of preventive 
measures, the nature and extent of the risk of such damage; 
(ii) the extent to which, at the time they are taken, such measures are likely 
to be effective; and 
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(iii) relevant scientific and technical expertise. 
(p) “Special Drawing Right”, hereinafter referred to as SDR, means the unit of 
account defined by the International Monetary Fund and used by it for its own 
operations and transactions. 
5. Paragraph 2 is replaced by the following text: 
2. An Installation State may, if the small extent of the risks involved so 
warrants, exclude any nuclear installation or small quantities of nuclear 
material from the application of this Convention, provided that - 
(a) with respect to nuclear installations, criteria for such exclusion have been 
established by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency and any exclusion by an Installation State satisfies such 
criteria; and 
(b) with respect to small quantities of nuclear material, maximum limits for 
the exclusion of such quantities have been established by the Board of 
Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency and any exclusion 
by an Installation State is within such established limits. 
The criteria for the exclusion of nuclear installations and the maximum limits 
for the exclusion of small quantities of nuclear material shall be reviewed 
periodically by the Board of Governors. 
ARTICLE 3 
After Article I of the 1963 Vienna Convention two new Articles I A and I B 
are added as follows: 
ARTICLE I A 
 1. This Convention shall apply to nuclear damage wherever suffered. 
 2. However, the legislation of the Installation State may exclude from the 
application of this Convention damage 
suffered - 
(a) in the territory of a non-Contracting State; or 
(b) in any maritime zones established by a non-Contracting State in accordance 
with the international law of the sea. 
 3. An exclusion pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Article may apply only in respect 
of a non-Contracting State 
which at the time of the incident - 
(a) has a nuclear installation in its territory or in any maritime zones established 
by it in accordance with the international law of the sea; and 
(b) does not afford equivalent reciprocal benefits. 
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 4. Any exclusion pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Article shall not affect the rights 
referred to in sub-paragraph 
(a) of paragraph 2 of Article IX and any exclusion pursuant to paragraph 2(b) of 
this Article shall not extend to damage on board or to a ship or an aircraft. 
ARTICLE I B 
This Convention shall not apply to nuclear installations used for non-peaceful 
purposes. 
ARTICLE 4 
Article II of the 1963 Vienna Convention is amended as follows: 
1. At the end of paragraph 3(a) the following text is added: 
The Installation State may limit the amount of public funds made available 
per incident to the difference, if any, between the amounts hereby established 
and the amount established pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article V. 
2. At the end of paragraph 4 the following text is added: 
The Installation State may limit the amount of public funds made available as 
provided for in sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph 3 of this Article. 
3. Paragraph 6 is replaced by the following text: 
6. No person shall be liable for any loss or damage which is not nuclear 
damage pursuant to sub-paragraph (k) of paragraph 1 of Article I but which 
could have been determined as such pursuant to the provisions of that sub-
paragraph. 
ARTICLE 5 
After the first sentence in Article III of the 1963 Vienna Convention the 
following text is added: 
However, the Installation State may exclude this obligation in relation to 
carriage which takes place wholly within its own territory. 
ARTICLE 6 
Article IV of the 1963 Vienna Convention is amended as follows: 
 1. Paragraph 3 is replaced by the following text: 
3. No liability under this Convention shall attach to an operator if he proves 
that the nuclear damage is directly due to an act of armed conflict, hostilities, 
civil war or insurrection. 
 2. Paragraph 5 is replaced by the following text: 
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5. The operator shall not be liable under this Convention for nuclear 
damage - 
(a) to the nuclear installation itself and any other nuclear installation, 
including a nuclear installation under construction, on the site where that 
installation is located; and 
(b) to any property on that same site which is used or to be used in connection 
with any such installation. 
 3. Paragraph 6 is replaced by the following text: 
6. Compensation for damage caused to the means of transport upon which 
the nuclear material involved was at the time of the nuclear incident shall not 
have the effect of reducing the liability of the operator in respect of other 
damage to an amount less than either 150 million SDRs, or any higher amount 
established by the legislation of a Contracting Party, or an amount established 
pursuant to sub-paragraph (c) of paragraph 1 of Article V. 
 4. Paragraph 7 is replaced by the following text: 
7. Nothing in this Convention shall affect the liability of any individual for 
nuclear damage for which the operator, by virtue of paragraph 3 or 5 of this 
Article, is not liable under this Convention and which that individual caused by 
an act or omission done with intent to cause damage. 
ARTICLE 7 
 1. The text of Article V of the 1963 Vienna Convention is replaced by the 
following text: 
1. The liability of the operator may be limited by the Installation State for 
any one nuclear incident, either - 
(a) to not less than 300 million SDRs; or 
(b) to not less than 150 million SDRs provided that in excess of that amount 
and up to at least 300 million SDRs public funds shall be made available 
by that State to compensate nuclear damage; or 
(c) for a maximum of 15 years from the date of entry into force of this 
Protocol, to a transitional amount of not less than 100 million SDRs in 
respect of a nuclear incident occurring within that period. An amount 
lower than 100 million SDRs may be established, provided that public 
funds shall be made available by that State to compensate nuclear 
damage between that lesser amount and 100 million SDRs. 
2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1 of this Article, the Installation State, having 
regard to the nature of the nuclear installation or the nuclear substances 
involved and to the likely consequences of an incident originating therefrom, 
may establish a lower amount of liability of the operator, provided that in no 
event shall any amount so established be less than 5 million SDRs, and 
provided that the Installation State ensures that public funds shall be made 
available up to the amount established pursuant to paragraph 1. 
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3. The amounts established by the Installation State of the liable operator in 
accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article and paragraph 6 of Article 
IV shall apply wherever the nuclear incident occurs. 
2. After Article V, four new Articles V A, V B, V C and V D are added as 
follows: 
ARTICLE V A 
1. Interest and costs awarded by a court in actions for compensation of nuclear 
damage shall be payable in addition to the amounts referred to in Article V. 
2. The amounts mentioned in Article V and paragraph 6 of Article IV may be 
converted into national currency in round figures. 
ARTICLE V B 
Each Contracting Party shall ensure that persons suffering damage may enforce 
their rights to compensation without having to bring separate proceedings according 
to the origin of the funds provided for such compensation. 
ARTICLE V C 
1. If the courts having jurisdiction are those of a Contracting Party other than the 
Installation State, the public funds required under sub-paragraphs (b) and (c) of 
paragraph 1 of Article V and under paragraph 1 of Article VII, as well as interest and 
costs awarded by a court, may be made available by the first-named Contracting 
Party. The Installation State shall reimburse to the other Contracting Party any such 
sums paid. These two Contracting Parties shall agree on the procedure for 
reimbursement. 
2. If the courts having jurisdiction are those of a Contracting Party other than the 
Installation State, the Contracting Party whose courts have jurisdiction shall take all 
measures necessary to enable the Installation State to intervene in proceedings and to 
participate in any settlement concerning compensation. 
ARTICLE V D 
1. A meeting of the Contracting Parties shall be convened by the Director General 
of the International Atomic Energy Agency to amend the limits of liability referred 
to in Article V if one-third of the Contracting Parties express a desire to that effect. 
2. Amendments shall be adopted by a two-thirds majority of the Contracting 
Parties present and voting, provided that at least one-half of the Contracting Parties 
shall be present at the time of the voting. 
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3. When acting on a proposal to amend the limits, the meeting of the Contracting 
Parties shall take into account, inter alia, the risk of damage resulting from a nuclear 
incident, changes in the monetary values, and the capacity of the insurance market. 
4. (a) Any amendment adopted in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Article 
shall be notified by the Director General of the IAEA to all Contracting 
Parties for acceptance. The amendment shall be considered accepted at 
the end of a period of 18 months after it has been notified provided that 
at least one-third of the Contracting Parties at the time of the adoption of 
the amendment by the meeting have communicated to the Director 
General of the IAEA that they accept the amendment. An amendment 
accepted in accordance with this paragraph shall enter into force 12 
months after its acceptance for those Contracting Parties which have 
accepted it. 
(b) If, within a period of 18 months from the date of notification for 
acceptance, an amendment has not been 
accepted in accordance with sub-paragraph (a), the amendment shall be considered 
rejected. 
5. For each Contracting Party accepting an amendment after it has been accepted 
but not entered into force or after its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 4 
of this Article, the amendment shall enter into force 12 months after its acceptance 
by that Contracting Party. 
6. A State which becomes a Party to this Convention after the entry into force of 
an amendment in accordance with paragraph 4 of this Article shall, failing an 
expression of a different intention by that State - 
(a) be considered as a Party to this Convention as so amended; and 
(b) be considered as a Party to the unamended Convention in relation to any State 
Party not bound by the amendment. 
ARTICLE 8 
Article VI of the 1963 Vienna Convention is amended as follows: 
1. Paragraph 1 is replaced by the following text: 
1. (a) Rights of compensation under this Convention shall be extinguished if an 
action is not brought within - 
(i) with respect to loss of life and personal injury, thirty years from 
the date of the nuclear incident; 
(ii) with respect to other damage, ten years from the date of the 
nuclear incident. 
(b) If, however, under the law of the Installation State, the liability 
of the operator is covered by insurance or other financial 
security including State funds for a longer period, the law of 
the competent court may provide that rights of compensation 
against the operator shall only be 
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extinguished after such a longer period which shall not exceed the 
period for which his liability is so covered under the law of the 
Installation State. 
(c) Actions for compensation with respect to loss of life and personal injury 
or, pursuant to an extension under sub-paragraph (b) of this paragraph 
with respect to other damage, which are brought after a period of ten 
years from the date of the nuclear incident shall in no case affect the 
rights of compensation under this Convention of any person who has 
brought an action against the operator before the expiry of that period. 
2. Paragraph 2 is deleted. 
3. Paragraph 3 is replaced by the following text: 
3. Rights of compensation under the Convention shall be subject to prescription 
or extinction, as provided 
by the law of the competent court, if an action is not brought within three years 
from the date on which the person suffering damage had knowledge or ought 
reasonably to have had knowledge of the damage and of the operator liable for 
the damage, provided that the periods established pursuant to sub-paragraphs 
(a) and (b) of paragraph 1 of this Article shall not be exceeded. 
ARTICLE 9 
Article VII is amended as follows: 
1. In paragraph 1, the following two sentences are added at the end of the 
paragraph and the paragraph so amended becomes sub-paragraph (a) of that 
paragraph: 
Where the liability of the operator is unlimited, the Installation State may 
establish a limit of the financial security of the operator liable, provided that 
such limit is not lower than 300 million SDRs. The Installation State shall 
ensure the payment of claims for compensation for nuclear damage which have 
been established against the operator to the extent that the yield of the financial 
security is inadequate to satisfy such claims, but not in excess of the amount of 
the financial security to be provided under this paragraph. 
2. A new sub-paragraph (b) is added to paragraph 1 as follows: 
(c) Notwithstanding sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph, where the liability  
of the operator is unlimited, the 
Installation State, having regard to the nature of the nuclear installation 
or the nuclear substances involved and to the likely consequences of an 
incident originating therefrom, may establish a lower amount of financial 
security of the operator, provided that in no event shall any amount so 
established be less than 5 million SDRs, and provided that the Installation 
State ensures the payment of claims for compensation for nuclear damage 
which have been established against the operator by providing necessary 
funds to the extent that the yield of insurance or other financial security 
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is inadequate to satisfy such claims, and up to the limit provided pursuant 
to sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph. 
3. In paragraph 3, the words “or sub-paragraphs (b) and (c) of paragraph 1 of 
Article V” are inserted after the words “of this Article”. 
ARTICLE 10 
Article VIII of the 1963 Vienna Convention is amended as follows: 
1. The text of Article VIII becomes paragraph 1 of that Article. 
2. A new paragraph 2 is added as follows: 
2. Subject to application of the rule of sub-paragraph (c) of paragraph 1 of 
Article VI, where in respect of 
claims brought against the operator the damage to be compensated under this 
Convention exceeds, or is likely to exceed, the maximum amount made 
available pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article V, priority in the distribution of the 
compensation shall be given to claims in respect of loss of life or personal 
injury. 
ARTICLE 11 
In Article X of the 1963 Vienna Convention, a new sentence is added at the end of 
the Article as follows: 
The right of recourse provided for under this Article may also be extended to 
benefit the Installation State insofar as it has provided public funds pursuant to 
this Convention. 
ARTICLE 12 
Article XI of the 1963 Vienna Convention is amended as follows: 
1. A new paragraph 1bis is added as follows: 
1bis. Where a nuclear incident occurs within the area of the exclusive economic 
zone of a Contracting Party or, if such a zone has not been established, in an 
area not exceeding the limits of an exclusive economic zone, were one to be 
established, jurisdiction over actions concerning nuclear damage from that 
nuclear incident shall, for the purposes of this Convention, lie only with the 
courts of that Party. The preceding sentence shall apply if that Contracting 
Party has notified the Depositary of such area prior to the nuclear incident. 
Nothing in this paragraph shall be interpreted as permitting the exercise of 
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jurisdiction in a manner which is contrary to the international law of the sea, 
including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. 
2. Paragraph 2 is replaced by the following text: 
2. Where a nuclear incident does not occur within the territory of any 
Contracting Party, or within an area 
notified pursuant to paragraph 1bis, or where the place of the nuclear incident 
cannot be determined with certainty, jurisdiction over such actions shall lie 
with the courts of the Installation State of the operator liable. 
3. In paragraph 3, first line, and in sub-paragraph (b), after the figure “1”, insert 
“, 1bis”. 
4. A new paragraph 4 is added as follows: 
4. The Contracting Party whose courts have jurisdiction shall ensure that 
only one of its courts shall have jurisdiction in relation to any one nuclear 
incident. 
ARTICLE 13 
After Article XI a new Article XI A is added as follows: 
ARTICLE XI A 
The Contracting Party whose courts have jurisdiction shall ensure that in 
relation to actions for compensation of nuclear damage - 
(a) any State may bring an action on behalf of persons who have suffered nuclear 
damage, who are nationals of that State or have their domicile or residence in 
its territory, and who have consented thereto; and 
(b) any person may bring an action to enforce rights under this Convention 
acquired by subrogation or assignment. 
ARTICLE 14 
The text of Article XII of the 1963 Vienna Convention is replaced by the 
following text: 
ARTICLE XII 
 1. A judgment that is no longer subject to ordinary forms of review entered by a 
court of a Contracting Party 
having jurisdiction shall be recognized, except - 
(a) where the judgment was obtained by fraud; 
(b) where the party against whom the judgment was pronounced was not given a 
fair opportunity to present his case; or 
(c) where the judgment is contrary to the public policy of the Contracting Party 
within the territory of which recognition is sought, or is not in accord with 
fundamental standards of justice. 
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 2. A judgment which is recognized under paragraph 1 of this Article shall, upon 
being presented for enforcement 
in accordance with the formalities required by the law of the Contracting Party where 
enforcement is sought, be enforceable as if it were a judgment of a court of that 
Contracting Party. The merits of a claim on which the judgment has been given shall 
not be subject to further proceedings. 
ARTICLE 15 
Article XIII of the 1963 Vienna Convention is amended as follows: 
1. The text of Article XIII becomes paragraph 1 of that Article. 
2. A new paragraph 2 is added as follows: 
2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1 of this Article, insofar as compensation for 
nuclear damage is in excess of 150 million SDRs, the legislation of the 
Installation State may derogate from the provisions of this Convention with 
respect to nuclear damage suffered in the territory, or in any maritime zone 
established in accordance 
with the international law of the sea, of another State which at the time of the 
incident, has a nuclear installation in such territory, to the extent that it does 
not afford reciprocal benefits of an equivalent amount. 
ARTICLE 16 
The text of Article XVIII of the 1963 Vienna Convention is replaced by the 
following text: 
This Convention shall not affect the rights and obligations of a Contracting 
Party under the general rules of public international law. 
ARTICLE 17 
After Article XX of the 1963 Vienna Convention a new Article XX A is 
added as follows: 
ARTICLE XX A 
1. In the event of a dispute between Contracting Parties concerning the 
interpretation or application of this Convention, the parties to the dispute shall 
consult with a view to the settlement of the dispute by negotiation or by any 
other peaceful means of settling disputes acceptable to them. 
2. If a dispute of this character referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article 
cannot be settled within six months from the request for consultation 
pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article, it shall, at the request of any party to 
such dispute, be submitted to arbitration or referred to the International 
Court of Justice for decision. Where a dispute is submitted to arbitration, if, 
within six months from the date of the request, the parties to the dispute are 
unable to agree on the organization of the arbitration, a party may request 
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the President of the International Court of Justice or the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations to appoint one or more arbitrators. In cases of 
conflicting requests by the parties to the dispute, the request to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations shall have priority. 
3. When ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to this Convention, a 
State may declare that it does not consider itself bound by either or both of the 
dispute settlement procedures provided for in paragraph 2 of this Article. The 
other Contracting Parties shall not be bound by a dispute settlement procedure 
provided for in paragraph 2 of this Article with respect to a Contracting Party 
for which such a declaration is in force. 
4. A Contracting Party which has made a declaration in accordance with 
paragraph 3 of this Article may at any time withdraw it by notification to the 
depositary. 
ARTICLE 18 
1. Articles XX to XXV, paragraphs 2, 3 and paragraph number “1.” of Article 
XXVI, Articles XXVII and XXIX of the 1963 Vienna Convention are deleted. 
2. The 1963 Vienna Convention and this Protocol shall, as between the Parties to 
this Protocol, be read and interpreted together as one single text that may be referred 
to as the 1997 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage. 
ARTICLE 19 
1. A State which is a Party to this Protocol but not a Party to the 1963 Vienna 
Convention shall be bound by the provisions of that Convention as amended by this 
Protocol in relation to other States Parties hereto, and failing an expression of a 
different intention by that State at the time of deposit of an instrument referred to in 
Article 20 shall be bound by the provisions of the 1963 Vienna Convention in relation 
to States which are only Parties thereto. 
2. Nothing in this Protocol shall affect the obligations of a State which is a Party 
both to the 1963 Vienna Convention and to this Protocol with respect to a State which 
is a Party to the 1963 Vienna Convention but not a Party to this Protocol. 
ARTICLE 20 
1. This Protocol shall be open for signature by all States at the Headquarters of 
the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna from 29 September 1997 until its 
entry into force. 
2. This Protocol is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by States which 
have signed it. 
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3. After its entry into force, any State which has not signed this Protocol may 
accede to it. 
4. The instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be 
deposited with the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, who 
shall be the depositary of this Protocol. 
ARTICLE 21 
1. This Protocol shall enter into force three months after the date of deposit of the 
fifth instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval. 
2. For each State ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to this Protocol after 
the deposit of the fifth instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval, this Protocol 
shall enter into force three months after the date of deposit by such State of the 
appropriate instrument. 
ARTICLE 22 
1. Any Contracting Party may denounce this Protocol by written notification to 
the depositary. 
2. Denunciation shall take effect one year after the date on which the 
notification is received by the depositary. 
3. As between the Parties to this Protocol, denunciation by any of them of the 
1963 Vienna Convention in accordance with its Article XXVI shall not be construed 
in any way as denunciation of the 1963 Vienna Convention as amended by this 
Protocol. 
4. Notwithstanding a denunciation of this Protocol by a Contracting Party 
pursuant to this Article, the provisions of this Protocol shall continue to apply to any 
nuclear damage caused by a nuclear incident occurring before such denunciation 
takes effect. 
ARTICLE 23 
The depositary shall promptly notify States Parties and all other States of: 
(a) each signature of this Protocol; 
(b) each deposit of an instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or 
accession; 
(c) the entry into force of this Protocol; 
(d) any notification received pursuant to paragraph 1bis of Article XI; 
(e) requests for the convening of a revision conference pursuant to Article XXVI 
of the 1963 Vienna Convention and for a meeting of the Contracting Parties 
pursuant to Article V D of the 1963 Vienna Convention as amended by this 
Protocol; 
(f) notifications of denunciations received pursuant to Article 22 and other 
pertinent notifications relating to this Protocol. 
ARTICLE 24 
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1. The original of this Protocol, of which Arabic, Chinese, English, French, 
Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the 
depositary. 
2. The International Atomic Energy Agency shall establish the consolidated text 
of the 1963 Vienna Convention as amended by this Protocol in the Arabic, 
Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish languages as set forth in the 
annex to this Protocol. 
3. The depositary shall communicate to all States the certified true copies of this 
Protocol together with the consolidated text of the 1963 Vienna Convention 
as amended by this Protocol. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized 
thereto, have signed this Protocol. Done at Vienna, the twelfth 
day of September, one thousand nine hundred and ninety-
seven. 
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CONVENTION ON SUPPLEMENTARY  
COMPENSATION FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE 
THE CONTRACTING PARTIES, 
RECOGNIZING the importance of the measures provided in the Vienna 
Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and the Paris Convention on Third 
Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy as well as in national legislation on 
compensation for nuclear damage consistent with the principles of these Conventions; 
DESIROUS of establishing a worldwide liability regime to supplement and 
enhance these measures with a view to increasing the amount of compensation for 
nuclear damage; 
RECOGNIZING further that such a worldwide liability regime would 
encourage regional and global cooperation to promote a higher level of nuclear safety 
in accordance with the principles of international partnership and solidarity; 
HAVE AGREED as follows: 
CHAPTER I 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Article I  
Definitions 
For the purposes of this Convention: 
(a) “Vienna Convention” means the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for 
Nuclear Damage of 21 May 1963 and any amendment thereto which is in force 
for a Contracting Party to this Convention. 
(b) “Paris Convention” means the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the 
Field of Nuclear Energy of 29 July 1960 and any amendment thereto which is 
in force for a Contracting Party to this Convention. 
(c) “Special Drawing Right”, hereinafter referred to as SDR, means the unit of 
account defined by the International Monetary Fund and used by it for its own 
operations and transactions. 
(d) “Nuclear reactor” means any structure containing nuclear fuel in such an 
arrangement that a self-sustaining chain process of nuclear fission can occur 
therein without an additional source of neutrons. 
(e) “Installation State”, in relation to a nuclear installation, means the Contracting 
Party within whose territory that installation is situated or, if it is not situated 
within the territory of any State, the Contracting Party by which or under the 
authority of which the nuclear installation is operated. 
(f) “Nuclear Damage” means: 
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(i) loss of life or personal injury; 
(ii) loss of or damage to property; 
and each of the following to the extent determined by the law of the 
competent court: 
(iii) economic loss arising from loss or damage referred to in sub-paragraph (i) 
or (ii), insofar as not included in those sub-paragraphs, if incurred by a 
person entitled to claim in respect of such loss or damage; 
(iv) the costs of measures of reinstatement of impaired environment, unless 
such impairment is insignificant, if such measures are actually taken or to 
be taken, and insofar as not included in sub-paragraph (ii); 
(v) loss of income deriving from an economic interest in any use or 
enjoyment of the environment, incurred as a result of a significant 
impairment of that environment, and insofar as not included in sub-
paragraph (ii); 
(vi) the costs of preventive measures, and further loss or damage caused by 
such measures; 
(vii) any other economic loss, other than any caused by the impairment of the 
environment, if permitted by the general law on civil liability of the 
competent court, 
in the case of sub-paragraphs (i) to (v) and (vii) above, to the extent that the loss 
or damage arises out of or results from ionizing radiation emitted by any source 
of radiation inside a nuclear installation, or emitted from nuclear fuel or 
radioactive products or waste in, or of nuclear material coming from, originating 
in, or sent to, a nuclear installation, whether so arising from the radioactive 
properties of such matter, or from a combination of radioactive properties with 
toxic, explosive or other hazardous properties of such matter. 
(g) “Measures of reinstatement” means any reasonable measures which have been 
approved by the competent authorities of the State where the measures were 
taken, and which aim to reinstate or restore damaged or destroyed components 
of the environment, or to introduce, where reasonable, the equivalent of these 
components into the environment. The law of the State where the damage is 
suffered shall determine who is entitled to take such measures. 
(h) “Preventive measures” means any reasonable measures taken by any person 
after a nuclear incident has occurred to prevent or minimize damage referred to 
in sub-paragraphs (f)(i) to (v) or (vii), subject to any approval of the competent 
authorities required by the law of the State where the measures were taken. 
(i) “Nuclear incident” means any occurrence or series of occurrences having the 
same origin which causes nuclear damage or, but only with respect to preventive 
measures, creates a grave and imminent threat of causing such damage. 
(j) “Installed nuclear capacity” means for each Contracting Party the total of the 
number of units given by the formula set out in Article IV.2; and “thermal 
power” means the maximum thermal power authorized by the competent 
national authorities. 
(k) “Law of the competent court” means the law of the court having jurisdiction 
under this Convention, including any rules of such law relating to conflict of 
laws. 
(l) “Reasonable measures” means measures which are found under the law of the 
competent court to be appropriate and proportionate, having regard to all the 
circumstances, for example: 
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(i) the nature and extent of the damage incurred or, in the case of preventive 
measures, the nature and extent of the risk of such damage; 
(ii) the extent to which, at the time they are taken, such measures are likely 
to be effective; and 
(iii) relevant scientific and technical expertise. 
Article II 
Purpose and Application 
 1. The purpose of this Convention is to supplement the system of compensation 
provided pursuant to national law which: 
(a) implements one of the instruments referred to in Article I (a) and (b); or 
(b) complies with the provisions of the Annex to this Convention. 
 2. The system of this Convention shall apply to nuclear damage for which an 
operator of a nuclear installation used for peaceful purposes situated in the territory of 
a Contracting Party is liable under either one of the Conventions referred to in Article 
I or national law mentioned in paragraph 1(b) of this Article. 
 3. The Annex referred to in paragraph 1(b) shall constitute an integral part of this 
Convention. 
CHAPTER II 
COMPENSATION 
Article III  
Undertaking 
 1. Compensation in respect of nuclear damage per nuclear incident shall be ensured 
by the following means: 
(a) (i) the Installation State shall ensure the availability of 300 million SDRs or a 
greater amount that it may have specified to the Depositary at any time 
prior to the nuclear incident, or a transitional amount pursuant to 
subparagraph (ii); 
(ii) a Contracting Party may establish for the maximum of 10 years from the date 
of the opening for signature of this Convention, a transitional amount of at 
least 150 million SDRs in respect of a nuclear incident occurring within 
that period. 
(b) beyond the amount made available under sub-paragraph (a), the Contracting 
Parties shall make available public funds according to the formula specified in 
Article IV. 
 2. (a) Compensation for nuclear damage in accordance with paragraph 1(a) shall be 
distributed equitably 
without discrimination on the basis of nationality, domicile or residence, 
provided that the law of the Installation State may, subject to obligations 
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of that State under other conventions on nuclear liability, exclude nuclear 
damage suffered in a non-Contracting State. 
(b) Compensation for nuclear damage in accordance with paragraph 1(b), shall, 
subject to Articles V and XI.1(b), be distributed equitably without 
discrimination on the basis of nationality, domicile or residence. 
 3. If the nuclear damage to be compensated does not require the total amount under 
paragraph 1(b), the contri- 
butions shall be reduced proportionally. 
 4. The interest and costs awarded by a court in actions for compensation of nuclear 
damage are payable in 
addition to the amounts awarded pursuant to paragraphs 1(a) and (b) and shall be 
proportionate to the actual contributions made pursuant to paragraphs 1(a) and (b), 
respectively, by the operator liable, the Contracting Party in whose territory the 
nuclear installation of that operator is situated, and the Contracting Parties together. 
Article IV 
Calculation of Contributions 
 1. The formula for contributions according to which the Contracting Parties shall 
make available the public funds 
referred to in Article III.1(b) shall be determined as follows: 
(a) (i) the amount which shall be the product of the installed nuclear capacity of that 
Contracting Party multiplied by 300 SDRs per unit of installed capacity; 
and 
(ii) the amount determined by applying the ratio between the United Nations rate 
of assessment for that Contracting Party as assessed for the year preceding 
the year in which the nuclear incident occurs, and the total of such rates for 
all Contracting Parties to 10% of the sum of the amounts calculated for all 
Contracting Parties under sub-paragraph (i). 
(b) Subject to sub-paragraph (c), the contribution of each Contracting Party shall be 
the sum of the amounts referred to in sub-paragraphs (a)(i) and (ii), provided 
that States on the minimum United Nations rate of assessment with no nuclear 
reactors shall not be required to make contributions. 
(c) The maximum contribution which may be charged per nuclear incident to any 
Contracting Party, other than the Installation State, pursuant to sub-paragraph 
(b) shall not exceed its specified percentage of the total of contributions of all 
Contracting Parties determined pursuant to sub-paragraph (b). For a particular 
Contracting Party, the specified percentage shall be its UN rate of assessment 
expressed as a percentage plus 8 percentage points. If, at the time an incident 
occurs, the total installed capacity represented by the Parties to this Convention 
is at or above a level of 625,000 units, this percentage shall be increased by one 
percentage point. It shall be increased by one additional percentage point for 
each increment of 75,000 units by which the capacity exceeds 625,000 units. 
2. The formula is for each nuclear reactor situated in the territory of the Contracting 
Party, 1 unit for each MW of thermal power. The formula shall be calculated on 
the basis of the thermal power of the nuclear reactors shown at the date of the 
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nuclear incident in the list established and kept up to date in accordance with 
Article VIII. 
3. For the purpose of calculating the contributions, a nuclear reactor shall be taken 
into account from that date when nuclear fuel elements have been first loaded 
into the nuclear reactor. A nuclear reactor shall be excluded from the calculation 
when all fuel elements have been removed permanently from the reactor core 
and have been stored safely in accordance with approved procedures. 
Article V 
Geographical Scope 
1. The funds provided for under Article III.1(b) shall apply to nuclear damage 
which is suffered: 
(a) in the territory of a Contracting Party; or 
(b) in or above maritime areas beyond the territorial sea of a Contracting Party: 
(i) on board or by a ship flying the flag of a Contracting Party, or on board or 
by an aircraft registered in the territory of a Contracting Party, or on or by 
an artificial island, installation or structure under the jurisdiction of a 
Contracting Party; or 
(ii) by a national of a Contracting Party; 
excluding damage suffered in or above the territorial sea of a State not Party to this 
Convention; or 
(c) in or above the exclusive economic zone of a Contracting Party or on the 
continental shelf of a Contracting Party in connection with the exploitation or 
the exploration of the natural resources of that exclusive economic zone or 
continental shelf; 
provided that the courts of a Contracting Party have jurisdiction pursuant to Article 
XIII. 
2. Any signatory or acceding State may, at the time of signature of or accession to 
this Convention or on the deposit of its instrument of ratification, declare that for the 
purposes of the application of paragraph 1(b)(ii), individuals or certain categories 
thereof, considered under its law as having their habitual residence in its territory, are 
assimilated to its own nationals. 
3. In this article, the expression “a national of a Contracting Party” shall include a 
Contracting Party or any of its constituent sub-divisions, or a partnership, or any public 
or private body whether corporate or not established in the territory of a Contracting 
Party. 
CHAPTER III 
ORGANIZATION OF SUPPLEMENTARY FUNDING 
Article VI 
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Notification of Nuclear Damage 
Without prejudice to obligations which Contracting Parties may have under 
other international agreements, the Contracting Party whose courts have jurisdiction 
shall inform the other Contracting Parties of a nuclear incident as soon as it appears 
that the damage caused by such incident exceeds, or is likely to exceed, the amount 
available under Article III.1(a) and that contributions under Article III.1(b) may be 
required. The Contracting Parties shall without delay make all the necessary 
arrangements to settle the procedure for their relations in this connection. 
Article VII  
Call for Funds 
1. Following the notification referred to in Article VI, and subject to Article 
X.3, the Contracting Party whose courts have jurisdiction shall request the other 
Contracting Parties to make available the public funds required under Article 
III.1(b) to the extent and when they are actually required and shall have exclusive 
competence to disburse such funds. 
2. Independently of existing or future regulations concerning currency or transfers, 
Contracting Parties shall authorize the transfer and payment of any contribution 
provided pursuant to Article III.1(b) without any restriction. 
Article VIII 
List of Nuclear Installations 
1. Each Contracting State shall, at the time when it deposits its instrument of 
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, communicate to the Depositary a 
complete listing of all nuclear installations referred to in Article IV.3. The listing shall 
contain the necessary particulars for the purpose of the calculation of contributions. 
2. Each Contracting State shall promptly communicate to the Depositary all 
modifications to be made to the list. Where such modifications include the addition of 
a nuclear installation, the communication must be made at least three months before 
the expected date when nuclear material will be introduced into the installation. 
3. If a Contracting Party is of the opinion that the particulars, or any modification 
to be made to the list communicated by a Contracting State pursuant to paragraphs 1 
and 2, do not comply with the provisions, it may raise objections thereto by addressing 
them to the Depositary within three months from the date on which it has received 
notice pursuant to paragraph 5. The Depositary shall forthwith communicate this 
objection to the State to whose information the objection has been raised. Any 
unresolved differences shall be dealt with in accordance with the dispute settlement 
procedure laid down in Article XVI. 
4. The Depositary shall maintain, update and annually circulate to all Contracting 
States the list of nuclear installations established in accordance with this Article. Such 
list shall consist of all the particulars and modifications 
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referred to in this Article, it being understood that objections submitted under this 
Article shall have effect retrospective to the date on which they were raised, if they 
are sustained. 
 5. The Depositary shall give notice as soon as possible to each Contracting Party of 
the communications and 
objections which it has received pursuant to this Article. 
Article IX 
Rights of Recourse 
1. Each Contracting Party shall enact legislation in order to enable both the 
Contracting Party in whose territory the nuclear installation of the operator liable is 
situated and the other Contracting Parties who have paid contributions referred to in 
Article III.1(b), to benefit from the operator’s right of recourse to the extent that he 
has such a right under either one of the Conventions referred to in Article I or national 
legislation mentioned in Article II.1(b) and to the extent that contributions have been 
made by any of the Contracting Parties. 
2. The legislation of the Contracting Party in whose territory the nuclear 
installation of the operator liable is situated may provide for the recovery of public 
funds made available under this Convention from such operator if the damage results 
from fault on his part. 
3. The Contracting Party whose courts have jurisdiction may exercise the rights of 
recourse provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 on behalf of the other Contracting Parties 
which have contributed. 
Article X 
Disbursements, Proceedings 
1. The system of disbursements by which the funds required under Article III.1 are 
to be made available and the system of apportionment thereof shall be that of the 
Contracting Party whose courts have jurisdiction. 
2. Each Contracting Party shall ensure that persons suffering damage may enforce 
their rights to compensation without having to bring separate proceedings according 
to the origin of the funds provided for such compensation and that Contracting Parties 
may intervene in the proceedings against the operator liable. 
3. No Contracting Party shall be required to make available the public funds 
referred to in Article III.1(b) if claims for compensation can be satisfied out of the 
funds referred to in Article III.1(a). 
Article XI 
Allocation of Funds 
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The funds provided under Article III.1(b) shall be distributed as follows: 
 1. (a) 50% of the funds shall be available to compensate claims for nuclear damage 
suffered in or outside the 
Installation State; 
(b) 50% of the funds shall be available to compensate claims for 
nuclear damage suffered outside the territory of the Installation 
State to the extent that such claims are uncompensated under sub-
paragraph (a). 
(c) In the event the amount provided pursuant to Article III.1(a) is less than 
300 million SDRs: 
(i) the amount in paragraph 1(a) shall be reduced by the same percentage 
as the percentage by which the amount provided pursuant to Article 
III.1(a) is less than 300 million SDR5; and 
(ii) the amount in paragraph 1(b) shall be increased by the amount of the 
reduction calculated pursuant to sub-paragraph (i). 
2. If a Contracting Party, in accordance with Article III.1(a), has ensured the 
availability without discrimination of an amount not less than 600 million SDRs, 
which has been specified to the Depositary prior to the nuclear incident, all funds 
referred to in Article III.1(a) and (b) shall, notwithstanding paragraph 1, be made 
available to compensate nuclear damage suffered in and outside the Installation State. 
CHAPTER IV 
EXERCISE OF OPTIONS 
Article XII 
1. Except insofar as this Convention otherwise provides, each Contracting Party 
may exercise the powers vested in it by virtue of the Vienna Convention 
or the Paris Convention, and any provisions made thereunder may be 
invoked against the other Contracting Parties in order that the public funds 
referred to in Article III.1(b) be made available. 
2. Nothing in this Convention shall prevent any Contracting Party from making 
provisions outside the scope of the Vienna or the Paris Convention and of 
this Convention, provided that such provision shall not involve any further 
obligation on the part of the other Contracting Parties, and provided that 
damage in a Contracting Party having no nuclear installations within its 
territory shall not be excluded from such further compensation on any 
grounds of lack of reciprocity. 
3. (a) Nothing in this Convention shall prevent Contracting Parties from entering 
into regional or other agreements with the purpose of implementing their 
obligations under Article III.1(a) or providing additional funds for the 
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compensation of nuclear damage, provided that this shall not involve any 
further obligation under this Convention for the other Contracting Parties. 
(b) A Contracting Party intending to enter into any such agreement shall notify 
all other Contracting Parties of its intention. Agreements concluded shall 
be notified to the Depositary. 
CHAPTER V 
JURISDICTION AND APPLICABLE LAW 
Article XIII  
Jurisdiction 
1. Except as otherwise provided in this article, jurisdiction over actions concerning 
nuclear damage from a nuclear incident shall lie only with the courts of the Contracting 
Party within which the nuclear incident occurs. 
 2. Where a nuclear incident occurs within the area of the exclusive economic zone 
of a Contracting Party or, if 
such a zone has not been established, in an area not exceeding the limits of an exclusive 
economic zone, were one to be established by that Party, jurisdiction over actions 
concerning nuclear damage from that nuclear incident shall, for the purposes of this 
Convention, lie only with the courts of that Party. The preceding sentence shall apply 
if that Contracting Party has notified the Depositary of such area prior to the nuclear 
incident. Nothing in this paragraph shall be interpreted as permitting the exercise of 
jurisdiction in a manner which is contrary to the international law of the sea, including 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. However, if the exercise of 
such jurisdiction is inconsistent with the obligations of that Party under Article XI of 
the Vienna Convention or Article 13 of the Paris Convention in relation to a State not 
Party to this Convention jurisdiction shall be determined according to those 
provisions. 
 3. Where a nuclear incident does not occur within the territory of any Contracting 
Party or within an area notified pursuant to paragraph 2, or where the place of a nuclear 
incident cannot be determined with certainty, jurisdiction over actions concerning 
nuclear damage from the nuclear incident shall lie only with the courts of the Instal-
lation State. 
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 4. Where jurisdiction over actions concerning nuclear damage would lie with the 
courts of more than one Contracting Party, these Contracting Parties shall determine 
by agreement which Contracting Party’s courts shall have jurisdiction. 
 5. A judgment that is no longer subject to ordinary forms of review entered by a 
court of a Contracting Party having jurisdiction shall be recognized except: 
(a) where the judgment was obtained by fraud; 
(b) where the party against whom the judgment was pronounced was not given a 
fair opportunity to present his case; or 
(c) where the judgment is contrary to the public policy of the Contracting Party 
within the territory of which recognition is sought, or is not in accord with 
fundamental standards of justice. 
 6. A judgment which is recognized under paragraph 5 shall, upon being presented 
for enforcement in accordance with the formalities required by the law of the 
Contracting Party where enforcement is sought, be enforceable as if it were a judgment 
of a court of that Contracting Party. The merits of a claim on which the judgment has 
been given shall not be subject to further proceedings. 
 7. Settlements effected in respect of the payment of compensation out of the public 
funds referred to in Article III.1(b) in accordance with the conditions established by 
national legislation shall be recognized by the other Contracting Parties. 
Article XIV  
Applicable Law 
1. Either the Vienna Convention or the Paris Convention or the Annex to this 
Convention, as appropriate, shall apply to a nuclear incident to the exclusion of the 
others. 
2. Subject to the provisions of this Convention, the Vienna Convention or the Paris 
Convention, as appropriate, the applicable law shall be the law of the competent court. 
Article XV 
Public International Law 
This Convention shall not affect the rights and obligations of a Contracting Party 
under the general rules of public international law. 
CHAPTER VI 
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
Article XVI 
1. In the event of a dispute between Contracting Parties concerning the 
interpretation or application of this Convention, the parties to the dispute shall consult 
with a view to the settlement of the dispute by negotiation or by any other peaceful 
means of settling disputes acceptable to them. 
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2. If a dispute of this character referred to in paragraph 1 cannot be settled within 
six months from the request for consultation pursuant to paragraph 1, it shall, at the 
request of any party to such dispute, be submitted to arbitration or referred to the 
International Court of Justice for decision. Where a dispute is submitted to arbitration, 
if, within six months from the date of the request, the parties to the dispute are unable 
to agree on the organization of the arbitration, a party may request the President of the 
International Court of Justice or the Secretary-General of the United Nations to 
appoint one or more arbitrators. In cases of conflicting requests by the parties to the 
dispute, the request to the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall have priority. 
3. When ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to this Convention, a State 
may declare that it does not consider itself bound by either or both of the dispute 
settlement procedures provided for in paragraph 2. The other Contracting Parties shall 
not be bound by a dispute settlement procedure provided for in paragraph 2 with 
respect to a Contracting Party for which such a declaration is in force. 
4. A Contracting Party which has made a declaration in accordance with paragraph 
3 may at any time withdraw it by notification to the Depositary. 
CHAPTER VII  
FINAL CLAUSES 
Article XVII  
Signature 
This Convention shall be open for signature, by all States at the Headquarters of 
the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna from 29 September 1997 until its 
entry into force. 
Article XVIII 
Ratification, Acceptance, Approval 
1. This Convention shall be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by the 
signatory States. An instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval shall be 
accepted only from a State which is a Party to either the Vienna Convention or the 
Paris Convention, or a State which declares that its national law complies with the 
provisions of the Annex to this Convention, provided that, in the case of a State having 
on its territory a nuclear installation as defined in the Convention on Nuclear Safety 
of 17 June 1994, it is a Contracting State to that Convention. 
135 
 
2. The instruments of ratification, acceptance or approval shall be deposited with 
the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency who shall act as the 
Depositary of this Convention. 
3. A Contracting Party shall provide the Depositary with a copy, in one of the 
official languages of the United Nations, of the provisions of its national law referred 
to in Article II.1 and amendments thereto, including any specification made pursuant 
to Article III.1(a), Article XI.2, or a transitional amount pursuant to Article III.1(a)(ii). 
Copies of such provisions shall be circulated by the Depositary to all other Contracting 
Parties. 
Article XIX  
Accession 
1. After its entry into force, any State which has not signed this Convention may 
accede to it. An instrument of accession shall be accepted only from a State which is 
a Party to either the Vienna Convention or the Paris Convention, or a State which 
declares that its national law complies with the provisions of the Annex to this 
Convention, provided that in the case of a State having on its territory a nuclear 
installation as defined in the Convention on Nuclear Safety of 17 June 1994, it is a 
Contracting State to that Convention. 
2. The instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Director General of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency. 
3. A Contracting Party shall provide the Depositary with a copy, in one of the 
official languages of the United Nations, of the provisions of its national law referred 
to in Article II.1 and amendments thereto, including any specification made pursuant 
to Article III.1(a), Article XI.2, or a transitional amount pursuant to Article III.1(a)(ii). 
Copies of such provisions shall be circulated by the Depositary to all other Contracting 
Parties. 
Article XX  
Entry Into Force 
1. This Convention shall come into force on the ninetieth day following the date 
on which at least 5 States with a minimum of 400,000 units of installed nuclear 
capacity have deposited an instrument referred to in Article XVIII. 
2. For each State which subsequently ratifies, accepts, approves or accedes to this 
Convention, it shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after deposit by such State of 
the appropriate instrument. 
Article XXI  
Denunciation 
1. Any Contracting Party may denounce this Convention by written notification 
to the Depositary. 
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2. Denunciation shall take effect one year after the date on which the 
notification is received by the Depositary. 
Article XXII  
Cessation 
1. Any Contracting Party which ceases to be a Party to either the Vienna 
Convention or the Paris Convention shall notify the Depositary thereof and of the 
date of such cessation. On that date such Contracting Party shall have ceased to be 
a Party to this Convention unless its national law complies with the provisions of 
the Annex to this Convention and it has so notified the Depositary and provided it 
with a copy of the provisions of its national law in one of the official languages of 
the United Nations. Such copy shall be circulated by the Depositary to all other 
Contracting Parties. 
2. Any Contracting Party whose national law ceases to comply with the 
provisions of the Annex to this Convention and which is not a Party to either the 
Vienna Convention or the Paris Convention shall notify the Depositary thereof and 
of the date of such cessation. On that date such Contracting Party shall have ceased 
to be a Party to this Convention. 
3. Any Contracting Party having on its territory a nuclear installation as defined in 
the Convention on Nuclear Safety which ceases to be Party to that Convention shall 
notify the depositary thereof and of the date of such cessation. On that date, such 
Contracting Party shall, notwithstanding paragraphs 1 and 2, have ceased to be a Party 
to the present Convention. 
Article XXIII 
Continuance of Prior Rights and Obligations 
Notwithstanding denunciation pursuant to Article XXI or cessation pursuant to 
Article XXII, the provisions of this Convention shall continue to apply to any nuclear 
damage caused by a nuclear incident which occurs before such denunciation or 
cessation. 
Article XXIV 
Revision and Amendments 
1. The Depositary, after consultations with the Contracting Parties, may convene a 
conference for the purpose of revising or amending this Convention. 
2. The Depositary shall convene a conference of Contracting Parties for the 
purpose of revising or amending this Convention at the request of not less than one-
third of all Contracting Parties. 
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Article XXV 
Amendment by Simplified Procedure 
1. A meeting of the Contracting Parties shall be convened by the Depositary to 
amend the compensation amounts referred to in Article III.1(a) and (b) or categories 
of installations including contributions payable for them, referred to in Article IV.3, if 
one-third of the Contracting Parties express a desire to that effect. 
2. Decisions to adopt a proposed amendment shall be taken by vote. Amendments 
shall be adopted if no negative vote is cast. 
3. Any amendment adopted in accordance with paragraph 2 shall be notified by the 
Depositary to all Contracting Parties. The amendment shall be considered accepted if 
within a period of 36 months after it has been notified, all Contracting Parties at the 
time of the adoption of the amendment have communicated their acceptance to the 
Depositary. The amendment shall enter into force for all Contracting Parties 12 
months after its acceptance. 
4. If, within a period of 36 months from the date of notification for acceptance the 
amendment has not been accepted in accordance with paragraph 3, the amendment 
shall be considered rejected. 
5. When an amendment has been adopted in accordance with paragraph 2 but the 
36 months period for its acceptance has not yet expired, a State which becomes a Party 
to this Convention during that period shall be bound by the amendment if it comes 
into force. A State which becomes a Party to this Convention after that period shall be 
bound by any amendment which has been accepted in accordance with paragraph 3. 
In the cases referred to in the present paragraph, a Contracting Party shall be bound 
by an amendment when that amendment enters into force, or when this Convention 
enters into force for that Contracting Party, whichever date is the later. 
Article XXVI 
Functions of the Depositary 
In addition to functions in other Articles of this Convention, the Depositary shall 
promptly notify Contracting Parties and all other States as well as the Secretary-
General of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development of: 
(a) each signature of this Convention; 
(b) each deposit of an instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or 
accession concerning this Convention; 
(c) the entry into force of this Convention; 
(d) declarations received pursuant to Article XVI; 
(e) any denunciation received pursuant to Article XXI, or notification received 
pursuant to Article XXII; 
(f) any notification under paragraph 2 of Article XIII; 
(g) other pertinent notifications relating to this Convention. 
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Article XXVII  
Authentic Texts 
The original of this Convention, of which Arabic, Chinese, English, French, 
Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Director 
General of the International Atomic Energy Agency who shall send certified copies 
thereof to all States. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, THE UNDERSIGNED, BEING DULY 
AUTHORIZED THERETO, HAVE SIGNED THIS 
CONVENTION. 
Done at Vienna, this twelfth day of September, one thousand nine hundred 
ninety-seven. 
 
ANNEX 
A Contracting Party which is not a Party to any of the Conventions mentioned 
in Article I(a) or (b) of this Convention shall ensure that its national legislation is 
consistent with the provisions laid down in this Annex insofar as those provisions are 
not directly applicable within that Contracting Party. A Contracting Party having no 
nuclear installation on its territory is required to have only that legislation which is 
necessary to enable such a Party to give effect to its obligations under this Convention. 
Article 1  
Definitions 
1. In addition to the definitions in Article I of this Convention, the following 
definitions apply for the purposes of this Annex: 
(a) “Nuclear Fuel” means any material which is capable of producing energy by a 
self-sustaining chain process of nuclear fission. 
(b) “Nuclear Installation” means: 
(i) any nuclear reactor other than one with which a means of sea or air 
transport is equipped for use as a source of power, whether for propulsion 
thereof or for any other purpose; 
(ii) any factory using nuclear fuel for the production of nuclear material, or 
any factory for the processing of nuclear material, including any factory 
for the re-processing of irradiated nuclear fuel; and 
(iii) any facility where nuclear material is stored, other than storage 
incidental to the carriage of such material; 
provided that the Installation State may determine that several nuclear 
installations of one operator which are located at the same site shall be 
considered as a single nuclear installation. 
(c) “Nuclear material” means: 
(i) nuclear fuel, other than natural uranium and depleted uranium, capable of 
producing energy by a self-sustaining chain process of nuclear fission 
139 
 
outside a nuclear reactor, either alone or in combination with some other 
material; and 
(ii) radioactive products or waste. 
(d) “Operator”, in relation to a nuclear installation, means the person designated or 
recognized by the Installation State as the operator of that installation. 
(e) “Radioactive products or waste” means any radioactive material produced in, or 
any material made radioactive by exposure to the radiation incidental to the 
production or utilization of nuclear fuel, but does not include radioisotopes 
which have reached the final stage of fabrication so as to be usable for any 
scientific medical, agricultural, commercial or industrial purpose. 
2. An Installation State may, if the small extent of the risks involved so warrants, 
exclude any nuclear installation or small quantities of nuclear material from the 
application of this Convention, provided that: 
(a) with respect to nuclear installations, criteria for such exclusion have been 
established by the Board of Governors of International Atomic Energy 
Agency and any exclusion by an Installation State satisfies such criteria; and 
(b) with respect to small quantities of nuclear material, maximum limits for the 
exclusion of such quantities have been established by the Board of Governors 
of the International Atomic Energy Agency and any exclusion by an Installation 
State is within such established limits. 
The criteria for the exclusion of nuclear installations and the maximum limits for the 
exclusion of small quantities of nuclear material shall be reviewed periodically by the 
Board of Governors. 
Article 2 
Conformity of Legislation 
1. The national law of a Contracting Party is deemed to be in conformity with the 
provisions of Articles 3, 4, 5 and 7 if it contained on 1 January 1995 and continues to 
contain provisions that: 
(a) provide for strict liability in the event of a nuclear incident where there is 
substantial nuclear damage off the site of the nuclear installation where the 
incident occurs; 
(b) require the indemnification of any person other than the operator liable for 
nuclear damage to the extent that person is legally liable to provide 
compensation; and 
(c) ensure the availability of at least 1000 million SDRs in respect of a civil nuclear 
power plant and at least 300 million SDRs in respect of other civil nuclear 
installations for such indemnification. 
2. If in accordance with paragraph I, the national law of a Contracting Party is 
deemed to be in conformity with the provision of Articles 3, 4, 5 and 7, then that Party: 
(a) may apply a definition of nuclear damage that covers loss or damage set forth in 
Article I(f) of this Convention and any other loss or damage to the extent that 
the loss or damage arises out of or results from the radioactive properties, or a 
combination of radioactive properties with toxic, explosive or other hazardous 
properties of nuclear fuel or radioactive products or waste in, or of nuclear 
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material coming from, originating in, or sent to, a nuclear installation; or other 
ionizing radiation emitted by any source of radiation inside a nuclear instal-
lation, provided that such application does not affect the undertaking by that 
Contracting Party pursuant to Article III of this Convention; and 
(b) may apply the definition of nuclear installation in paragraph 3 of this Article to 
the exclusion of the definition in Article 1.1(b) of this Annex. 
3. For the purpose of paragraph 2 (b) of this Article, “nuclear installation” 
means: 
(a) any civil nuclear reactor other than one with which a means of sea or air transport 
is equipped for use as a source of power, whether for propulsion thereof or any 
other purpose; and 
(b) any civil facility for processing, reprocessing or storing: 
(i) irradiated nuclear fuel; or 
(ii) radioactive products or waste that: 
(1) result from the reprocessing of irradiated nuclear fuel and contain 
significant amounts of fission products; or 
(2) contain elements that have an atomic number greater than 92 in 
concentrations greater than 10 nano-curies per gram. 
(c) any other civil facility for processing, reprocessing or storing nuclear material 
unless the Contracting Party determines the small extent of the risks involved 
with such an installation warrants the exclusion of such a facility from this 
definition. 
4. Where that national law of a Contracting Party which is in compliance with 
paragraph 1 of this Article does not apply to a nuclear incident which occurs outside 
the territory of that Contracting Party, but over which the courts of that Contracting 
Party have jurisdiction pursuant to Article XIII of this Convention, Articles 3 to 11 of 
the Annex shall apply and prevail over any inconsistent provisions of the applicable 
national law. 
Article 3 
Operator Liability 
1. The operator of a nuclear installation shall be liable for nuclear damage upon 
proof that such damage has been caused by a nuclear incident: 
(a) in that nuclear installation; or 
(b) involving nuclear material coming from or originating in that nuclear 
installation, and occurring: 
(i) before liability with regard to nuclear incidents involving the nuclear 
material has been assumed, pursuant to the express terms of a contract in 
writing, by the operator of another nuclear installation; 
(ii) in the absence of such express terms, before the operator of another 
nuclear installation has taken charge of the nuclear material; or 
(iii) where the nuclear material is intended to be used in a nuclear reactor with 
which a means of transport is equipped for use as a source of power, 
whether for propulsion thereof or for any other purpose, before the person 
duly authorized to operate such reactor has taken charge of the nuclear 
material; but 
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(iv) where the nuclear material has been sent to a person within the territory 
of a non-Contracting State, before it has been unloaded from the means of 
transport by which it has arrived in the territory of that non-Contracting 
State; 
(c) involving nuclear material sent to that nuclear installation, and occurring: 
(i) after liability with regard to nuclear incidents involving the nuclear 
material has been assumed by the operator pursuant to the express terms 
of a contract in writing, from the operator of another nuclear installation; 
(ii) in the absence of such express terms, after the operator has taken charge 
of the nuclear material; or 
(iii) after the operator has taken charge of the nuclear material from a person 
operating a nuclear reactor with which a means of transport is equipped 
for use as a source of power, whether for propulsion thereof or for any 
other purpose; but 
(iv) where the nuclear material has, with the written consent of the operator, 
been sent from a person within the territory of a non-Contracting State, 
only after it has been loaded on the means of transport by which it is to be 
carried from the territory of that State; 
provided that, if nuclear damage is caused by a nuclear incident occurring in a nuclear 
installation and involving nuclear material stored therein incidentally to the carriage 
of such material, the provisions of sub-paragraph (a) shall not apply where another 
operator or person is solely liable pursuant to sub-paragraph (b) or (c). 
2. The Installation State may provide by legislation that, in accordance with such 
terms as may be specified in that legislation, a carrier of nuclear material or a person 
handling radioactive waste may, at such carrier or such person’s request and with the 
consent of the operator concerned, be designated or recognized as operator in the place 
of that operator in respect of such nuclear material or radioactive waste respectively. 
In this case such carrier or such person shall be considered, for all the purposes of this 
Convention, as an operator of a nuclear installation situated within the territory of that 
State. 
3. The liability of the operator for nuclear damage shall be absolute. 
4. Whenever both nuclear damage and damage other than nuclear damage have 
been caused by a nuclear incident or jointly by a nuclear incident and one or more 
other occurrences, such other damage shall, to the extent that it is not reasonably 
separable from the nuclear damage, be deemed to be nuclear damage caused by that 
nuclear incident. Where, however, damage is caused jointly by a nuclear incident 
covered by the provisions of this Annex and by an emission of ionizing radiation not 
covered by it, nothing in this Annex shall limit or otherwise affect the 
liability, either as regards any person suffering nuclear damage or by way of recourse 
or contribution, of any person who may be held liable in connection with that emission 
of ionizing radiation. 
5. (a) No liability shall attach to an operator for nuclear damage caused by a nuclear 
incident directly due to an act of armed conflict, hostilities, civil war or 
insurrection. 
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(b) Except insofar as the law of the Installation State may provide to the 
contrary, the operator shall not be liable for nuclear damage caused by a 
nuclear incident caused directly due to a grave natural disaster of an 
exceptional character. 
6. National law may relieve an operator wholly or partly from the obligation to pay 
compensation for nuclear damage suffered by a person if the operator proves the 
nuclear damage resulted wholly or partly from the gross negligence of that person or 
an act or omission of that person done with the intent to cause damage. 
7. The operator shall not be liable for nuclear damage: 
(a) to the nuclear installation itself and any other nuclear installation, including a 
nuclear installation under construction, on the site where that installation is 
located; and 
(b) to any property on that same site which is used or to be used in connection with 
any such installation; 
(c) unless otherwise provided by national law, to the means of transport upon which 
the nuclear material involved was at the time of the nuclear incident. If national 
law provides that the operator is liable for such damage, compensation for that 
damage shall not have the effect of reducing the liability of the operator in 
respect of other damage to an amount less than either 150 million SDRs, or any 
higher amount established by the legislation of a Contracting Party. 
8. Nothing in this Convention shall affect the liability outside this Convention of 
the operator for nuclear damage for which by virtue of paragraph 7(c) he is not liable 
under this Convention. 
9. The right to compensation for nuclear damage may be exercised only against the 
operator liable, provided that national law may permit a direct right of action against 
any supplier of funds that are made available pursuant to provisions in national law to 
ensure compensation through the use of funds from sources other than the operator. 
10. The operator shall incur no liability for damage caused by a nuclear incident 
outside the provisions of national law in accordance with this Convention. 
Article 4 
Liability Amounts 
1. Subject to Article III.1(a)(ii), the liability of the operator may be limited by the 
Installation State for anyone nuclear incident, either: 
(a) to not less than 300 million SDRs; or 
(b) to not less than 150 million SDRs provided that in excess of that amount and up 
to at least 300 million SDRs public funds shall be made available by that State 
to compensate nuclear damage. 
2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1, the Installation State, having regard to the nature 
of the nuclear installation or the nuclear substances involved and to the likely 
consequences of an incident originating therefrom, may establish a lower amount of 
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liability of the operator, provided that in no event shall any amount so established be 
less than 
5 million SDRs, and provided that the Installation State ensures that public funds shall 
be made available up to the amount established pursuant to paragraph 1. 
 3. The amounts established by the Installation State of the liable operator in 
accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2, 
as well as the provisions of any legislation of a Contracting Party pursuant to Article 
3.7(c), shall apply wherever the nuclear incident occurs. 
Article 5 
Financial Security 
1. (a) The operator shall be required to have and maintain insurance or other 
financial security covering his liability for nuclear damage in such 
amount, of such type and in such terms as the Installation State shall 
specify. The Installation State shall ensure the payment of claims for 
compensation for nuclear damage which have been established against the 
operator by providing the necessary funds to the extent that the yield of 
insurance or other financial security is inadequate to satisfy such claims, 
but not in excess of the limit, if any, established pursuant to Article 4. 
Where the liability of the operator is unlimited, the Installation State may 
establish a limit of the financial security of the operator liable provided 
that such limit is not lower than 300 million SDRs. The Installation State 
shall ensure the payment of claims for compensation for nuclear damage 
which have been established against the operator to the extent that yield 
of the financial security is inadequate to satisfy such claims, but not in 
excess of the amount of the financial security to be provided under this 
paragraph. 
(b) Notwithstanding sub-paragraph (a), the Installation State, having regard to 
the nature of the nuclear installation or the nuclear substances involved and 
to the likely consequences of an incident originating there from, may 
establish a lower amount of financial security of the operator, provided that 
in no event shall any amount so established be less than 5 million SDRs, 
and provided that the Installation State ensures the payment of claims for 
compensation for nuclear damage which have been established against the 
operator by providing necessary funds to the extent that the yield of 
insurance or other financial security is inadequate to satisfy such claims, 
and up to the limit provided in sub-paragraph (a). 
2. Nothing in paragraph 1 shall require a Contracting Party or any of its constituent 
subdivisions to maintain insurance or other financial security to cover 
their liability as operators. 
3. The funds provided by insurance, by other financial security or by the 
Installation State pursuant to paragraph 1 or Article 4.1(b) shall be 
exclusively available for compensation due under this Annex. 
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4. No insurer or other financial guarantor shall suspend or cancel the insurance or 
other financial security provided pursuant to paragraph 1 without giving 
notice in writing of at least two months to the competent public authority 
or, in so far as such insurance or other financial security relates to the 
carriage of nuclear material, during the period of the carriage in question. 
Article 6  
Carriage 
 1. With respect to a nuclear incident during carriage, the maximum amount of 
liability of the operator shall be governed by the national law of the Installation 
State. 
2. A Contracting Party may subject carriage of nuclear material through its 
territory to the condition that the amount of liability of the operator be increased 
to an amount not to exceed the maximum amount of liability of the operator of 
a nuclear installation situated in its territory. 
3. The provisions of paragraph 2 shall not apply to: 
(a) carriage by sea where, under international law, there is a right of entry in cases 
of urgent distress into ports of a Contracting Party or a right of innocent passage 
through its territory; 
(b) carriage by air where, by agreement or under international law, there is a right 
to fly over or land on the territory of a Contracting Party. 
Article 7 
Liability of More Than One Operator 
1. Where nuclear damage engages the liability of more than one operator, the 
operators involved shall, in so far as the damage attributable to each operator is 
not reasonably separable, be jointly and severally liable. The Installation State 
may limit the amount of public funds made available per incident to the 
difference, if any, between the amounts hereby established and the amount 
established pursuant to Article 4.1. 
2. Where a nuclear incident occurs in the course of carriage of nuclear material, 
either in one and the same means of transport, or, in the case of storage incidental 
to the carriage, in one and the same nuclear installation, and causes nuclear 
damage which engages the liability of more than one operator, the total liability 
shall not exceed the highest amount applicable with respect to anyone of them 
pursuant to Article 4. 
3. In neither of the cases referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall the liability of 
anyone operator exceed the amount applicable with respect to him pursuant to 
Article 4. 
4. Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 1 to 3, where several nuclear installations 
of one and the same operator are involved in one nuclear incident, such operator 
shall be liable in respect of each nuclear installation involved up to the amount 
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applicable with respect to him pursuant to Article 4. The Installation State may 
limit the amount of public funds made available as provided for in paragraph 1. 
Article 8 
Compensation Under National Law 
1. For purposes of this Convention, the amount of compensation shall be 
determined without regard to any interest or costs awarded in a proceeding for 
compensation of nuclear damage. 
2. Compensation for damage suffered outside the Installation State shall be 
provided in a form freely transferable among Contracting Parties. 
3. Where provisions of national or public health insurance, social insurance, social 
security, workmen’s compensation or occupational disease compensation 
systems include compensation for nuclear damage, rights of beneficiaries of 
such systems and rights of recourse by virtue of such systems shall be 
determined by the national law of the Contracting Party in which such systems 
have been established or by the regulations of the intergovernmental 
organization which has established such systems. 
Article 9 
Period of Extinction 
1. Rights of compensation under this Convention shall be extinguished if an action is 
not brought within ten years from the date of the nuclear incident. If, however, under 
the law of the Installation State the liability of the operator is covered by insurance 
or other financial security or by State funds for a period longer than ten years, the 
law of the competent court may provide that rights of compensation against the 
operator shall only be extinguished after a period which may be longer than ten 
years, but shall not be longer than the period for which his liability is so covered 
under the law of the Installation State. 
2. Where nuclear damage is caused by a nuclear incident involving nuclear material 
which at the time of the nuclear incident was stolen, lost, jettisoned or abandoned, 
the period established pursuant to paragraph 1 shall be computed from the date 
of that nuclear incident but the period shall in no case, subject to legislation 
pursuant to paragraph 1, exceed a period of twenty years from the date of the 
theft, loss, jettison or abandonment. 
3. The law of the competent court may establish a period of extinction or 
prescription of not less than three years from the date on which the person 
suffering nuclear damage had knowledge or should have had knowledge of the 
damage and of the operator liable for the damage, provided that the period 
established pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not be exceeded. 
4. If the national law of a Contracting Party provides for a period of extinction or 
prescription greater than ten years from the date of a nuclear incident, it shall 
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contain provisions for the equitable and timely satisfaction of claims for loss of 
life or personal injury filed within ten years from the date of the nuclear incident. 
Article 10 
Right of Recourse 
National law may provide that the operator shall have a right of recourse 
only: 
(a) if this is expressly provided for by a contract in writing; or 
(b) if the nuclear incident results from an act or omission done with intent to cause 
damage, against the individual who has acted or omitted to act with such intent. 
Article 11 
Applicable Law 
Subject to the provisions of this Convention, the nature, form, extent and 
equitable distribution of compensation for nuclear damage caused by a nuclear 
incident shall be governed by the law of the competent court. 
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Appendix 12: IAEA 1988 Joint Protocol on the Application of the 
Vienna and Paris Conventions Source: International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) 
 
JOINT PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE 
APPLICATION OF  
THE VIENNA CONVENTION AND THE PARIS 
CONVENTION 
THE CONTRACTING PARTIES 
HAVING REGARD to the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear 
Damage of 21 May 1963; 
HAVING REGARD to the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in 
the Field of Nuclear Energy of 
29 July 1960 as amended by the Additional Protocol of 28 January 1964 and by the 
Protocol of 16 November 1982; CONSIDERING that the Vienna Convention 
and the Paris Convention are similar in substance and that no State 
is at present a Party to both Conventions; 
CONVINCED that adherence to either Convention by Parties to the other 
Convention could lead to difficulties resulting from the simultaneous application of 
both Conventions to a nuclear incident; and 
DESIROUS to establish a link between the Vienna Convention and the Paris 
Convention by mutually extending the benefit of the special regime of civil liability 
for nuclear damage set forth under each Convention and to eliminate conflicts arising 
from the simultaneous applications of both Conventions to a nuclear incident; 
HAVE AGREED as follows: 
ARTICLE I 
In this Protocol: 
(a) “Vienna Convention” means the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for 
Nuclear Damage of 21 May 1963 and any amendment thereto which is in force 
for a Contracting Party to this Protocol; 
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(b) “Paris Convention” means the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the 
Field of Nuclear Energy of 29 July 1960 and any amendment thereto which is 
in force for a Contracting Party to this Protocol. 
ARTICLE II 
For the purpose of this Protocol: 
(a) The operator of a nuclear installation situated in the territory of a Party to the 
Vienna Convention shall be liable in accordance with that Convention for 
nuclear damage suffered in the territory of a Party to both the Paris Convention 
and this Protocol; 
(b) The operator of a nuclear installation situated in the territory of a Party to the 
Paris Convention shall be liable in accordance with that Convention for nuclear 
damage suffered in the territory of a Party to both the Vienna Convention and 
this Protocol. 
ARTICLE III 
1. Either the Vienna Convention or the Paris Convention shall apply to a nuclear 
incident to the exclusion of the other. 
2. In the case of a nuclear incident occurring in a nuclear installation, the 
applicable Convention shall be that to which the State is a Party within whose 
territory that installation is situated. 
3. In the case of a nuclear incident outside a nuclear installation and involving 
nuclear material in the course of carriage, the applicable Convention shall be that to 
which the State is a Party within whose territory the nuclear installation is situated 
whose operator is liable pursuant to either Article II.1(b) and (c) of the Vienna 
Convention or Article 4(a) and (b) of the Paris Convention. 
ARTICLE IV 
1. Articles I to XV of the Vienna Convention shall be applied, with respect to the 
Contracting Parties to this Protocol which are Parties to the Paris Convention, in the 
same manner as between Parties to the Vienna Convention. 
2. Articles 1 to 14 of the Paris Convention shall be applied, with respect to the 
Contracting Parties to this Protocol which are Parties to the Vienna Convention, in 
the same manner as between Parties to the Paris Convention. 
ARTICLE V 
This Protocol shall be open for signature, from 21 September 1988 until the date 
of its entry into force, at the Headquarters of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
by all States which have signed, ratified or acceded to either the Vienna Convention 
or the Paris Convention. 
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ARTICLE VI 
1. This Protocol is subject to ratification, acceptance, approval or accession. 
Instruments of ratification, acceptance or approval shall only be accepted from States 
Party to either the Vienna Convention or the Paris Convention. Any such State which 
has not signed this Protocol may accede to it. 
2. The instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be 
deposited with the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, who 
is hereby designated as the depositary of this Protocol. 
ARTICLE VII 
1. This Protocol shall come into force three months after the date of deposit of 
instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession by at least five States 
Party to the Vienna Convention and five States Party to the Paris Convention. For 
each State ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to this Protocol after the 
deposit of the above-mentioned instruments this Protocol shall enter into force three 
months after the date of deposit of the instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval 
or accession. 
2. This Protocol shall remain in force as long as both the Vienna Convention and 
the Paris Convention are in force. 
ARTICLE VIII 
1. Any Contracting Party may denounce this Protocol by written notification to 
the depositary. 
2. Denunciation shall take effect one year after the date on which the notification 
is received by the depositary. 
ARTICLE IX 
1. Any Contracting Party which ceases to be a Party to either the Vienna 
Convention or the Paris Convention shall notify the depositary of the termination of 
the application of that Convention with respect to it and of the date such termination 
takes effect. 
2. This Protocol shall cease to apply to a Contracting Party which has terminated 
application of either the Vienna Convention or the Paris Convention on the date such 
termination takes effect. 
ARTICLE X 
The depositary shall promptly notify Contracting Parties and States invited to the 
Conference on the relationship between the Paris Convention and the Vienna 
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Convention as well as the Secretary General of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development of: 
(a) Each signature of this Protocol; 
(b) Each deposit of an instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession 
concerning this Protocol; 
(c) The entry into force of this Protocol; 
(d) Any denunciation; and 
(e) Any information received pursuant to Article IX. 
ARTICLE XI 
 
The original of this Protocol, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, 
Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with 
the depositary, who shall send certified copies to Contracting Parties and 
States invited to the Conference on the relationship between the Paris 
Convention and the Vienna Convention as well as the Secretary General of 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned being duly authorized by their 
respective Governments for that purpose have signed the present Joint 
Protocol. 
 
DONE at Vienna this twenty-first day of September, one thousand nine hundred 
and eighty-eight. 
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Appendix 13:The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
(NPT) Source: Department for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations 
(2000). 
 
THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR 
WEAPONS (NPT) 
TEXT OF THE TREATY 
The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the 
Parties to the Treaty, 
Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind 
by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to 
avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the 
security of peoples, 
Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously 
enhance the danger of nuclear war, 
In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General 
Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the 
prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons, 
Undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the application of 
International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear 
activities, 
Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts 
to further the application, within the framework of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of 
safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable 
materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain 
strategic points, 
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Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of 
nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which 
may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of 
nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to 
all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-
weapon States, 
Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the 
Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of 
scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation 
with other States to, the further development of the applications of 
atomic energy for peaceful purposes, 
Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the 
cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective 
measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament, 
Urging the co-operation of all States in the attainment of this 
objective, 
Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 
Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer 
space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the 
discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time 
and to continue negotiations to this end, 
Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the 
strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the 
cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of 
all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national 
arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant 
to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and 
effective international control, 
Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, 
States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or 
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use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence 
of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of 
the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of 
international peace and security are to be promoted with the least 
diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic 
resources, 
Have agreed as follows: 
Article I 
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to 
transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices 
directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or 
induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise 
acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or 
control over such weapons or explosive devices. 
Article II 
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to 
receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear 
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such 
weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to 
manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the 
manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. 
Article III 
1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to 
accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and 
concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in 
accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency and the Agency’s safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose 
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of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this 
Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from 
peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. 
Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be 
followed with respect to source or special fissionable material 
whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal 
nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required 
by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable 
material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such 
State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control 
anywhere. 
2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source 
or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially 
designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special 
fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful 
purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be 
subject to the safeguards required by this Article. 
3. The safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a 
manner designed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to 
avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the 
Parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear 
activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material 
and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear 
material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of 
this Article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble 
of the Treaty. 
4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude 
agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the 
requirements of this Article either individually or together with other 
States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence 
within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For 
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States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after 
the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence 
not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter 
into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of 
negotiations. 
Article IV 
1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the 
inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, 
production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without 
discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty. 
2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the 
right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, 
materials and scientific and technological information for the 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to 
do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with 
other States or international organizations to the further development 
of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially 
in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, 
with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the 
world. 
Article V 
Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to 
ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate 
international observation and through appropriate international 
procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of 
nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon 
States Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the 
charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as 
possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-
nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such 
benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or 
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agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate 
representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this 
subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters 
into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring 
may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements. 
Article VI 
Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in 
good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear 
arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a 
treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and 
effective international control. 
Article VII 
Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to 
conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of 
nuclear weapons in their respective territories. 
Article VIII 
1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. 
The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the 
Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the 
Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the 
Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a 
conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to 
consider such an amendment. 
2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of 
the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all 
nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, 
on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of 
Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The 
amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its 
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instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such 
instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including 
the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to 
the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is 
circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into 
force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of 
ratification of the amendment. 
3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of 
Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to 
review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the 
purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being 
realised. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties 
to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the 
Depositary Governments, the convening of further conferences with 
the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty. 
Article IX 
1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State 
which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in 
accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any 
time. 
2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. 
Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be 
deposited with the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
and the United States of America, which are hereby designated the 
Depositary Governments. 
3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, 
the Governments of which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, 
and forty other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their 
instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-
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weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear 
weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967. 
4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are 
deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall 
enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of 
ratification or accession. 
5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory 
and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit 
of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry 
into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for 
convening a conference or other notices. 
6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments 
pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. 
Article X 
1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right 
to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, 
related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the 
supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such 
withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United 
Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall 
include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having 
jeopardized its supreme interests. 
2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a 
conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall 
continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional 
fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of 
the Parties to the Treaty.1 
Article XI 
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This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts 
of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of 
the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall 
be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of 
the signatory and acceding States. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have 
signed this Treaty. 
DONE in triplicate, at the cities of London, Moscow and Washington, 
the first day of July, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-eight. 
Note: 
On 11 May 1995, in accordance with article X, paragraph 2, the 
Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons decided that the Treaty should 
continue in force indefinitely (see decision 3). 
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Appendix 14: Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident 
Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
 
International Atomic Energy Agency 
18 November 1986 
 
INFORMATION CIRCULAR 
 
CONVENTION ON EARLY NOTIFICATION OF A NUCLEAR ACCIDENT 
1. The Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident was 
adopted by the General Conference at its special session, 24-26 September 
1986, and was opened for signature at Vienna on 26 September 1986 and at 
New York on 6 October 1986. It entered into force on 27 October 1986, i.e. 
thirty days after the date (26 September 1986) on which three States 
expressed their consent to be bound by the Convention, as required under 
Article 12 thereof. 
2. The text of the Convention, taken from a certified copy, is 
reproduced herein for the information of all Members. 
3. CONVENTION ON EARLY NOTIFICATION OF A NUCLEAR 
ACCIDENT 
4. THE STATES PARTIES TO THIS CONVENTION,AWARE that 
nuclear activities are being carried out in a number of States,NOTING that 
comprehensive measures have been and are being taken to ensure a high level o safety in 
nuclear activities, aimed at preventing nuclear accidents and minimizing the consequences 
of any such Evident, should it occur, 
5. DESIRING to strengthen further international co-operation in the safe 
development and use o nuclear energy, 
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6. CONVINCED of the need for States to provide relevant information about nuclear 
accidents as early as possible in order that transboundary radiological consequences can be 
minimized, 
7. NOTING the usefulness of bilateral and multilateral arrangements on 
information exchange in this area, 
 
HAVE AGREED as follows: 
Article I 
Scope of application 
I. This Convention shall apply in the event of any accident involving facilities or activities of 
a State Party or of persons or legal entities under its jurisdiction or control, referred to in paragraph 
2 below, from which a release of radioactive material occurs or is likely to occur and which has 
resulted or may result in an international transboundary release that could be of radiological safety 
significance for another State. 
2. The facilities and activities referred to in paragraph I are the following: 
(a) any nuclear reactor wherever located; 
(b) any nuclear fuel cycle facility; 
(c) any radioactive waste management facility; 
(d) the transport and storage of nuclear fuels or radioactive wastes; 
(e) the manufacture, use, storage, disposal and transport of radioisotopes for 
agricultural, industrial, medical and related scientific and research purposes; and 
(f) the use of radioisotopes for power generation in space objects. 
Article 2 
Notification and information 
In the event of an accident specified in article I (hereinafter referred to as a "nuclear accident"), 
the State Party refei red to in that article shall: 
(a) forthwith notify, directly or through the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(hereinafter referred to as the "Agency"), those States which are or may be physically 
affected as specified in article I and the Agency of the nuclear accident, its nature, the 
time of its occurrence and its exact location where appropriate; and 
(b) promptly provide the States referred to in sub-paragraph (a), directly or through the 
Agency, and the Agency with such available information relevant to minimizing the 
radiological consequences in those States, as specified in article 5. 
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Article 3 
Other Nuclear Accidents 
With a view to minimizing the radiological consequences, States Parties may notify in the 
event of nuclear accidents other than those specified in article I. 
Article 4 
Functions of the Agency 
The Agency shall: 
(a) forthwith inform States Parties, Member States, other States which are or may be 
physically affected as specified in article I and relevant international intergovernmental 
organizations (hereinafter referred to as "international organizations") of a notification 
received pursuant to sub-paragraph (a) of article 2; and 
(b) promptly provide any State Party, Member State or relevant international organization, 
upon request, with the information received pursuant to sub-paragraph (b) of article 2. 
Article 5 
Information to be provided 
I. The information to be provided pursuant to sub-paragraph (b) of article 2 shall comprise the 
following data as then available to the notifying State Party: 
(a) the time, exact location whae appropriate, and the nature of the nuclear accident; 
(b) the facility or activity involved; 
(c) the assumed or established cause and the foreseeable development of the nuclear accident 
relevant to the transboundary release of the radioactive materials; 
(d) the general characteristics of the radioactive release, including, as far as is practicablr and 
appropriate, the nature, probable physical and chemical form and the quantity, 
composition and effective height of the radioactive release; 
(e) information on current and forecast meteorological and hydrological conditions, 
necessary for forecasting the transboundary release of the radioactive materials; 
(f) the results of environmental monitoring relevant to the transboundary release of the 
radioactive materials; 
(g) the off-site protective measures taken or planned; 
(h) the predicted behaviour over time of the radioactive release. 
2. Such information shall be supplemented at appropriate intervals by further relevant 
information on the development of the emergency situation, including its foreseeable or actual 
termination. 
3. Information received pursuant to sub-paragraph (b) of article 2 may be used without restriction, 
except when such information is provided in confidence by the notifying State Party. 
163 
 
Article 6  
Censultations 
A State Party providing information pursuant to sub-paragraph (b) of article 2 shall, as far as 
is reasonably practicable, respond promptly to a request for further information or consultations 
sought by an affected State Party with a view to minimizing the radiological consequences in that 
State. 
Article 7 
Competent authorities and points of contact 
1. Each State Party shall make known to the Agency and to other States Parties, directly or 
through the Agency, its competent authorities and point of contact responsible for issuing 
and receiving the notification and information referred to in article 2. Such points of contact 
and aiocal point within the Agency shall be available continuously. 
2. Each State Party shall promptly inform the Agenty of any changes that may occur in the 
information referred to in paragraph I. 
3. The Agency shall maintain an up-to-date list of such national authorities and points of contact 
as well as points of contact of relevant international organizations and shall provide it to 
States Panics and Member States and to relevant international organizations. 
 
Article 8 
Assistance to States Parties 
The Agency shall, in accordance with its Statute and upon a request of a State Party 
which does not have nuclear activities itself and borders on a State having an active nuclear 
programme but not Party, conduct investigations into the feasibility and establishment of 
an appropriate radiation monitoring system in order to facilitate the achievement of the 
objectives of this Convention. 
Article 9 
Bilateral and multilateral arrangements 
In furtherance of their mutual interests, States Parties may consider, where deemed 
appropriate, the conclusion of bilateral or multilateral arrangements relating to the subject 
matter of this Convention. 
Article 10 
Relationship to other international agreements 
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This Convention shall not affect the reciprocal rights and obligations of States Parties under 
existing international agreements which relate to the matters covered by this Convention, or 
under future international agreements concluded in accordance with the object and purpose 
of this Convention. 
Article 11 
Settlement of disputes 
1. In the event of a dispute between States Parties, or between a State Party and the Agency, 
concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention, the parties to the 
dispute shall consult with a view to the settlement of the dispute by negotiation or by 
any other peaceful means of settling disputes acceptable to them. 
2. If a dispute of this character between States Parties cannot be settled within one year from 
the request for consultation pursuant to paragraph 1, it shall, at the request of any party 
to such dispute, be submitted to arbitration or referred to the International Court of 
Justice for decision. Where a dispute is submitted to arbitration, if, within six months 
from the date of the request, the parties t the dispute are unable to agree on the 
organization of the arbitration, a party may request the President of the International 
Court of Justice or the Secretary-General of the United Nations to appoint one o more 
arbitrators. In cases of conflicting requests by the parties to the dispute, the request to 
th Secretary-General of the United Nations shall have priority. 
3. When signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to this Convention, a State ma 
declare that it doe:: not consider itself bound by either or both of the dispute settlement 
procedure provided for in paragraph 2. The other States Parties shall not be bound by 
a dispute settlement procedure provided for in paragraph 2 with respect to a State 
Party for which such a declaration is in force. 
4. A State Party which has made a declaration in accordance with paragraph 3 may at any 
time withdraw it by notification to the depositary. 
Article 12 
Entry into force 
5. This Convention shall be open for signature by all States and Namibia, represented by the 
United Nations Council for Namibia, at the Headquarters of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency in Vienna and at the Headquarters of the United Nations in New 
York, from 26 September 1986 and 6 October 1986 respectively, until its entry into 
force or for twelve months, whichever period is Longer. 
6. A State and Namibia, represented by the United Nations Council for Namibia, may 
express its consent to be bound by this Convention either by signature, or by deposit 
of an instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval following signature made 
subject to ratification, acceptance or approval,or by deposit of an instrument of 
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accession. The instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be 
deposited with the depositary. 
7. This Convention shall enter into force thirty days after consent to be bound has been 
expressed by three States. 
8. For each State expressing consent to be bound by this Convention after its entry into force, 
this Convention shall enter into force for that State thirty days after the date of 
expression of consent. 
9. (a) This Convention shall be open for accession, as provided for in this article, by 
international organizations and regional integration organizations constituted by 
sovereign States, which have competence in respect of the negotiation, conclusion 
and application of international agreements in matters covered by this Convention. 
10. In matters within their competence such organizations shall, on their own behalf, exercise 
the rights and fulfil the obligations which this Convention attributes to States Parties. 
11. When depositing its instrument of accession, such an organization shall communicate to 
the depositary a declaration indicating the extent of its competence in respect of 
matters covered by this Convention. 
12. Such an organization shall not hold any vote additional to those of its Member States. 
 
Article 13 
Provisional application 
A State may, upon signature or at any later date before this Convention enters into 
force for it, declare that it will apply this Convention provisionally. 
 
Article 14  
Amendments 
1. A State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. The proposed 
amendment shall be submitted to the depositary who shall circulate it 
immediately to all other States Parties. 
2. If a majority of the States Parties request the depositary to convene a conference 
to consider the proposed amendments, the depositary shall invite all States 
Parties to attend such a conference to begin not sooner than thirty days after 
the invitations are issued. Any amendment adopted at the conference by a two-
thirds majority of all States Parties shall be laid down in a protocol which is 
open to signature in Vienna and New York by all States Parties. 
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3. The protocol shall enter into force thirty days after consent to be bound has been 
expressed by three States. For each State expressing consent to be bound by 
the protocol after its entry into force, the protocol shall enter into force for that 
State thirty days after the date of expression of consent. 
Article IS  
Denunciation 
I. A State Party may denounce this Convention by written notification to the 
depositary. 
2. Denunciation shall take effect one year following the date on which the 
notification is received by the depositary. 
Article 16  
Depositary 
1. The Director General of the Agency shall be the depositary of this 
Convention. 
2. The Director General of the Agency shall promptly notify States Parties and 
all other States of: 
(a) each signature of this Convention or any protocol of amendment; 
(b) each deposit of an instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or 
accession concerning this Convention or any protocol of amendment; 
(c) any declaration or withdrawal thereof in accordance with article 11; 
(d) any declaration of provisional application of this Convention in accordance 
with article 13; 
(e) the entry into force of this Convention and of any amendment thereto; and 
(f) any denunciation made under article 15. 
 
Article 17 
 
Authentic texts and certified copies 
The original of this Convention, of which the Arabic. Chinese, English. French, Russian 
and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Director General of 
the International Atomic Energy Agency who shall send certified copies to States Parties 
and all other States. 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized, have signed this 
Convention, open for signature as provided for in paragraph 1 of article 12. 
ADOPTED by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency meeting in 
special session at Vienna on the twenty-sixth day of September one thousand nine hundred and 
eighty six. 
 
